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Between Technophilia, Cold War and Rationality: 
A Social and Cultural History of Digital Art 
 
Evoking his early personal experiences, computer art pioneer Paul Brown wrote in the 
mid-1990s that to work with computers was akin to a ‘kiss of death’. According to him, 
as a result of sheer prejudice, the majority of people in the art world did not acknowledge 
such artworks as interesting, valid or important. Although recurrent in the literature 
concerned with such art, Brown’s claims must be confronted with the relative success of 
artistic practices interchangeably labelled as computer, new media, cybernetic, electronic 
or simply digital art. However, as attested by this proliferation of labels as well as by the 
development of numerous dedicated awards, degrees, galleries, museums, awards and 
publications, the success of such practices cannot be explained by artistic merit alone. 
Since many in the art world do not accept these artworks, as Brown and others suggest, 
how can we explain the works’ success in securing and developing their own space over 
the course of fifty years? This thesis investigates the emergence, development and 
institutionalisation of the field termed here as ‘art, science and technology’ (AST) 
between 1965 and the mid-1970s in Europe and North America. Also recognised by the 
aforementioned labels (among others), AST is an umbrella term that arguably designates 
the artistic practices interested in the adoption, theorisation and dissemination of post-war 
technologies and, particularly, information technology. Yet, despite this shared interest, 
here I argue that it is the particular institutional arrangement of AST that best 
distinguishes it from other artistic practices. A direct consequence of its rejection, AST’s 
emergence as a separate field is here explained via a revision of its initial social and 
cultural contexts. Arising from the technophile cultural climate of the long 1950s, and 
alongside the massive investments in technology made by Western governments in the 
same period, early AST developed not within traditional artistic spaces but within 
industries and universities. In the late 1960s, however, with the rise of economic, political 
and social uncertainties alongside escalating international conflicts, it became 
increasingly difficult to justify an art produced with the tools and support of the military–
industrial complex. If on the one hand artists such as Brown understood these new 
artworks as central to art and its history, a normative development of a new technological 
era, on the other hand opponents located at the centre of contemporary art lambasted 
these new artworks for their supposedly scientific, commercial and aesthetic pretensions. 
Differently from previous attempts aimed at justifying the artistic worthiness of art 
produced with post-war technology, this thesis presents the history of such practices from 
the point of view of its own struggle – that is, its fight for survival. Ultimately, here I 
explain and describe how AST became detached from art while claiming its status. This 
is an effort not interested in the merits of these practices per se but, instead, concerned 
with AST’s development as an autonomous and prosperous field. 
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I like to think (and 
the sooner the better!) 
of a cybernetic meadow 
where mammals and computers 
live together in mutually 
programming harmony 
like pure water 
touching clear sky.  
 
I like to think 
(right now, please!) 
of a cybernetic forest 
filled with pines and electronics 
where deer stroll peacefully 
past computers 
as if they were flowers 
with spinning blossoms.  
 
I like to think 
(it has to be!) 
of a cybernetic ecology 
where we are free of our labors 
and joined back to nature, 
returned to our mammal 
brothers and sisters, 
and all watched over 
by machines of loving grace. 
 





I don’t care how God-damn smart 
these guys are: I’m bored. 
 
It’s been raining like hell all day long 
and there’s nothing to do. 
 
Richard Brautigan, At the California Institute of Technology (1967) 
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On its website, one British university offers a BA course where the student is invited to 
‘shape the future’, to ‘break down barriers and see things in a new way’, to be ‘ready for 
wherever this rapidly evolving industry will take you’ (Plymouth University, no date). Its 
graduates, it claims, rank among ‘the world’s best game designers, digital artists, web 
designers, coders and creative thinkers’ (Plymouth University, no date). Another 
university, which offers a similar BA, tells the prospective student that its ‘is an entirely 
new, innovative and sharply focused approach to the practices and issues surrounding 
contemporary digital art’ (University of Wales Saint David, no date). Here, we are told, 
one is also ‘ready to shape the digital landscape of the future’. Other similarly titled BAs, 
while not necessarily boasting about the future importance of digital technologies and 
digital industries, remind the reader that those have already ‘had a tremendous impact on 
all forms of communication in the 21st century’ (University of Kent, no date) and that 
they ‘occupy an increasingly important role in our lives, changing how we live, work, and 
play’ (Canterbury Christ Church University, no date). 
Despite their obviously dull rhetoric, and apart from the emphasis on technology 
and its future and actual promises, something else connects these courses: they are all 
self-described as bridging two worlds, one artistic and the other industrial. Resembling a 
discourse perhaps mostly remembered in the arts as ‘bauhausian’ and echoing the calls 
professed by the ‘two cultures’ debate (Snow, 2000), on the one hand these courses are 
designed to help students to work with logic, industry and computing techniques and on 
the other hand they wish to provide students with freedom, creativity and, finally, artistic 
skill. The end result is a student who is either prepared to face both worlds at once, within 
a ‘new media’ (University of Wales Saint David, no date) or a ‘digital creative’ industry 
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(University of Greenwich, no date), or the artistic world itself. In these BAs you should 
be able to ‘improve your understanding of the principles of art and design, your aesthetic 
eye’ (University of Hull, no date); combine ‘creative and technical skills with cultural and 
new media theory’ (Plymouth University, no date); ‘learn about the application of digital 
technologies in a creative context’ (Kingston College, no date); and celebrate ‘the 
combination of creative and logical thinking’ (University of Wales Saint David, no date). 
These BAs, all designated as digital art, are not alone. Another similarly 
designated course, this one a BSc and not a BA, tells us that ‘it integrates technical 
programming skills, theoretical and historical conceptions of art into a distinctively 
computational arts practice’ (Goldsmiths, no date). It too makes it clear that its 
‘programme will develop you not just as a technical expert, but also as a creative thinker, 
allowing you to learn and explore through a combination of technology and imagination’ 
(Goldsmiths, no date). Despite being a bachelor of sciences and not art, this is also a 
course where the vocabulary of design, for example, is very much present. Other hybrids 
also lurk in the educational field. Let’s take another course, a joint BA/BSc degree, which 
titles itself not as ‘Digital Art’ but as ‘Imaging Art and Science’ (University of 
Westminster, no date). This course is based on the idea that we ‘live in a world saturated 
by images’ and ‘carry sophisticated technologies in our pockets’ that ‘capture private 
moments and share them publicly online’ (University of Westminster, no date ). 
According to its observations, it tells us that we now ‘have access to a visual world 
previously unimaginable; medical imaging making visible the hidden; warfare conducted 
via imaging technologies; reality itself increasingly mediated, augmented, and even 
replaced by images’ (University of Westminster, no date ). In a rather prophetic and 
alarming tone, it rhetorically asks its reader: ‘how do we discern that what we see is real, 
imagined, translated, visualised or manipulated?’ (University of Westminster, no date ). 
Obviously and unfortunately the text does not provide us with an answer to this 
apparently very pressing question. Hinting that the answer will be unveiled during its 
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three-year course, it nevertheless tells us, similarly to all previous degrees, that it 
‘examines the visually rich and complex world of imaging from multiple perspectives of 
art, science and technology, in a dynamic, creative and interdisciplinary environment’ 
(University of Westminster, no date ). 
By further investigating the prospectuses of these degrees, it becomes clear that 
these are not classic fine art degrees in any sense – and I have the feeling that the majority 
of their graduates would much prefer the riches of the new industry anyway. Let’s take 
again, as an example, the Goldsmiths BSc, which seems at times more concerned with 
industry than the arts (and vice versa). Some of its basic subjects, intended primarily for 
first-year students, cover topics such as ‘Introduction to Programming’ (30 credits), 
‘Mathematics for Problem Solving’ (15 credits), ‘Audio-Visual-Computing’ (15 credits), 
‘Critical Studies in Computational Arts’ (30 credits) and so on (Goldsmiths, no date). The 
combination of commercial and artistic vocabulary is further intertwined over the 
subjects themselves. Whereas ‘Critical Studies in Computational Arts I […] aims to offer 
a space for exploring and examining the historical and critical context in which art is 
made, seen and understood’, another module, ‘Computational Arts Practice’, while still 
focused ‘on fine art practice’, finds its rationale within the idea that ‘software 
development, digital art and design and e-commerce have been noted for the 
predominance of independent thinkers, often self-employed’ (Goldsmiths, no date ). The 
emphasis on artistic knowledge is made yet more puzzling in the ‘Skills and Careers’ 
section of the same BSc. There students are told they could work with film/TV special 
effects and post-production, as visual interface designers, as computer graphics designers, 
as video game developers, in music production, in multimedia systems analysis, in the 
media and entertainment industries, as mobile app developers, as web developers, as 
computer music/sound engineers, as interface designers or as database managers. It seems 
like a dream degree for any whizz kid immersed in the so-called digital world. Perhaps – 
with a certain dose of cynicism – it is indeed a dream. Nonetheless, as another degree 
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clearly posits, ‘an industry needs creative digital artists to cultivate rich combinations of 
hybrid skills, as well as a broader cross-disciplinary awareness’ (University of Wales 
Saint David, no date). 
By promoting an imagined future via a technophile narrative – the necessity of 
multidisciplinary learning, with elements of both industry and art – these degrees 
contribute to a field that has been in existence for at least fifty years. Originating from an 
aspirant artistic practice that yet sits at the margins of the art world today, all these rather 
technical and commercially oriented degrees have in one way or another repeated the 
mantras of this field, and it, in return, has matured well beyond a humble, small and 
eccentric fragment of art. Supported by industrial giants such as Google and IBM; taught 
in renowned universities; discussed in specialised museums, festivals and awards, this 
field, in which I have participated for at least seven years as an insider, as a ‘digital art’ 
practitioner, is not, despite its best efforts, seen as artistic or, against the will of many of 
its participants, central to artistic debates. 
This thesis, following my own intuition regarding what it means to be a digital 
artist, corroborates the apprehension of what one of the pioneers of the field, Paul Brown, 
labelled as the ‘kiss of death’ (Brown, 1996), or the incapacity, even ‘prejudice’, of the 
‘mainstream art world’ against ‘any creative soul who experiments beyond the 
boundaries they prescribe’ (Brown, 1996) – in short, the incapacity of the art world to 
accept artworks that are dependent on computers. Despite diminishing over the past 
decade, it is this same incapacity and indifference that, in many ways, enthused this 
research. It was in my MA in digital art, undertaken right after a postgraduate diploma in 
fine art, where it seemed most accentuated. Despite sharing the same building, students of 
fine art and students of digital art simply did not see eye to eye: their interests, methods, 
concerns, references, career paths, exhibitions, mannerisms and, unsurprisingly, their 
artworks were very, very different. To me as a young scholar still in my mid-twenties, 
that division was astonishing: How could two groups that theoretically play the same 
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game, of art, be so distant from one another? How could the mutual suspicion exist if, in 
fact, these groups did not know each other at all? How could it be that they are both right, 
that both approaches, certainly, are art? In time it became clear that, despite some 
occasional intrusions on each other’s turf, the difference between mainstream 
contemporary art and this digital field runs deeper than mere incompatibility of 
vocabulary or artistic methods. 
Hence, this thesis investigates the emergence and insularity of the artistic field 
designated here as ‘art, science and technology‘ (AST), between its first public 
appearances in the 1960s and its institutionalisation in the 1970s, both in Europe and in 
the US. Also recognised today by labels such as digital art, art and technology, new 
media art, art and science, computational art, electronic art, cybernetic art and telematic 
art, AST is an umbrella term that arguably designates the artistic practices interested in 
the adoption, theorisation and dissemination of post-war technologies and, particularly, 
information technology. Yet, despite this interest in non-traditional methods and 
materials, here I argue that it is its institutional arrangement that best illustrates the 
boundaries between AST and other artistic practices. 
The rationale for this assertion, focused on the networks of artistic production, 
instruction and dissemination, rather than styles or materials, is straightforward: the 
proliferation of labels that have attempted to unify the field over its fifty-year history are 
proxies of past failed attempts. If, on the one hand, the stylistic heterogeneity of these 
artworks renders any aesthetic criteria restrictive, on the other hand the quick and 
pervasive technological development of information technology decrees that most of the 
art produced today can be seen, at least partially, as digital, electronic or new media art. 
In other words, these two discerning methods, stylistic and medium-specific, are 
respectively too limited and general to offer any analytical value. 
It is here, then, that the methodological worthiness of AST is most clear. Since it 
designates practices that circulate within a certain arena, its borders are the same as those 
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of the very institutions that promote AST. This definition, then, constructs a term that 
does not denote a movement or school of thought – that is, neither a defined style nor a 
medium-specific practice. As such, AST is the very specialised site, the world, where 
those artworks are discussed and seen. Ascending after the counter-cultural shift of the 
late part of the 1960s, from an optimistic technophile cultural climate towards a 
pessimistic technophobe one, this institutional split between AST and other artistic 
practices resulted internationally in an isolated, peripheral and highly specialised field 
that is, above all, highly autonomous in relation to contemporary art. 
In order to explain this autonomy, I propose a method that steers away from the 
phenomenological, formalist or art historical methods, which have failed to explain the 
conditions and results of the partial success of AST, which has simultaneously been 
disregarded by contemporary art circles yet grown in size over the years. As this thesis is 
not interested in the merits of AST but, instead, is concerned with its emergence and 
development, I propose the adoption of a sociologically inspired method that is closer to 
my concerns. With that in mind, it is important to remember that my work does not 
contribute to debates regarding the qualities and particularities of AST. My method, 
concerned with individuals and institutions as well as AST’s discourses and internal 
politics, cannot discern what it is that makes good or bad art. Likewise, although the 
thesis itself is historical, it is neither a traditional art historical work, in the sense of 
placing these artworks within a canon, nor a traditional sociological work, concerned 
more with society at large than the artistic practice itself. This limit, which is a 
consequence of my efforts to attempt to explain the emergence of a group of people 
interested in the development of a new practice, should hence always be in the mind of 
my reader. 
Having said that, it is it difficult to understand the value of the term ‘AST’ 
without applying it to case studies or examples. Whereas the first third of this thesis is 
dedicated to the discussion of my method, it is the other two thirds in which AST itself is 
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discussed. Yet, since a total history of anything is an impossible task, I dedicate my 
efforts to moments that best exemplify the tension between contemporary art and AST, as 
well as events that point to their separation and, consequentially, the eventual formation 
of specialised AST institutions. My emphasis on AST’s very beginnings is not, then, 
arbitrary. It is there that we find both the material and cultural context that made art with 
computers possible. Unfortunately, for the newly emerging practice, these conditions 
would, by the end of the 1960s, completely change. As we shall see, in a short space of 
time, between 1965 and 1971, with worsening economic conditions, the prospect of 
nuclear annihilation, the Vietnam War and the rise of the counter-culture and its varied 
social movements, many of AST’s pioneers would abandon the field. was is the people 
who stayed and persisted, despite growing resistance from the specialised art press and a 
technophobic cultural climate, who would inaugurate the first institutions. It is not a 
coincidence, then, that some of these, such as the journal Leonardo, are still central 
players in the development of AST. 
At this point we should note that, although this thesis does not investigate recent 
developments, we are able to see the results of AST’s tumultuous early years in its 
current insularity. Despite the efforts of some brilliant artists – and perhaps against their 
own opinions – I expect to demonstrate how far AST is from contemporary art by not 
only showing the development of its institutional autonomy but also highlighting the 
particularities of its own discourse. Originating in its early days, a legitimatory 
component – common to any artistic product that attempts to justify its raison d’être, its 
worthiness as valid artistic expression – can currently be seen in a variety of sources, 
including in the university adverts and prospectuses seen above. Employed, for example, 
by degrees that are usually associated with industries rather than the arts, this discourse 
and its relation to matters not necessarily considered traditional artistic topics are, then, 
pivotal in explaining the field’s current state. Here the choice of the focus of this 
introduction is made clear. After all, there is an important reason to consider what adverts 
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for degrees have to say. While not all students may become artists, the institutions that 
instruct them are intimately connected to those of our subject, AST – and not only by 
their titles. It is via these degrees that, generally, AST’s newcomers are taught the habits, 
concepts and values of their future profession, either in AST or in industry. 
The optimistic discourse professed by these degrees, technically oriented while 
proclaiming the subject to be creative, even artistic, is shared by many current institutions 
of AST. Let us use as an example two of the oldest institutions concerned with the 
training of these new artists/industrialists/scientists: MIT Media Lab and Plymouth’s 
Planetary Collegium. Apart from the obvious but nevertheless pivotal fact that both are 
university-based research centres, it is noteworthy that these are both advertised as 
‘transcultural, transdisciplinary’ (Planetary Collegium, no date) or as ‘antidisciplinary 
[and] beyond known boundaries and disciplines’ (MIT Media Lab, no date). Moreover, 
similarly to the BA and BSc degrees described above, both centres worry about the future 
by, ironically, celebrating it. Picturing a new, better and improved society invariably 
changed by new technology, they tell us that at ‘the Media Lab, the future is lived, not 
imagined. In a world where radical technology advances are taken for granted, Media Lab 
researchers design technologies for people to create a better future’ (MIT Media Lab, no 
date). Likewise, at one of the Planetary Collegium ‘nodes’, ‘while stretching to the full 
the constructive and expressive potential of electronic, telematic, and interactive digital 
media’, this research centre ‘pursue[s] developments in post-biological research, 
molecular engineering, neuroscience, and nanotechnology, while identifying artistic and 
spiritual strategies that optimise human capabilities, and seed new visions of a planetary 
society’ (M-Node, no date). Yet, despite their shared technophilia, these institutions sit at 
rather different points on the artistic and industrial spectrum and, in essence, reflect the 
different natures of their founders: Nicholas Negroponte and Roy Ascott. Negroponte, an 
architect and entrepreneur famous for his ‘One Laptop per Child’ project, favoured an 
institution not shy of corporate links and goal-oriented projects. However, usual for an 
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AST institution is that, at the same time that MIT Media Lab boasts patents, solutions, 
faculty awards and an annual operating budget of $50 million, it also considers among its 
achievements exhibitions in places such as MoMa, the Boston Institute of Contemporary 
Art, the Venice Biennale and ‘many commercial and non-profit galleries’ (MIT Media 
Lab, no date). The Planetarium Collegium and its nodes, while less excited about 
commercial or industrial links as such, follows Ascott’s academic tendency towards 
imaginative and speculative research, outputted nevertheless as traditional articles, books, 
journals and degrees. It is unsurprising, then, that Ascott is considered more as a 
pedagogue than an artist, mostly concerned with art as education for a future world, as 
exemplified by his Groundcourse work at Ealing Art College in 1961 and as a direct 
consequence of his teachers the Basic Design course of his teachers Hamilton and 
Pasmore (Mason, 2009, p. 250). With those differences in mind, we can think of the two 
institutions/founders as complementary and hence ‘both the Media Lab and Nicholas 
Negroponte would become leading emblems of the techno-social future’ (Turner, 2006, p. 
181) while ‘Ascott’s visionary theory and practice aspire to enhance human 
consciousness and to unite minds around the world in a global telematic embrace that is 
greater than the sum of its parts’ (Shanken, 2003, p. 1). Irrevocably, they are supporters 
of a new society enhanced, controlled (MIT) and connected (Planetarium Collegium) by 
technology. 
 An optimistic emphasis on the future and its technologies, a combination of 
artistic and technoscientific discourses, and a focus on interdisciplinary learning: these 
were not only part of a new industry but also integral to the development of AST, as 
explored by this thesis. The brief examples discussed in this introduction are merely the 
most common and routine aspects of AST. Yet, while informing a new generation of 
digital, new media, electronic and computer artists, these degrees and institutions, in a 
very concrete sense, produce the future agents of our field. Regarding the state of the 
field itself, it is enlightening to follow the rationale of Bourdieu, for whom the field of art 
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is characterised by two principles (Johnson, 1993, p. 16; Tudor, 2005, p. 126): the 
‘heteronomous’ and the ‘autonomous’. Together these form a structuring ‘double 
hierarchy’ where the former negatively subjects artists to the ‘ordinary laws prevailing in 
the field of power […] (e.g. sales, honours, appointments etc.)’ while the latter is a 
positive force in which artists seek to ‘achieve total autonomy with respect to the laws of 
the market […] (literary or artistic prestige)’ (Bourdieu, 1993b, p. 38). This potentially 
unholy combination between industrial/commercial concerns and artistic independency is 
then intrinsically manifested elsewhere: from specialised publications to AST’s own 
internal awards, and from dedicated degrees to AST’s inability to be rendered into the 
artistic canon. This dissonance with the hierarchal principles of the art field, as I 
demonstrate, is one of the aspects responsible for the failure of AST to be recognised as a 
prestigious, serious and central artistic practice. Initially nurtured within an industrial 
setting, by attaching itself to the development of computational technologies and by 
promoting an outmoded discourse favouring rationality and scientism, AST survived its 
early years and developed into a powerhouse in its own right while simultaneously being 
relegated to a peripheral artistic position – that is, a mere curiosity, important for industry 
but not so much for contemporary art. 
This thesis is divided into three chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter 
examines the epistemological assumptions regarding the method employed here. In other 
words, I examine two concepts borrowed from sociology that are central to my text. 
Firstly, I begin by seeing art as the result of collective action – that is to say, rejecting any 
formalist or essentialist understanding of art. Secondly, I investigate the similitude 
between artistic worlds and social movements via the sociological literature, which sees 
both as collective social developments sharing many distinct features: frames, discourses, 
institutions and a quest for necessary resources. The second chapter traces the origins of 
AST, which initially developed from computer art and promoted a technocratic, rational 
formalist and pseudo-scientific view of both art production and perception. Moreover, in 
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the same chapter I investigate the material and discursive links that made possible this 
first wave of AST: its close relationship with the material world of the post-war and Cold 
War eras and its cybernetic dream of full control and predictability. Finally, in the third 
chapter I follow the consequences of AST’s first developments; specifically, its uneasy 
relationship with the artistic world and its response to the social protests of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, which resulted in its own specialised institutions. My approach to most 
of these points is comparative. By selecting particular events, sometimes from different 
national contexts, I contrast many particular events central to the development of AST as 
we know it today. 
It is important to note that I am not attempting to write a canonical history of 
AST. Likewise, I do not wish to map the production of a whole artistic practice over a 
period of more than fifty years; nor do I want to propose a unified aesthetic and 
theoretical discourse that unites what in reality is a very heterogeneous field. Instead, the 
aim here is to provide both a framework and a case study of how art worlds develop and 
mature into their own particular space while not necessarily being placed within the 
larger world of contemporary art. I conclude this thesis by painting a picture of an artistic 
field still evolving from the configurations of its earlier days: too detached from 
contemporary art and too preoccupied with its own futuristic visions. 
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Chapter 1: Method, scope and rationale 
 
 
This first chapter has the intention of delimiting both the method and scope of this thesis. 
Beginning with an examination of some key authors who inform much of my rationale, I 
provide a brief and most certainly incomplete introduction into the core idea of art as a 
product of collective activity. This perspective, which is not necessarily in concordance 
with more essentialist or formalist ideas of art (i.e. it does not automatically assume the 
artistic output of a group of people is art, nor does it believe in some 
transcendental/universal quality of art) is derived mainly from the sociological work of 
authors interested in the production, dissemination, assessment and construction of that 
which we label as art, or, more broadly speaking, culture. The reason for such a method is 
the result of a series of questions both simple and naïve: What is it that makes the field of 
AST so particular? Why are the products of this group of people not seen, commented or 
known by people who are theoretically part of the same sphere, of art? Why are the 
participants in this world unknown to people outside it and why are they superstars for 
their own peers? Why do they label their works as art? In order to answer these questions 
from an art historical perspective, I would need, invariably, to construct a theory that 
justified AST as art within already established canons and debates. The result might 
resemble the existing works by very competent scholars but, like those works, it would be 
too focused on its own legitimation, too detached from the social world that art inhabits 
and, ultimately, would fail to address the question of why it is detached in the first place. 
Why should one investigate AST as a traditional artistic field if it is not one? The answer, 
this thesis argues, lies not with art and its canon but, instead, with people themselves: 
How do they organise groups? How do they justify their actions? How do they describe 
their work? How do they see themselves in relation to others? 
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At this point it is important to anticipate the confines of my research. Although 
non-Western AST artists appeared right after the first exhibitions of computer art, most of 
the newly created institutions were still centred in nations such as the US, Germany and 
the UK. While this narrative can be seen as Western-centric, we cannot forget that it was 
within those nations that the production of most AST was commented on and discussed. 
Journals such as Leonardo (France and the US), associations such as the Computer Arts 
Society (UK) and publications such as Studio International (US) held considerable sway 
over the early field. Despite some recent efforts dedicated to unearthing the production of 
artists and their groups outside these nations, some of which will be discussed further in 
this thesis, the central fact remains that AST’s early history has been established as a 
primarily Western phenomenon. Seen in better detail in my second chapter, this Western 
emphasis cannot, however, be seen as a prejudice or oversight of historians – at least for 
early AST. As argued latter in that chapter, it was within these nations that artists found 
the appropriate material conditions for an artistic practice centred in what was then high 
technology. Hence, we cannot forget that, up to the mid-1970s, digital computers were 
not only rare but also incredibly expensive; the specialist knowledge required to operate 
them was not, under any circumstances, easily found. 
Yet, having said that, the same benefit of the doubt cannot be given to the 
incredible oversight regarding gender in these first few years. While many female artists 
were active participants in the first years, much of their contribution has been sidelined in 
the academic productions discussing the early days of AST. Although there has been a 
movement towards reasserting women’s history and contribution since, at least, 1993 
(Malloy, 2003; Taylor, 2013c), damage seems to have already been done. Ironically this 
oversight may have happened a posteriori, later in the development of AST. According to 
Taylor (2013c), despite the androcentric character of computing and its industry in the 
late 1960s, given its rapid development, this industry was a place where talent was in 
high demand. For him what explained the disappearance of women from the history of 
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computer art was not the elusiveness of gender equality in computing but, instead, the 
very kind of artistic orthodoxy that also shunned computers in the first place; that is, 
‘while women artists had to endure unwelcome masculine behaviours in the vanguard of 
computing, those experiences were often minor compared to the highly gendered 
impasses found in the artworld’ (Taylor, 2013c)1. All in all, then, my thesis reflects 
today’s readings of AST: A male-dominated Western-centric field that, despite some 
advances, still reverberates with previous oversights. 
This chapter additionally discusses a different kind of problem, away from the 
questions of gender, nationality and the collective nature of art. It will explore the variety 
of, sometimes opposing, definitions of AST itself. Variously referred to as digital art, 
computer art, electronic art, new media art, technoscience art and so on, the productions 
of people pertaining to this small and detached art world have over the years acquired 
myriad different narratives, some concerning such art’s relationship with ‘traditional’ 
visual art; some more interested in its own particular developments. Although much has 
                                                      
 
1 Regarding the issue of gender in AST, one major project should be commented on here. Edited by 
Judy Malloy (2003), the book Women, Art and Technology has an extensive list of contributors and 
thoroughly discusses the subject of gender in AST. Yet, having said that, as Taylor (2013c) realises, this 
effort is still very much dedicated to more recent developments and not, as we may expect, at revising the 
field’s understanding of the contributions of women in early AST. A definitive work in this area is, then, still 
lacking. A great place to start may be Melanie Lenz’s (2014) article in the V&A Online Journal. There, using 
the museum’s own collection, she briefly but competently contextualises the production and importance of 
some female pioneers, discussing people such as Lillian Schwartz, Vera Molnar and Katherine Nash. We 
should also note that the V&A collection on computer art, which is perhaps the most important collection in 
the whole field, has been constructed with the help and donation of Patric Prince, one of the few historians 
who actively collected early AST works. It is interesting to me that not much has been written about her 
contribution. Despite the fact that this thesis does not attempt to remedy this gap in our knowledge of early 
AST, one female character features heavily in its pages: Jasia Reichardt. She will be a very present and 
recurrent character in the second and third chapters. 
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been clarified by previous scholarship, much is also missing. The particular problem of 
AST is not related to its legitimacy as an artistic practice. Following my initial premise, 
that art is the result of collective action – at least for active participants, institutions and 
theorists within the field – the question of the validity of AST is not any more a worthy 
question. For something to be called an artistic practice, it is only necessary that a group 
of people consensually think it to be so (and that another group funds this first one). 
Hence, I will review some of the claims made by people attempting to coherently 
describe the artistic production of AST. Unsurprisingly, the people who agree over its 
merits, as art, are the same people who engage in the work of defining this practice 
according to the methods and theories seen in traditional art history. They look at patterns 
– aesthetic, theoretic and discursive ones – that may unite the work of a heterogeneous 
group of individuals, with the intention of locating a whole multitude of objects as 
belonging or not to any of the aforementioned labels. In this sense, this thesis represents a 
much humbler attempt to define AST: if your work is treated as such, as AST, then you 
are already part of the debate. If you publish within its journals, you belong to AST. If 
you show your artworks under its banners and at its festivals, you are an AST artist. If 
you have studied in one of its specialised courses, either as an undergrad or as a 
postgrad2, if you are interested in and use its tools, you may already be part of it. This 
simplistic yet powerful method has the advantage of looking at the field from a more 
unbiased perspective. It does not wish, then, to legitimise the production of these artists 
as art (although, as discussed later in this text, it may do so regardless). Neither does it 
want to group the works of individuals under a set of stylistic, aesthetic characteristics. 
To be part of AST, you must simply be part of its debate: engage with its concerns, 
support it via your very presence at its exhibitions, read about it etc. Having said that, 
                                                      
 
2 Just for fun, go to Google and type ‘BA’ or ‘MA’ and one of the following: ‘digital art’, ‘new 
media art’, ‘art and science’, ‘media art’ or ‘electronic art’.  
  16 
AST is not a free-for-all world where anyone can partake as an active member. One thing 
is critical in order to contribute, both intellectually and artistically, to this world: to be 
engaged with the technologies developed after the Second World War. If you are familiar 
with either computing or technoscientific lingo, congratulations! You may well be able to 
join the group. This lack of artistic definition, of a stylistic definition of a group, allows 
us to see AST for what it is: a detached and autonomous artistic world, full of internal 
histories, inconsistences, institutions and conventions like any other art world. 
Finally, in this chapter I also prepare the ground for my idiosyncratic analyses. 
By presenting some of the key concepts employed throughout this thesis, many of them 
borrowed from the literature concerned with social movements and their tactics, I intend 
to allow both myself and the reader to concentrate on the details of AST’s history, from 
its humble beginnings to its emergence as a whole industry in itself. To do otherwise 
would be counter-productive. It would continually break the narrative, which is the most 
important aspect of this work. It is not (only) an art historical narrative but one concerned 
with the development of a group of people and a set of ideas that originated the strange 
world of AST that we know today. 
 
 
1.1 Episteme: Art as collective action 
 
People today do not commonly refer to the art world as a world for no reason. Art, after 
all, is perceived to be an independent, somewhat self-contained and detached sphere of 
social practices. This idea of art presented as a partially independent sphere of social 
practice has been discussed, affirmed and debated before. This section reviews some of 
the authors who have greatly contributed to the term (art world) as well as the debate 
regarding art as a collective activity. Varying greatly in emphasis and methods, these 
authors do, however, share one main argument: that art is only made possible by the 
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interaction of individuals who act in favour of a set of practices called art. It is quite 
obvious that art’s consumption, creation, education and organisation all depend on 
collective, organised efforts. But that is not the whole story. What these authors see is that 
the same collective process determines not only the material organisation of art but also 
its value and, consequentially, art history itself. The resulting picture portrays a local 
instead of a universal phenomenon; a punctual instead of a timeless event; a fragmented 
world where the game of power between ideas, participants and institutions is constantly 
reconfiguring the very space inhabited by them. Furthermore, as our first author and 
subject remind us, these inhabitants are not randomly contributing to the thing that we 
call art. Not only do they act within relatively defined boundaries but they are also 
informed by something before their own experience. At least for Pierre Bourdieu, that 
was the case. In his Rules of Art (1996), a book that builds from his earlier works but 
especially from Distinction (1984), the French sociologist describes the emergence of 
what he calls the ‘literary field’ within the aesthetic project of Gustave Flaubert’s novel 
Sentimental Education (1869). I shall examine the main points concerning the 
independency of this field (and its own definition) as well as its relation to another 
characteristic typical of social practices like the arts: power and its legitimising 
properties. A ‘science’ of the literary field, Bourdieu defines elsewhere, could be defined 
as: 
 
a form of analysis situs which establishes that each position – e.g. the one which 
corresponds to a genre such as the novel or, within this, to a sub-category such as 
the ‘society novel’ […] or the ‘popular’ novel – is subjectively defined by the 
system of distinctive properties by which it can be situated relative to other 
positions; that every position, even the dominant one, depends for its very 
existence, and for the determinations it imposes on its occupants, on the other 
positions constituting the field; and that the structure of the field, i.e. of the space 
of positions, is nothing other than the structure of the distribution of the capital of 
specific properties which governs success in the field and the winning of the 
external or specific profits (such as literary prestige) which are at stake in the 
field. (Bourdieu, 1993b, p. 30) 
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This literary field, for Bourdieu, is markedly political. More than merely a reunion of 
people involved in a collective project, this is a space of conflict, where interdependency 
is a fact. ‘High art’ is just high because there is something underneath it. Bourdieu’s 
conception of fields, therefore, assumes a fragmented existence: one presenting a 
hierarchy of value that is consequentially reflected in material gain for a specific genre. In 
this game3 legitimacy is crucial to the existence of a particular art genre (practice, form, 
field…). The game, played by agents within the field (the artist, the critic, the 
historian…), is inevitably surrounded by the question of ‘definitions’ (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 
223). Similar to the action exercised by this very text, the capacity of naming or defining 
is undoubtedly related to power. Paraphrasing Bourdieu, the struggle is not about who is 
the writer, for example, but about what the writer is (1993b, p. 42). Art, or the artistic 
field, is not a completely separate world, though. While Bourdieu acknowledges the 
existence of art’s own internal structures, values and codes, he also reminds us of its own 
relation to local and timely contexts. When he conceptualises this field of cultural 
production, he is relating it to a larger, broader field of power. This field of power, for 
him, is ‘the space of relations of force between agents or between institutions having in 
common the possession of the capital necessary to occupy the dominant positions in 
different fields (notably economic or cultural)’ (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 215). While it does 
not necessarily take a lot of thought to understand this field of power as the various 
                                                      
 
3 The ‘game’, a recurrent theme on Bourdieu’s oeuvre, can be seen as an ingrained, socially 
determining mode of being in which agents of cultural and intellectual fields partake. This game, however, is 
not without objectives; it is not play: ‘To enter a field (the philosophical field, the scientific field, etc.), to 
play the game, one must possess the habitus which predisposes one to enter that field, that game, and not 
another. One must also possess at least the minimum amount of knowledge, or skill, or “talent” in the most 
advantageous way possible. It means, in short, investing one’s (academic, cultural, symbolic) capital in such a 
way as to derive maximum benefit or profit from participation. Under normal circumstances, no one enters a 
game to lose’ (Johnson, 1993, p. 8). 
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dominant portions of society (e.g. the political elite, the intelligentsia, the academic elite), 
each with its own internal structures and resources, Bourdieu actually makes a distinction 
between these different forms of force exercised by the field of power: 
 
A field of possible forces exercised on all bodies entering it, the field of power is 
also a field of struggle, and may thus be compared to a game: the dispositions, 
that is to say the ensemble of incorporated properties, including elegance, facility 
of expression or even beauty, and capital in its diverse forms – economic, 
cultural, social – constitute the trumps which will dictate both the manner of 
playing and the success in the game – in short, the whole process of social ageing 
which Flaubert calls ‘sentimental education’. (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 10) 
 
 
Economic, political and cultural capital are all concepts that have been expanded and 
popularised over time. Given its complexity, here I prefer to just refer to the results of 
these forces as resources, whether material or otherwise (I shall talk more about these 
later on). This relationship between Bourdieu’s literary field and the field of power, if one 
could summarise it, is one of dominance and subjugation; its spoils are resources that, in 
turn, can be translated into more power. Relating the emergence of the nineteenth-century 
literary field to its economic and political context (an exclusively French one), we can see 
the exchange between the field of power and the field of cultural production. At the heart 
of this tension lies the idea or the concept that from that moment there was a shift in the 
very economic order, resulting not only from the rise of the bourgeois but also from new 
modes of economic and political power being created by the Second Empire’s industrial 
expansion (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 48). This new economic reality, in conjunction with the 
consequent change in the social order (the rise of the bourgeoisie), was about to change 
not only the relation between artists and their financers but also the relation between art 
and the dominant classes of the period. Bourdieu reminds us that, at the time, cultural 
producers were 
 
far from the learned societies and the clubs of aristocratic society of the 
eighteenth century, or even the Restoration. The relationship between cultural 
producers and the dominant class no longer retains what might have 
characterized it in previous centuries, whether that means direct dependence on 
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financial backer (more common among painters, but also occurring in the case of 
writers), or even allegiance to a patron or an official protector of the arts. 
(Bourdieu, 1996, p. 49) 
 
For Bourdieu, then, the new field of cultural production, following its newly acquired 
productive ‘independence’, needed to realign itself in order to survive. If the old methods 
of financing were being supplemented by different forms of artistic backing, mainly by 
means of new markets and industry (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 49), it was only natural that, 
while certain connections presented between the artist and their backers were severed, 
others were created. When Bourdieu talks about the subordination of one field (of cultural 
producers) in relation to another field (of power), he talks mainly (but not exclusively) 
about economic and material subordination. The autonomy described by Bourdieu (which 
is similar to that which exists today) may come at a price. However, it enables the 
emergence of a different sort of capital before only ascribed to other fields outside the 
scope of the arts: cultural capital. The logic of this system, of symbolic exchange, 
between the field of power and the field of cultural production, can be summed up in a 
sentence: artistry (as conceptualised by Flaubert and his contemporaries) is inversely 
proportional to its economic value. While artists ought to survive, they should not intend 
to sell their art (themselves) to others because it, like all good art, is both priceless and 
worthless at the same time4. 
                                                      
 
4 In his own words: ‘The symbolic revolution through which artists free themselves from bourgeois 
demand by refusing to recognize any master expect their art produces the effect of making the market 
disappear. In fact they could not triumph over the “bourgeois” in the struggle for control of the meaning and 
function of artistic activity without at the same time eliminating the bourgeois as a potential customer. At the 
moment when they argue, with Flaubert, that “a work of art […] is beyond appraisal, has no commercial 
value, cannot be paid for”, that it is without price, that is to say, foreign to the ordinary logic of the ordinary 
economy, they discover that it is effectively without commercial value, that it has no market. The ambiguity 
of Flaubert’s phrase, saying two things at once, leads to the uncovering of a sort of infernal mechanism, 
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As in the theology of fasting, the good artist (for Baudelaire, Flaubert and their 
circle) can and should only have remuneration ‘necessarily deferred – as opposed to the 
“bourgeois artist”, who is assured of an immediate clientele, or to mercenary producers of 
commercial literature’ (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 82). The paradoxical situation of the newly 
created modern artist is, hence, one of economic disposition. By effectively renouncing 
immediate economic gain, the artist, in this view, can concentrate solely on their work. 
And it is at this point, and only then, that art responds merely to its own rules and to the 
necessities that art and that artists are perceived as free. With its autonomy assured, the 
field of cultural production (or at least the good, legitimate part of it) would assume a 
symbolically powerful but yet destitute position within society. This ambiguous 
relationship between the self-proclaimed real artist and their backer, a relationship of 
symbolic and economic exchange, is (un)resolved via the rejection of one part over 
another for, as we know, everyone needs money to survive. Bourdieu’s interest in 
Flaubert is justified in the fact that this is the very same situation presented to each one of 
Flaubert’s characters, from early adulthood to maturity, who navigate through the social 
world of their time in search of recognition, money and success for themselves and their 
art. Hence, 
 
the sentimental education of Frédéric [the main character of Sentimental 
Education] is the progressive learning about the incapability between two 
universes, between art and money, pure love and mercenary love; it is the story of 
structurally necessary accidents which determine social ageing by determining 
the telescoping of structurally irreconcilable possibles which were allowed to 
exist in an equivocal state by the double games of ‘double existence’: the 
successive meeting of independent causal series annihilate little by little all the 
‘lateral possibles’. (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 20–21) 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
which is set up by artists and in which they find themselves caught: making a necessity of their virtue, they 
can always be suspected of making a virtue of necessity’ (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 81). 
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Bourdieu, although tracing the development of artistic autonomy in the French 
artistic world, does not necessarily focus his Rules of Art on the question of production 
itself – that is, on art ‘as the products of collective […] efforts rather than as individual 
creations’ (Zolberg, 1990, p. 80). That, as Zolberg tells us, ‘is most closely associated 
with the approach of Howard S. Becker’ (Zolberg, 1990, p. 80). Likewise, ‘not only does 
he see changes in the meaning of art, but Becker posits the coexistence of a number of 
different art worlds, whose actors engage in the process of creating art de novo, by 
including and excluding works from the category as they define it’5 (Zolberg, 1990, p. 
80). Becker’s most renowned work, Art Worlds (2008 [1982]), as the title itself suggests, 
is interested not as much in the emergence of an independent artistic field as it is in the 
consolidation and production of our contemporary art and its multiple forms (hence ‘art 
worlds’ in the plural). If we say that Bourdieu’s work concentrates on the consumption of 
art, as well as how it creates and legitimises distinctions within class society (and within 
fields themselves), Becker instead looks at the field of cultural production itself and more 
importantly production of culture (art) itself. 
Art Worlds starts with a discussion of the definitions of art as a collective 
enterprise. At this stage Becker reinforces the idea of interdependency between many of 
the artistic field’s participants, consciously or otherwise, in relation to the definition of art 
itself. An artwork, whether a play, a painting or a concert, involves not only artists but 
also producers, workers, institutions and resources not necessarily seen as part of the 
artistic processes themselves. The first thing to come out of this rationale is the 
importance of conventions in an art world. This is no small matter, for convention is what 
unites all disparate participants in the art world. Without it there would be no way to 
                                                      
 
5 An act that I believe is in itself analogous to Bourdieu’s game. 
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collaborate unless every relationship were thought out anew and fresh, and, as we know, 
that is not the case6. 
For Becker not only does the artwork itself appear as it is because of these 
overlooked connections but also it is perceived as such because of these very same 
connections. The quality of materials available to the artist; the installations provided by 
the exhibitor; the methods by which the artist’s show is promoted; the demographic 
composition of the public; the educational institution that trained the artist – these are all 
obvious but powerful examples of how and why external factors influence the reception 
of a certain artwork or artistic career. To believe otherwise, that these external forces do 
not have any effect on the arts, apart from being naïve, is similar to the act of levelling all 
institutions, materials and participants. If all resources were identical and abundant and 
all artists were similar, why would there be any need for competition in the art world? 
When we say that Becker is an author on the subject of production, it is because he seeks 
an understanding of how an artwork is produced, considering factors from its physical 
                                                      
 
6 As Becker posits: ‘People who cooperate to produce a work of art usually do not decide things 
afresh. Instead, they rely on earlier agreements now become customary, agreements that have become part of 
the conventional way of doing things in that particular art world. Artistic conventions cover all the decisions 
that must be made with respect to works produced, even though a particular convention may be revised for a 
given work. Conventions dictate the materials to be used, as when musicians agree to base their music on the 
note contained in a set of modes, or on the diatonic, pentatonic, or chromatics scales, with their associated 
harmonies. Conventions dictate the abstractions to be used to convey particular ideas or experiences, as when 
painters use the laws of perspective to convey illusion of three dimensions or photographers use black, white 
and shades of grey to convey the interplay of light and mass. Conventions dictate the form in which materials 
and abstractions will be combined, as in music’s sonata form or poetry’s sonnet. Conventions suggest the 
appropriate dimensions of a work, the proper length of a performance, the proper size and shape of a painting 
or sculpture. Conventions regulate the relations between artist and audience, specifying the rights and 
obligations of both’ (Becker, 2008, p. 29). 
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entity to its intellectual reception. While there could be an argument that unites 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and convention (as Becker thought), it is important to note 
that the latter is focused mainly on the practical differences between the disparate 
participants of the art world. This can be seen, for example, in the explicit effort of 
thinking about materials in the same way Bourdieu thinks about actions and discourses – 
that is to say, thinking about material culture as learned and experienced7. 
This approach, while not in complete resonance with Bourdieu’s more holistic 
and broader view of art and society, does illuminate some aspects of the groupings of 
people, acts and institutions that constitute the arts (or at least our contemporary 
understanding of them). We could say, perhaps simplistically, that Becker’s approach is 
concerned with the inner workings of the artistic field inasmuch as it is interested in how 
these workings relate to the production of both an artwork and its own self-perceived 
value. Becker does acknowledge, for example, art’s dependency on external resources. 
The difference here is that Becker does not necessarily equate these resources with an 
external field of power, apt for categorisation and ready to distribute resources. In fact for 
                                                      
 
7 That is, ‘When a particular convention can be taken for granted, when almost everyone involved 
almost always does things that way, the understandings that shape the convention can be embodied in 
permanent equipment. The existence of such permanent equipment (expensive, it goes without saying) makes 
it more likely that the conventional ways of doing things will continue, because any change will be 
expensive’ (Becker, 2008, pp. 56–57). It is interesting to note that Becker’s understanding of conventions, as 
a criteria that in essence minimise the costs involved in transactions, in our case between suppliers, experts, 
producers and consumers of art, seems quite similar to the idea of ‘path dependence’ as proposed by 
economics. Perhaps best exemplified by the work of Paul A. David in his ‘Clio and the Economics of 
QWERTY’ (1985), path dependency aims to explain why and how certain standards hold over time against a 
perceived market failure vis-à-vis better optimised but not established standards. Whereas this resemblance 
can be corroborated through further investigation, unfortunately, it cannot be seen within this thesis; but this 
is certainly an interesting topic needing further study. 
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Becker there is no need to talk of a larger field of power. At the same time that he does 
not negate external influences (Becker, 2008, pp. 38–39)8, distinction for him is achieved 
mainly via the artistic world’s own internal mechanisms. Shown in the dichotomy created 
between ‘mavericks’ and ‘integrated professionals’, ‘folk artists’ and ‘naïve artists’ (all 
themes of the eighth chapter of Art Worlds: ‘Integrated Professionals, Mavericks, Folk 
Artist and Naïve Artists’) and also between ‘art and craft’ (ninth chapter), these 
mechanisms differentiate one production from the other, mainly via one method: artistic 
theory itself9. 
While focusing on the material aspects of art making, Becker also underlines the 
positions of power taken by some art world participants and products. These people 
entitled to speak on behalf of the art world are, in his theory, the main factor behind acts 
of categorisation. Not everyone can or will be allowed to discuss the merits of art. 
Anyone can have an opinion regarding a particular artistic practice and consider it as 
valuable and worthy of the name art. But, for it to be perceived as true (the 
categorisation), you would need more than just an opinion (Becker, 2008, p. 152). This 
disposition of some actors with a voice (a reputation) within the art world is what 
demarks Becker’s views regarding distinction. Without relying on a diffuse field of 
power, a field that is inevitably always changing, Becker constructs an argument that 
                                                      
 
8 His is a research concerned with the ‘mundane social organizational problems’ (Becker, 2008, p. 
39). 
9 In that we could say that Becker is also distancing himself from the more classical, Marxist social 
history of art proposed by T. J. Clark and not only from Bourdieu. Having said that, I should also point out 
that the connection between Marx and Bourdieu, at least for me, is far from conclusive. On the one hand, at 
least as far as the concept of ‘capital’ is concerned, one is in deep disagreement with another (Murray-
Beasley, 2000, p. 101). On the other hand, as for ‘fields’, Bourdieu seems to follows Marx ‘in viewing 
scholarly work and cultural production in general as interventions in the social world rather than a form of 
disinterested reflection’ (Webb et al., 2002, p. 20). 
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simplifies the explanation of the act of categorising art. Perhaps too art-centric, this view 
acknowledges the important contribution of a class of people highly regarded in the art 
world and entitled via (not a necessarily broad) consensus to speak. Such people embody 
what Becker calls ‘aestheticians’. A pivotal figure in any art world, the aesthetician in 
Becker’s view fulfils the role given to the field of power in Bourdieu’s theory. 
Aestheticians, then, ‘provide that element of the battle for recognition of particular styles 
and schools which consist of making the arguments which convince other participants in 
an art world that the work deserves, logically, to be included within whatever categories 
concern that world’ (Becker, 2008, p. 135). 
As we can see, underneath the apparent similarity between both theories there is a 
clear rift between Bourdieu’s artistic field and Becker’s art world. While Bourdieu uses 
his study of the arts in order to understand society and its conflicts, Becker wishes to 
study society and its practices in order to understand art (or rather art making in his case). 
By emphasising the division of labour within the artistic field, its hierarchical processes 
of internal distinction (mainly an aesthetic discussion via the work of the aesthetician) 
and art’s internal disposition towards change, Becker seems to be engaged in a project of 
understanding the principles that arguably instruct social behaviour and collective action 
in relation to the art making. The action of his actors, always a matter of constantly 
adapted personal choice rather than predispositions merely received from external forces 
(Bourdieu’s field of power), is undoubtedly less deterministic than in Bourdieu’s view. 
Becker’s view regarding relations of power is decidedly more inclusive, less restrained 
and more fluid when thought of as a range of possibilities available for actors in the 
world/field. In an interview in the epilogue of the twenty-fifth anniversary edition of Art 
Worlds, Becker gives a compelling account and consequentially a critique (perhaps a 
tentative explanation) of Bourdieu’s point of view in relation to his own background – 
that is to say, the differences between the French and American sociological 
establishments: 
  27 
 
I have for years been telling people in France that to understand American 
sociology they must first understand that there are something like 20,000 
sociologists in the United States and something like 2,000 departments of 
sociology […] This is at least ten times the number of people and departments as 
exist in France, probably more like twenty times. One consequence of this is that 
it is relatively easy to support a wide variety of sociological activities. No idea is 
too crazy or unacceptable to find a home somewhere. You name it and there is, 
somewhere, a department or a part of a department devoted to propagating that 
idea or point of view. You can always find some other people who think your 
idea, unacceptable as it is to ‘the leaders of the field’, whoever they are, is really 
good and ready to march under your flag. If you can find two or three hundred of 
them (not so easy, but certainly not impossible when there are 20,000 among 
whom to recruit) you can organize a section of the ASA [American Sociological 
Association]. If you can’t get that number, you can start your own organization 
(e.g., the International Visual Sociology Association), publish your own journal, 
elect your own president, and give your own prizes. It’s in that sort of setting that 
the idea of ‘world’ seems like a ‘natural’ way to think about organized activity. 
(Becker, 2008, pp. 377–378) 
 
While Bourdieu describes his field in relation to the external forces that, for him, 
decidedly constrain the options available for both producers and consumers of culture 
alike, Becker shows how flimsy this overreaching view can be, especially within the 
present context. If a quasi-totalitarian field of power restrains these participants, how then 
can today’s art be the heterogeneous beast we see today? This is perhaps Bourdieu’s main 
flaw10. Change within the art world, for Bourdieu (in The Rules of Art), is a rather pre-
defined game resting solely in the field of power influence. Bourdieu may capture the 
feeling behind the changes within Flaubert’s time but at the same time he does not 
acknowledge the changes within his field of power itself, which is always a unified and 
totalitarian concept. Hence, for him, to understand art is a matter of first understanding its 
relation to the larger field of power (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 214) instead of understanding the 
                                                      
 
10 This deterministic view, although not as over-reaching as it may sound, since there is never an 
explicit argument for transcendence in Bourdieu’s ideas, is nevertheless a constant struggle and source of 
internal self-criticism in the sociology of culture and art as a whole (Zolberg, 1990, pp. 11–15; Wolff, 1993, 
Chapter 2; Chaney, 1994, pp. 40–47; Born, 2010). 
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changes presented within art and its own conception (for him a product of the interference 
of his field of power). I wonder, then, how Bourdieu would react to the more 
contemporary debate regarding the rise of the so-called omnivorous consumer of culture 
instead of the fixed, restricted consumer of Flaubert’s time. Distinction and power itself, 
history shows, also change over time11. 
This problematic of change within an art world, for us, is an essential question. 
After all, the emergence of AST and its world is the very problem of this thesis. It is 
important to define how different authors have observed the phenomenon of change 
within art worlds. We know that, for example, AST has changed deeply since its 
beginnings. We also know that its many labels are disputed. The question then is: If there 
is change in this particular art world, what may have caused it? Could it be larger 
struggles in society, as Bourdieu proposes in his field of power? Or could the internal 
dispositions proper to the art world and its material/institutional culture be main culprits? 
Unfortunately we cannot answer these questions at this point, for that is the objective of 
the research. What we can do, however, is to piece the various explanations for change in 
and the constitution of art worlds into a brief context (which is the focus of this chapter). 
Only then will we be able to recognise and ponder the influences of these various 
explanations in relation to our subject (the emergence and development of AST). 
Becker’s contribution to this endeavour is central. The adoption of either the concept of 
field or the concept of world is, consequentially, not a random choice. Becker himself in 
the above-mentioned interview denies that his research is a ‘light’ version of Bourdieu’s 
grand theory of fields (Becker, 2008, p. 372). In this work I do not have the intention or 
                                                      
 
11 On the relationship between Becker and Bourdieu, Inglis posits that, although both authors share 
concerns, Becker, ‘given that his style of sociology derives from the symbolic interactionist school with its 
emphasis on how people “label” each other and what effects those labels can have, […] focuses more on the 
“gatekeeping” functions of institutions, persons and practices in the art world – art schools, galleries, 
museums, showings, art critics, magazine and newspaper reviews’ (Inglis, 2005b, p. 27). 
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pretension of constructing an expansive theory that relates artistic development to large 
conflicts in society (as Bourdieu does). I do recognise the interference of external power, 
mainly manifested via resources distribution, but I do not, in any instance, wish to 
extrapolate these observations into the understanding of social struggles and geopolitical 
aspirations. That is not the job of this thesis. From this point of view it is fair to say that 
this thesis examines both the AST world, recognised as the set of institutions, agents and 
values that designate AST’s constituencies, and the AST field, thought of primarily as the 
site of intellectual struggles and power relationships – struggles and relationships that are 
constantly demonstrated throughout this thesis. Another way of conceptualising this 
distinction is to think of the material and the mundane (to borrow Becker’s adjective) in 
contrast to the political. Having said that, when we use ‘field’ or ‘world’ other than to 
describe AST, we are expressing one aspect (the mundane, the micro) over the other (the 
political, the macro). 
Surely Bourdieu and Becker were not the only ones to conceptualise an idea of 
art within a sociological perspective, one that stresses not only the objects but also the 
institutions and conventions of art. In a relatively brief but influential text for The Journal 
of Philosophy (‘The Artworld’, 1964), Arthur C. Danto describes what he calls the art 
world. Danto’s art world, however, despite being superficially similar to Bourdieu’s 
concept, contains many differences that both writers highlighted in subsequent texts. 
Starting from the commentary of both Socrates and Shakespeare (via the character of 
Hamlet) in relation to art’s similitude to a mirror facing nature – the idea that art’s 
properties reside within its capacity to mirror reality – Danto traces a path in which this 
idea of art (as mimesis of the world) is supplemented by the idea of art as a reality in 
itself, self-contained within the art object and, invariably, containing an essence (in 
Bourdieu’s depreciative label) in the object itself. This project, stemming from an 
apparent desire for order within the heterogeneous artistic practices developed specially 
after the Second World War, differs from Bourdieu’s not only in its origins but also in its 
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scale. Let’s clarify the respective arguments. Danto, aiming for an overreaching 
connection between disparate artistic practices, finds in the institutions of art (its 
organisations, discourses, ideologies…) a common ground in which all art resides. 
Therefore, for him, the most important step in the recognition of an art world was the 
replacement of a Socratic ‘Imitation Theory of Art’ (IT) (Danto, 1964, p. 572) – in which 
art’s value (or lack of, for Socrates) resides in its capacity to recreate and therefore 
illuminate reality (Danto, 1964, p. 572) – with a ‘Reality Theory of Art’ (RT) (Danto, 
1964, p. 574) – in which we perceive the art object not as representation or imitation but 
as an entity in itself. It is this ideological change, brought forward by aesthetic 
developments in the arts, that, for Danto, characterises our current art world. When Danto 
stresses the importance of the change, however, he is not looking at the change only but 
also at how it persists. It is, then, by recognising that these distinct principles (IT and RT) 
were transmitted (and consequentially transmuted) through time that Danto finds his art 
world: ‘To see something as art requires something the eye cannot decry – an atmosphere 
of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld’ (Danto, 1964, p. 580). 
For Bourdieu, Danto’s perception of an art world, while not completely mistaken, 
is certainly faulty and incomplete. In the final part of The Rules of Art, Bourdieu attempts 
to understand the origins of the idea of a ‘pure aesthetics’ (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 285) 
presented in, for example, the modernist thought of formalist and phenomenological 
theories. As we saw with Danto, as the IT came to supplement the RT in the intellectual 
quest for understanding that which we call art, we, the participants of the art world, could 
no longer recognise art as a mimesis of nature. Instead, from this paradigmatic change, 
we (in this view) come to see the art object as an independent, self-contained and 
indivisible entity with a reality of its own. This materialised body, in turn, has to have a 
quality (the ‘essence’ in Bourdieu’s term) inherent in it in order to be appreciated as such 
an indivisible entity. Otherwise, how could one explain that object A is different from 
object B if they are perceived to be identical? This emphasis on the object of art and its 
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reception, one can conclude, is what differentiates Bourdieu and Danto. This is not to say 
that Bourdieu ignores the fact that certain objects are perceived as art. While Bourdieu 
does acknowledge the existence of this selective reception, in contrast to Danto, he also 
realises that the reception itself is a temporal subject, subject to its own particular context. 
Danto may recognise the institution of art but, as Bourdieu argues, he fails to understand 
the emergence of the art world with/within society and its context, and its relationship to 
that context 12 . Danto, inclined to view ‘greatness’ in art as independent from an 
                                                      
 
12 He then posits that ‘to escape this aporia [the essentialist one], is it sufficient to assert, with Arthur 
Danto, that the basis of the difference between works of art and ordinary objects is none other than an 
institution, to wit, the “artworld” which confers on them the status of candidates for aesthetic appreciation? 
This is a terse assertion, and if a sociologist may be permitted such a judgment, rather “sociological”; born 
once again out of a singular experience which is too quickly universalized, it only designates the fact of the 
institution (in the active sense) of the work of art. It overlooks the historical and sociological analysis of the 
genesis and structure of the institution (the artistic field) which is capable of accomplishing such an act of 
institution, that is, of imposing recognition of the work of art as such’ (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 287). Danto’s 
review of The Rules of Art, published over thirty years after his ‘The Artworld’, reaffirms his belief in the 
intrinsic value of artistic objects. Nearly lamenting his own point of view, he says that: ‘It is not clear that 
Sartre’s question of what makes Flaubert Flaubert has been answered, inasmuch as a field will account for 
everyone, great or good or competent, who exists in it at any given time. There is an implied criticism that 
this sort of social-scientific analysis might “somehow have the effect of ‘levelling’ artistic values by 
‘rehabilitating’ second-rate authors.” The Musee d’Orsay opened to cries of indignation for seeming to give 
the same degree of prominence to the lesser contemporaries of great artists as to those artists themselves. To 
this Bourdieu offers a compelling response: “Everything inclines us to think that, on the contrary, one loses 
the essence of what makes for individuality and even the greatness of the survivors when one ignores the 
universe of contemporaries with whom and against whom they construct themselves.” Yes and no. It is 
certainly true that we get a definite perspective on Courbet’s masterpiece, The Studio, when we see it in the 
context the Musee d’Orsay provides. But I incline to view that its greatness is somehow independent of that 
understanding, and that the work’s power is present in it however much or little we may happen to know 
about the field that made Courbet and that Courbet in turn transformed. There are autonomous experiences 
with art that do not entail that art itself is autonomous’ (Danto, 1996). 
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understanding of the relations of power presented at and within the object in question, 
while acknowledging the institution of art, also dismisses the larger, broader context in 
which the art institution (and the artist itself) emerged. Hence, for him, things (art) have 
an intrinsic, universal and timeless value (‘greatness’). The autonomy proposed by Danto, 
that the objects considered art contain autonomous properties within themselves, is 
certainly different from the autonomy proposed by Bourdieu, which rests on the advent of 
an idea of autonomy of the art object (the ‘pure gaze’; the pure aestheticism) in relation to 
its position in the nineteenth-century social power struggle (mainly a class struggle). 
It is important to note that Becker also discusses Danto’s contribution in his Art 
Worlds but, like Bourdieu, he recognises Danto as being an actor involved rather 
internally in the arts. That is to say, Danto, for both Becker and Bourdieu, is an 
aesthetician, a gatekeeper, namely that obscure creature which defines via discourse the 
very definition of art. Surely artists, historians and the institutions of art themselves also 
contribute to the debate. Flaubert was an artist himself and in the Bourdieusian narrative 
he does contribute to changing perceptions. Both Becker and Bourdieu, despite believing 
otherwise, also contribute to the debate. The difference here, between Danto and the 
others, is the lack of a specific aesthetic theory to support their claims. For Becker, it is 
by being in the position of a ‘critic’ (something which Danto certainly was) that the 
aesthetician becomes the biggest contributor of certain aesthetics perceived as correct. 
Danto, for example, may recognise the institutions of art (and its varied participants) as a 
major influence in the development of the arts but, as an aesthetician, he also delves into 
the debate surrounding merit, and that, a priori, is what characterises the position of an 
aesthetician. It comes as no surprise then that Becker discusses Danto’s theory in his 
‘Aesthetics, Aestheticians and Critics’ chapter. By discussing the position and function of 
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this critic (Danto), Becker develops his argument in relation to art’s own internal 
developments. Informed by conventions and status, these internal disputes (a political 
aspect natural to a subjective belief system such as art) are what we may call the artistic 
theoretical struggle (Becker, 2008, p. 135). Being a consequence of art’s discriminating 
feature, artistic theory (aesthetics) is perhaps the main vehicle via which positions are 
taken, judgements are made and merits are bestowed: it is art’s main intellectual 
battleground. Artistic theory, however, is not the everything-goes some might imagine. 
Instead, is a reasonably clear game with some distinct features that, it could be argued, 
account for a world in itself13. Even if its particular consequences for art in general are 
not easily defined, theory and its practitioners hold a great deal of importance in the 
creation, development and survival of art worlds. Therefore, common to both Bourdieu 
and Becker is an engagement in reviewing Danto’s argument concerning the perceived 
importance of Warhol’s work. Danto’s example, I believe, remembered so many times in 
this kind of sociological questioning of the arts, is important for two reasons. Firstly, it 
constructs a framework whereby one comes to understand Warhol’s work (and all that is 
subsequent) as a consequence of its relationship with the institutions and conventions of 
art14. For both Bourdieu and Becker this was interesting in itself: that there was a man, 
outside their sociological discipline, who developed an argument relatively close to 
theirs. Becker, for example, says, without giving names, that ‘ironically enough, a 
number of philosophers have produced a theory that, if it is not sociological, is 
sufficiently based on sociological considerations to let us see what such a theory might 
look like’ (Becker, 2008, p. 145). Secondly, it can be argued, both Becker and Bourdieu 
                                                      
 
13 Bourdieu discusses a similar situation – within the independent literary world – in the capacity of 
art to persist (1996, p. 270) and in the constitution of its internal struggles (1996, p. 252). 
14 ‘Never mind that the Brillo box may not be good, much less great art. The impressive thing is that 
it is art at all. But if it is, why are not the indiscernible Brillo boxes that are in the stockroom?’ (Danto, 1964, 
p. 581). 
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are interested in Danto’s importance in the American artistic establishment itself. This 
might sound cynical, but I believe there is strong evidence for this, for Danto certainly 
was not just any critic. 
Danto was indeed a force within the art world studied by Bourdieu and Becker. 
He was an embodiment of the aesthetician, respected and more importantly heard, and 
both our writers knew of his importance in the game of defining art. Danto’s status within 
the art world, coupled with his understanding of institutional conventions, is a good 
example of artistic theory being made live, without intermediaries or second-hand 
historical sources. Because it used very similar observations to those made by both 
Becker and Bourdieu, Danto’s artistic theory (the institutional one) proved too much of a 
temptation for both those sociologists, since they are also part of the game. It seems that 
both found a perfectly neat example of how to misunderstand art as a collective activity 
in the figure of Danto. While Bourdieu attacks Danto for being unperceptive of the role of 
society and its context in artistic comprehension (as we have previously seen), Becker’s 
complaint is centred over Danto’s ambition and insistence on classifying art as distinct 
from non-art: 
 
By shifting the locus of the definitional problem from something inherent in the 
object to a relation between the object and an entity called an art world, the 
institutional theory provided a new justification of the activities of contemporary 
artists, and an answer to the philosophically distressing questions levelled at their 
work, which asked for a demonstration of skill or beauty, thought or emotion, in 
the works regarded as excellent […] The institutional theory allows art world 
participants to define that special talent in a new way, as (for instance) the ability 
to invent imaginative new concepts, and thus gives legitimacy to the artist’s 
special role and rewards. Our analysis of the institutional theory adds some 
nuances to the description of art worlds. We see that art world officials have the 
power to legitimate works of art, but that power is often disputed. As a result, the 
aesthetician’s desire for definitive criteria by which to distinguish art from non-
art, criteria congruent with the actions of art world officials, cannot be satisfied. 
(Becker, 2008, pp. 163–164) 
 
It is interesting to note the beginning of Becker’s argument here, where he claims that 
Danto and others shift ‘the locus of the definitional problem from something inherent in 
  35 
the object to a relation between the object and an entity called an art world’. As we saw, 
Danto did not shift his focus entirely. He still believed in something inherent in the 
object. Becker, in his own logic, is right to stress that the so-called institutional theory 
had the ambition of differentiating art from non-art; after all, that was Danto’s function, 
his position, his right as a critic/aesthetician. Becker, however, differs from Bourdieu in 
that he misses a point here. If there is an argument to be made against Danto’s theory and 
its limitations, it is Bourdieu who conveys the definitive one. Danto’s art world is indeed 
disconnected from its context. By not recognising his own act as a legitimising one, 
despite understanding the importance of art’s conventions in society’s reception, Danto 
ends up contributing to the very belief system he himself describes. The correct 
interpretation and applicability of this thought, in Becker’s view, is that the sociologically 
informed theory of the arts, while being able to distinguish internal struggles and 
developments characteristic of the art world, cannot and does not have the intention of 
settling the definition of art. A similar point could be said about this text. It does not 
contribute to an aesthetic definition of AST. Instead, it wishes to answer the question of 
how the AST world, with its participants and products, came to be what it is today. My 
intention, shared by both Bourdieu and Becker, is one of curiosity and not necessity15. 
Coming back to our example, the matter of the fact is that Danto’s art world, differently 
from Becker’s, was a creation from within the artistic culture, with no intention of 
understanding how Warhol was accepted and instead offering a rationale on why he 
should be acknowledged. While Danto built his sociologically informed theory in order to 
classify art as distinct from non-art, Becker wishes to explain the production of art or 
whatever object people may call art, focusing instead on the internal mechanisms that 
produce such a definition. 
                                                      
 
15 Although this inadvertently may contribute to a definition. 
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Since Becker, Bourdieu and Danto there has been a significant growth in the art 
world theory within sociological establishments. I say growth because sociology itself, 
similarly to the arts, has an incredibly strong political element, or struggle. In fact, this 
struggle has been translated in a series of works and research into the internal political 
aspects of various cultural fields of production. This thesis is not interested in reviewing 
the status of a whole intellectual field; however, relevant work to highlight is that of 
Shyon Baumann, a relatively young researcher and the author of Hollywood Highbrow: 
From Entertainment to Art (2007). My choice to study him is based on two points 
regarding his work. Firstly Baumann, like this thesis, has revisited Becker’s and 
Bourdieu’s respective conceptions of ‘world’ and ‘field’. Baumann sees them as being 
compatible, despite their differences. In fact, Baumann recognises these differences as 
being a ‘matter of degree rather than type’ (2007b, p. 180). I will explore this idea later 
on. The second reason lies in the fact that Baumann, also similarly to this text, is 
interested in the applicability of these ideas by understanding them in relation to a certain 
temporal and spatial context. His subject, namely the acceptance of certain Hollywood 
films as art, is indeed a very defined one. In fact it is much more defined than this broader 
study of everything that is called digital, electronic, computer, technoscience or new 
media art. Nevertheless, his focused attention informs much of the thought presented 
here. Hollywood Highbrow, as the author suggests, advocates ‘the creation of an 
understanding of the medium of film as a legitimate and serious artistic medium, and of a 
body of film works as being legitimate and serious works of art’ (Baumann, 2007b, p. 1). 
It could be said that, while both Bourdieu and Becker are interested in the constitution of 
an artistic field and an artistic world (respectively), Baumann is rather interested in the 
legitimising processes of these art fields and worlds – that is, how do they become 
accepted as legitimate constituents of the label ‘art’? According to this method, Baumann 
does not develop a new understanding of the idea of an art world and instead builds upon 
the thought of Bourdieu, Becker and others. That certainly makes sense, as Baumann 
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himself attaches his work to Becker’s legacy (2007b, p. 4). Perhaps he is right in 
bypassing many of the discussions regarding the boundaries of the art world. To enrol 
once again in the minutiae and nuances of definition of such a world would be self-
defeating for, as Baumann’s work shows, every art world and its local context do 
something to make a single definition of ‘art world’ insufficient. Importantly, Becker too 
talks about this problem, of defining boundaries for the art world, and his conclusion is 
similar to Baumann’s (Becker, 2008, p. 35). 
However, what most differentiates Baumann in relation to Becker’s or 
Bourdieu’s method is the propensity to align his research (legitimacy in the arts) to 
another branch of social study more broadly concerned with the history and development 
of social movements. Baumann’s epistemological preference is discussed in a succinct 
yet clear text written for the journal Poetics (Baumann, 2007a). In this text he argues that 
‘there is an analogy between social movement success and recognition as art, so that the 
major concepts that explain the paths of social movements also apply to art worlds: 
political opportunity structures, resource mobilization, and framing processes’ (Baumann, 
2007a, p. 47). Both Hollywood Highbrow and this text are in fact filled with these kinds 
of analogies, which mostly refer to third parties’ research into the legitimation of a 
variety of art forms. Baumann’s general premise is as follows: 
 
Discrete areas of cultural production attain legitimacy as art, high or popular, 
during periods of high cultural opportunity through mobilizing material or 
institutional resources and through the exercise of a discourse that frames the 
cultural production as legitimate art according to one or more pre-existing 
ideologies. The main benefit for the sociology of art is a theoretical advancement 
beyond the current state of tenuously linked cased [sic] studies of artistic 
legitimation toward an understanding of a process that is common across art 
worlds. (Baumann, 2007a, p. 60) 
 
 
In many ways, Hollywood Highbrow can be seen as a rather positivistic study. 
Baumann’s use of raw data (i.e., concerning the consumption of art, concerning the social 
make-up of museum publics, concerning the time distribution of articles devoted to 
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seeing cinema as art etc.) is not a common method of investigation applied to the arts and 
is based on by his own career, department and academic formation. His methods are 
taken from contemporary (American) sociology and, as such, the attempt to quantify 
social relations is part of him and his game. In Baumann’s defence I would say, again, 
that his method first and foremost is not concerned with particular aesthetic forms or 
universal claims regarding those forms (in contrast to many AST participants, as will be 
seen later in this thesis). He does not attempt to formalise perception, nor does he wish to 
link a specific artistic practice to its consensus within a particular art world. He is very 
aware that consensus itself is far from being a complete and unrestrained agreement 
(Baumann, 2007a, p. 61). Ours is a more undecided, fragmented world than that 
described by Bourdieu. Given the increasingly transnational nature of art, there seems to 
be no single and/or totalitarian field of power partitioning resources as Bourdieu 
describes it. The heterogeneous cultural production championed by contemporary art is 
testimony to this fragmentation, which may serve many different agendas and wills. 
Baumann’s premise, for example, talks about ‘periods of high cultural 
opportunity’ – that is, cultural and political opportunities for the art world to develop. 
What would these opportunities be and how does Baumann find them within the infinite 
possibilities of society? How does Baumann, with his positivistic tendency, find 
arguments to support this claim and term? His rationale is quite simple, actually. In order 
for Hollywood films to be perceived as art, there must be a public acknowledging them as 
such. Baumann and others (Baumann, 2007b, pp. 21, 52) realise that, differently from in 
Europe, it was only around the 1960s that films came be seen as art in America. That is 
not to say there were no attempts whatsoever before that date to create films as art in 
America. Quite the opposite; but, despite the efforts of some, it was only after the Second 
World War that the American audience started to resemble their peers across the Atlantic. 
This resemblance/distinction in attitude towards films can be attributed to industrial set-
up, educational development and the political environment within the US. The early 
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development of the industry and its differences across European and North American 
territories were the first factors behind the disparity in perception. To begin with, early 
American cinema, usually developed around the idea of very affordable nickelodeons, 
was mainly a blue-collar entertainment with high attendance and was usually seen as 
corrupt by higher classes and American intellectuals (Baumann, 2007b, p. 24). This 
picture stands in strong contrast with the early European cinema described by Baumann 
and the work he references. As opposed to the American urban working class, which was 
largely formed of European immigrants favoured by strong economic growth and 
therefore with disposable income, the European working class was heavily affected by 
the First World War and did not possess the same surplus to enable them to enjoy cinema 
like their American cousins. As a result, the film industry in the major European film-
producing countries was built around already existent artistic institutions. Baumann goes 
on to argue, citing the historian Benjamin Hampton, that 
 
rather than creating inexpensive makeshift theatres from stores and restaurants, 
European films became a part of a variety theatre and music-hall programs, with 
prices similar to those other forms of entertainment. Consequently, there were far 
fewer outlets for exhibition, which in general was more expensive for populations 
with less disposable income. (Baumann, 2007b, p. 25) 
 
Being present in a more elitist setting certainly helped the perception of film as 
art in the European context. Figures quoted by Baumann highlight the disparity of the 
early film industry: by 1929, 7 per cent of the French population frequented cinemas 
whereas in the US 75 per cent of the population did (Baumann, 2007b, p. 28). Another 
combination of qualitative evidence and sociological statistical data can be found in 
Baumann’s analysis of the reasons why most American cultural establishments accepted 
film as art only after the Second World War. The reason for this, argues Baumann, 
resides in the educational development achieved by the US following the end of the war. 
To show its dramatic increase, Baumann plots two very simple charts following firstly the 
total enrolment in institutions of higher education and secondly the percentage of 18- to 
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24-year-olds enrolled in such institutions (Baumann, 2007b, pp. 33–34). For him ‘the 
film history literature is rife with assertions that the audience for film in the 1960s was 
qualitatively different from previous decades’ (Baumann, 2007b, p. 33). Once sure of this 
development, Baumann’s questions turn to its logical consequence or, in other words, 
how this change in qualitative terms resulted in differences between the US and Europe in 
terms of perceptions of film as art. He offers three explanations presented in the literature, 
and we should very briefly develop those here. Firstly, ‘as DiMaggio (1992) and Levine 
(1988) have noted, associations with the status of audience members have in many cases 
contributed to the rise and fall in prestige of various art forms’ (Baumann, 2007b, p. 34). 
The second mechanism described by Baumann lies not in the increasingly high status of 
cinema audiences but instead in rising levels of education, especially higher education. 
According to his sources there is a ‘claim that a taste for the high arts is facilitated by the 
educational system that teaches individuals how to approach and to understand high art 
[…] the proper audience, then, first had to be constituted before film could succeed as 
Art’ (2007b, pp. 34–35)16. The third mechanism described by Baumann, instead of 
focusing solely on the public, is rather centred upon the idea that it was artists, critics, 
theorists, historians and ‘any other intellectuals who were members of the film world’ 
(Baumann, 2007b, p. 36) themselves who first articulated an understanding of film as art. 
While not ‘mutually exclusive’ (Baumann, 2007b, p. 36), the second and third points of 
view may both be responsible for the change of status of Hollywood films. The first is 
also related to the second in a symbiotic manner in which the two are responsible for each 
other. People got richer because they studied more; people studied more because they got 
richer. Baumann may not have achieved a clear arbitration between these views, but one 
could say that this was not his intention. All changes were of historical importance in one 
way or another. The most important contribution, it could be argued, was the mere 
                                                      
 
16 A point also extensively developed by Bourdieu (1986). 
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confirmation of contextual importance in the development of an artistic form (cinema 
being his case study). Baumann’s method of investigation is indeed very helpful. 
Hollywood Highbrow in fact excels at describing this change in perception via factors 
placed outside the art world in question17. 
His intention in discussing this subject of contextual, larger changes in society 
that affect the perception of cultural production stems from his larger project concerning 
legitimising processes. For Baumann, understanding the development of an artistic form 
involves recognising developments not only within the artistic world in question but also 
within society in general. These influences, albeit variable in nature and definition, could 
be simply defined (as Baumann himself does) as exogenous and endogenous in relation to 
the art world. That the boundaries of an art world may vary according to previous 
definitions and emphasis does not change the fact that events happen either outside or 
within such a circle of collective activity – either outside or within art. The most obvious 
examples of these exogenous events can be found in big political events as well as major 
technological advancements: the rise of Nazi Germany; the Soviet revolution; North 
American McCarthyism; the Brazilian and much of Latin America’s repressive 
dictatorships; the terrible atomic fate of Japan; the rise of the moving picture; 
computational technology… these are not anecdotal examples but hard events that, in one 
way or another, had consequences for the arts but did not originate from the arts 
themselves. Likewise, by tracing the development and birth of artistic institutions 
dedicated to film’s appreciation as an art, Baumann finds his endogenous factors. This 
battleground, over definition and status, not only theoretical and ideological but also 
                                                      
 
17 For a much more complete description and debate of the merits and limits of exogenous factors 
(both material and cultural) as explanatory and formative in social movements, see Meyer and Staggenborg 
(1996), Edwards and McCarthy (2004), Kriesi (2004), Meyer and Minkoff (2004) and Williams (2004). 
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economical, can be regarded as the place where art (and its worthiness) is politically 
constructed. The creation of film festivals, film clubs, academic departments dedicated to 
film, specialised museums and galleries… these events can, according to Baumann’s 
argument, all be described as derived from within the artistic establishment, emerging 
from the collective action taken by some (never all) participants active in the art world 
and politically engaged in the dissemination of an idea of film as art. Perhaps the most 
enduring and visible feature of this practice can be found in the creation of an argument, a 
rationale, an explanation or, simply, a justification that explains the positions taken by art 
world participants and their ‘support’ for film as art. Baumann usually defines this act of 
rational justification as ‘framing’. Although he has explicitly developed this subject 
elsewhere (2007a, pp. 57–58), its main features are still a recurrent subject in his book. 
Usually associated with the work of social psychologist Erving Goffman (1986), and 
more recently with David Snow (2004), framing’s worthiness has been called into 
question as a result of its proliferation in various academic fields and given the fact that it 
has not been properly defined (Snow, 2004, p. 380; Baumann, 2007a, p. 57). Despite this 
I believe, following Baumann in his own rationale, this is an idea that relates cultural 
production and collective action to contextual change and ideology like few others do. 
Given the complexity and historicity of the subject, let us yet again briefly clarify this 
theme. In its most basic form, the framing process can be understood as a representation 
of focused attention in relation to a perceived problem, opportunity or grievance18. 
                                                      
 
18 That is to say, ‘in contrast to the traditional view of social movements as carriers of extant, 
preconfigured ideas and beliefs, the framing perspective views movements as signifying agents engaged in 
the production and maintenance of meaning for protagonists, antagonists, and bystanders […] The verb 
“framing” is used to conceptualize this signifying work, which is one of the activities that social movement 
adherents and their leaders do on a regular basis.’ That is, ‘they frame, or assign meaning to and interpret 
relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to 
garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists’ (Snow and Benford, 1988, p. 198). The resultant 
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Differently from the idea of contextual or internal change in relation to the social 
movement (or, in our case, AST itself), framing processes are concerned with the micro-
relationships present in any art world: letters, speeches, manifestos, conversations, 
arguments etc. For this research the consequences are clear: Why, for example, would 
one believe in, support, create or finance AST’s projects? Baumann’s book, despite being 
unknown in the art world, offers a novel perspective on the changes common to all fields 
of cultural production. Similarly, the whole sociological enterprise dedicated to the 
subject of collective action, while not usually applied to the arts, can be enriched by a 
case study like this one. This text will continue by applying and criticising the concepts 
developed mainly by these three authors (Bourdieu, Becker and Baumann). For now it 
suffices to say that, despite this very brief epistemological introduction, we are armed 
with the tools to tackle our own subject: AST. 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
products of this framing activity within the social movement arena are referred to as collective action frames 
– that is, ‘Collective action frames, like picture frames, focus attention by punctuating or specifying what in 
our sensual field is relevant and what is irrelevant, what is “in frame” and what is “out of frame,” in relation 
to the object of orientation. But frames also function, perhaps even more importantly, as articulation 
mechanisms in the sense of tying together the various punctuated elements of the scene so that one set of 
meanings rather than another is conveyed, or, in the language of narrativity, one story rather than another is 
told’ (Snow, 2004, p. 384). The huge literature being produced in relation to the framing perspective, 
unfortunately, cannot be reviewed here. For more on the general nature of the theory, please see Snow et al. 
(1986), Benford (1993a, 1993b, 2013), Benford and Snow (2000, 2005) and the collection edited by Johnston 
and Noakes (2005). In relation to the debate or discussion regarding the differences between frame and 
ideology, see Snow (2004), Snow and Benford (2005) and Westby (2005). On a general note, I also 
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1.2 Scope: Too many labels 
 
In Art Worlds, Becker (2008) discusses the viability of and the context for the 
development of new art worlds. New art worlds, he posits, ‘grow up around something 
that has not been characteristic practice for artists before’ (2008, p. 311). One example 
that might fit the bill, he says, is the ‘invention and diffusion of a technology’, which may 
produce new ‘art products possible’ (Becker, 2008). This new technological 
breakthrough, probably ‘originated for nonartistic products’, would then, very much like 
‘photography and motion pictures’ (Becker, 2008), be used by artists beyond its original 
intentions. Although today both photography and motion pictures are art worlds in their 
own right, Becker notes the ambiguities inherent in this development. In short, are they 
new art worlds or ‘only new segments of old ones’ (Becker, 2008)? As an amateur 
musician he ponders the advancement of electronic devices, ‘from oscillators to 
synthesizers’ (Becker, 2008), and this development’s capacity to generate a new art 
world. Although the tools are new, ‘much electronic music is created by people trained in 
music, who use machines as an adjunct to live human performance, is heard by audiences 
raised on more or less conventional concert music, and is judged by critics who use the 
same standards they apply to other serious, composed music’ (Becker, 2008). For these 
reasons, he concludes, no new art world could have risen from the machines only since, 
in essence, electronic music is just a genre of music. But here there is a catch. Some of 
the people who made sound with electronics are different from what we might 
conventionally think of as musicians. Not traditionally trained and perhaps coming from 
places such as ‘computer electronics or mathematics’ (Becker, 2008), they ‘beg[a]n to 
make music with the machines alone, dispensing with the human figure’ (Becker, 2008, 
p. 312). Moreover, not being trained as traditional musicians, since first and foremost 
they were engineers, mathematicians or physicists, their music was also different and 
contained ‘random noise or machine-generated pure tones […] for instance’ (Becker, 
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2008). This cultural output, different from that being produced by musicians using 
electronic devices, ‘makes the development of a new art world more likely’ (Becker, 
2008). Since this new product brought ‘together people who [had] never cooperated 
before to produce art based on and using conventions previously unknown or not 
exploited’ (Becker, 2008, p. 310), it could develop into something other than traditional 
music. It is then no coincidence that we have electronic music, a genre of traditional 
music, based on the same conventions utilised by traditional musicians, and 
electroacoustic music, a world in its own right, complete with internal conventions, 
institutions and discourses19. 
Before we proceed, then, it is important to ask: Is AST a genre? Is it a style or 
theory that unifies a wide range of artworks? Is it a specific method of artistic practice? 
The answer to these questions is, in short, no. Derived from its institutions, mobilising 
discourse and material context, and not from stylistic considerations, the specificity of 
AST as a label is demonstrated throughout this thesis by a series of case studies that trace 
the origins of this world back to its post-war and then Cold War context. This context, 
both intellectual and material, is what makes AST an effective tool for understanding the 
birth of this emergent field. To take the opposite path, to attempt to discover aesthetic, 
stylistic or theoretical patterns that make AST distinct, is futile since, up to now, there has 
not being a single label that has managed to encapsulate its whole production cohesively. 
That is not surprising since, as we shall also see, the production of what people may refer 
to computer, digital, new media, virtual or even electronic art encompass a too large and 
heterogeneous practice to be considered as a single artistic style, movement or conceptual 
                                                      
 
19 Tellingly (though unfortunately, since we do not have the space to further explore this subject), 
this world shares much in common with AST: from a historiography concerned with its concrete art lineage, 
by way of musique concrete (Camilleri and Smalley, 1998), even to shared awards, such as the ones given out 
by Ars Electronica, in Linz, Austria. 
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proposition, much in the same way that there is not a single electroacoustic music but, 
instead, a series of conventions and institutions that bind those practices together. What 
unites the artworks, artists, writers, theoreticians, critics, journals, BAs, festivals and 
biennales of AST is, to put it simply, its involvement with technoscientific developments 
of the post-Second World War era and the belief, despite larger art world rejection, that 
this was a worthy project. This perhaps simplistic criterion, while not wholly perfect, as 
there are intersections between AST and contemporary art, as in between music and 
electroacoustic music, is nevertheless the most appropriate way to study the world and the 
field of AST: in other words, that which is shown, discussed and promoted by AST. 
Moreover, as Becker elucidates: 
 
We cannot clearly separate new art world from those which have changed 
substantially by virtue of an artistic revolution, nor can we easily decide when an 
art word has died, as opposed to being changed or taken over by new people. We 
need not make these distinctions definitively, since our interest is in the growth 
and decay of forms of collective action rather than in the development of logical 
typologies […] To understand the birth of new art worlds, then, we need to 
understand, not the genesis of [artistic] innovations, but rather the process of 
mobilizing people to join in a cooperative activity on a regular basis. (Becker, 
2008, pp. 310–311) 
 
Follow the money, they say. AST students, festivals, publications and the like, as I shall 
demonstrate, do not need or find it necessary to rely on the art world’s blessing. AST has, 
after all, developed a whole network of collaborators and supporters for itself and it does 
not need the resources used by the art world and, perhaps more importantly, its market20. 
                                                      
 
20 Although AST’s relationship, or lack of, with the art market is an important topic, I do not wish to 
engage with it at the moment. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, its size is tiny. Although there have been 
some isolated successes, on the large scale of things, it is barely noticeable (Reyburn, 2014). Some of the 
reasons for this are explored in the third chapter, within Section 3.3.1 (‘Conventions’), although these are not 
developed with the market in mind. The second, and certainly most crucial, aspect of my decision to keep the 
market outside my discussions is that AST does not need it. It mainly survives via industrial, commercial, 
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Supported by industry, commerce and academia, it has, from humble beginnings, 
developed into a large area of collaboration. The mobilisation of these people behind the 
idea of AST is hence key to its own development. The diffusion of its ideals and the 
certainty of its worthiness, over time, have produced the highly complex activity that we 
now label as AST. Having said that, it is important to stress that resources are not only 
material, financial objects. Institutions such as museums, universities, salons, awards, 
galleries and so on provide an invaluable source of symbolic capital, via a cultural 
authority often synonymous with the names of such institutions. That the V&A has 
developed an extensive collection of early computer art is no trivial fact. Museums in this 
case, by ‘their ability – indeed their mission – to collect, preserve, restore, display and 
promote art gives them an enormous amount of control over the value, visibility and 
survival of cultural productions’ (Baumann, 2007a, pp. 55–56). Likewise, universities, 
while proving physical spaces and, on many occasions, a salary for artists (especially true 
in AST), may also intangibly support AST via their curricula21. In this way, ‘universities 
can preserve and disseminate knowledge of cultural content while simultaneously 
bestowing legitimacy on that content by its very inclusion’ (Baumann, 2007a, p. 56)22. 
Yet, one final intangible resource is primary in AST’s quest for legitimacy: that which is 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
academic and governmental links. These will be shown throughout this research. Here, again, AST is in 
dissonance with contemporary art since, in many ways, it does not possess a high-status crowd to support it. 
Instead, as exemplified by the push made by Google towards AST via its highly financed DevArt program, 
AST is supported by multiple, distinct identities full of resources but lacking symbolic capital. Admittedly, 
however, its relationship with the traditional market is an aspect that must be investigated further, but this is 
not done here. Likewise, its relationship with the symbolic capital of its donors and supporters, industry and 
the like is seen indirectly, mainly via the art world’s negative reaction to it; see Section 3.1.1 
(‘Experimentalism: Cybernetic Serendipity and E.A.T.’) for more on this. 
21 For a review of the literature on resources applied to the sociology of art, via a perspective that 
aligns it with the research into social movements, see Baumann (2007a). 
22 Remember the BAs, BScs and research centres of our introduction? 
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produced by its theorists, aestheticians, philosophers and historians. If we did not choose 
AST as a lens through which to discuss artistic developments intersected with 
technoscientific knowledge, what would be the alternative? Some of these alternatives, 
then, are the subject of this section. These are resources of AST, in that they attempt to 
coherently and ideologically frame the production of AST within various artistic 
perspectives. What is important to highlight at this point, over the proposed labels 
discussed next, is that those, and invariably all, definitions of art require a certain degree 
of consensus – that is, a (loose) agreement between AST members. While not entirely 
consensual to all participants, and hence the multiplicity of definitions, these attempts are 
nevertheless important in that they not only justify AST as art but also try to organise and 
define the field or at least some parts of it. If consensus were universal, there would be no 
need for critics, philosophers and artists to discuss aesthetic arguments. If artistic 
consensus were general and universal, art would not change over time, nor it would vary 
according to context and place. Perhaps a more fitting question would look at this 
problem from a different angle. For something to be legitimate it must be made legitimate 
by someone. Legitimacy of new art does not happen a priori but, instead, is exercised by 
such textual attempts. 
In order to briefly demonstrate the problem with such labels, as well as the 
interplay between theoreticians competing for the right to name the objects of AST, let’s 
consider the label that describes the degrees and the art practice seen in the introduction 
to this work: digital art. The name itself, used repeatedly over the past twenty years or so, 
does not denote anything special. ‘Digital’ may popularly be thought as an adjective 
derived from computational developments, from Turing, but it hardly describes the 
products produced only with the technoscientific developments of the post-Second World 
War world. Likewise, ‘technological’, as in art and technology, hardly specifies anything 
different from previous artistic productions since all art, in essence, is applied technology. 
Hence, as Poltronieri (2010) highlights, it would be preferable to use the label 
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computational instead of the popularly found definitions of ‘technological’ and 
‘digital’ once we have understood that ‘technological art’ is translated simply as 
an artistic praxis in which a series of applied techniques are deployed. Since all 
forms of manifestation through art involve the use of some technique the term 
‘technological art’ results in something redundant. All art is technological by 
itself […] With respect to digital art, Lopes tells us that computational art is not 
the same thing as digital art. Above all, computer art is not the same as digital art. 
Moreover, computer art is a new art form and digital art is not […] Electronic 
computers available today use binary code, represented by zeros and ones, as a 
form of symbolic exchange. However, the binary format is not the only digital 
code available. To name a few, the alphabet is another digital code, as are the 
numerals and signs of traffic. None of them are binary but they are all digital as 
they are constituted of discrete and discontinuous elements – as letters and 
numbers are. (Poltronieri, 2010, pp. 17–18, my translation) 
 
As we know, the label ‘digital art’ – despite being incomplete and failing to 
account for perhaps the most important and novel aspects of this production of 
computational objects – is nevertheless very much present. Perhaps an exercise of pure 
marketing by some, the digital has become one of those catchwords that everyone uses 
but nobody gives much thought to. Similarly to ‘sustainability’, ‘creative’ or ‘dynamism’, 
‘digital’ has become a prima donna in a lot of cultural discourse. The talk of a digital 
culture is, for example, another topic that could be debated in these same terms. Another 
one of these wide, almost meaningless terms that have been attached to AST production 
is ‘new media’. In order to talk about this one, I will review some of the ideas of a famed 
media theorist, Lev Manovich, and his book The Language of New Media (2002). Like 
others throughout this section, his work is interested mainly in distinction – that is, in 
separating his new media from old media. It is not a work dedicated exclusively to the 
arts and, therefore, it does not speak about artistic objects per se but rather about that 
which he classifies as new media. Throughout this book he presents a systematic reading 
of his new media, built almost like a pedagogical, straightforward book about the 
qualities that make new media new. In his own words: 
 
This book aims to contribute to the emerging field of new media studies (other 
names which have been already used to describe it are ‘digital studies’ and 
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‘digital culture’) by providing one potential map of what the field can be. If a 
textbook of literary theory may, for instance, have chapters on narrative and 
voice, and a textbook of film studies may discuss cinematography and editing, 
this book proposes that new media theory requires the definition and refinement 
of separate categories such as interface and operations. (Manovich, 2002, p. 36) 
 
Manovich then starts with a reading of Dziga Vertov’s silent film Man with a Movie 
Camera (1927) as a perfect example of the qualities he deems exclusive to this new 
media. Vertov’s work, for Manovich, embodies and predates the challenges and 
possibilities created by new media. This film also serves as an example of the qualities 
and works continuously discussed throughout Manovich’s book and as a reminder of the 
similitude between film and new media. The qualities observed by him to exemplify new 
media are labelled ‘numerical representation’, ‘modularity’, ‘automation’, ‘variability’ 
and ‘transcoding’. I shall briefly review them in order to understand Manovich’s 
rationale, which, inevitably, led him to place new media closer to film than to other 
media. Numerical representation, to begin with, is presented as the basis for the creation 
of new media. Therefore, ‘all new media objects, whether they are created from scratch 
on computers or converted from analog media sources, are composed of digital code; they 
are numerical representations’ (Manovich, 2002, p. 49). This simple observation, that 
new media can be mathematically represented, is indeed correct but, as it is, can we say is 
it sufficient to make a distinction between new and old media? The answer is no because, 
as we saw before with Poltronieri, there are many other things that can be represented 
numerically (or, more simply, digitally). Manovich is well aware of this and so he 
continues to outline his view. Modularity, as he conceives it, refers to the capacity of new 
media to be presented discretely – that is to say, divided into units that in a way that 
resembles the behaviour of fractals. Like language itself, which is composed of 
interchangeable units, Manovich’s new media, given its capacity for being digitally 
represented, can be manipulated. The construction of new media objects, then, is done by 
a method of building modules into new media objects and those, in turn, are in reality 
collections of discrete numerical units that are also new media objects. ‘Media elements, 
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be it images, sounds, shapes, or behaviours, are represented as collections of discrete 
samples (pixels, polygons, voxels, characters, scripts). These elements are assembled into 
larger-scale objects but they continue to maintain their separate identity. The objects 
themselves can be combined into even larger objects – again, without losing their 
independence’ (Manovich, 2002, p. 51). These two qualities, numerical representation 
and modularity are responsible, in Manovich’s theory, for the other three qualities that, 
combined, characterise new media. Automation and variability are both related to that 
which we usually associate with new media and consequentially computers: programs 
and programmability. Because new media objects can be numerically represented and 
constructed by a modular process that we can automate, manipulate and change, 
transcoding, as a consequence, refers to the capacity of computing practices and 
conventions to alter our very understanding of things represented by the numerical code. 
The images given to us by computers, for example, while being a representation of a 
certain image that occurs in reality, also affect our perception of this very same image: 
 
In new media lingo, to ‘transcode’ something is to translate it into another 
format. The computerization of culture gradually accomplishes similar 
transcoding in relation to all cultural categories and concepts. That is, cultural 
categories and concepts are substituted, on the level of meaning and/or the 
language, by new ones which derive from the computer’s ontology, epistemology 
and pragmatics. New media thus acts as a forerunner of this more general process 
of cultural re-conceptualization. (Manovich, 2002, p. 64) 
 
It is not uncommon for us to think of our minds as computers. Neurologists, for 
example, use terms such as ‘short memory’, ‘deep memory’ and ‘unconscious process’ 
(similar to ‘deep’ programming languages) to describe brain functions. Likewise 
designers, among whom I must include myself, usually describe colours as particular 
Pantone hues or, yet, as RGB or CYMK numbers (used by monitors and printers 
respectively). Transcoding, then, is indeed a powerful analogy to describe the effects of 
new media in our lives. The problem with Manovich’s systematic reading is, then, what 
to make of all of this. If there is such a strict set of conditions for something to be 
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described as new media, and if all these qualities are as clear cut as he suggests, why do 
people like him still engage in this debate? The confusion seems to be, for him and 
others, a matter of defining the new. And the new, as we will see, is derived mostly from 
somewhere else; only the combination of all these ‘qualities’ is what makes new media 
new. 
New media according to Manovich is a by-product of two independent but 
eventually intertwined creations: the moving picture and the analytical machine. The 
combination of elements, above anything else, is what characterised the new media in 
contrast with the old media (Manovich, 2002, p. 21). Again, as we saw with Poltronieri, 
numerical representation and modularity are also qualities of language itself. It is only by 
uniting them with cinematic qualities that we have new media, according to Manovich. 
He provides some insightful examples. Perhaps the best one concerns how we operate 
and communicate with these analytical machines later called computers. The screen, in its 
rectangular two-dimensional format, is still pretty much the most common way to interact 
with computers. That is to say, computers and the industry that sprang from them still 
rely on a century-old format that was mainly developed by cinema. This reliance on 
convention is what Manovich calls into question (despite the fact that this convention in 
particular could also have been adopted from painting itself) and that, according to him, is 
what makes new media appear so close to film and therefore to film’s theory. 
This view, which posits film and computational technology as closely related, is 
interesting when considered in light of the popular label ‘digital art’: an artistic practice 
that, in turn, should rely on new media objects as conceptualised by Manovich. While 
Manovich is interested in positioning his new media objects within the umbrella of film 
and media studies, another popular book, simply named Digital Art (2003), written by 
Christiane Paul, Adjunct Curator of New Media Arts at the Whitney Museum in New 
York takes a more holistic view of those terms and technology. Understandable as it is, 
given that the book was conceptualised as a survey (Paul, 2003, p. 8) of practices, it is 
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still interesting to note the variation of interpretation of technology itself and how 
difficult is to define these very heterogeneous practices. 
Paul’s history of digital art (her adopted label), developed briefly in her 
introduction, follows a regular, well-known path. It is a history that acknowledges and 
rationalises the interdependency between digital art and its material culture, on one hand, 
and between digital artworks and art history on the other. While constructing these links, 
Paul, similarly to other authors, attempts to unite this new practice with the vanguards of 
twentieth-century art while simultaneously making it singular, given its particular 
material culture. In this view Paul, for ‘obvious reasons’, posits the history of digital art 
as ‘being shaped as much by the history of science and technology as by art-historical 
influences’ (2003, p. 8). In her brief introduction she reminds the reader of the 
institutional links between the complex scenario surrounding early developments in the 
field and the interplay between computers, military complexes and academic complexes. 
These developments, for her and to some degree for the argument put forward in this 
thesis, are what characterised the early production of digital art. It is interesting to note 
her recognition of Cybernetics: Or, Control and Communication in the Animal and the 
Machine, Norbert Wiener’s 1948 seminal work, which was a major force in the 
development of the field of the same name. For now we should note that, as opposed to 
Manovich, Paul’s history of digital art is firmly positioned in the context of the 
developments in the artistic field of the first half of the twentieth century. This narrative 
provides the reader with the assumption that 
 
Digital Art did not develop in an art-historical vacuum either, but has strong 
connections to previous art movements, among them Dada, Fluxus and 
conceptual art. The importance of the movements for digital art resides in their 
emphasis on formal instructions and in their focus on concept, event, and 
audience participation, as opposed to unified material objects. (Paul, 2003, p. 11) 
 
The construction of an argument adjoining both the history of computational art 
and art history is, as we will see throughout this text, a common feature of digital art 
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discourse. And, as we know, is also a defining characteristic of legitimatory discourses. 
Since it attempts to posit digital art as a consequence or development of previous artistic 
movements (in a very modernist fashion), Paul in reality is attaching a production that she 
believes is worthy (digital art) to previous highly regarded productions. By positioning 
her digital art within a larger art historical continuum, she is, in effect, attempting to 
transfer the symbolic capital of established styles such as ‘Dada, Fluxus and conceptual 
art’ to digital art. It is important to stress here that Paul is not in any way unusual in doing 
it so; neither she is insincere or manipulative. She is, after all, an art historian, and all 
historical texts on AST follow the same process, of attaching its history to larger art 
historical debates. In fact, all art history, criticism and theory do the same. Perhaps with a 
negative or positive contrast, highlighting both the continuities and the disruptions, this is 
the nature of the positioning game. That is what explains, categorises and justifies a new 
product as art. Hence, Paul’s positioning undoubtedly follows this most basic step and is 
also undoubtedly a strong element in the discourse that aims to legitimise the practice 
regarded as digital art. One element (very similar to Manovich’s remarks about the 
particular qualities of new media) that draws attention to this discourse and its process 
can be seen in the perceived relationship between Dada and logarithmic art. According to 
Paul, ‘The element of a controlled randomness that emerges in Dada, OULIPO, and the 
works of Duchamp and Cage points to one of the basic principles and most common 
paradigms of the digital medium: the concept of random access as a basis for processing 
and assembling information’ (Paul, 2003, p. 15). It is ironic that both Manovich and Paul 
perceive ‘random access’ as being paradigmatic to the computer only. Here we find one 
of the fallacies of this legitimising discourse. With a bit of thought, we can imagine the 
same situation presented in a book. Nothing after all impedes one accessing a certain 
page of the book randomly and non-linearly. Paul does not quote Manovich on this topic, 
but that is not surprising. This is a thought that is repeated by many writers and in a way 
has become an obsession for all: to search for what makes computational art an exclusive 
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practice and, at the same time, to place this seemingly new practice as art. This modernist 
impulse, in a formalist and Greenberg-like fashion, finds the real subject of the artwork in 
its very medium: its specificity. Instead of the flatness of the painting’s surface, for 
example, we have the controlled randomness of computers as the subject of concern. 
Paul’s method of classification then highlights more than the structure of her book only 
and also gives away the frame (or at least one of them) in which some people think about 
these cultural practices. If Manovich defines new media in terms of the questions raised 
by the moving picture and the computational apparatuses, Paul, on the other hand, defines 
the development of digital art as concerned with the arts and their preoccupations with 
medium specificity. Both authors, in fact, are searching for something unique and 
particular within these products. While Manovich is concerned with the specificity of the 
medium itself, Paul is searching for and promoting this uniqueness in digital art. Hence, 
for her, the ‘medium’s distinguishing features certainly constitute a distinct form of 
aesthetics: it is interactive, participatory, dynamic, and customizable, to name just a few’ 
(Paul, 2003, p. 67). Although admitting the difficulty in pinpointing exactly what she 
means is specific to the digital, since ‘the employment of digital technologies’ can be 
‘multiple’ and ‘hybrid’, she stress that her work emphasises the ‘formal languages 
specific to them’ (Paul, 2003). I cannot recall finding a reference to Greenberg in her 
book, but she has almost mirrored that classificatory system remembered as modernist: 
 
What had to be exhibited was not only that which was unique and irreducible in 
art in general, but also that which was unique and irreducible in each particular 
art […] It quickly emerged that the unique and proper area of competence of each 
art coincided with all that was unique in the nature of its medium. (Greenberg, 
2003, pp. 774–775) 
 
Paul’s emphasis on medium specificity seems to betray another problem and 
again one concerned with distinction and classification. Given the complexity of works 
made of not one but many forms and apparatuses, and the lack of a theory that defines the 
specificity of digital art as a whole, Paul resorts to what she dubs ‘themes’ (Paul, 2003, p. 
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139) that are employed by digital artists. Similar to the divisions used in big art shows, 
these themes are actually the headings within Paul’s last chapter, which is arguably what 
makes her work seen as a survey of digital art’s practice. Of all these themes perhaps the 
most enduring and popular  can be found in the theme of the body (other such themes 
include the questioning of randomness and control). By linking with questions raised by 
cybernetics, Paul finds a connection between the histories of art and of the production of 
digital art, via the debate surrounding the body (Paul, 2003, p. 139). This theme – the 
body – and its technologically informed reinterpretation, the ‘cyborg dream’, has indeed 
trespassed not only on the artistic field in question but also on the larger popular culture 
(and is the subject of Section 3.4). Being present in the form of film, literature and art, the 
debate over machines (computers) and the concept links between them and the body is 
undeniably a recurrent theme. The relationship between humans and machines and its 
consequent debate, I believe, has become more than a localised and temporal 
phenomenon: it is reflected in the positivistic impulses shown by sociology, for example; 
in the attention human modelling is given within academia; in the methods presented by 
the automatic algorithmic market; in prosthetic limbs, which resemble the imaginings of 
human–machine fictions of some decades ago; in the popular imagination; and so on. 
Since I will review some of these transhuman impulses in AST later on in this thesis, for 
now it suffices to stress the importance of this theme in Paul’s digital art and our AST. 
With this centrality in mind, we should not be surprised that some commentators 
consider this theme to be a central characteristic of the products of AST. One of the most 
active characters in the debate concerning both creating a discourse that rationalises AST 
and celebrating human–machine analogies can be found in the figure of Roy Ascott, 
founder of the Planetary Collegium (see the Introduction). A professor, writer and artist 
of the computational, Ascott has in a way become a guru – sometimes literary – of the 
field. He has been one of the leading figures since the late 1960s, and is also a prolific 
thinker on the subject. Ascott and his ideas, it could be argued, are the closest to 
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consensus the field may offer. His discourse, in one way or another, has such a reach that 
Carl Popper, for example, quotes him as being ‘the outstanding artist in the field of 
telematics’ (in Shanken, 2003, p. 1). Telematics is a blend of telecommunication and 
computational technology and is perhaps the most well-known concept develop by 
Ascott. According to Ascott, telematics can be defined as: 
 
a term used to designate computer-mediated communications networking 
involving telephone, cable, and satellite links between geographically dispersed 
individuals and institutions that are interfaced to data-processing systems, remote 
sensing devices, and capacious data storage banks. It involves the technology of 
interaction among human beings and between the human mind and artificial 
systems of intelligence and perception. The individual user of networks is always 
potentially involved in a global net, and the world is always potentially in a state 
of interaction with the individual. (Ascott, 2003, p. 232) 
 
The main reference used in this thesis is a collection of Ascott’s writings edited 
by Edward A. Shanken and titled Telematic Embrace: Visionary Theories of Art, 
Technology, and Consciousness (2003). A student of Richard Hamilton, Ascott was very 
much interested in cybernetics in his early days23 and, like most people before and after 
him, what most interested him was not the technology itself but the possibilities raised by 
it in regard to the human body and mind: 
 
The technologies of presence are preparing us for connectivity with artificial life, 
the creation of a cyborg culture. If we are leaving the old, classical, earthly body 
for another, it is not in order to dematerialize but to inhabit a new corpo-reality, 
which is almost totally artificial, bionic, prosthetic. Just as the artist is concerned 
no longer with the creation of content but with the construction of a context (the 
goal is a hypercontext), so, too, the brain seeks its hypercontext in the hyperbody. 
This is to talk about the post-biological body as interface. (Ascott, pp. 266–267) 
 
                                                      
 
23 In fact, as early as 1968 he contributed to the journal Leonardo’s second issue (Ascott, 1968). 
Leonardo is a central AST publication and has latterly been a nurturing institution for the same world; it will 
be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
  58 
Telematic Embrace, as the title itself suggests, is an ode of love regarding the 
possibilities of technology. For Ascott the computational revolution is much more than an 
increase of productivity, a decrease of physical distances or a new medium available for 
artists. For him and for many involved with this subject, the computer heralds a new time 
and a new human. These new possibilities in fact are his most beloved subject, and his 
views even (perhaps tritely) verge on futurology. He is undoubtedly a romantic over the 
computer, and that is why he is seen by some as a utopian (Shanken, 2003). A pause is 
necessary to clarify his perceived utopianism. Of course, one could argue in his favour, 
for example, by affirming that his rationale is correct, that new media will free human 
beings from their corporeal limitations, via telematics, and therefore expand our 
consciousness beyond our physical bodies; that the ‘post-biological body’, as described 
by him above, is indeed a possibility. People can believe (and they do) that with it we 
would achieve feats unknown in human or natural history. The logical extrapolation from 
telematics, if Ascott’s predictions are correct, would represent a new state of being. 
Facilitated by computing technology, the new human would be master of its essence and 
would, similarly to the act of programming, reshape itself at its own will. If we say Ascott 
is a utopian it is because we do not concur and do not believe this feat to be possible. 
Ascott is a romantic and not a rationalist because, as our technical knowledge informs us, 
we are very, very far away from his transhumanistic dreams24. Likewise, Ascott is a 
utopian and not a realist because, even after some fifty years of continuous development 
of technology, we are nowhere near his telematic existence (or at least the most radical, 
non-biological versions of it). If we say he is naïve, it is because nothing in the world 
confirms his convictions. Paraplegics still cannot walk, people still get sick and we are 
still very much bounded by our national, local and biological identities. Moreover, even if 
all these realities could be altered, would the political arrangements of humans change? 
                                                      
 
24 For more on transhumanism and AST, see Section 3.4.1. 
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Wouldn’t these changes just further intensify the differences between the haves and have-
nots? This question of utopianism is actually discussed (and dismissed) by Shanken in his 
introduction to the aforementioned book (Shanken, 2003). Using methods similar to 
Paul’s, of linking Ascott’s production with the larger concerns of art, Shaken returns to 
the artistic debate and negates the perceived utopianism: 
 
Whereas conceptual art deemphasizes the materiality of art objects to interrogate 
the semiotic basis of visual meaning, telematic art asks how the semiotic 
structure of computer networking offers alternative forms of authorship, 
meaning, and consciousness in the electronic ether of cyberspace. If telematic art 
is interpreted as an extension of conceptual art, then a significant aspect of a 
telematic artwork will be embodied in its own idea. Opposition to what has been 
termed the ‘techno-utopian rhetoric’ of telematic art may be responsible, in part, 
for the occlusion of this point […] While such critical challenges are important, 
this so-called rhetoric may, in and of itself, be considered a significant aspect of 
the art form. In other words, the conceptual idea of Ascott’s telematic art – that 
electronic telecommunications technologies may contribute to the creation of a 
networked consciousness that is greater than the sum of its parts – is an integral 
part of his work and the history of the genre. (Shanken, 2003, p. 86) 
 
For us the importance of this discourse does not reside in its overreaching consequences 
but rather in the manner in which the argument is played out. Combining and 
reinterpreting, in fact even predating, transhumanism (crudely speaking: the idea that 
humans will surpass the necessity of their physical bodies via technology), Ascott 
actually manages to create a gripping and optimistic view of the future. Although naïve, 
this view has attracted much support and, in effect, separates those with the vocabulary 
and expertise of telematics from those belonging to the old art25. For Ascott, art will not 
survive without a deeper involvement with his telematics and its new telematic world 
order (Ascott, 2003, p. 258). 
                                                      
 
25 This popularity, for example, can be seen in the proliferation of Ascott’s Planetary Collegium 
‘nodes’ around the globe. 
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When I say the reading of cultural production may vary according to context and 
ideological point of view, this is not merely an assumption. The next example, Julian 
Stallabrass’ Internet Art: The Online Clash of Culture and Commerce (2003), can be seen 
as a classic example of counter-balancing the more fictional approaches proposed by 
Ascott. Stallabrass is a professor at the Courtauld Institute of Art26, and his Internet Art 
has an obviously different tone from his other most famous work: High Art Lite: The Rise 
and Fall of Young British Art (2006). In Internet Art, Stallabrass explores not the whole 
world of AST but a subsection of it: namely that which is exclusively done through and 
for the Internet. This, I believe, is a wise choice since Stallabrass neither seems interested 
in all developments of Internet art nor seems to care about those which do not fit his 
criteria. Usually a harsh critic of consumerism in the arts, Stallabrass’ views are no 
different here, as Internet Art tackles questions very dear to the arts such as the object, 
ownership and production. He sees the productions of certain AST artists not guides for 
the future, as Ascott (2003, p. 11) does, but pretty much the opposite. Internet Art posits 
its cultural products27 as contemporary events of today. To do that it searches for the 
contextual scenario, the local politics and the economics in which his artists are present. 
So political in fact is his emphasis that, resembling Aracy Amaral (2006a, 2006b), a 
celebrated Brazilian theorist concerned with the social aspects of art, he talks about ‘the 
emergence of art on the Net [that] hands back to artists a prize and an obligation favour of 
artistic license and cottage-industry production values: an explicit social role’ 
(Stallabrass, 2003, p. 10). It is important to note that Stallabrass refers to a small and 
(literally) interconnected group of artists that, in a very similar behaviour to other social 
                                                      
 
26 Stallabrass’s participation is in itself noteworthy. He is not, like most of the sources mentioned in 
this text, an insider of AST. In fact the opposite is true. He has always been a very important figure within 
traditional contemporary art and his book was produced while he held a fellowship at Tate Britain. 
27 To talk about products in relation to Stallabrass’ Internet art is quite problematic since, for him, 
Internet art sits diametrically opposite the art world’s market and culture.  
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movements, have organised themselves and created their own channels of discussion and 
exhibition. These were not, like Ascott’s students and group, brought together by an 
ideology of transhumanism via computational technology; instead Stallabrass presents a 
sarcastic, anti-establishment and confrontational grouping – a collective, albeit loose, 
group interested in today’s questions and not in some future scenario. 
Yet, when we say Stallabrass understands Internet art as political, we are not 
saying he does not regard it as art. On the contrary: his Internet Art, like many of the 
other works reviewed here, flirts with the idea of positioning its subject within a larger 
historical lineage. Although highlighting the similarities between Internet artists’ 
discourse and the discourse of the early twentieth-century avant-garde – that is, ‘its anti-
art character, its continual probing of the borders of art, and of art’s separation from the 
rest of life, its challenge to art institutions, genuine group activity, manifestos and 
collective programmes, and most of all an idea of forward movement (as opposed to one 
novelty merely succeeding another)’ (Stallabrass, 2003, p. 35), he finds in conceptual art 
the real potential link between Internet art and previous artistic developments28. For him, 
conceptual art’s ‘break from the aesthetic of the isolated art object and the move towards 
an art of discursive process […] could be completed online, where the provisional, ever-
changing character of material is taken for granted’ (Stallabrass, 2003, p. 26). Moreover, 
also similarly to our previous examples, Stallabrass too sees a distinguishable 
characteristic in Internet art. Although affirming that Internet art is not a medium, and 
                                                      
 
28 Modernistic ideals were also especially present in the discourse of early computer artists (see 
Chapter 2). However, in time, that also would give away to a rereading according to conceptual art (see 
Chapter 3). Stallabrass identifies three reasons for avant-gardism in the early Internet art: ‘First, there was the 
need to carve out a recognizably distinct area of interest for this novel art. Second, since modernism and the 
avant-garde were one more lively models, the issue of autonomy had to be addressed. Third, it was a way of 
hitting out against disabling and over recursive strands of postmodern theory that had been used to shelter an 
increasingly conservative art world’ (Stallabrass, 2003, p. 39). 
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hence cannot be thought of under the banner of a single medium or form ( Stallabrass, 
2003, p. 24), Stallabrass posits two qualities particular to it. Firstly, ‘the most 
fundamental’ is its relationship to ‘data’ (Stallabrass, 2003, p. 26). Borrowing from 
Manovich’s conception of old media, Stallabrass states that, whereas ‘artists made unique 
objects in particular media in which the interface and content were inseparable[, …] in 
new media the content of the work and the interface are separated [and hence] a work of 
new media can be understood as the construction of an interface to a database’ 
(Stallabrass, 2003, pp. 26–27). This preoccupation with data, or information, identified by 
him as a conceptualist, argues for Internet art as a new kind of conceptual art. With this 
Stallabrass is both positioning his Internet art within the spectre of conceptual art and 
promoting it as an alternative to conceptual artists: ‘Online, Conceptual art potentially 
reinvents itself’ (Stallabrass, 2003, p. 33). His second distinguishing feature of Internet 
art is found in its interactivity. Here, differently from the popular view of interactivity as 
empowering, engaging and democratising artistic audience, he finds artists discussing 
interactivity in a negative and suspicious way (Stallabrass, 2003, p. 61). Writing in 2003, 
an aeon away from us in 2016, he perceives the Internet as scanty in depth, with 
interactivity and true engagement a yet-to-be-achieved phenomenon. Perhaps even worse, 
he and his examples perceive the Internet not as a space of utopian dreams but one 
‘lacking democratic values’, with an ‘increasing dominance of business ethos’ seeing 
interactivity and its uses as just another tool ‘that leads to the all important 0/1 choice, to 
buy or not to buy’ (Stallabrass, 2003, p. 67). Interactivity potential, for him, is found not 
in the tricks of machine interaction but in possible networks, ‘fostering transnational 
politics’ (Stallabrass, 2003, p. 83), giving Internet artists the ‘possibility of making their 
works act as political and social agents without the mediation of state institutions, 
commercial dealers and the print or broadcast media’ (Stallabrass, 2003, p. 104). 
Stallabrass, however, at the end of his work, ponders the definition of Internet art and, 
like this work, acknowledges the impossibility of reaching such a definition. Despite 
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recognising some particularities – its use of data and interactivity (as a catalyst of social 
engagement) – he concurs on the view that, although many links have been attempted 
between Internet art and art, usually adopting a formalism that emphasises the medium 
specificity of it, these projects have failed: ‘It is just this synthesis of content, media and 
transmission that makes definitions so difficult’ (Stallabrass, 2003, p. 139). 
Unsurprisingly for us, Stallabrass identifies these many possible arguments for an 
undefined (perhaps even indefinable) practice – arguments regarding the existence, the 
quality, the peculiarity and the validity of Internet art (or any other product of AST) – as 
resulting in something else entirely: ‘The outcome of that conversation has been a 
developing field of art, which, as we have seen, has been conceptually challenging and 
politically radical, but also emergence of a distinctive theoretical discourse’ (Stallabrass, 
2003, p. 143). 
 
1.3 Method: A comparative history of AST? 
 
It could be said that the authors we saw in the previous section all offer different takes on 
the production of an AST narrative, highlighting both its specificity and qualities. Their 
narratives are not in total concordance and one could say, rightly, that neither should they 
be. Despite painting different pictures from one another, these visions could and actually 
do exist in parallel. What they do represent, however, is the very battle over definition 
present in any given field of artistic production. By positioning AST as X instead of Y, 
each individual supports a particular point of view sustained by their own views of the 
world and institutions of art. As I have said before, my job here is not to choose between 
available discourses. What I am trying to show is that, despite their different takes on the 
same phenomenon, they all share a similar method. In order to achieve their objectives of 
sorting out the mess created by the artists, they create a canon of worthy subjects and 
artworks; they historically link these artworks to previous artistic developments and they 
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also create a discourse, based on these previous steps, to distinguish what they perceive as 
correct or worthy of attention. These efforts, similarly to Danto’s institutional ones 
(discussed in Section 1.1), are all involved in classification. Even Stallabrass, the most 
critically attuned theorist, despite recognising the impossibility of such a definition, also 
engages in an exercise of extracting Internet art from the larger AST (or new media as he 
sees it). They cannot give a picture of the whole field but only small sections of it. Others, 
such as Ascott, argue for the future potential, a telematic one, in order to influence the 
development of these productions. Others, such as Paul, focus on the various ‘themes’ 
present in what Paul labels as digital art. 
As pieces of critical analyses, following their own hermeneutical rationale, I 
believe all of them to be valid. They may be contradictory, but what they are doing is to 
reflect the heterogeneity of production in the first place; the artists, like the theorists, also 
have different points of view regarding their practice. This is indeed a problem and not 
only for this text. How can one recount the whole history of something if there is no way 
of discerning what you want to speak about? How does one describe something as 
legitimate if not all voices are heard? And what makes something legitimate anyway? 
The answers may not be what one expects. First of all we are comfortable in saying the 
neutrality of Becker and Bourdieu is in fact nothing but the opposite of neutral. They 
indeed do not wish to classify artistic practice explicitly, as Ascott, Danto, Manovich, 
Paul and Stallabrass do. That, however, does not change the fact that, as they observe the 
arts, they do in fact change our perception of them (as long as one is aware of them, of 
course). To observe is to interact and they, like everyone else, are caught in this circle. As 
they try to describe the functioning of the artistic legitimising process, they will 
invariably affect it. Theirs is also a particular view on the subject and, consequently, as 
long as people recognise the patterns of legitimation as they do, they will also affect the 
way people perceive and discuss art: that may not be their intention (nor is it mine), but it 
may indeed affect the perception of the field. Danto’s institutional critique, perhaps better 
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represented by Stallabrass and his insights into the institutional constraints of Internet art, 
is an example of the institutional reading of the arts. Inadvertently, this thesis may also 
fall into this circle. Since I do not intend to stylistically or aesthetically classify AST, by 
using the very term and as a result of its own method of inquiry (which is concerned with 
how a whole new network of people developed an art in parallel to art itself), I may well 
be creating another (imperfect) definition. This problem invariably takes us to the 
question of what we should look at. As this thesis is interested in the emergence of AST 
as a separate world, it is imperative then to concentrate our efforts on some particular 
areas of the field: its discourse, resources and institutions. Hence, I am aware that, by the 
very act of discussing one of the many possible stories presented in the field, I could also 
define it. This process is bias in itself but it is not naïve in its emphasis29, as have not 
chosen my case studies at random. They are events and institutions that are central to the 
mythology of AST. Since these subjects hold a canonical value for the field, in fact, 
members of AST themselves have already selected them for us. Consequentially, I will 
not talk about obscure AST artists or undisclosed contexts and events. What I will doing, 
however, is to review, via a sociologically inspired perspective, the events that are 
considered central in the development of whatever term you may prefer: digital, 
computer, new media, art and technology and so on. I analyse and contrast these events, 
characters, artworks, institutions and discourses not with the intention of delineating a 
particular stylistic or formalist conception of the vast production of AST but rather to 
demonstrate how AST got from A to B, from then to now, from early computer art and 
art & technology attempts to AST. 
At this point a paradoxical problem emerges: Is this thesis then proposing a 
history, a historiography, a sociology, a critique or, simply, a study of the material culture 
of the period and practice in question? Firstly, the study of emerging artistic practices 
                                                      
 
29 As seen in Becker’s premise (2008, p. 310), discussed in Section 1.1. 
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developed here is constructed on the basis of perceived facts existing both in the past and 
present tenses. Let’s take, for example, a central element of AST development, the 
microprocessor and the transistor revolution, portents of a new type of apparatus, the 
computational one. These apparatuses are still, relatively speaking, recent creations, being 
only popularised over the past twenty years or so and still reverberating through society 
as a whole. Respectively, in relation to the aim of this thesis – to understand an artistic 
practice via a developmental history as it is institutionalised – entails not only an 
apprehension of previous moments but also an acknowledgement of the present state of 
this very practice. If history, as it is commonly understood, attempts to represent the past 
via a particular narrative (Foucault, 2002a, p. 7; Caire-Jabinet, 2003, p. 11; Prost, 2008, p. 
235), then we could indeed say that this is a historical research. The problem, however, 
becomes more latent when we think about when history finishes (if indeed it does) and 
when we reach the present (Gombrich, 2008, p. 599; Braudel, 2011, p. 98). Where should 
we stop and say, ‘this is not history of art but rather contemporary art (history?)’? 
That is perhaps the main problem regarding art history in the context of new and 
relatively young practices that are not completely positioned within institutional, 
aesthetic, ideological or technical umbrellas; even though the practices that constitute 
AST are at least fifty years old and have passed through very established historical 
periods (post-war, the Cold War and the history of computing), AST’s history is very 
much up for grabs, depending on your epistemological, material and/or aesthetic 
concerns. While the traditional forms of art history, from Gombrich to Argan, are 
preoccupied with defined and consensual styles and periods (the Renaissance, Baroque, 
Romanticism, Modernism etc.), given the novelty of our subject, we cannot afford such 
stylistic generalisations, for these are histories concerned with canons and with 
established and validated forms of art. That is not to say that the thing we call AST has 
not moved in this same direction, towards consensual and institutionalised conceptions of 
itself, but rather that its canon is still in its infancy and, as its biography shows, it is still 
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very much a work in progress. My emphasis on AST’s institutions and on very few 
characters, for example, demonstrates an anxiety in relation to what is in effect a very 
ephemeral canon. Would it be more appropriate to regard this research as 
historiographical, being as it is more concerned with how the very history of AST is 
being constructed, instead of mythologising art history itself (Mansfield, 2002b, p. 1; 
Caire-Jabinet, 2003, p. 16)? Perhaps. But again, and quite reasonably, we are involved in 
yet another paradox. How can one analyse the predicaments and arguments for a certain 
history without being involved in a new, revisited history? This question will have to 
remain unanswered for now. 
Plausibly one might ask how it can be possible to explain a practice so new and 
vast if not by looking at its documents (the oeuvre) and its characters (the artists) only, as 
many art histories do? I do not, in any form, negate the value and insights that result from 
this kind of effort. Neither do I negate the very presence and importance, in art history, of 
these references or units of discourse. The fact is that, as Foucault (2002a, p. 26) has 
argued, despite its apparent simplicity, the very definition of oeuvre, for example, is not 
an easy one. Moreover, by concentrating my efforts on the society and culture to which 
these units of discourse (Foucault, 2002a, p. 120) belong, I hope for an unbiased 
(aesthetically speaking) survey of artistic practice: one that heavily acknowledges local 
contexts, pre-existing ideologies and the material culture in which AST is found. This 
emphasis on context, I believe, is central to the sociological, material and institutional 
preoccupations of this thesis. In contrast to a stylistically preoccupied history, this is 
broader; it is a history that, even though it may fall victim to the kinds of paradoxes 
described above, aims to remove itself from the art theory (as in proposing a theory of 
artistic practice) and critical theory (as in proposing a critique of artistic products) canons. 
AST, as a detached and heterogeneous artistic world, again, cannot be fully explained by 
phenomenological, stylistic or philosophical insights. 
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Perhaps the problem concerning the history of AST can be summarised between 
two approaches, a stylistic one and a formalist one. Stylistic approaches, as exemplified 
by Stallabrass, recognise an incapacity to define what the medium of AST is and, instead, 
focus their efforts on developing a theory that unites discrete elements within AST – his 
Internet art. Likewise, although Paul attempts to work within the constraints of a digital 
art – that is to say, art developed with computers – she also develops a collection of 
themes that are used as guides within a discrepant art world. Formalist approaches, on the 
other hand, as exemplified by Manovich’s new media, attempt to discern a set of 
characteristics that are unique and proper to AST. Since he is satisfied with his distinction 
between new media and old media, he does not attempt to discuss styles within AST 
artworks – to do so would require negation of the intrinsic value of new media and, at the 
same time, would destroy its specificity as a medium. Since all these attempts fail to 
comprehend the separateness of AST, as well as its peculiarity not as a medium or 
method but as a distinct artistic practice, this thesis cannot follow either of these 
constructions, formalist or stylistic. My method at once avoids the problem of styles and 
medium specificity by locating the emergence of a new art not in its objects but rather at 
the development of its discourses and institutions; it is, literally, a story of how people got 
together to do AST and how and why they did so. The theoretical components central to 
my analyses (institutions, political opportunities, technological changes, framing 
processes, contexts etc.) are drawn from a large but cohesive field of knowledge, a field 
that deals with social movements and their political dynamism. It is important to note, 
however, that mine is not a classic sociological method either, one that in some views 
completely disregards individuals and discourse in favour of large, social statistical 
samples (Prost, 2008, pp. 174–176). Additionally, it can be argued, in relation to my 
previous analyses of Bourdieu, that there is a tendency in some of these sociological 
studies to disregard the effects of time in favour of a stable mechanism that, somehow in 
this kind of narrative, persist in its entirety over time. Even though mine is a 
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sociologically inspired analysis of an artistic practice, I cannot and will not concur with 
any pretence to universality. This overarching universality, with some very brief 
examples (Prost, 2008, pp. 183–184), does not hold in the face of evidence. 
Notwithstanding these observations on atemporal and/or universal approaches, I 
do not mean to forecast the demise of insights by more positivistic authors. Could we, for 
instance, hold Baumann’s (2007b) study regarding the legitimation of Hollywood films to 
be a historical work? Is it possible that, despite not discussing the oeuvre of Hollywood 
cinema itself as an art history would, his is an art historical work? It all depends on who 
you ask. Baumann himself would probably not subscribe to this label. After all, in 
contrast to an art historian, he is not preoccupied with a historical narrative, the 
particularities of its oeuvre (films) and its authors; nor does he value artistic merit, 
aesthetic theories and/or biographies. So how can we see his work as a historical inquiry? 
There are two paths to follow in this analogy. Firstly, Baumann’s work, even though not 
intended to be a historical study, deals with a timeframe that is inherently historical. He 
may not be constructing a narrative of films and their creators but he is constructing a 
narrative of cinema, as a collective activity, and its development towards recognition. 
This is conceivably not the kind of enquiry people would ascribe to art history but it is 
history nevertheless. Following the ambitions of the Annales (and later the New History) 
school of thought, exemplified by the efforts of Fernand Braudel (2011, pp. 100–101), the 
study of society in general is blurred by its time; in other words, both fields of knowledge 
(sociology and history) are, in essence, talking about the same subject and are not, 
imperatively, mutually exclusive. Foucault, for example, who criticised the quest for a 
total history that is naturally multidisciplinary (2002a, pp. 10–14), was also very aware of 
the artificiality of divisions in these academic disciplines (2002a, p. 12). We could also 
quote historian Antonie Prost, for whom ‘the sociological affirmation is always, equally, 
historical because it focuses on the inseparable realities of very determined contexts; 
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therefore it is only valid at the respective space and time of these contexts’ (2008, p. 183, 
my translation). 
The second and perhaps most important fact to be aware of in the analogy 
between sociology and history regards the comparative method itself. This, I believe, is 
where historiographical method meets sociological method (Prost, 2008, p. 172). 
Sociology, a study of that which is general (otherwise it would not be a ‘social science’, 
which, invariably, studies that which is general to societies and not particularities), needs 
to examine social facts in X in order to compare them with others in Y. In this way, how 
does it differ from the comparative art historical method, which, in most part, deals with 
particularities of individuals and compares them with particularities of other individuals? 
What are the peculiarities if not ‘facts’ constructed in relation to something else? This 
method, resembling the medical one, of indirect experimentation, in which ‘it is 
necessary to determine whether the absence of a fact is followed by the absence of 
another or, inversely, whether the presence of a determined fact is always followed by the 
absence of other’ (Prost, 2008, p. 174, my translation), is nothing but an experimental 
method a posteriori that invariably forces the researcher into looking at similar 
constructed facts exterior to the first sample. Hence the need for a comparative social and 
cultural art history that, differently from the emphasis given by the sociologist, is 
interested not only in the general (the social) but also in the particular (the individual). 
Such an approach organises and reaffirms the understanding of both the art historical and 
the sociological methods employed by this thesis. Differently from the approaches of the 
authors described in my biographical review, this comparative art history relates both to 
the social and to the individual. This thesis is not a collection of artworks sorted by 
stylistic considerations or technological, medium-specific components. Instead, by 
focusing on the social and cultural contexts presented in various spaces, which are 
invariably subject to change over time, this thesis hopes to present a rather dynamic 
history and certainly not an immovable one – in other words, neither a simple collection 
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nor an idle anthology of AST. Finally, it is important to stress that this method, as 
sketched here, is not finished. A whole new study will invariably be needed in order to 
supplement some of the deficiencies of this thesis. I have not, for example, started to 
compare and analyse the works of historians concerned with a social history of art, as 
exemplified by T. J. Clark. Marxism may appear to be incompatible with an 
understanding of collective action but, being very honest, who knows? That is certainly a 
judgement that cannot be accomplished here. The method here should be seen as a first 
step and not, as one might expect, a complete and conclusive effort30. 
                                                      
 
30 For a long and ongoing debate between the merits and demerits of sociology of art, social art 
history, art history and artistic criticism, see Zolberg (1990) and Wolff (1993). 
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Chapter 2: The initial setting of AST: Computer art 
 
 
No artistic world develops in a historical vacuum, nor is it unconnected to its context, be 
it political, cultural or material. AST and its first appearance, as computer art, are no 
exception. It is only by understanding the connections of these early practitioners to the 
world at large that we can comprehend the rationale behind much of the action – and 
reaction – caused by those new cultural products positioned within the label ‘computer 
art’. 
There are indeed two elements, exogenous to the art world in question, that 
oriented and allowed both the production and the reception of those practitioners and, in 
turn, the people who would follow them in the next few years. These interconnected 
events are, namely, the Cold War (in which the West, and particularly the US, was 
focused on the containment and isolation of the USSR via an economic and scientific 
lead, resulting in the creation of the military–industrial complex) and the development of 
a rational formalist discourse (which arose amid rapid technological change; concerned 
belief in a process of total formalisation of human activity; and provided a framework for 
national policies vis-à-vis geopolitical strategies). Together these two events allowed 
early computer art development in a very specific manner: they provided the material, 
institutional and discourse opportunities in which the new art form would develop. These 
opportunities, allied with changes happening within the artistic field itself, informed and 
nurtured the early AST field and, as we shall see in this and the next chapter, are still felt 
today. The payoff from this enquiry is, therefore, paramount to our endeavour, as it will 
provide a framework in which we can read the subsequent years of computer art practice 
and, later, AST itself. 
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Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, we need to comprehend that computer art 
initially developed not only within academic and industrial settings but also, more 
generally, within the context of the Cold War. We should not underplay the importance of 
mutual annihilation and a technological race between two superpowers. From national 
policy to geopolitical struggle, from technological development to military application, 
from philosophy of science to street protests, all social facts of life were touched by the 
spectre of a dualistic world struggle between the US and the USSR. Albeit an indirect 
influence on the pioneering work of early computer artists, such is the importance of this 
conflict for our subject that it can be confidently asserted that the development of the 
computing industry, pivotal to computer art for obvious material reasons, was a direct 
consequence of both the Second World War and its resulting geopolitical struggle 
(Edwards, 1996; Ceruzzi, 2003; Kline, 2006; O’Mara, 2006; Longo, 2008; Alberts, 2010; 
Haigh, 2010; Laprise, 2011; Cortada, 2014). 
Moreover, not only did the conflict reorient the geopolitical landscape of the pre-
war status quo but it also affected the way economies and states as a whole were 
managed. US policy, as part of the Cold War effort, consequentially had shifted towards 
industries that helped the Cold War effort. Assuming a (ironic) statist and centralised 
disposition, the US diverted its investments to industries and universities rather than to 
the military itself, creating the now infamous military–industrial complex, an amalgam of 
private industries, government departments and universities working in tandem. This new 
funding system not only resulted in the leviathans of computing technology, such as IBM, 
but also made possible the development of myriad other industries (Haigh, 2010). IBM, 
for example, with vast previous experience in ‘office machines’ and huge state support, 
dominated the computing market. Likewise American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T), 
with a vast monopoly over the telephone systems in the US and hence sheltered from 
competition, profited from closer government ties, allowing the development of a unique 
corporate culture and excellent research capability (Kane, 2010). This only exacerbated 
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the gap between the US industries, universities and economy and those of its European 
allies. One effect of this gap (and the attempted bridging of it), especially in the years 
following the war, and of reparations efforts after the Second World War (the Marshall 
Plan), is referred to as the ‘Americanisation’ of the US’s European and Asian allies 
(Berghahn, 1986; Kipping and Bjarnar, 1998; Zeitlin and Herrigel, 2000; Kipping, Kudo 
and Schröter, 2003; Longo, 2008; Alberts, 2010). Unsurprisingly, as early as 1965 
Europe still had a very asymmetrical relationship with North American industry and 
science in general (Nau, 1975). This newfound affluence in the US also affected the 
people within those privileged industries, such as computing. With profits soaring, a 
labour relationship marked by a deep fear of Soviet influence and of consequential 
unionisation (better exemplified by McCarthyism), together with greater interventionism 
by nation states (Ikenberry, 1992), made resurgent the idea of early twentieth-century 
welfare capitalism, especially in industries attached to the history of ‘office machines’ – 
that is, analogue computers, already precursors of the practice of welfare capitalism in the 
early twentieth century. This preoccupation with employees, in turn, made the vast 
research compounds of tech firms in the US possible, by creating both huge new 
suburban neighbourhoods and careers (similar to those of early computer artists) that 
could easily move from academic to industrial positions and vice versa (Kaiser, 2004): a 
characteristic shared by both computer and AST artists alike. Moreover, the 
agglomeration of researchers from different areas into the same physical space, a rather 
open and liberal internal culture that promoted interdisciplinary work, and a blurring 
between workspace and life in general would, in some specific cases such as Bell Labs, 
create the necessary conditions for the development of partnerships and highly 
speculative work such as that of the early practitioners of computer art31. 
                                                      
 
31 It is important to note that these three developments did not allow computer art only. The whole 
AST field in fact is a product of these social, economic and political developments. If the reader is reluctant 
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Although better armaments help, that alone cannot explain why governments 
elsewhere, not only in the US, were keen in investing huge sums in technological and 
scientific research. In other words, why did technocrats and politicians everywhere bet 
that the future was attached to a nation’s technoscientific competence? What made them 
so sure that, by achieving scientific and technological development, victory and 
prosperity were around the corner? Our final link concerns the ideological, discursive 
aspects of the arms race and its most exuberant characteristic, namely the faith in 
technological development and rationality exhibited in the aftermath of the Second World 
War. With a mixture of national pride, fear of the enemy and a wish for a better future, 
post-war faith in the rational capability of humanity cannot be thought of outside the 
frame of Cold War politics and the geopolitical order after the Second World War. 
Simultaneously proposing a method and a rationale, supposedly rational, scientific and 
formalist theories painted a picture of a world that was controllable, predictable and, 
hopefully, better. This, for a world that had left its ‘darkest hour’, should indeed have 
sounded reassuring. On the one hand, if the geopolitical conflict accounts for the 
technical and economic developments that made possible computer technology (and 
consequentially computer art), on the other hand, a particular rational discourse provided 
early computer art with a frame in which to conceptualise its practice. Consequentially 
some computer art pioneers, seeing themselves as harbingers of a new society, a modern 
one, appropriated these discourses in order to justify their actions; theirs was the true new 
art for a new society. A product of the Enlightenment and integral to modernity, the post-
war faith in rationality was both a cause and a result of rapid technological development 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
to accept these changes as pivotal to the whole AST field, and not only to computer art specifically, consider 
that the very idea of the group E.A.T. (see Chapter 3), born in the heart of AT&T’s Bell Labs, would have 
been impossible without this institutional setting. These relationships will be outlined in detail later on. 
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that would, theoretically, achieve social and economic progress32. The reader would be 
correct in pointing out that this was not a new phenomenon. Misa (2004, p. 5), for 
example, reminds us that the ‘tie between modern technology and social progress was 
much in the minds of “modernists” in the early twentieth century’. What differentiates the 
post-war rationality and the early twentieth-century one, however, is not the object of this 
faith itself (rationality) but rather the scope of its effects. Despite the Cold War, people 
were genuinely optimist in relation to their future. Although brief, since we know that by 
the end of the 1960s this optimism had all but vanished, for a while there was a near 
consensus that the best was yet to come. This new rationality, an unreasonable one 
(Erickson et al., 2013), since it also dictated the precepts of mutually assured destruction, 
was so pervasive that it attempted to formalise, universalise and define all aspects of 
human activity, from art to science, from commerce to policy and so on. This general 
disposition is herein referred to as ‘rational formalism’. In its attempt to control the fate 
of mankind, rational formalism found in the digital computer both a tool and a symbol of 
its intent. The artists in this section, then, in a way, colluded with this program. 
This chapter (and Chapter 3) will describe the exogenous events that allowed 
AST to develop before dropping into the case studies themselves. Endogenous factors 
that were important for the development and reception of the new field, however, will be 
included within each particular artistic example. In other words, I shall first look at 
society at large and then settle into the artistic field. A final subsection, a conclusion, 
follows this pattern and works as a way to tie together the social and artistic events 
explored in each chapter. Arranged in chronological order, this collection of thoughts 
should give a clear picture of the dynamics between the arts, society and the historical 
context. Hence, for now it suffices to say that the next subject concerns the formative 
factors of early computer art. 
                                                      
 
32 For an in-depth discussion of rationality, modernity and technology, see Misa et al. (2004). 
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2.1 The Cold War era 
 
If there is one clear and documented narrative central to Cold War technological 
development, it is that digital computing technology is the result of the Truman 
Doctrine’s ‘containment’ – itself a reflection of ‘perceived Soviet globalist intentions’ 
(Edwards, 1996, p. 8). Under this perspective, as characterised by Edwards (1996), the 
paradigmatic narrative of politics and foreign policy was that of the closed world. That, in 
essence, constituted the global imperative frame in which most relations, both within and 
between states, were characterised. The closed world of Edwards can be defined as ‘a 
radically bounded scene of conflict, an inescapably self-referential space where every 
thought, word, and action is ultimately directed back toward a central struggle. It is a 
world radically divided against itself. Turned inexorably inward, without frontiers or 
escape, a closed world threatens to annihilate itself, to implode’ (Edwards, 1996, p. 12). 
Borrowing the term from literary criticism, Edwards creates a narrative of digital 
computing development based not on interrelated scientific discoveries, as usually done 
by historians of science, but concerned with the social and discursive conditions that 
informed its development during those turbulent years (Eriksson, 1998). His main 
argument, that computing technology was as much a product of pragmatic necessities 
arising from the complexity of an ever-watched world as it was a product of the belief in 
digital computers as tools for control, is constructed with the help of two elements, 
identified by him as pivotal in this undertaking: the ‘closed world’ and ‘cyborg’ 
discourses33. These two discourses, which he constructs from the works of Foucault and 
Wittgenstein, share the aspects of being discourses in the sense that: 
                                                      
 
33 If on the one hand closed world discourse provided the frame for all actors to think and act 
according to the other, the outside, on the other hand the cyborg discourse provided the metaphorical insight 
in which this other could be controlled. The cyborg discourse, as we shall see later in the description of 
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Foucault conceives of discourses as the sites where the objects of knowledge are 
constructed. In a sense, for Foucault the idea of a discourse replaces the more 
traditional notions of ‘institution,’ ‘convention,’ and ‘tradition.’ Discourses are 
the Wittgensteinian forms of life which institutions and traditions structure for 
their inhabitants. A form of life is not – or is not only – a form of experience. 
Discourses create and structure experience, but they are themselves primarily 
conventional, material, and linguistic, rather than experiential. (Edwards, 1996, p. 
38) 
 
Hence, Edwards concludes that: 
 
A discourse, then, is a self-elaborating ‘heterogeneous ensemble’ that combines 
techniques and technologies, metaphors, language, practices, and fragments of 
other discourses around a support or supports. It produces both power and 
knowledge: individual and institutional behaviour, facts, logic, and the authority 
that reinforces it. It does this in part by continually maintaining and elaborating 
‘supports,’ developing what amounts to a discursive infrastructure. It also 
continually expands its own scope, occupying and integrating conceptual space in 
a kind of discursive imperialism. Like a paradigm, much of the knowledge 
generated by a discourse comes to form common sense. (Edwards, 1996, p. 44) 
 
Right after the end of the Second World War this scenario, the closed world one, 
was already in place. On 12 March 1947, with a new struggle already on the horizon, 
President Truman delivered a passionate and alarming speech at the US Congress. Its first 
paragraph34 paints a picture of imminent disaster. This ‘Truman Doctrine’, as it would 
later be known, provided the first arguments towards Soviet containment. According to 
its rationale, the US, which had already spent over $341,000,000,000 in the Second 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
Norbert Weiner’s Cybernetics and Edwards’ cyborg discourse, provides then both the fundaments of human–
machine analogies and a logical description of how one can understand the cognition and behaviour of 
another being, in this case, the other, the enemy. By rationalising and formalising humans, these discourses 
not only equate humans to machines but also open up the idea that, as machines, as objects, the other and the 
self can be controlled, modified and transformed. 
34 ‘The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a 
joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved’ 
(Truman, 1947). 
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World War effort, should, then, continue to spend in order to stop ‘the seeds of 
totalitarian regimes’ (Truman, 1947). This definition of priorities and the quickly 
evolving events, soon resulting in the Marshall Plan and the formation of NATO, not 
only signalled the start of the Cold War, as an economic and technological race against 
the enemy, but also drew attention to the demarcation of boundaries between the Soviets 
and the West. 
From the perspective of conflict, of containment, three policies may be regarded 
as pivotal to the US strategy. Firstly, in foreign policy, the formalisation of a union 
between the US and its allies, in the form of the NATO alliance, not only sought to 
provide a military deterrent but also signalled a minimum political understanding 
between its participants. Underneath the rhetoric of its charter35, however, the hegemonic 
position and national interests of the US would undermine its allies’ economic interests 
and, furthermore, create tension between its participants (Maier, 1977). US foreign policy 
was so important in fact that it would inform two other pillars in the struggle against the 
Soviets. Trade policy, then, can be considered the second front on which the US would 
impose its will, via an ideologically motivated economic plan directed at both the US 
itself and its allies. Not only was there a push towards the isolation of the Soviet economy 
in the form of an embargo (Mastanduno, 1988) – since it was seen as a ‘war economy’ – 
but also US trade policy pushed for the creation of a new monetary and trade system, 
based on multilateralism and foreign assistance, which in effect would push its allies 
                                                      
 
35 ‘The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to 
safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of 
democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North 
Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace 
and security’ (NATO, 1949). 
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closer to its influence while, at the same time, keeping the Soviets away36. Despite not 
directly affecting its own business, the pressure on its allies was such that the US had to 
intervene. Foreign aid, which reached its peak with the Marshall Plan, became both a tool 
of military containment of the Eastern bloc, via a massive investment in rearmament 
(detrimental to local economies) and political containment (via the exercise of financial 
dependency). This dependency on Marshall aid, which redrew national politics as much 
as it did economies, 
 
was not only conditional on coalition governments marginalizing the influence of 
Communist parties but was also intended to push Europeans along the path 
toward closer economic integration. The secretary of state implied that Europeans 
were to view the problem of recovery as a whole, and see what contribution each 
could make to the mutual benefit of all. The program, he said, ‘should be a joint 
one’; rather than come to the table with individual shopping lists, European 
governments should think how best to coordinate their requests […] In short, the 
Marshall planners took the American structure of a federation of states with a 
single market as a ‘model’ for the direction in which Europe should move – not 
by force, but by persuasion. (Krige, 2006, pp. 21–22) 
  
The construction of this ‘informal empire’, done not by force but by allure and/or lack of 
alternatives, moved Western Europe closer to the US not only politically but also 
symbolically, in that it would be thought of and managed as a United States of Europe – 
under US guidance and control. The approximation between allies, already then a 
political, military and economic matter, also presented itself socially, in the sense that 
                                                      
 
36 The US’s firms, unlike the firms in Western Europe, had no links to the Eastern bloc and so did 
not oppose the commercial isolation of the East (Mastanduno, 1988, p. 128). In fact, ‘extreme anti-
communism exposed any firm that expressed even a passing interest in East–West commerce to the charge of 
trading with the enemy’, harming its own position in the American domestic market (Mastanduno, 1988, p. 
129). That is not to say, however, that America’s own economy was not affected by the new order of Cold 
War geopolitics. Once a staunch advocate of antitrust and free market practices within a decentralized 
economy, the US turned to a rather interventionist approach in the name of productive efficiency (Maier, 
1977, pp. 614–615). This economic warfare, however, was not without costs from the US perspective. 
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Europeans, distraught by war, simulated US institutions, resulting in their 
‘Americanisation’37 (Kipping and Bjarnar, 1998; Krige, 2006, p. 268; Alberts, 2010). 
Despite this hegemonic position, ‘one can also detect a desire on the part of many 
officials to promulgate a postwar system that would have a normative appeal to elites in 
other nations’ (Ikenberry, 1992, p. 320). 
The final pillar in the US strategy for Soviet containment – science policy – was 
also exerted under the scope of geopolitical struggle. As early as 1945, at the request of 
President Roosevelt, Vannevar Bush published the famous Science: The Endless Frontier 
(1945) as a ‘blueprint for postwar science and technology policy’ (Edwards, 1996, p. 58). 
This tract, which sought to not only inform but also direct research over the coming 
years, pleaded not only for more resources but also for a continuous statist engagement 
between the scientific establishment and government: 
 
The Government should accept new responsibilities for promoting the flow of 
new scientific knowledge and the development of scientific talent in our youth. 
These responsibilities are the proper concern of the Government, for they vitally 
affect our health, our jobs, and our national security. It is in keeping also with 
basic United States policy that the Government should foster the opening of new 
frontiers and this is the modern way to do it. For many years the Government has 
wisely supported research in the agricultural colleges and the benefits have been 
great. The time has come when such support should be extended to other fields. 
(Bush, 1945) 
  
This new view, of a government-led science, relatively new from the US perspective in 
peace time, resulted in continuous investment, at war levels, and rapid technological 
change. Here we find the birth of the military–industrial complex38. Apart from these 
                                                      
 
37 Although I have focused on the Americanisation of business practices, I do not negate the same 
influence on culture in general. For a broader overview of the implications of this phenomenon for culture 
(and also resistance to it), see Kuisel (1993), Poiger (2000), Scott-Smith et al. (2003) and Stephan (2005).  
38 Bush called for a ‘civilian-controlled National Research Foundation to preserve the government–
industry–university relationship created during the war’ (Edwards, 1996, p. 58). There was indeed a valid 
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obvious material effects, Cold War politics also interfered with the scientific 
establishment in a cultural and institutional manner. Firstly, whereas during the war effort 
science was centralised, done under the auspices of the military, the Cold War era 
brought to the fore the participation of both private companies and universities39. The 
newly created agencies that supported research in both industries and universities were, in 
effect, all contributing to projects of national security40. The main beneficiaries, however, 
were private companies that worked within the high-tech sector. From the early 1950s up 
to the late 1960s long boom, ‘computer, electronics, and other high-technology firms 
such as GE, IBM, Xerox, Polaroid, DEC, Texas Instruments, and ITT came to represent 
the new mainstream of corporate America’ (Haigh, 2010, p. 14). 
Secondly, science policy, similarly to trade policy, sought to bring the two sides 
of the Atlantic closer. Yet again the devastation of Europe presented an opportunity to an 
American-led restructuring of another field. If on the one hand the push for scientific 
integration could be seen as ‘a vehicle to promote American values’ (Krige, 2006, p. 2) 
and ‘to support doctrinal arguments about the superiority of liberal capitalism and 
democracy over Marxism-Leninism’ (Manzione, 2000, p. 49), on the other hand this 
integration, because of its imbalance, was responsible for the reconfiguration of the 
European scientific landscape by an American-led effort (Krige, 2006, p. 3)41. This 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
argument in his rationale. After all, it was only consequential to maintain and sustain the investments made 
during the Second World War in relation to the technological development of the war machine. 
39 That is not to say that basic research was done in an altruistic manner (Edwards, 1996, p. 59), nor 
that military involvement with the academy was only a Cold War phenomenon. For a complete and detailed 
discussion of the features of science policy, and how it affected the US’s allies in Europe, see Krige (2006). 
40 For detailed information on the construction of the military–industrial complex and its relation to 
academia, see Edwards (1996). 
41 This reformist effort could also be seen in the creation, between 1943 and 1950, of the ‘Food and 
Agriculture Organization, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
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internationalist push, similarly to the trade one, also contained a streak of self-serving 
American pragmatism. This scientific policy was perhaps best described as an instrument 
to foreign policy by 1951, with the publication of the Berkner Report, officially titled 
Science and Foreign Relations, produced for the US State Department as a guideline for 
scientific cooperation. Quoting the report, Miller (2004) details its objectives: 
 
The Berkner Report offered a four-fold rationale for a foreign policy of 
promoting expert cooperation. First, ‘science is essentially international in 
character’; ‘it is therefore an effective instrument of peace.’ Scientists, by virtue 
of their unique moral character, could avoid the political difficulties of 
cooperation faced by others, and scientific cooperation could serve as a model for 
other forms of international cooperation. Second, American science depended for 
its success on ‘access to foreign scientific sources,’ which could be best achieved 
through free and open ‘scientific intercourse.’ Third, science contributed to 
‘economic welfare,’ which in turn contributed to ‘political security and stability,’ 
and therefore helps to ‘counter the occurrence of economic depression and thus to 
offset the threat of Communist infiltration.’ Finally, science had become the 
keystone of national defence, which demanded that ‘the scientists of this nation 
be kept currently aware of the latest advances of modern technology, in whatever 
nation these may occur’. (Miller, 2004)42 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
and Cultural Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, World Health Organization, and World 
Meteorological Organization’ (Miller, 2004). 
42 Another characteristic of aid devoted to the US’s European allies in relation to its scientific policy 
was the many constraints imposed on the recipient countries. Not only would they need to pay for the 
reconstruction of science, with aid money, but they were also expected to concentrate on basic research only. 
Cash-strapped governments, however, had to convince that that aid money would help economically as well 
as socially, since aid was thought of as an essential resource directed at basic necessities. The results across 
the different European countries were mixed (Krige, 2006, p. 36). Geopolitically, however, the emphasis on 
basic research can be thought of, again, in relation to the Soviet threat. ‘The obvious advantage was that basic 
research was a long-term investment with no immediate or obvious interest to the Soviets’ (Krige, 2006, p. 
33). 
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2.1.1 The computing industry 
 
Integral to science policy, computing technology developed within the same frame of 
Cold War conflict and Soviet containment. The full rationale for its development was, 
predictably, control: control over the enemy, control over the future, control of discourse, 
control of the battlefield, control of one’s own nuclear capacity and, if possible, control 
over reality. For two decades, from the early 1940s until the early 1960s, the armed forces 
of the US were the single most important driver of digital computer development (Misa, 
1985; Edwards, 1996; Haigh, 2010). Edwards reminds us that, ‘though most of the 
research work took place at universities and in commercial firms, military research 
organizations […] paid for it’ (Edwards, 1996, p. 43). Indeed the ‘military–industrial 
complex’, as President Eisenhower thoughtfully defined it in his farewell address to the 
nation, was akin to the ‘technological revolution’ in its capacity to change the industrial 
and military posture of the US: ‘For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new 
electronic computers’ (Eisenhower, 1961). 
This massive state investment in high-tech industries and academic institutions 
allowed the development of behemoths of industry and of the academy. However, despite 
the enormous influence, mainly in the form of grants or by providing a market for 
computers, government-led sponsorship allowed for a great deal of freedom for 
researchers in both the industrial and academic establishments (Krige, 2006, chapter 8). 
The rationale for this arrangement, as exemplified by the development of operations 
research theory in the US, was that the scientific community had to be placed in an 
environment where its ideas could evolve freely. Developed during the Second World 
War, operations research, rather in the same mood as the Bush report, placed a heavy 
emphasis on basic research, free of direct military influence. It is thought that the results 
of such techniques were better than the results of a simply objective-based research 
approach (usual in military involvement in the sciences prior to the Second World War). 
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That is not to say that these scientific advances were not shared with the military. In fact, 
military observers were placed close to these research centres in order to peek at the very 
latest results in science and, in turn, provide feedback to scientist in order to help the 
development of actual equipment and/or techniques. The relationship between scientists 
and the military in operations research was, in the view of one of its proponents, akin to 
the relationship between a doctor and a patient (Krige, 2006, p. 232), where 
confidentiality, independence and mutual respect are pivotal for appropriate diagnostics. 
Apart from massive military investment, a multidisciplinary focus and the 
relative freedom given to researchers, three other characteristics define the military–
industrial complex and, in particular, the computing industry that arose from it. 
(i) Firstly, before the 1960s’ heavy investments, which created a niche and 
protected the industry, and despite being mostly financed by government agencies, the 
early computing industry was mostly composed of private institutions that did not have 
customers outside government (National Research Council, 1999, p. 87). IBM, for 
example, ‘underwent a dramatic shift toward defence work. Its first stored-program 
electronic computer to reach market, the IBM 701, was originally code-named the 
“Defense Calculator” and was launched as a response to the outbreak of the Korean War’ 
(Haigh, 2010, p. 16). Indeed, IBM would retain its central position, especially in 
mainframe computers, up to the 1980s, dictating both the development and use of 
technology (Bresnahan and Malerba, 1999, p. 82). From there on, as technology matured, 
its market expanded. Government was still an important player, being responsible for 
most investments in both equipment and research. New technologies, however, created 
new opportunities for new players that could not compete with the dominant IBM 
(Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999). Apart from creating giants such as IBM, state 
investments and a growing market (as well as the demystification of the computer), 
combined with a number of specialists drawn from the war effort who would end up as 
entrepreneurs or as employees, resulted in many other smaller but technically significant 
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companies focused on specialist technologies. The main idea was that, although the 
gigantic IBM dominated the world market for mainframe digital computers, a number of 
small firms would also develop with time. From the 1960s ‘this newly vital industry, 
dominated by “Snow White” (IBM) and the “Seven Dwarfs” (Burroughs, Control Data, 
GE, Honeywell, NCR, RCA, and Sperry Rand), came to have several effects on 
government-supported R&D’ (National Research Council, 1999, p. 96). 
(ii) Secondly, given its protected and guaranteed market, some of the behemoths 
of technology also became investors in basic research. Their extraordinary position 
allowed for the support of ‘several large and highly productive research facilities, such as 
IBM’s T. J. Watson Research Center, American Telephone and Telegraph’s […] Bell 
Laboratories, and the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center’ (National Research Council, 
1999, p. 31). These centres, later even referred to as ‘industrial Versailles’ (Knowles and 
Leslie, 2001), represented the peak of Bush’s recommendation of fostered research and 
Morse’s operations research, free of direct military interference and championing a 
multidisciplinary approach to science and its relationship to industry. It is no surprise, 
then, that the term ‘big science’ had emerged within this context (Weinberg, 1961, in 
Reynolds, 2010, p. 378). 
(iii) Finally, the privileged position of those businesses was also reflected 
towards employees who, differently from their European counterparts, enjoyed a revival 
in the early twentieth-century idea of welfare capitalism in their industry (Haigh, 2010) at 
the same time as the social policies of the New Deal were under attack (Griffith, 1982; 
Haigh, 2010, p. 13). The rationale in the minds of corporate liberals, as the historians 
recall those in favour of welfare43 capitalism, was motivated by a twofold strategy: they 
wished to avoid government intervention, in the form of New Deal policies and 
                                                      
 
43 For an in-depth review of welfare’s historiographical construction – and consequential debate – 
see Delton (2013).  
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regulations, while repelling any attempt at unionisation by their employees (Delton, 2013, 
pp. 63–64). The early computing industry, largely a development of companies stemming 
from the ‘office machines’, was already devoted to such practices in the pre-war years. 
With the advent of Cold War policies, and of anti-communist sentiment, the desire to 
avoid unions became paramount. As a result, the US had the smallest unionised work 
force of the Western bloc (Western, 1993). The effects of welfare capitalism, the desire 
for non-interventionist practices, the creation of larger-than-life scientific–industrial 
establishments and the relatively guaranteed market for some of those high-tech 
industries resulted in a unique corporate culture. Whereas before people in academic 
institutions would be confined to their departments, now the norm dictated that they 
should mingle. Not tied by academic discipline or by military procurement, scientists 
were free of economic and managerial pressure to pursue their own ideas. These were the 
times of large suburban developments, creating not only new neighbourhoods but also 
new scientifically and industrially oriented communities (Kaiser, 2004; O’Mara, 2006). 
As we shall see later in this chapter, these three characteristics were pivotal to early 
computer artists, who, unsurprising, sat at the centre of the military–industrial complex. 
 
 
2.2 Faith in rationality 
 
If so far I have discussed the material context that computer art emerged from; the next 
topic shall be the discursive and ideological scenario of computer art – namely, rational 
formalism. It is important to begin this section by affirming that I will not attempt to 
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survey the many ideas of rationality 44 . Instead, my intention is to delineate the 
characteristics of rationality specific to the Cold War. It is from the perspective of 
rational formalism that the conflict was managed, planned and conducted. Moreover, not 
only did it provide a framework for action (as in the strategies of mutually assured 
destruction, the RAND Corporation, radar networks, war games etc.) but rational 
formalism also provided the legitimate, authoritative discourse of action. Serving both as 
instrument and justification, since its theoretical output assumed a scientific, universal 
and timeless character, rational formalist theories are central to understanding both early 
computer art and the Cold War. While the conflict specifically nurtured computer art via 
a supporting network of institutions and industrial practices, rational formalism was a 
much broader phenomenon and affected not only computer art but also the artistic and 
intellectual fields in general (the subject of Section 2.2.1). 
                                                      
 
44 This monumental task, unfortunately, cannot be achieved within this thesis. Moreover, the very 
definition of ‘rational’ presents another problem: What is rationality and how does one go about in order to be 
rational? This is a philosophical exercise that, I am afraid, is perhaps endless. This text is preoccupied more 
with the assumptions of rationality, embodied as a rational discourse of reality, and is therefore close to 
Weber’s conception, in the sense not only that we experience a rationalised attempt to organise and improve 
our condition but also that there is a conscious effort to do so. The effects of ‘means–end’ and not the dangers 
of the ‘iron cage’ interest us. The difference here, in modernity, is that the discourse of rationality becomes 
prevalent, is detriment of all other forms of knowledge and, again, is exemplified by Weber’s paradox of 
disenchantment (Kalberg, 1980). This thesis thus assumes that there are many rationalities and not one. It is 
not that humans before the Enlightenment, for example, were savage beasts without any trace of rational 
thought; after all, ‘even everyday actions of “primitive” man could be subjectively means–end rational, as for 
example, when specific religious rituals were performed with the aim of receiving favours from a god’ 
(Kalberg, 1980, p. 1148).  
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‘Cold War rationality’ (Erickson et al., 2013), simply put, can be thought of as a 
guiding principle in which technocrats could think and act in a scenario of increasing 
complexity where ‘the traditional forms of practical reason and statecraft, which 
emphasized prudence, experience, deliberation, and consultation, seemed inadequate to 
the challenge, as outmoded as conventional weapons in comparison with nuclear 
arsenals’ (Erickson et al., 2013, p. 3). Its central characteristics (formalist, universal and 
computable) were as much a result of conflict, perceived as increasingly demanding and 
complex, as they were part of a long intellectual tradition that sought to formalise, via an 
axiomatic structure, all areas of knowledge. Resulting in a ‘formalistic language’, 
interpreting ‘war using categories of games, bargaining, production and management’, it 
‘reinforced the view of war as a rational problem, rather than a struggle with its roots in 
ancient feelings of patriotism, desires for justice, and resentments of foreign intervention 
that might not respond to a “rational” challenge’ (Edwards, 1996, p. 143). This 
formalisation of procedures, as a means to an end, was therefore pivotal to policymakers 
and, under the guidance of rational discourse, not only created an apparently unstoppable 
discourse (perhaps a nod to Weber’s ‘unstoppable force’) but also informed much of the 
investment being made during the cold conflict. It is important to stress that the rational 
formalist discourse was not only present in the Cold War rationality as described by 
Erickson et al. (2013). Its influence was much broader. Although not constituting a single 
field or theory, it was instead felt as a general disposition of intellectual fields. 
Before we proceed to some clear examples, we must, however, briefly discuss the 
raison d’être of these numerous rational formalisms. In other words we need to discuss 
the meanings of ‘rational’ and ‘formalism’ and, in relation to the first two, the post-war 
‘faith’ in the approach’s capacities. The rational, as conceived in this text, should be 
perceived as an obligatory prerequisite for truth-searching methods. It is then a 
disposition, a modern one, derived from the Enlightenment and thus substituting for all 
previous forms of knowledge where truth was found. To be irrational, in other words, is 
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to be immoral, false and hence lacking the foremost requisite of truth. The first contours 
of this discourse can be found in the works of Descartes45. Under Descartes’ predicate, 
truthful, real knowledge could only come into existence by the exercise of reason and 
not, as he thought of his rivals and ancient predecessors, by ‘just following the passions 
or memorized patterns of actions’ (Jones, 2001, p. 53). Descartes’ reasoning, understood 
by him to be common to all humans and exercised by training46, was the basis for real 
knowledge since it spoke to universals and particulars alike. To read reality as history, as 
a series of interconnected discrete events, allowed one to be dependent on genius, luck or, 
even worse, deceptiveness. Under this view, ‘epistemic failings led inevitably to moral 
ones’ (Jones, 2001, p. 58). The break with classical thought is found, then, in the 
construction of a systematic and clear description of events. For Descartes and his 
contemporaries, Greek and Roman thinkers were geniuses but not less lucky to have 
constructed their body of knowledge since, under this new epistemological (and moral) 
assumption, particulars were not of importance: one should aim to explain the general in 
order to claim truth. Only from the general would the particular be understood. For 
Descartes, geometry, then, can be seen as an attempt to exercise this discourse since, for 
him, ‘all problems in Geometry can easily be reduced to such terms that there is no need 
to know more than the lengths of certain strait lines to construct them’ (in Jones, 2001, p. 
51). Histories (as he decried its competitors), with their collections of disparate events, 
relied too much on memory alone and not on reason. To not be able to comprehend the 
                                                      
 
45 For thoughtful, deeper discussions of Descartes and the development of the modern mindset, refer 
to Jones (2001) and Gray (2008). 
46 This ‘spiritual exercise’ was akin to a physical exercise in the sense that it virtuously protected and 
improved the body. According to Jones (2001, pp. 42-44), this idea, coming from Cicero, was widely 
disseminated in early modern Europe. The virtuous mind would find in this exercise a mathematical, game-
like quality (his geometry), ‘the deeper truth of things’. 
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whole picture and instead to focus on the units of a thing was akin to losing the capacity 
to think47. 
For Descartes, then what could be universal, clear and self-sufficient? Here we 
find the paradigmatic importance of mathematics as the universal language of science 
(the general) as opposed to the humanities (the particular). At the core of this new 
conception of ‘mathematics as poiésis is the technique of construction’, where the newly 
conceptualised (Cartesian) mind ‘uses as its template the adeptness of the intelligence in 
solving problems by means of this [mathematical] technique’ (Lachterman, 1989, p. 26) 
and, in its most radical version, presents a novel, modern ontology. Mathematics, a 
product of the newly conceptualised mind, representative of a spiritual exercise, equated 
to goodness and virtuousness, was then thought not to renovate ancient Greek knowledge 
but to propose a completely new method of inquiry. The intention behind Descartes’ 
method, however, was not in mathematics per se. In fact ‘Descartes rejected standard 
mathematical proof […] no consensus existed around the objects of mathematics, its 
proof techniques’ (Jones, 2001, p. 45). Mathematics, true mathematics, was yet to be 
realised and for Descartes it ought to be constructed and not merely used or applied. That 
the ancients had written so many books was, for Descartes, proof that ‘they did not have 
the true method for finding all’ solutions (Jones, 2001, p. 49); only a new mathematics, 
constructed by his reason, systematic and pure, could explain it all. Exercising its own 
philosophy, Cartesian geometry – which sought to replace lines with points in 
coordinates, and in effect created symbols to represent itself – according to John Stuart 
Mill, ‘far more than any of his metaphysical speculations, immortalized the name of 
                                                      
 
47 Lachterman (1989, p. 135) reminds us that history, ‘in the following crucial respect, is like pre-
Cartesian philosophy (and theology): it is a matter of opinion, more exactly, of many, diverse opinions […] it 
designates the antithesis to Cartesian science, for we are passively exposed and can succumb to opinions, 
while science is always a matter of the mind’s active invention’. 
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Descartes and constitutes the greatest single step ever made in the progress of the exact 
sciences’ (in Lachterman, 1989, p. 141). Following Descartes’ philosophical postulates 
concerning universality of methods, this was a geometry that ‘proposed to explicate the 
phenomena of nature’ (in Lachterman, 1989, p. 142), not discreetly, bit by bit, but as a 
whole, as an undivided being. 
Descartes was but one of many early modern thinkers. Their methods naturally 
varied48. Nevertheless Descartes serves as an example of a new rationality, a modern one, 
anchored in the new truth-seeking methods exposed by the Enlightenment, which, suffice 
to say, came at the expense of previous methods for truth, particularly the religious 
ones49. That is not to say, of course, that God, the Christian one, disappeared overnight. 
                                                      
 
48 For a complete introduction to this history, see Gower (1997). According to him, ‘there were at 
least two dimensions to the debate about scientific method in the seventeenth century. One of these 
dimensions was concerned with the roles of mathematics and experiment. Galileo and Descartes recognised a 
role for both in their accounts of method, though they placed the greater weight on mathematics. Their view 
was shared by Hobbes in England. Bacon, too, recognised a role for both mathematics and experiment, but 
both he and Harvey placed the greater weight on experiment. Their view was shared by Boyle, Hooke and 
other founders of the Royal Society. A second dimension was determined by reactions to conflicting 
conceptions about the aim of scientific method. Some, like Bacon and Descartes, sought to preserve the 
traditional view that science is concerned above all with knowledge of causes, and that methods should be 
devised which will help us achieve this aim. Others, such as Galileo and Harvey, took the view, also 
sanctioned by tradition, that the absolute certainty of conclusions reached is crucial, and methods should 
secure that aim’ (Gower, 1997, p. 67). 
49 This disenchantment with the world, a modern characteristic, meant that ‘in earlier times the 
ultimate purposes of life were seen as part of the fabric of the world, as part of the Greek “cosmos” or of 
Christian “creation”; the description of fact and the affirmation of norms were not sharply distinguished. The 
modern era, by contrast, has recast rationality as simply the calculation of efficient means to given ends. This 
narrower, instrumental conception of reason was what, in Weber’s eyes, brought about the unprecedented 
increase in knowledge and power, prediction and control, characteristic of modern science’ (Larmore, 1996, 
p. 190). 
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Instead it was the creation of a method, not the substitution of God, that would produce 
effective rational results50 and truth. This development, one of emancipation – that is to 
say, humans emancipated by reason, as in Kant (Dupré, 2004, p. 7), where people should 
not blindly follow theological predicates but instead themselves – resulted in a 
declaration of war against unexamined traditions. Hence Kant ‘regarded no act as truly 
free unless it was based on reason and promoted the rule of reason. Good and evil depend 
on the law of reason: they are constituted in and through that law’ (Dupré, 2004, p. 11). 
Paradoxically, many early moderns did not lose their faith: 
 
Christianity, for centuries the core of European culture, had left a tradition of 
values on which even secular intellectuals remained dependent long after having 
abandoned their faith. Most professed a belief in God even while adhering to a 
philosophy that emptied the idea of God of its traditional content. They continued 
to regard the idea as indispensable for morality, though morality had largely 
ceased to rely on it. (Dupré, 2004, pp. 14–15) 
 
 
This new morality, born out of the Enlightenment, which equated knowledge and 
freedom, ‘associated political intolerance with monotheism in general and Catholicism in 
particular, and advocated the separation of church and state as a necessary condition of 
individual liberties’ (Turner, 2011, p. 131). Ironically, Turner reminds us that: 
 
Kant distinguished between religion as cult, which seeks favours from God 
through prayer and offerings to bring healing and wealth to its followers, and 
religion as moral action that commands human beings to change their behaviour 
in order to lead a better life. Kant further elaborated this point by an examination 
of ‘reflecting faith’ that compels humans to strive for salvation through faith 
rather than the possession of religious knowledge […] In order to have 
autonomy, human beings need to act independently of God. In a paradoxical 
fashion, Christianity implies the ‘death of God’ because it calls people to 
personal freedom and autonomy without any divine assistance. Hence the 
Christian faith is ultimately self-defeating, because human maturity implies that 
                                                      
 
50 For a broader discussion on the topic, viewed under the scope of sociological theories of 
secularisation, see Turner (2011). 
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an autonomous individual would no longer need the support provided by 
institutionalised religion. (Turner, 2011, pp. 4–5) 
 
Secularisation, from this point of view, is intrinsic to Judeo-Christian monotheism and 
thus ‘does not consist in the illegitimate expropriation of the divine attributes and in their 
Promethean transference to man’ (Larmore, 1996, p. 42). The new modern does not, then, 
replace God with himself. They cannot control reality at their will, neither are they able to 
account for its totality (although I think rational formalists would very much appreciate 
that). With the end of religion we have the transference of authority from an all-powerful 
entity to a method: no longer would men require God to explain the world, nor would 
God’s word command it. The new human, rational and hence free, now responded to a 
good and correct system. It was this new authority, emanating from its own rational 
method, that would command human action. I should stress then that, when referring to 
faith in relation to a certain method (e.g., the rational formalist one), I am referring to a 
belief that this particular discourse is authoritative. It was from these ideas that reality 
would and could be explained and consequentially controlled. Rational formalism’s wide 
impact, covered in the next section, can be seen to be acting within various academic 
fields transformed or created in order to accommodate it. But that is not to say that 
rational formalism would only affect intellectual and academic playgrounds. This faith, in 
fact, was externalised as action, for example, in the form of modernisation theories of the 
post-war order. And, in this sense, for ‘the modernization theorists, the whole world was 
destined to converge with the model of modernity limned by the contemporary United 
States’ (Gilman, 2003, p. 14). Modernisation theory(ies), in short, broadly refers to the 
contentious idea that economic and technological progress equates the development of 
democracy to increased communal well-being (Lipset, 1959; Feldman and Hurn, 1966; 
Grew, 1977; Stearns, 1980; Gilman, 2003; Berman, 2009; Inglehart and Welzel, 2009). 
The contentiousness of its assertions, however, is more of a recent development, 
beginning with the cultural turn of the late 1960s (the subject of Chapter 3) and, although 
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yet professed by certain intellectuals even today (Berman, 2009; Inglehart and Welzel, 
2009), modernisation is mostly seen as the by-product of the 1950s’ and 1960s’ Cold War 
faith in rationality (Grew, 1977; Gilman, 2003). This theory, exercised as part of the US’s 
foreign policy, ironically resulted in the support of autocratic governments from Africa to 
Latin America51. In this respect the work of Gilman (2003) is illuminating. By tracing the 
network of academic institutions, government agencies and intellectuals, as well as the 
development of the very idea of progress in the post-war scenario, Gilman’s work maps 
the influence and perverseness of this (naïve) faith52. By referring to Habermas’ reading 
on the topic, Gilman reminds us that: 
 
The modernism of the modernization theorists was not the modernism of 
Nietzsche, Kafka, or the Dadaists, but rather that of August Comte, Piet 
Mondrian, and Le Corbusier. Rather than a modernism of iconoclasm, madness, 
and irrationality, it was a modernism of order, plan, and mastery. Rejecting the 
emotionality and spirituality of romanticism, this form of modernism celebrated 
the ideals of the Enlightenment: the power of science, the importance of control, 
and the possibility of achieving progress through application of human will and 
instrumental reason. Modernists in this tradition, like the modernization theorists, 
                                                      
 
51 Bockman (2006, p. 51), succinctly describing Gilman’s (2003) theory, says that: ‘In the early days, 
modernization theorists argued that economic development would bring political and social liberation, but 
they later changed their tune and supported the funding of authoritarian governments and military regimes to 
enforce stability in the supposedly childlike Third World. Gilman proposes several explanations for the 
hegemony of modernization theory: that the modernization theorists’ shared assumptions about American 
society “made [these] scholars believe that they were onto something” (p. 16); that the deep insularity of the 
group caused them to ignore other, countervailing intellectual trends; and that the status of modernization 
theory as the dominant paradigm induced its adherents to continue working within this paradigm and to 
ignore criticisms and anomalies until a paradigm shift occurred in the late 1960s.’  
52 Retrospectively, by looking at the assertions of one of the founding intellectuals of this movement, 
one can see the naiveté of its propositions: ‘Perhaps the most widespread generalization linking political 
systems to other aspects of society has been that democracy is related to the state of economic development. 
Concretely, this means that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain 
democracy’ (Lipset, 1959, p. 75). 
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saw themselves as the culmination of an Enlightenment purged of the intellectual 
conceits of the philosophes, the sanguinary hubris of the Jacobins, and the 
epistemological naïveté of positivism and realism. Thus the modernization 
theorists saw their project as the Enlightenment writ large: a welfare state based 
on progressive income taxation, democratic accountability, social levelling and 
‘integration’ as a solution to social conflict, techno-logical fixes, and industrial 
prowess. (Gilman, 2003, pp. 7–8) 
 
 
Hence, by way of Lyotard’s commentaries on Parsons, another pillar in modernisation 
theory, Gilman concludes that: 
 
These discourses shared a hidden faith that rationalism, social scientific 
universalism, and cultural relativism represented the convergent tendency of all 
states and societies in the modern world. Built on a foundation of American 
national self-confidence, these various social modernist discourses were mutually 
reinforcing during the 1950s, and modernization theory stood at the center of this 
discourse. (Gilman, 2003, pp. 241–242) 
 
Modernisation theory might not have been fully formalist in the way that other disciplines 




2.2.1 Rational formalism in action 
 
Rationalists of all types were the backbone of early Cold War intellectual authority in the 
US: they commanded the big budgets; they promoted the idea of modernity abroad; they 
endorsed the military–industrial complex; they constituted the big science projects; they 
held the key to knowledge and truth. Representing a new authority, this ‘new priesthood’ 
(White in Erickson et al., 2013, p. 10), flown around the US for consultations and 
conferences, worked for government and industries alike and were central in shaping 
Cold War policies. For some of them a particular method, a scientific, rational formalist 
one, by way of mathematics and reason, was what could universally explain the world. 
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They were the new authoritative voice of reason. Similarly to early moderns however, 
Cold War rationalists, with their many distinct approaches and emphases, cannot be 
thought of as a single entity. Yet, we can argue that what united a large section of this 
group was a faith in axiomatic, formalist and universal mathematical structures. A 
product of mathematical formalism, the projects and ideas of this new priesthood evolved 
not only towards a mathematical description of conflict but also of society itself53. 
Economic systems, social interactions and communication could all be described by a 
limited string of symbols, drawing upon the abstraction of mathematics itself. Mimicking 
Maddy (1989, p. 1123), it is possible to ask: What is it, then, to regard mathematics as a 
formal game? Maddy, a staunch Platonist – that is, believer in the existence of 
mathematics as external to itself – defines formalism (mathematical) in relation to its 
limitations: 
 
What you hear from the mathematician intent on avoiding philosophy often 
sounds more like this: ‘All I’m doing is showing that this follows from that. 
Truth has nothing to do with it. Mathematics is just a study of what follows from 
what. This position is Formalistic in that it denies truth-value, and perhaps 
meaning, to mathematical statements as standardly understood, and it treats the 
choice of mathematical assumptions as arbitrary. On the other hand, mathematics 
is neither a game with symbols nor pure metamathematics; rather, it is the study 
of logical consequence.’ (Maddy, 1989, p. 1124). 
 
More recent debate has come to see this difference, between different schools of 
mathematics, as mere miscomprehension of theory (Marek and Mycielski, 2001, p. 451). 
The characterisation between these schools is even more problematic for physicists and 
economists (Weintraub, 1998), for whom mathematics is the language of the trade. Yet 
we can, despite our partial knowledge of the subject, discern some characteristics that are 
                                                      
 
53 Ironically this rational discourse, of rationalism, that is to say, with an emphasis in reason and a 
priori knowledge (as in Descartes), opposes that which we today have come to recognise as proper scientific 
thought – that is, empiricism (Dupré, 2004, p. 7). 
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common to all discourses of formalism in mathematics. Firstly, mathematical formalism 
regards mathematics itself as a game of finite symbols that attempts to describe 
mathematics according to its own logic. In this formalistic approach, there is an attempt 
to describe, prove and construct axioms of the approach’s subject (the corpus of a certain 
discipline) via a rational effort that describes the most basic units of the subject itself. 
Formalism in mathematics, usually ascribed to German mathematician David Hilbert54, 
notwithstanding its method, can be seen as proposing 
 
a new foundation of mathematics based on two pillars: the axiomatic method, and 
finitary proof theory. Hilbert thought that by formalizing mathematics in 
axiomatic systems, and subsequently proving by finitary methods that these 
systems are consistent (i.e., do not prove contradictions), he could provide a 
philosophically satisfactory grounding of classical, infinitary mathematics 
(analysis and set theory). (Zach, 2006, p. 411) 
 
The tendency to rethink or rewrite all previous knowledge in a set of axiomatic 
postulates was hugely influential. It attempted, in a way, to build a corpus of knowledge 
without inconsistencies and that, consequentially, could be used as a basic structure for 
the construction of further knowledge. It was rational in the sense that it was based on 
reason alone and its was formal in the sense that it could be described by finite units 
                                                      
 
54 Gray (2008, pp. 26–27), however, also highlights that formalism, in the mathematical sense, had 
already been sketched in the eighteenth century with an emphasis on mathematics as a (successful) language. 
Nevertheless Hilbert, for Gray (2009, p. 5), was the one mathematician who ushered modernism into 
mathematics, not because of ‘individual works that change the world, but [because of] the messages they 
convey. Those messages go from people to people and, to succeed, must articulate genuine concerns that are 
also expressed elsewhere. The intellectual concerns therefore must be those of people able to advance them, 
and so those of significant groups of people with the right opportunities. The professional situation of 
mathematicians, in particular their relative autonomy from scientists, did not cause modernism to happen, but 
it enabled it and it promoted it.’ 
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ordered by an axiomatic structure. Mathematical knowledge, as such, is not empirical 
(Russell, 2004, p. 741). So how could an unempirical model of the world be able to 
describe that world? This limitation, however, did not impede mathematics’ authority. 
Although ‘most of the Cold War rationalists were acutely aware of the limitation of their 
models’, the alternatives were no better: irrational and with no ‘gain in accuracy’ 
(Erickson et al., 2013, pp. 48–49). Rational formalism, despite its inherited limitations, 
was popularised during the Cold War. It was the authoritative method of inquiry despite 
having ‘no end of critics who disagreed, on technical, philosophical, or moral grounds’ 
(Erickson et al., 2013). Its allure was such that many fields adopted its precepts. 
Economics is such an example: 
 
The metamorphosis of economics in the late 1940s and 1950s is aptly called a 
‘formalist revolution’ because it was marked, not just by a preference, but by an 
absolute preference for the form of an economic argument over its content. This 
frequently, but not necessarily, implied reliance on mathematical modelling 
because its ultimate objective was to emulate the notorious turn-of-the-century 
Hilbert program in mathematics by achieving the complete axiomatization of 
economic theories. (Blaug, 2003, p. 145). 
 
 
The assumption in economic formalism is that, in order to comprehend the 
interaction of economic actors that ought to maximise allocation of resources, economic 
interaction must be thought of as a game between rational participants that, in turn, are 
assumed to be ‘farsighted’ (Colander, 2000) – that is, they are assumed to be fully aware 
of their circumstances. The problem with this method, as any other that assumes rational 
actors, is that it formalises a scenario that can only be seen in a thought experiment 
(Granovetter, 1985), detached from existing historical social relations. Content and 
context are, therefore, excluded from such a formalist approach. Another criticism 
directed at formalism in economic thought can be seen in formalism’s characteristic 
tendency to assume not only perfectly rational actors or axiomatisation (a result of a 
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purely formal view of mainly subjective phenomena) but also a constant and, hence, 
universal formula (Klamer, 1998, p. 49)55. 
A similar wave hit the work of linguistics. Again, following the rationale of 
prevalent rational discourse, it was only natural to develop a scientific – rigorously 
mathematical and formal – description of language. This development, in fact, would not 
only affect its field but also would inform the new field of computer science. The key 
name within this development was Noam Chomsky, who is still as central to linguistics 
today as he was in the 1950s and 1960s (Martin-Nielsen, 2012, p. 66). Chomsky, in order 
to ‘determine and state the structure of natural languages without semantic reference’, 
sought to ‘inquire seriously into the formality of linguistic method and the adequacy of 
whatever part of it can be made purely formal’ (Chomsky, 1953, p. 242). Given the 
complexity of his project, I shall not dwell on its intricacies56: what is important to us is 
to demonstrate the sweeping influence of rational discourse in the fields that had been, 
                                                      
 
55 Amadae’s (2003) work can supplement this narrative. Instead of looking at economics only, she 
contends that, as much as military containment and economic might, the Cold War was an ideological victory 
by ‘rational choice liberalism: a philosophy of markets and democracy that was developed in part to anchor 
the foundations of American society during the Cold War’ (Amadae, 2003, pp. 2–3). In this context, and 
converging into my analysis: ‘The mathematical formalism structuring rational choice theory is impelled by 
the same academy-wide momentum propelling an increased emphasis on formal models as an indication of 
scientific standing […] The priority given to mathematically articulated research findings has two rationales. 
First, in the wake of World War II, during which scientific analysis of strategic problems proved useful to the 
war effort, additional mathematically oriented research was supported as a response to the Soviet Union’s 
successful launch of the Sputnik satellites. Money was thus channeled to research endeavors that provided 
quantitative analyzes [sic] of social issues. Second, this preference for mathematical formulas and models 
served the function, as RAND leaders realized, of depoliticizing research by translating contentious social 
debates into the “objective” language of mathematics’ (Amadae, 2003, p. 158). 
 
56 For further information on the topic of linguistics and formalism, see the extensive research of 
Tomalin (2006). 
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until then, detached from formalist impulses. The linguistic turn, evolving from a 
semantically to a syntax-based research effort, would also stem from some practical 
aspects of the Cold War. In a war in which propaganda and intelligence were as important 
as brute force, the ability to 
 
read the enemy’s public and private documents in a timely manner was of the 
utmost importance. Machine translation was neither flashy nor dramatic [and] it 
did it work not by deciphering the meaning of the input text, but by using a 
lexicon and knowledge of the syntactic structure of the input output languages to 
build a translation. Since ‘meaning’, or semantics, was not part of the strategy, 
the success of machine translation depended on firm understanding of syntax […] 
as such. (Martin-Nielsen, 2012, p. 68) 
 
Hence, in true formalist fashion, linguistics, predating Chomsky himself, was ‘interested 
in syntax of its own sake’ (Martin-Nielsen, 2012, p. 70). Both the formalist turn and the 
material necessities of the Cold War created a ‘pressing need to develop a new legitimate 
scientific framework of linguistics’ (Martin-Nielsen, 2012, p. 70), which, following the 
usual theoretical battles, was then occupied by Chomsky. A brief definition of Chomsky’s 
view is as follows: 
 
The first step in the linguistic analysis of a language is to provide a finite system 
of representation for its sentences. We shall assume that this step has been carried 
out, and we shall deal with languages only in phonemic or alphabetic 
transcription. By a language then, we shall mean a set (finite or infinite) of 
sentences, each of finite length, all constructed from a finite alphabet of symbols. 
If A is an alphabet, we shall say that anything formed by concatenating the 
symbols of A is a string in A. By a grammar of the language L we mean a device 
of some sort that produces all of the strings that are sentences of L and only 
these. (Chomsky, 1956, p. 114) 
 
We can all agree, then, on those postulates: sentences and alphabets are finite, any 
word/sentence is a combination of finite symbols and, consequentially, it is in grammar 
that we find the rules for combining those finite symbols. Chomsky here not only recalls 
early formalist traditions, in mathematics, but also stresses the ‘game’ of combinations, as 
defined by grammatical rules. A result of this combinatorial ‘game’, its strings, was not 
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exclusive to linguistics and certainly was not thought of by Chomsky. What he had done 
in effect was to translate mathematical ideas into the realm of linguistic inquiry. Another 
important development arising from such inquiries of the mathematical formalist game, 
as proposed by Hilbert, came from none other than Alan Turing. Turing machines, or the 
paradigmatic idea that would eventually led to digital computers, were, in essence, 
described some decades earlier in a paper titled ‘On Computable Numbers, with an 
Application to the Entscheidungsproblem’ (Turing, 2004 [1936]). Given its pivotal role, it 
is important to quote a key passage in full: 
 
Computing is normally done by writing certain symbols on paper. We may 
suppose this paper is divided into squares like a child’s arithmetic book. In 
elementary arithmetic the two-dimensional character of the paper is sometimes 
used. But such a use is always avoidable, and I think that it will be agreed that the 
two-dimensional character of paper is no essential of computation. I assume then 
that the computation is carried out on one-dimensional paper, i.e. on a tape 
divided into squares. I shall also suppose that the number of symbols which may 
be printed is finite. If we were to allow an infinity of symbols, then there would 
be symbols differing to an arbitrarily small extent. The effect of this restriction of 
the number of symbols is not very serious. It is always possible to use sequences 
of symbols in the place of single symbols. Thus an Arabic numeral such as 17 or 
999999999999999 is normally treated as a single symbol. Similarly in any 
European language words are treated as single symbols (Chinese, however, 
attempts to have an enumerable infinity of symbols). The differences from our 
point of view between the single and compound symbols is that the compound 
symbols, if they are too lengthy, cannot be observed at one glance. This is in 
accordance with experience. We cannot tell at a glance whether 
9999999999999999 and 999999999999999 are the same. 
The behaviour of the computer at any moment is determined by the 
symbols which he is observing, and his ‘state of mind’ at that moment. We may 
suppose that there is a bound B to the number of symbols or squares which the 
computer can observe at one moment. If he wishes to observe more, he must use 
successive observations. We will also suppose that the number of states of mind 
which need be taken into account is finite. The reasons for this are of the same 
character as those which restrict the number of symbols. If we admitted an 
infinite of states of mind, some of them will be ‘arbitrarily close’ and will be 
confused. Again, the restriction is not one which seriously affects computation, 
since the use of more complicated states of mind can be avoided by writing more 
symbols on the tape. (Turing, 2004, pp. 75–76) 
 
Computers, hence, have to operate in formalistic processes. In order to be configured 
indefinitely, its input, mere meaningless symbols, should be finitely defined. Whereas 
Chomsky thought of this as an alphabet of discrete and finite symbols, Turing simplified 
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this thought to an extreme position. By using only two symbols, 0 and 1, ‘on’ and ‘off’, 
he conceived a machine that could calculate any given logically defined and systematic 
mathematical operation; it could resolve any algorithm it wished if the algorithm were 
properly described. It is important to note, however, that when Turing speaks of 
‘computers’ he is not talking about analogue or digital computers, since these 
technologies would still take some time to be created. He is literally talking about human 
computers: 
 
A computer – sometimes also spelt ‘computor’ – was a mathematical assistant 
who calculated by rote, in accordance with a systematic method. The method was 
supplied by an overseer prior to the calculation. Many thousands of human 
computers were employed in business, government, and research establishments, 
doing some of the sorts of calculating work that nowadays is performed by 
electronic computers. Like filing clerks, computers might have little detailed 
knowledge of the end to which their work was directed. (Copeland, 2004, p. 40) 
 
Long before the advent of digital computers (i.e., digital computing machines), the 
increasing complexity of modern institutions demanded increasingly complex 
calculations that, then, could only be done by humans57. Turing’s insight was not only 
mathematical but also metaphorical in that he saw a resemblance between those tedious 
mental processes and his universal machine. By likening the human mind to the processes 
of his machine, Turing contributed both theoretically58 and practically (by creating the 
basis for the digital computer itself) to the discourse that united human and machine. 
Albeit not the sole contributor to this development, Turing perhaps was the mostly 
                                                      
 
57 See Grier (2005). Moreover, for a comprehensive history of human computers see Croarken 
(2009). It is also interesting to note, in relation to the ideas of mechanisation and increasingly complex 
bureaucracies, that the history of computers in Britain – as told by Agar (2003) – was much based upon these 
problems present before the advent of the digital computer.  
58 Later described in his artificial intelligence program; for more see Copeland (2004). 
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influential since he put forward the cyborg vision of human–machine integration in his 
theoretical machine well before it became popularised via cybernetics. 
 
 
2.3 Cybernetics: A consequence of rational formalism 
 
Although it seems that rational formalism was very similar to Cartesian rationalism, 
much was different. Perhaps nothing demonstrates this more readily than the different 
ways in which the human mind was conceived. As previously stated, to define rationality 
as a single cohesive concept is perhaps impossible. There were indeed many different 
approaches to the question, many different ‘flavours’ in the theories proposed during the 
Cold War59. During the Enlightenment reason was traditionally conceived as the highest 
mental capacity in terms of understanding, memory, judgement and imagination 
(Erickson et al., 2013, p. 8). Mathematical reasoning, as a mechanical problem, such as 
the one dismissed by Descartes, was seen as a lower form of thought; one valid for 
exercises only. In fact ‘human reason was often defined in opposition to mechanical rule 
following’ (Erickson et al., 2013, p. 32) and, as such, the idea that machines ‘might 
reason better than human minds was alien to Enlightenment thinkers’ (Erickson et al., 
                                                      
 
59 ‘This heterogeneity makes sense, for none of these component features inexorably summoned any 
of the others. Economic rationalization does not necessarily lead to algorithmic procedures, any more than 
game theoretical matrices intrinsically favor Bayesian statistics or even highly formalized war games. 
Nuclear strategists often laced intricate calculations with pop psychology. Proponents of the social science 
“situation” may have attempted to mechanize observation, but they did not aspire to mathematical models. 
These domains did not “belong together,” if by that one expects there to be a rigid logic linking A to B to C’ 
(Erickson et al., 2013, p. 8). Nevertheless, in the same text Erickson et al. posit that Cold War rationality, 
first and foremost, must be ‘formal, and therefore largely independent of personality or context’ (Erickson et 
al., 2013, p. 5). 
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2013, p. 8). By the second half of the twentieth century, however, a shift had occurred. 
Cybernetics, perhaps the most extreme and logical consequence of rational formalism, 
had become central in blurring the boundaries between humans and machines60. 
It would not be overstating the importance of cybernetics to say that, together 
with the computer itself, it was one of the most pervasive theoretical developments of the 
early Cold War. Given the impact of cybernetics, it is difficult to describe all the 
disciplines, technologies, metaphors, discourses and frames arising from it. I will try, at 
least, to show the areas that were undoubtedly affected by it and, in turn, to show its 
development in both the Western bloc and the Soviet one. In the previous section we saw 
that rational formalist discourse, dating back to the early twentieth century, was 
responsible for changes not only in intellectual fields but also in geopolitics and policy. 
This attempt, to control, quantify and formalistically define human interaction will 
become even clearer to the reader once I have surveyed some intellectual developments 
that were consequential to one another. Hence, attention must be paid to cybernetics and 
its consequences, for both social theory (rational choice, game theory, cognitive 
psychology) and for art itself (computer and concrete art). 
In order to begin to talk about the influence of something as originally distant 
from the arts as cybernetics entails some thought on not only the origin of the term, 
cybernetics, but also the reason it became incorporated in the artistic discourse in first 
place. From the 1940s through to today, cybernetics and its concepts would not only 
become part of the artistic debate and theory but also a theme in themselves, presented in 
many different forms throughout the decades. Given its great theoretical and historical 
importance, as well as its artistic presence to this day, both in specialised circles and in 
popular culture, it is fair to question how this scientific discipline was adopted, discussed 
                                                      
 
60 This blurring will be a central concept later on. For now it suffices to say that its most preeminent 
description comes from Hayles (1999). 
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and translated by the artistic and intellectual fields in general. The very fact that it 
happened, it seems, points to something larger than both specialised fields in question and 
dates back to our concern of rational formalism. The adoption of this cybernetic discourse 
in the arts, for example, was markedly a worldwide phenomenon with distinct local 
characteristics. Given the different states of the economies and societies of the Americas, 
Europe and Asia following the Second World War, this is no revelation. For now I should 
stress that what is strange and startling about this adoption is the very fact that it 
happened in the first place. Despite being mostly incomprehensive to common readers in 
its own terms and language (maths), cybernetics found a warm and welcoming audience 
in the art world. Therefore, as our problem becomes clearer, what was the raison d’être of 
this theory in the field of artistic practice in the first place? This section aims to answer 
some of the questions raised by this theme (the adoption of cybernetics as part of the 
artistic discourse) and, in turn, to discuss how it helped to catapult early computer art 
production. 
Cybernetics, as an academic discipline, was above all a converging philosophy of 
the sciences via an abstract, formal (and consequentially impartial) language: 
mathematics. It was all about control and feedback in the organic, physical and 
psychological systems. Following the end of the Second World War and its atomic 
climax, one could argue that it would have been untimely to publish a book aiming to 
unite almost all disparate fields of scientific knowledge using insights and concepts taken 
from the very practical problem of the trajectory of missiles and warplanes. Nevertheless, 
this is what exactly happened when in 1948 Norbert Wiener published his Cybernetics: 
Or, Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine61. Wiener, who received 
his PhD from Harvard at the tender age of eighteen, was, like most of his contemporaries 
                                                      
 
61 References to this book are based upon the second edition, from 1961, republished in 1965 by 
MIT Press. 
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in the American academic establishment, a creature of academic and industrial ties. After 
his graduation in 1912, Wiener went to Europe to continue his studies as a fellow 
researcher visiting from Harvard. From 1913 to 1914, in an academic trip cut short by the 
upcoming war, Wiener studied mostly at Cambridge and travelled through Europe 
pursuing his interest not only in the works of fellow mathematicians and logicians such as 
G. H. Hardy and J. E. Littlewood but also in the philosophical works of Edmund Husserl 
and Bertrand Russell (Paty and Freire Júnior, 2005). By 1919 Wiener had received a post 
at MIT, an institution that gave him ‘the encouragement to work and the freedom to 
think’, an attitude in contrast to his opinion of Harvard (Vallée, 2001). He would spend 
most of his academic career there, forming the Cybernetics Group with a fellow scientist 
following meetings known as the Macy Conferences (from 1946 to 1953). He and his 
colleague coined the famous term ‘cybernetics’62. The central concern of those monthly 
meetings at Vanderbilt Hall (an influence on his work) was to discuss the scientific 
method alone, with each participant talking about their method in relation to their own 
field of specialisation. It was during these encounters that it became clear to Wiener and 
to others that ‘the most fruitful areas for the growth of the sciences were those which 
have been neglected as a no-man’s land between the various established fields’ (Wiener, 
1965, p. 2). For Wiener and others the problem resided within not only in the academy 
but also in the way we thought about the sciences and their applicability: 
 
If the difficulty of a physiological problem is mathematical in essence, ten 
physiologists ignorant in mathematics will get precisely as further as one 
physiologist ignorant in mathematics, and no further. If a physiologist who 
knows no mathematics works together with a mathematician who knows no 
physiology, the one will be unable to state his problem in terms that the other can 
manipulate, and the second will be unable to put the answers in any form that the 
first can understand. (Wiener, 1965, p. 2) 
                                                      
 
62 For a full biographical and intimate description of Wiener, please see Segal (1992) and Conway 
and Siegelman (2005). 
  108 
 
From Wiener’s point of view this problem of separating knowledge into disparate 
scientific fields had a real applicability and was not only an epistemological question to 
be reckoned with. There was a perception that science was not only limiting itself as a 
method but also as an institution, the result being the creation of barriers that did not 
stand the facts of reality: 
 
we had dreamed for years of an institution of independent scientists, working 
together in one of these backwoods of science, not as subordinates of some great 
executive officer, but joined by the desire, indeed by the spiritual necessity, to 
understand the region as a whole, and to lend one another the strength of that 
understanding. (Wiener, 1965, p. 3) 
 
This holistically oriented proposition would become much more real with the start of the 
Second World War. Cybernetics’ precepts would not be conducted, however, by a 
spiritual necessity. Instead, they would be developed under the light of the very real 
problems involved in ballistic trajectory. Working at the time on projects relating to anti-
aircraft defence, Wiener realised that in order to understand his task he had to apply the 
concepts developed in those early, light-hearted meetings. When we think about the 
problems he faced, his rationale – and perhaps the reason behind cybernetics’ allure – 
becomes quite obvious. In order to build an automated defence system that works, in 
other words one that destroys its target, the machine needs to recognise patterns of 
movement, predict the future of curvilinear trajectory and, more importantly, understand 
the ‘performance’ of the human behind the equipment: 
 
It will be seen that for the second time I had become engaged in the study of a 
mechanico-electrical system which was designed to usurp a specifically human 
function – in the first case, the execution of a complicated pattern of 
computation, and in the second, the forecasting of the future. In this second case, 
we should not avoid the discussion of the performance of certain human 
functions […] It is essential to know their characteristics, in order to incorporate 
them mathematically into the machines they control. Moreover, their target, the 
plane, is also humanly controlled, and it is desirable to know its performance 
characteristics. (Wiener, 1965, p. 6) 
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An important insight of his work can be seen in the very simple idea that a human was 
also part of the very system that he was required to create. From this point of view he 
concludes that: 
 
the central nervous system no longer appears as a self-contained organ, receiving 
inputs from the senses and discharging into the muscles. On the contrary, some of 
its most characteristic activities are explicable only as a circular process, 
emerging from the nervous system into the muscles, and re-entering the nervous 
system through the sense organs […] This seemed to us to mark a new step in the 
study of that part of neurophysiology which concerns not solely the elementary 
process of nerves and synapses but the performance for the nervous system as an 
integral whole. (Wiener, 1965, p. 8) 
 
For Wiener the relationship between human, machine and communication was 
naturally understood as part of a single system and subsequent to his quest for a unifying 
science that used mathematics as its only language. Despite these fundamental insights, it 
is a fact that Wiener’s work for the war effort did not conclude in any practical solution. 
His anti-aircraft systems were only marginally superior to other much simpler and 
cheaper systems (Galison, 1994; Mindell et al., 2003) and, as a consequence, he lost his 
commission and his opportunity to collaborate in the war effort, something that, as his 
biography shows, he aspired to (Segal, 1992; Galison, 1994). It was only when he lost his 
contract that he could develop cybernetics freely. It is important to note, however, that 
when I say ‘free’ I am not talking metaphorically about freedom. During Wiener’s period 
working for the military, he was under strict contractual obligations that prohibited him 
from talking about his research. Similarly to most academics who were contributing to 
the war effort, such as Turing, most of his technical work was classified and, as a 
consequence, he could not publish anything that was related to it (Mindell et al., 2003; 
Conway and Siegelman, 2005). The texts produced by Wiener after his involvement in 
the war effort show reluctance to discuss military matters (Wiener, 1964, 1989) and 
instead focus on the rather larger, holistic applications of cybernetics such as 
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multidisciplinarity, human–machine analogies, feedback in the physiological and 
psychological realms, mathematics as a unified language for the sciences, etc. His famous 
book also follows this tendency of not discussing the technicalities of the process that led 
him to a complete theory of his cybernetics. Historians of the science picked up on this 
and are usually surprised by the lack of acknowledgement Wiener dedicates to his 
contemporary precursors63. 
His contractual obligations, one can suppose, despite being a restraint, do not 
explain his sudden change of heart. The fact that he did not acknowledge some of these 
scientists was mainly due to an ideological position, one that had a civilian tone rather 
than a militaristic one. It appears that Wiener wished to think of cybernetics within a 
humanist and illuminist context, more fundamental than its initial technicalities and 
pragmatically involved in rethinking science and its institutions. For him such a program 
should be remembered and developed as ‘civilian philosophy rather than military 
engineering’ (Mindell et al., 2003, p. 73). After the war, Wiener’s discontent with the 
scientific establishment and its emphasis on military research would become a quite 
public affair and, in January 1947, in the Atlantic Monthly Magazine, he published a letter 
titled ‘A scientist rebel!’ (Segal, 1992; Triclot, 2006). In this letter Wiener swore ‘not to 
                                                      
 
63  ‘Most indicative of this alienation and reconstruction is Wiener’s consistent hesitation to 
acknowledge any of the multiple traditions of feedback in engineering which preceded him. In all his writing 
on cybernetics, he never cited Elmer Sperry, Nicholas Minorsky, Harold Black, Harry Nyquist, Hendrik 
Bode, or Harold Hazen — all published on the theory of feedback before 1940 (their publications became 
standard citations); all were recognized as important to the field; all speculated on the human role in 
automatic control; some even wrote on the merger of communications and control and the epistemology of 
feedback. But Wiener only rarely cited any servo theory later than Maxwell’s 1867 paper “On Governors.” 
The omissions are striking… Wiener’s chapter on “Cybernetics in history,” from The Human Use of Human 
Beings, refers only to Leibniz, Pascal, Maxwell, and Gibbs as “ancestors,” of the new discipline’ (Mindell et 
al., 2003, p. 72). 
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publish any future work […] which may do damage in the hands of irresponsible 
militarists’ (Wiener, 1989, p. xxviii). Wiener was alarmed not only by a renewed 
militaristic impulse in science, even with the end of the war, but also by the application of 
new technologies and cybernetics’ own insights. In time, he turned increasingly 
pessimistic about the future of the world following the intellectual development of the 
Second World War and Cold War theoretical apparatuses. Turning to an ever more 
prophetic discourse 64 , he still saw salvation as a possibility but, nevertheless, 
acknowledged the capacity for both bad and good arising out of changes he himself had 
participated in: 
 
Yet this pessimistic sentiment is only conditional upon our blindness and 
inactivity, for I am convinced that once we become aware of the new needs that a 
new environment has imposed upon us, as well as the new means of meeting 
these needs that are at our disposal, it may be a long time yet before our 
civilization and our human race perish, though perish they will even as all of us 
are born to die. However, the prospect of a final death is far from a complete 
frustration of life and this is equally true for a civilization and for the human race 
as it is for any of its component individuals. May we have the courage to face the 
eventual doom of our civilization as we have the courage to face the certainty of 
our personal doom. The simple faith in progress is not a conviction belonging to 
strength, but one belonging to acquiescence and hence to weakness. (Wiener, 
1989, p. 47) 
 
During the war, at the peak of the carnage, the image of the other, the enemy 
(later turned into the image of the Soviet) was of central concern not only 
materialistically, with the increasing development of war technology, but also 
ontologically, with the development of ‘decision sciences’, in Heyck’s terms (2012, p. 
99) and ‘Manichean sciences’ in Galison’s terms (1994). These sciences, which in 
essence cybernetics were part of, were not concerned with the human in the sense of 
humans’ well-being. Rather the opposite: they were focused on very real and time-
specific warfare problems in which humans were only a part of a larger system: 
                                                      
 
64 For example in his God and Golem, Inc. (1964). 
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cybernetics’ ideas of a human–machine system came into being, as we have seen, from 
the problems of ballistics; operation research concentrated ‘on maximizing efficiency in 
locating and destroying German U-boats’ (Galison, 1994, p. 231); game theory was ‘a 
way of analysing what two opposing forces ought to do when each expected the other to 
act in a maximally rational way but were ignorant both of the opponent’s specific 
intentions and of the enemy’s choice of where to bluff’ (Galison, 1994). However, despite 
being initially concerned with problems specific to their time, they all had an afterlife 
following the end of the war. Supported mostly by American military agencies, think-
tanks, university departments and conferences – central institutions of the military–
industrial complex – those theories provided the underpinning of rational control on 
which the closed world and cyborg discourses, as defined by Edwards, could be 
constructed. Hence, 
 
The centrality of these metaphors reflects a number of features of early cyborg 
discourse and the emerging cybernetics community. First, these machines 
embodied shared wartime experiences. Second, semiautomatic weapons systems 
integrated humans and machines through both mathematical description (formal 
structure) and embodied practice (mechanism), making them prototypical cyborg 
devices. Finally, before computers, in terms of information activity such 
machines were the most advanced devices known to the group. So the war 
machines were not simply one example among others, but a central, unifying 
metaphor of early cyborg discourse. (Edwards, 1996, p. 186) 
 
 
We should remember, then, that the developments described earlier, in regards to 
both policy and industry, were not isolated cases. These policies were conducted under 
the spell of a rational discourse and the urgent necessities of Cold War conflict. 
Consequentially, despite manifesting in various fields and circumstances, these are not 
isolated or unrelated events65. Whether by motives of the closed world perspective, 
                                                      
 
65 Another example of rational formalistic discourse (and consequentially closed world and cyborg 
discourses) can be seen in the emergence of decision sciences. The end-goal of those ‘techno-social sciences 
of choice was the design of systems that would generate rational choices automatically, whether humans 
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whether by the rationale of various factions within the US itself (Amadae, 2003, p. 30), 
the fact was that the view of human rationality, and consequentially its agency, should 
and could be explained formally by mathematical prepositions and, hence, logical 
descriptions of human action66. Erickson, for example, even downplays the importance of 
military funding for the emergence of this new paradigm: 
 
If anything, the widespread adoption of theories of rational choice during this 
period speaks less to the power of funding to direct research or the strength of 
some hegemonic discourse, and more to the interpretive plasticity of the 
mathematics of choice and rationality. Game theory, utility theory, and social 
choice theory provided mathematical tools that could be reworked to engage with 
any number of debates over the nature of ‘rationality’ and ‘choice’ that often 
unfolded independently of state funding, but that nevertheless were characteristic 
of American intellectual culture during this period. Many social and behavioral 
scientists of the 1950s and 1960s worried that traditional decision-making 
procedures in government and industry simply could not cope with the demands 
of a society increasingly dependent on complex technologies for its economic 
development as well as for its defence. As a result, techniques that had initially 
been developed to maximize the combat effectiveness of new guns and aircraft – 
most notably, systems analysis and operations research as practiced at the RAND 
Corporation and elsewhere – were readily adapted in the 1960s to help manage 
the provisioning of health care, education, and urban services, all of which were 




It seems that the applicability of rational formalist discourse was indeed the 
reason behind Wiener’s anxiety and his pacifist turn. As long as he was contributing to 
the ‘just war’, he felt his acts were legitimate. The reason behind his denouncing, a 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
involved were rational creatures or not’ (Heyck, 2012, p. 106). It is in these ‘techno-social sciences’ of choice 
that rational formalism is embodied, not only as a theory but also as a policy and geopolitical strategy 
(similarly to my previous example of modernisation theories).  
66 A proposal that would certainly have horrified Descartes, since this proposition would equate 
humans to animals and, hence, automatons without reason. Wiener engages in a discussion regarding the 
motifs of Descartes’ anti-mechanistic position by saying that he equates animals to automata (but not 
humans) in order to ‘avoid questioning the Christian attitude that animals have no souls to be saved or 
damned’ (1965, p. 40).  
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religious and moral turn, was indeed the misuse of his ideas; cybernetics after all was, as 
in the title of one of his books, aimed at the ‘human use of human beings’. This turn may 
also explain Chomsky’s political activism in later years, in the same way that it might 
explain the change of heart in many practitioners of early computer art (a subject seen in 
Chapter 3 and best exemplified by Frieder Nake and Gustav Metzger). By the end of the 
1960s the dreams of a perfectly rational world were disappearing and many in the rational 
formalist fields were either abandoning it or becoming ever more insular (also discussed 
in Chapter 3). If we can explain the development of digital computing technology through 
US science and foreign policy, conceptualised in the light of the Cold War, the same 
cannot be true of rational formalist discourse. Discourse, differently from massive 
machines of war, does not require large amounts of (material) investment and, similarly 
to an infectious disease, it may spread quickly via very simple means of transmission. 
The next topic touches on the development of cybernetics into a completely different 
field: the artistic and, consequentially, computer art. 
 
 
2.3.1 Cybernetics and the arts: Transnational examples 
 
Only partly explained by his prestige in the scientific world, the pervasiveness of 
Wiener’s work can be seen in fields far beyond its birthplace67. Differently from its more 
technical theoretical cousins, information and system theories, cybernetics had 
overreaching intentions and a not so subtle social commentary68. Despite its heavy 
                                                      
 
67 Part of this section was presented at the Meeting Margins International Conference: Transnational 
Art in Latin America and Europe 1950–1978, at the University of Essex in 2010. 
68 Wiener is especially assertive in the later section of his Cybernetics (section already present in the 
first edition of 1948). There he describes, for example, contrary to small communities that have ‘a very 
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scientific content and strange new ideas, cybernetics was not only adopted as a reclusive 
intellectual discourse. In fact, the book was quite popular, selling more than twenty-one 
thousand copies in six months (Mindell et al., 2003, p. 75). It was discussed in 
newspapers from Rio de Janeiro to Paris. Artists found in its pages analogies for their 
processes and practice. Social scientists understood society by adopting its terminology. 
People in general marvelled at the idea of self-governing automata. Cybernetics, perhaps 
more than any other scientific theory, because it was translated over and over again into 
so many distinct contexts, nations, periods and intellectual fields, became a prime topic 
for researchers interested in the adoption and translation of foreign ideologies, discourses 
and frames into varied scenarios. This thesis’ interest in it is similar to this. Not only did 
cybernetics represent a huge leap of logic, from rational formalism’s postulates to a 
whole new intellectual enterprise, but it was also widely disseminated into artistic circles. 
Because it was ubiquitous, cybernetics provided an incredible opportunity for researchers 
interested not only in artistic objects but also in the construction of artistic discourse. 
Despite its popularity, cybernetics had a distinct flavour amid the paranoia of the 
Cold War. In fact, given Wiener’s pacifist discourse, his critique of the military’s 
emphasis on scientific research and his refusal to collaborate with ‘militarists’ (as shown 
in his open letter to the Atlantic Monthly Magazine, for example), it is surprising that he 
did not encountered more resistance from his more nationalistic peers, the government or 
the press. Ironically, it could be argued that ‘there may be nothing more cybernetic than 
the Soviet model of society with its attempts at a universal system of centralized 
information control (cf. Moscow-based bureaucracy), feedback (cf. socialist democracy), 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
considerable measure of homeostasis’ – that is to say, are self-regulated towards equilibrium – ‘the large 
community, where the Lords of Things as They Are protect themselves from hunger by wealth, from public 
opinion by privacy and anonymity, from private criticism by the laws of libel and the possession of the means 
of communication’, saying that, there, ‘ruthlessness can reach its most sublime levels’ (Wiener, 1965, p. 160). 
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and noise reduction (cf. censorship)’ (Peters, 2008, p. 71). If cybernetics can be seen as a 
Soviet model par excellence, it is ironic to see how it was received in the USSR during 
the 1950s. ‘Russian Scandal’ is both a traditional game69 and an article by historian Slava 
Gerovitch that explains, in the nature of the game itself, the climate in which cybernetics 
was adopted in the USSR. For those who don’t know it, Russian Scandal is 
 
a parlour game in which players sitting in a circle pass a message from one to 
another by whisper and finally observe how it has been transformed […] In the 
Soviet Union, however, cybernetics itself became the subject of a true ‘Russian 
scandal’. Literally, in Soviet public discourse in the early years of the Cold War 
cybernetics acquired the scandalous reputation of a ‘modish pseudo-science.’ 
Figuratively, the mechanism of a Soviet anticybernetics campaign resembled the 
‘Russian scandal’ game, for it involved profound discursive transformation. 
(Gerovitch, 2001b, p. 547) 
 
Cybernetics, as we have seen before, differently from its sibling theories – system and 
information theory – had an incredibly dense moral and idealistic undertone to it. It is 
quite funny to imagine then what would have been be the reaction of the Soviet 
nomenklatura when its members read Wiener’s text for the first time. Soviet scientists, 
who were discouraged from accepting and conforming to alleged Western scientific 
knowledge, originally denounced cybernetics as a reactionary pseudo-science and an 
ideological weapon of imperialist America (Gerovitch, 2001b, 2002; Mindell et al., 2003; 
Peters, 2008, 2012). It is important to note that the same treatment was given to 
information theory and, consequentially, both had their original meanings changed in a 
very blunt and Stalinist manner70. Seeking a pure, technical and truly scientific theory, 
Soviet science would strip information theory and cybernetics of any trace of ideology 
and social commentary, preserving instead the material and mathematical aspects of both 
theories. These Soviet translations, however, would only appear to Soviet scholars 
                                                      
 
69 In English this game is usually known as Chinese Whispers. 
70 A form of newspeak, with obvious Orwellian contours, according to Gerovitch (2002). 
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generally after Stalin’s death in 1953 and at the beginning of the ‘thaw’71 (Gerovitch, 
2001b, 2002). As Gerovitch reminds us, ‘discussions of genetics, relativity theory, 
quantum mechanics, and various Western-born theories in economics, chemistry, 
physiology, linguistics, and mathematical logic became saturated with the pejorative 
labels idealism, mechanicism, metaphysics, formalism, and cosmopolitanism (Gerovitch, 
2002, p. 19). Talking about the translation of Cybernetics and Claude Shannon’s book 
Mathematical Theory of Communication (1949), one of the works that laid the 
foundations for information theory, Mindell et al. clarify the problem in a lucid manner: 
 
Soviet critics charged that Shannon’s theory of communication reduced the 
human being to a ‘talking machine’ and equated human speech with ‘just a 
“flow” of purely conditional, symbolic “information,” which does not differ in 
principle from digital data fed into a calculating machine.’ Wiener’s formula, 
‘information is information, not matter or energy,’ provoked a philosophical 
critique of the concept of information as a non-material entity. Repeating Lenin’s 
criticism of some philosophical interpretations of relativity physics in the early 
twentieth century, Soviet authors castigated cyberneticians for replacing material 
processes with ‘pure’ mathematical formulae and equations, in which ‘matter 
itself disappears’. (Mindell et al., 2003, p. 82)72 
 
Russian art had taken notice of cybernetics only by the late 1950s, following the 
excitement for all things scientific, resulting especially from the government campaign 
for the sciences (exemplified by Sputnik’s launch in September 1957 and Yuri Gagarin 
                                                      
 
71 Nikita Khrushchev’s reforms from within attempted to de-Stalinise the USSR; in other words, 
repression, in general, began to relax. There is an incredibly detailed scholarship on this process. To name a 
few: Khrushchev (2000), Taubman et al. (2000), Jones (2006) and Tromly (2014).  
72 Cybernetics would eventually be adopted by the Soviet state and its scientists as a truly scientific 
and Soviet enterprise. In a complex and confusing symbiosis of ideology, translations and commentaries, 
cybernetics would become, and according to the Soviet narrative it already was, a historically anchored 
Soviet tradition central to the Soviet future (Gerovitch, 2002; Mindell et al., 2003; Peters, 2012). Its critique 
of the human–machine analogy, however, would still be preserved. For a complete contextual and political 
history of cybernetics in the USSR see Gerovitch (2002). 
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short trip around the earth in orbit in 1961) and made possible by Khrushchev’s softening 
of cultural control. According to Matthew Jackson, in synchronisation with Gagarin’s 
trip, the Communist Party adopted ‘the “scientific and technological revolution” 
(nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiia, or NTR) as one of the cornerstones of its political 
and economic program. In this atmosphere of pervasive technophile sentiment it is not 
surprising that the experimental filed of cybernetics rapidly brought the sciences and 
humanities into its orbit’ (Jackson, 2010, p. 34). Two artists stand out in the adoption, or 
rather conversation, with cybernetics: Ilya Kabakov, at the time a young man but 
established as an official Soviet artist, and Yuri Zlotnikov, a long-time friend of Kabakov 
and an unofficial underground artist without the support and acknowledgement of the 
state and, consequentially, Soviet society at large (Jackson, 2010). Of those two, 
Zlotnikov was the first and most intensely involved with cybernetics. Mirroring Max 
Bense’s73 approach (but as far as we know with no connections to it) he ‘strove to rid his 
art of all “excessively human” expression and clung to the new sciences’ (Dyogot, 2012) 
and is considered to be among the first Soviet artists to return to abstractionism. 
Zlotnikov’s paintings, heavily influenced by cybernetics’ ideas, were primarily interested 
in communication, signs and language. His large-scale paintings on paper, Signal Systems 
(1957–1962) (Fig. 1), also translated as Signalling Systems by Dyogot, are a collection of 
quasi-repetitive compositions using very limited forms, which resembled, in a way, a 
confusing Morse code. In these works Zlotnikov emphasises the process rather than the 
final object (Gutov, 2003). According to him, ‘the fundamental meaning of work became 
an interest in language’ (in Jackson, 2010, p. 37). The influence of cybernetics’ concepts 
on his discourse and practice is widely accepted (Gutov, 2003; Chukhrov, 2010; Jackson, 
2010; Dyogot, 2012; Kovalev, 2012). His emphasis on communication, very close to the 
                                                      
 
73 Max Bense is an enormously important figure later on this chapter, for both computer and concrete 
art. 
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cybernetic idea that everything can be defined and interpreted as information, can be seen 
as an example of this. Likewise, cybernetics’ idea of feedback is a central concept in this 
kind of endeavour. His Signal Systems, being a series, aimed to explore 
phenomenological reactions against a rather systematic stream of compositions. The 
artist’s feedback is there to consequentially ‘steer’ (the original meaning of kyber) the 
series towards the most ‘effective’ possibilities. 
It is important to understand the context of Zlotnikov’s work in relation to the 
thaw. Zlotnikov himself describes the situation as ‘stormy’74 (in Simms, 2007, p. 53). 
With the gradual thaw, Russian artists were becoming familiar with their own history. 
Some artists, previously imprisoned for not conforming to social realism, were freed. 
Although restrictions were imposed until 1989, artists who did not conform to the official 
style no longer feared for their lives (Simms, 2007, p. 86). The thaw also marked a larger 
cultural trend, felt in all aspects of cultural life75. The thaw may not have meant total 
freedom from the Soviet apparatus of control, nor a radical break from the past (Tromly, 
2014, pp. 20–21), but for Zlotnikov it meant a possible path for personal development76. 
                                                      
 
74 Zlotnikov’s words in full: ‘The “Doctors” trial, Stalin’s death, confusion in the country […] the 
Twentieth Congress, romantic hopes of the “Thaw” – it was a stormy time. It was the time of the new 
discovery of strange culture of the 20’s. It was also the time of the first exhibitions of Western art: beginning 
from Picasso’s exhibition which led to the reconsideration of all stable values of our lives. The artist himself 
was becoming an object of his own study. Picasso and the element of game in his art, Pollock, Mondrian, 
Nicholson, Pasmor all this material was “chewed”, analyzed and with a great difficulty digested. Sometimes 
it was a dramatic turn from the past ideas and beliefs. This drama is a distinctive characteristic of our 
generation from that of the present’ (in Simms, 2007, p. 53). 
75 Or, as Condee would describe it: ‘the story of Thaw politics is about culture. The story of Thaw 
culture is about politics’ (Condee, 2000, p. 160). 
76 We also should remind ourselves that without the thaw any reading of cybernetics would have 
been banned since it was seen as formalist, lacking a (Stalinist) social context and hence against the 
proletariat. Gerovitch reminds us that the ‘word formalism acquired a much more ominous meaning during 
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This emphasis on individualism, via his co-option of cybernetics, can be seen as a 
resistance move of not just Zlotnikov but also all abstract artists of the time (Simms, 
2007, p. 93). It was not coincidental, then, his emphasis on rationalism. While ‘most 
Soviet nonconformist artists of the period who chose abstraction as a style were under the 
direct influence of the works of Mark Rothko and Jackson Pollock […] Zlotnikov went in 
the opposite direction and insisted that it was important not to give into the chaos of 
emotional self-expression but to analyse’ (Kovalev, 2012). Cybernetics, as a rational 
formalist discipline, did not allow for subjectivity or emotion. Whereas his colleagues 
embraced abstract expressionism, Zlotnikov looked for a different path for his 
abstractions, closer to his Russian heritage but yet denying the Soviet utopia. Within this 
contextual opportunity, cybernetics and computers ‘came to symbolize a new spirit of 
rigorous thinking, logical clarity, and quantitative precision, contrasting sharply with the 
vague and manipulative language of Stalinist ideological discourse’ (Gerovitch, 2002, p. 
8) and, hence, were central to the de-Stalinisation efforts promoted by Khrushchev. 
Sadly, the very thing that Zlotnikov saw as potentially liberating became central to Soviet 
control. ‘After Brezhnev replaced Khrushchev, the academic and political establishment 
began to appropriate cyberspeak and computer technology as means of conserving the 
existing administrative hierarchies and power structures’ (Gerovitch, 2002, p. 8). It 
should not be surprising then that Zlotnikov would abandon his cybernetic methods. In a 
move resembling those of some later computer arts pioneers (and Wiener himself), he 
refused to use his work to promote the status quo (and militarism) and ‘returned to 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
the militant debate over the interpretation of Marxist philosophy in 1930. One group of Marxist philosophers 
accused another of “formalistic views and errors”, which consisted in “the repetition of abstract formulas 
instead of solving concrete problems posed by life itself”. The accused charged that their opponents were 
themselves guilty of “formalistic deviations,” and qualified formalism as an “idealistic” departure from 
dialectical materialism’ (Gerovitch, 2002, pp. 31–32). 
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figurative Cézannist painting in the early 1960s and would only go back to abstract art, 
this time the expressionist style, in the late 1960s’ (Kovalev, 2012). 
The Brazilian context, my next example, differently from the situation found in 
the USSR, did not present any restrictions whatsoever for cybernetics. In fact the opposite 
was true: the full text was fairly well known and debated, especially within the artistic 
field related to the Brazilian concrete movement77. Brazil of course was a very different 
place from the USSR. Riding the 1950s over a wave of populism, industrialisation and 
developmental nationalism, which would culminate with the capital city Brasilia’s heroic 
foundation in 1960 (under President Kubitschek), the ideologically flexible government 
of Getúlio Vargas aimed to promote a vision of a modern, new Brazil. Artists, thinkers 
and activist were a reasonably free bunch, despite Vargas’ close relationship with fascist 
groups some decades earlier. Hence, differently from the Soviet reading, the Brazilian 
one did not focus on the mathematical, technical work of cybernetics. What interested 
readers was the very ideological formalist discourse that had been considered bourgeois 
garbage and pseudo-science by the Soviet state78. In 1958, ten years after Wiener’s 
publication, cybernetics was given five weeks of coverage in the Sunday supplement of 
the Jornal do Brasil (Fig. 2), a now extinct newspaper published in Rio de Janeiro. It is 
important to note that the Suplemento was, at the time, one of the main vehicles of debate 
and promotion for constructivists’ art, poetry and theory in Brazil. It was in its pages that, 
almost a year later, the neoconcrete manifest would be published79. On 19 October 1958 
                                                      
 
77 Not entirely surprising, given the close ties between German and Brazilian concrete artists at the 
time, via the Ulm School (Max Bill and Max Bense) and its emphasis on mathematics, formalism and 
abstractionism. Campos (2011, p. 182) explicitly posits Bense, for example, as the interlocutor between the 
two groups. 
78 Which was latter reworked as an attempt at de-Stalinisation (the purge of Stalinist ideology) in the 
Soviet sciences. 
79 Ironically a fiercely anti-rational formalist movement. 
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the manifesto was published on its cover, and thus it is important to quote the passage in 
full: 
 
It could be said, and it is not an overstatement, that the word ‘cybernetics’ was 
spread within the Brazilian literary circles by the Suplemento Dominical of the 
JORNAL DO BRASIL during the debates about concrete poetry. Until then the 
word belonged to specialised circles and to telegraphic news, which, once in a 
while, would briefly refer to it. Yet, despite the fact that that the word 
‘cybernetics’ has become familiar, what is cybernetics after all? It is with the 
purpose of providing our readers with a more or less satisfactory answer to this 
question that we begin here a series of articles regarding the subject […] In 
general it could be said that cybernetics is a very recent science that studies the 
relationships between human behaviour and the machine. It is evident that such a 
definition does not empty the subject and does not even allows us to predict this 
newest human science. In truth, cybernetics not only studies the relationships 
between human physiology (or animal) and the machine but also looks to transfer 
to the machine properties that until now were exclusive to the animal and human 
worlds, such as the capacity to react to exterior stimulation, to correct its reaction 
and to ‘think’ and resolve highly complex mathematical problems. (Barroso, 
1958, p. 1, my translation) 
 
Unfortunately I could not find within the paper’s archive earlier quotations about 
cybernetics. Despite this, it is quite clear what type of emphasis the Brazilian 
constructivists were stressing, namely, ‘the relationships between human behaviour and 
the machine’. The remaining text of the five articles was not in fact Brazilian or from 
someone within Brazilian concretism. Instead it was a French reporter, Pierre de Latil, 
who wrote the text. His book La Pensée artificielle, published in France in 1953 and in 
Brazil in 1959, was the basis for the five-week coverage of the Jornal do Brasil, a year 
before the book’s publication in Brazil. Its initial lines for cybernetics are, undoubtedly, 
very different in emphasis from those in Norbert Wiener’s original text. While Wiener’s 
initial conceptions were dedicated to a programmatic approach to unite the sciences via a 
common language, De Latil’s initial commentary refers to the understanding of new 
phenomena: the autonomous robot and the artificial brain. It is notable that Wiener 
  123 
himself would only talk directly about robots or automata80 in the second edition of 
Cybernetics, some thirteen years after the original publication and, consequentially, some 
six years after de Latil’s book. In this Suplemento edition, of 19 October 1958, after his 
initial commentaries on the robot and the artificial brain, de Latil described cybernetics in 
the same way that Wiener did. By this I mean that de Latil told Wiener’s history, from his 
meetings at the Vanderbilt Hall to his involvement with anti-aircraft projects and his 
subsequent insight concerning the inter-relationship between disparate fields of scientific 
knowledge. De Latil, however, did not emphasise the institutional and epistemological 
problems denounced by Wiener. If Wiener saw the ideas that came from his studies as 
tools for a revolutionary project of merging within the sciences themselves, de Latil 
instead read cybernetics as virtue, finding an even more esoteric approach to it. As we 
can see in his flamboyant text, cybernetics, for him, apparently inspired something more 
than revolution within the sciences only: 
 
The cybernetics revolution has developed, however, with an astonishing and 
shocking speed. The deflagration appeared between two spheres until now 
independent; and, even more than that, opposed: between mathematics and 
physiology, between machines and life. Enormous quantities of knowledge had 
accumulated in each extremity. And suddenly, with the approximation of those 
two poles, a spark was produced. […] Within its light the dark abyss that we 
thought existed between matter and spirit has been revealed to us as a new world. 
Suddenly, the margins of science, well known for a long time, are enlightened by 
a new splendour. There is no field of knowledge – or ignorance – that does not 
receive a reflection of this light. Everything started from the simple thought that 
life can, if not be explained, at least be approached by rationales and experiences 
of mathematical character. (de Latil, 1958, p. 7, my translation) 
 
                                                      
 
80 Although he briefly discussed automata in the original publication of 1949, later in the 1961 
edition (only three years before his death), Wiener would dedicate two entire chapters to the subject (Chapter 
9, ‘On Learning and Self-Reproducing Machines’ and Chapter 10, ‘Brain Waves and Self-Organizing 
Systems’). By 1964, the year of his death, his God and Golem, Inc. had also touched on the subject, but this 
time around his tone was more sombre and alarmed. 
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De Latil’s romanticism is remarkable given the rather cold, mathematical and un-poetic 
texts of Wiener’s initial work (Cybernetics, first edition). The story of cybernetics 
presented by de Latil may be the same as Wiener’s but, as the former’s initial 
commentaries show, the way in which the story is told, as well as its emphasis and 
agenda, are rather different from its initial conception.  
Let’s clarify this problem. Pierre de Latil, coming from the French context and its 
tendency to “franconise” perceived Anglo-Saxon scientific knowledge, especially in the 
turbulent years following the Second World War, framed cybernetics within a French 
tradition81 . Similarly to the process that occurred within the Soviet Union and its 
campaign against un-Soviet knowledge, the French press and public only accepted 
cybernetics as a valid and worthy discipline once it had been translated and harmonised 
into the national agenda and post-war discourse. In fact de Latil, following the French 
trend that he was part of, rewrote cybernetics’ epistemological origins away from its 
technical and mathematical origins. As we have seen before, Wiener himself would try to 
                                                      
 
81 Similarly to its Soviet translation, Cybernetics in France was initially denounced as ‘American’ in 
the early years after the war and would only be accepted when recast as a French intellectual tradition. Anti-
Americanism in France, up to the late 1940s, should be seen as both a product of the Soviet relation to 
cybernetics and the rise and exclusion of communism’s ministers from government: ‘In 1947, France was 
marked by political instability. In the November 1946 legislative election, the French Communist Party came 
first, with nearly a third of the votes, but in May 1947, the Communist ministers were dismissed by the [sic] 
President Ramadier who followed Truman’s appeal from March 15th to all Western countries to exclude all 
communist forces from governments. French people still had to live with rationing […] Strikes in October 
and November led to the resignation of the Ramadier cabinet’ (Mindell et al., 2003, p. 76). We have seen 
before that science was a central tenet in American foreign policy. The adoption of cybernetics in France can 
be seen as an extension of the tension between American and French interests, between international science 
and national science. This topic, too varied and detailed to be seen in this text, can be much better seen in 
Kuisel (1993) and Krige (2006). For a historiographical account and critique of the concept of 
internationalism versus nationalism in the study of technosciences, see Edgerton (2007). 
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frame cybernetics outside these technical fields. The difference here is that de Latil 
framed cybernetics within an exclusively French tradition. He talked, for example, in the 
same piece for the Suplemento, about how this idea, that life could ‘if not be explained, at 
least approached by rationales and experiments of mathematical character’, was not 
something new. He attributed this rationale to Claude Bernard, a nineteenth-century 
French physiologist. Moreover, not only did he give the emphasis on mathematics to 
someone else but he also attributed interdisciplinary emphasis to Henri Poincaré, who is 
quoted by de Latil as saying that ‘the great progresses are produced when two sciences 
approach each other, when they become conscious of the similarities of its forms, despite 
the dissimilitude of its object’ (in de Latil, 1953, p. 14). We should note that neither 
Bernard nor Poincaré are quoted in Wiener’s original work. That is not to say, however, 
that there is no similarity between their conception and Wiener’s. Obviously this 
propensity to reframe theories and ideas for one’s own purpose is commonplace and not 
an exclusively French or Soviet activity. What I aim to show here is rather the extent to 
which de Latil and others would go to legitimise their conviction on cybernetics: namely, 
to create a nationalistic discourse that sought to contextualise cybernetics within their 
own national and intellectual traditions82. 
I am not aware of any attempt to nationalise cybernetics discourse within Brazil. 
In fact, the case was pretty much the opposite, with cybernetics seen as an international 
phenomenon, being solely the result of modernity. When the Suplemento claimed to have 
introduced the theme to Brazilian readers, it plainly stated that the theme came from 
somewhere else and not Brazil. Hence it was introduced to Brazilian readers and not 
                                                      
 
82 A process that, similarly to the example of the USSR, could only happen with the death of Stalin 
and in the context of the thaw.  
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simply readers83. When the Suplemento stated that its Brazilian readers were about to see 
‘the birth of this ultramodern science’, even though it was publishing de Latil’s version of 
cybernetics’ history, the Suplemento was nevertheless attaching cybernetics to its own 
present time and not to some French, American or Soviet intellectual tradition. 
Unfortunately I cannot say for sure who introduced cybernetics to the Suplemento in the 
first place. Yet, it is interesting to note that cybernetics’ ideas of rationalisation and 
mathematical formalism regarding human affairs, as well as its analogies between human 
and machine, would be utterly rejected by the neoconcrete manifesto less than a year 
later. Being a rift between the São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro artists over what was often 
perceived as a dogmatic rationalistic attitude from the São Paulo concrete group, the 
neoconcrete manifest would be a pivotal point in the development of Brazilian 
concretism. In this case, given the carioca rejection of human–machine analogies and the 
paulista84 close relationship with mathematical dogmatism, as well as the fact that both 
groups had shown an ‘uncompromising stance throughout the decade’ (Asbury, 2006, p. 
73), it is fair to assume that it was via the São Paulo group that cybernetics’ principles, 
and specially the feedback analogies, would come under discussion. 
São Paulo indeed could be seen as the main motor behind rational formalism in 
Brazil. Again we may say that the politics of the Cold War were pivotal to these 
                                                      
 
83 This I believe represents more the status of Brazil in the post-war order than a lack of nationalism. 
Still perceiving itself as peripheral, Brazil(ians) wanted to see the country and promote its image as a modern 
entity. It was not that they did not want to cast cybernetics as Brazilian; rather, being modern, equal to 
Europeans and Americans, seemed to be the objective of these attempts to introduce cybernetics to a wider 
public. It seems that it was through its architecture, arts and industries that Brazil would attempt to claim its 
modern status, an attempt that started at the beginning of the twentieth century with the first Brazilian 
modernist wave.  
84 Carioca is the name given to Rio de Janeiro’s natives whereas paulistas are people born in São 
Paulo. 
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developments, which positioned São Paulo at the heart of Brazilian concretism. Firstly we 
need to take into consideration the Brazilian geopolitical context of the early Cold War. 
Differently from Europe, Brazil did not benefit from huge sums of money in American 
aid. Successive Brazilian governments, throughout the late 1940s up to the late 1960s, 
and even after the military coup of 1964, despite constant pleas for aid, were side-lined as 
second-class allies. Desperate for funds for their modernisation project, Brazilian 
governments throughout the early Cold War felt betrayed by the lack of American 
interest despite Brazil’s continuous effort in the Second World War. Since Brazil was the 
only South American nation to provide troops for the Allied effort, it had felt that its 
relationship with the US would become a special, generous kind of relationship. 
Frustrated by this feeling of neglect, successive governments came to stress the need for 
autonomy in relation to the US on top of industrial and economic emancipation. These 
developments, narrated and documented by Hilton (1981), would have a lasting result: 
they entrenched the idea that the US could not be trusted and at the same time reinforced 
the idea that industrialisation, and hence modernity, would only be achieved by forging a 
new, independent path of self-reliance concluding with desenvolvimentismo 
(developmentalism). The US policy towards Brazil, which provided not aid but instead a 
moralising discourse favouring private investment, can be seen, for example, at the 
opening of the first São Paulo Biennale, in 1951, where protesters outside chanted 
slogans denouncing US imperialism (Oliveira, 2001). The protest was not aimless, 
though. Oliveria (2001) reminds us that some days before the opening the left-oriented 
press would emphatically highlight the union of Nelson Rockefeller and Ciccillio 
Matarazzo in a Museum of Modern Art fundraising ball, promoting then a new 
cosmopolitan, private-led and industrious Brazilian modernity some few days before the 
opening of the Biennale. São Paulo, the industrial capital of Brazil, would indeed become 
the de facto centre for this new, idealised modern Brazil. ‘Positioning itself as a rupture 
within the visual arts, the [paulista] concrete paradigm positioned itself as a proposal for 
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a modern art’ (Sant’Anna, 2007, p. 34, my translation) that tactically rejected the 
previous modernity of the early twentieth century, of the Semana de 22 (which heralded 
Brazilian modernism), based upon a negotiation of industrial–rural and national–
international Cartesian conceptions of Brazil (Arruda, 1997; Sant’Anna, 2007). This new 
modernity would not be based upon the digestion of the outsider, the foreigner; instead, it 
was conceived as a purely rational exercise, a product universally common not only to 
concrete poets but also to all artists. Hence ‘concrete poetry, in a Brazilian manner, 
conceptualised a new poetics, national and universal’ (H. de Campos, 2006b, p. 245, my 
translation). Ironically, to be modern (and a modern Brazilian), for concrete artists, was to 
be part of this universal communion of rational beings85. The adoption of cybernetics, 
then, can be seen as just one of the many developments towards this conception of 
Brazilian modernity, universal (but national), rational and formalist, as developed in São 
Paulo but not necessarily elsewhere86. 
Augusto dos Campos, Haroldo de Campos and Décio Pignatari, exponents of the 
São Paulo concrete poetry movement, would dedicate some pages to reflections on the 
virtues of cybernetics’ feedback87, as de Latil would put it. Haroldo de Campos, talking 
                                                      
 
85 Haroldo de Campos would describe at length this quite paradoxical relation, between the national 
and the universal, between antropofagia and poesia concreta, between subdeveloped modernity and 
developed modernity, in an article published in 1981 (H. de Campos, 2006b, pp. 231–258).  
86 For Arruda, for example, post-war economic growth anchored by desenvolvimentismo would 
mainly impact São Paulo. Hence, ‘there was a clear coincidence between the concrete movement […] and the 
increase of industrial production changing [paulista] society, which, eventually, would validate the ideal of 
progress as its most important [paulista] social feature’ (Arruda, 1997, p. 47 my translation). 
87 A pause is necessary to clarify this term. Negative feedback, very basically, refers to a tendency in 
systems towards equilibrium. In this kind of system, the output is opposed to its input; that is, it is directed in 
order to counter it and, consequentially, reach an equilibrium between the two. This is actually much simpler 
than it sounds. Your body, for example, regulates its temperature in this manner. It always works towards 
equilibrium and, as everyone knows, this is found at around 36 degrees Celsius. The body, however, also 
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about Pignatari’s famous Earth Poem (Fig. 3), explains that the poem, ‘as Pignatari 
himself refers to it, used the process of retro-alimentation [feedback] of cybernetics as a 
structural resource of the poem’ (A. de Campos, 2006, p. 112 my translation). Central to 
Pignatari’s work and his conception of feedback is the idea of negative feedback. In fact, 
negative feedback is what usually artists mean when they refer simply to feedback. What 
interested the São Paulo concretists was the very possibility of evoking such self-
regulatory capabilities in their poems. With interests similar to Zlotnikov’s but dissimilar 
in their application, the São Paulo concretists saw feedback not only as a tool aiding the 
creative process but also as a quality inherent in the structure of the poem itself88. Instead 
of experimenting with negative feedback via a repetitive process, thus aiming for a trial-
and-error method in which the artist is a regulator, the concrete poem should instead 
correct itself in the eyes of its readers. The concrete poem, for the paulistas, has a will, 
and that is what the artist attempts to communicate to the observer via the poem’s self-
regulatory structure89. The São Paulo artists, despite their radical rationalist tendencies, 
were interested in cybernetics as an ideological tool and not in its mathematical work. 
Cybernetics for them, via its conception of feedback and its analogies between human 
and machine, provided paths in which concrete art could be understood and commented 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
needs to produce heat in proportion to the outside weather in which the body in question is located. If it is too 
hot, it needs to reduce the heating. If the weather is cold, it increases heat production, always towards 36 
degrees Celsius. This kind of process can be seen everywhere. Cybernetics as a programmatic discipline 
highlights the similarities in this process in humans (in body and mind), machines and nature. 
88 ‘The error on the verbal and procedural level, as we saw, expresses the self-correction of the 
poem, coerced by the will of structure in which the poet pitched his creative option. A topic of cybernetics, 
correlate, still needs to be called in scene: the method of solving problems by “trial and error”, which in the 
same way interests the psychologists of Gestalt’ (A. de Campos, 2006, p. 113, my translation). 
89 Later on this would be precisely one of the arguments Ferreira Gullar used to denounce the 
paulista rationalistic doctrine (Gullar, 1959, p. 3). 
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on as a modern phenomenon. This culminated, as we saw, in the idea that such principles 
could be attached to the poem via its compositional structure. 
Another Brazilian artist, Abraham Palatnik, would have a similar interest in 
cybernetics. Yet his involvement was a rather practical affair and not only an ideological 
one. A native of Natal, in the northeast of Brazil, and the son of Jewish Russian 
emigrants, he was unusual in the Brazilian artistic context of the 1950s. Usually 
associated with the second exhibition of the Grupo Frente, which included many future 
members of the neoconcrete opposition to dogmatic rationalism, Palatnik’s work, it could 
be argued, presented the most rationalist tendencies of all Brazilians involved in the 
concrete/neoconcrete debate. His rationality, however, did not involve the championing 
of rationality per se but instead can be seen in his methods. A pioneer of kinetic art, he 
probably had a much more intimate experience with cybernetics, closer to that of its 
initial creator and context, than the paulistas could hope for. While claiming intuition as 
his main guide (Palatnik, 2004, p. 22) – like most of his neoconcrete peers – Palatnik had 
a very orderly conception of intuition himself. The artist’s role, in his words, was ‘to 
discipline the perceptive chaos’ (in Morais, 2004, p. 164). His position within the 
Brazilian concrete/neoconcrete debate, for me at least, is far from conclusive90. He seems 
                                                      
 
90 Asbury lucidly stresses this problem as mainly one of labelling. For him the ‘notion of precedents 
is always problematic since on the one hand, origins are always evasive, while on the other, Palatnik’s work, 
in its own evolution does not fit comfortably with the Kinetic art “movement”. The same could be said about 
the artist’s relation to the field of art and technology, there is a relation at the origin, but Palatnik refuses to 
submit to this strand, remaining faithful to mechanical operating systems, that is, to his own process of 
working and creating […] such interpretations are fundamentally teleological and […] within such a context 
Palatnik’s position remains awkward. Undoubtedly the product of the specialization of academic practice, 
whether formalist, sociological or technological in their orientation, these respective fields have, often 
inadvertently, created barriers that forcibly lead the work of an artist such as Palatnik to either escape 
between the interstices of categories or alternatively to be framed inappropriately’ (Asbury, 2013, p. 62). 
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to drift between both extreme positions, carioca and paulista, and at the same time 
reconcile many of their disparate concepts. From this point of view we can say he was 
more of a moderate than a radical. Amaral tells us that Palatnik ‘embodies well the artist 
as an inventor in our century, one in which the control of technique and inventiveness 
could achieve, through the visual poetics of the image, the formal creation; that, for the 
same reason, interested concretists as much as neoconcretists’ (Amaral, 2006b, p. 155, 
my translation). 
Palatnik’s entry into the Brazilian artistic context of the time is attributed to his 
relationship with another artist, Almir Mavignier91, and their visits to the psychiatric 
hospital Engenho de Dentro (Osorio, 2004, p. 49; Asbury, 2013). There, Palatnik tells us, 
he himself was ‘in front of people who had never studied, that had not gone through any 
kind of tuition, producing works of complex and profound language’ (in Morais, 2004, p. 
164). For the young Palatnik, who had a rather classical artistic education, this was a 
shock. In his biographical profile, Barcinski tells us that: 
 
Mavignier, seeing his friend so disturbed, resolved to introduce him to Mario 
Pedrosa, who knew and admired the work of Engenho de Dentro’s patients and 
considered it to be legitimate art. Both went to visit the critic in his house and 
Palatnik reported his enormous conflict. Pedrosa laughed off the young artist’s 
despair and tried to settle the situation by declaring that he ought to know the 
other ‘aspects of form’ and lent him a book that dealt with psychology of form 
and the Gestalt, and a book about cybernetics, because Palatnik had expressed the 
‘desire of activating something in space, but not randomly’ to the artist in control. 
And so, Abraham Palatnik initiated his experiments with light. (Barcinski, 2004, 
p. 98, my translation) 
 
                                                      
 
91  Later on Mavignier would become an Ulm student under Max Bense’s tutelage. Not 
coincidentally, given his modernist credentials and proximity to the rational abstract artists of the time, he 
would also be one of the founders of the New Tendencies exhibitions in Zagreb, exhibitions that would have 
a central role in the history of computer art. For more on Mavignier and his relation to computer art see 
Rosen (2011a). 
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This ‘desire of activating something in space’ would, in 1951, result in Palatnik’s first 
‘cinechromatic device’ – a term created by Pedrosa (Kac, 1996; Pedrosa, 1996) – being 
presented at the first São Paulo Biennale. Azul e roxo em primeiro movimento (Fig. 4, 5) 
(1951) can be read as an example of cybernetics’ ideas being put into practice. To begin 
with, this was a very complex device, only made possible by Palatnik’s engineering 
knowledge acquired during his youth in Tel-Aviv. In fact, there are times in which he 
seems to be more of an engineer and inventor than anything else. Although Palatnik does 
not possess the kind of advanced mathematical knowledge required for a comparison 
between his and Wiener’s systems, his artworks were markedly defined by precise 
mechanisms that, similarly to paulistas concretists or Zlotnikov paintings, had to be 
rearranged, taking the observer (human) and the artwork (machine) into consideration. 
Similarly to paulistas or Muscovites, then, it was not a case of applying cybernetics 
directly; what came into play for Palatnik were the insights provided by Wiener’s work 
and not his mathematical techniques. Palatnik, I believe, despite not having the technical 
knowledge to follow Wiener’s book, could nevertheless understand, as many did, the 
implications of that book. An example of his intuitive behaviour can be seen in the fact 
that, despite his not having formal engineering training, not only are there many patents 
in his name but also his analytical and novel approaches in relation to engineering were 
quite legendary (Osorio, 2004, p. 51). His first cinechromatic device contained ‘600 
meters of electric cables, differentiated by colour, that served 101 focuses of different 
voltage, that moved, in different speeds, some cylinders. The projection is made through 
obstacles, lenses and a prism for light refraction’ (Morais, 2004, p. 165, my translation). 
Unfortunately Palatnik did not write as compulsively about his work as the São Paulo 
concretists did. There are few instances in which he comments on cybernetics and fewer 
in which he engages more thoroughly with the subject. In fact, there seems to be 
confusion regarding his own knowledge of the subject. He recalls that Pedrosa lent him ‘a 
book about Gestalt, by Norbert Wiener, and at that time there was no talk about that, not 
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even among artists […] [Pedrosa] told me that it was very important to follow what was 
written in that book. I read it carefully and it really did open my horizons a bit, the ideas 
started getting clearer’ (Palatnik, 2013, p. 50). As far as we can tell, however, there is no 
Gestalt book written by Wiener. In his bibliography compiled by the American 
Mathematical Society (Bull. Amer. Math. Soc., 1966). Just one entry is explicitly related 
to Gestalt. This single article, as expected, offers a similar understanding of Gestalt to 
that in Wiener’s first edition of Cybernetics, where he discusses Gestalt under his own 
cognitive and cybernetic theories. That is not to say that there were no connections. Not 
only was Wiener aware of Gestalt but he even briefly sketched ideas of his own. Despite 
his knowledge of Gestalt, Wiener never fully engaged with the subject and, more 
importantly, cyberneticists in general seemed to be positioned against it92. 
Yet, despite his own inconsistencies, Palatnik is still seen as somehow 
representing cybernetics, both at the time and today, resulting at times in his positioning 
within the umbrella of new media or digital art discussions93. In February 1955 Augusto 
                                                      
 
92 Riskin, in fact, reminds us that ‘Cyberneticists such as Norbert Wiener were hostile to what they 
saw as the organicism and mysticism of Gestalt psychology’ (Riskin, 2010b, p. 22). Moreover, ‘in 1951, the 
preeminent Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Köhler published a review of Norbert Wiener’s seminal work, 
Cybernetics, which included a famous chapter entitled “Computing Machines and the Nervous System.” 
Though he praised certain features of the book, including the important theorization of feedback, Köhler had 
serious reservations about the idea that electronic calculators and other machines could serve as models for 
the human nervous system and thereby help to explain the origin and nature of human thought. As Köhler put 
it, this “now popular comparison” was entirely ungrounded – the kind of information processing carried on 
by these new computing machines was, he believed, “functionally” and “generically” different from human 
thinking’ (Bates, 2010, pp. 239–240). 
93 Tellingly, Palatnik himself did not move towards the computer: ‘In a 1960 article in the Jornal do 
Brasil, Pedrosa challenged the artist to immerse himself into the emerging field of electronics. The fact that 
Palatnik did not respond to such a challenge is perhaps revealing of his relation to technology itself […] It is 
problematic therefore to associate Palatnik unquestionably with the constructivist tradition, since by the 
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de Campos wrote to Palatnik in order to discuss the possibility of using luminous objects 
or ‘letterfilms’ for his poems. His brother, Haroldo, would clarify this by stating that the 
‘possibilities of a combinatory art, obtained through electric means, cybernetics etc., is 
extremely interesting to the concrete poet as a new organizational perspective for poetic 
material’ (H. de Campos, 2006a, p. 148, my translation). The cinechromatic devices, as 
well as Palatnik’s later works, the Objetos Cinéticos (Kinetic Objects) series (Fig. 6), all 
share the same controlled and constrained process. For Palatnik this would have been 
natural and would have resulted not only from his interests in cybernetics (as a metaphor) 
but also from the materials he used. His objects are deconstructions, similar to hacking in 
today’s terms, of industrial objects that were primarily intended to be something else. For 
someone who wanted to experiment with light and not the reflection of it, this was (and 
pretty much still is) the only way to work. His devices follow plans, charts and 
schematics and those, in turn, follow the rationale of industry, which created those objects 
in the first place. Given his material limitations and his belief in control over perception 
(via intuition), one could argue that this was a very restricted practice, yet this could not 
be more mistaken. This is a playful and ludic practice, based on an intuitive trial-and-
error method rather than a mathematical one. Palatnik’s control over the object was 
limited – so limited in fact that the first cinechromatic took around two years to be 
realised and was a very precarious machine. Furthermore, this interest in the ludic aspects 
of creation was translated into a series of game-like artworks and objects developed 
throughout the 1960s. Reading Palatnik, as we can see, it is never straightforward. His 
position in relation to intuition can be seen as an argument against cybernetics’ rational 
principles, similar to those adopted by the São Paulo concretists. I am not aware of any 
development in Palatnik’s work that came about as a result of Augusto de Campos’ letters 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
1950s the association between art and technology, which presented the artist as engineer, as in Tatlin’s vision 
for instance, could no longer be sustained, particularly in a country such as Brazil’ (Asbury, 2013, p. 76). 
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to him and, honestly, this is not surprising. I might be wrong but this may show that, 
despite their apparent similarities, Palatnik’s artistic process and understanding of 
cybernetics were incompatible with the approaches professed by the de Campos brothers. 
For Palatnik, rationality cannot be disassociated with the intuitive characteristics of 
humanity. In his own words: 
 
The comprehension of the formal aspects, not only in the external world but also 
at the unconscious roots of human activity, would dismantle the doubt and the 
controversy that exists between the relations of art, science, technology and 
communication. The subconscious is also gifted with mechanisms that are 
activated spontaneously and in such extraordinary manner that not even the 
powerful science could yet comprehend all its processes. One of these, intuition, 
is undoubtedly one the most important human faculties. The evolution of 
technology would largely depend on this faculty, being that the acting of the 
denomination ‘intelligence’ would be integrated in the intuitive process. A 
complex problem merges in our head but its solution jumps unexpectedly and, 
suddenly, we see order and logic in the diverse irregular facts within the disorder. 
(Palatnik, 2004, p. 22) 
 
If in Brazil we may say that Palatnik and the concretists were the first examples 
of cybernetics being appropriated for artistic discourse prior to computer art’s first public 
exhibitions of 1965, for a European audience perhaps the most recognisable name of a 
cybernetics-concerned artist is Nicolas Schöffer. Born in Hungary but living most of his 
life in France, Schöffer came to be regarded as the pioneer of kinetic art and, 
consequentially, cybernetic art (as he liked to call his later works). His CYSP 1 (Fig. 7) 
(1956) undoubtedly incorporates cybernetics’ ideas of input, output and feedback, not 
only as concepts but also as physical properties manifested in artistic machines. CYSP 1 
was originally commissioned by choreographer Maurice Béjart for the Festival of Avant-
Garde Art in Marseille (Fernández, 2009, p. 472) but it was shown in many other places 
and contexts after its first public appearance. CYSP stands for ‘cybernetic spatial 
dynamism’, ‘spatial dynamism’ being a term coined by Schöffer some years earlier in 
order to explain his practice and his early kinetic works. Not coincidentally perhaps, in 
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1951 Pedrosa also played with the idea of dynamism, but this time chromatic, in order to 
discuss Palatnik’s work at the first São Paulo Biennale (Pedrosa, 1996). 
When we compare Schöffer and Palatnik, however, there is a sense of an uneven 
game being played. While Palatnik created his projects mainly by himself, using old 
machines for his constructions, Schöffer had the comforting experience of having Phillips 
engineers working alongside him. Schöffer’s machines were not precarious linear 
constructions. Rather the opposite: CYSP 1 was a very complex machine for its time. It 
did not have a beginning, middle or end, unlike Palatnik’s linear constructions. Instead, 
CYSP 1, in true cybernetic fashion, would react to the observer and its environment in a 
never-ending process, limited not by time but by its input. The machine here reacts pretty 
much as if alive, having, therefore, a will exterior to that of the observer. We could say 
that if Zlotnikov used feedback as a form of conceptualising his repetitive practice, if the 
São Paulo concretists saw the poem itself as a repository of possibilities regulated by the 
observer’s mental feedback and if Palatnik saw feedback as a conceptual tool for 
controlling our chaotic perception, Schöffer created an object in which feedback was not 
within the mental capacity of the artist but rather in the object itself. The electronic brain 
(as computers used to be called) developed by Phillips gave CYSP 1 a self-regulatory 
system, which reacts to exterior stimuli, in a kind of homeostatic system that tends to 
equilibrium, similarly to the cybernetic system described earlier. This work was, finally, 
an incorporation of a real, independent, cybernetic system. This was clearly a major step 
in the conceptual development of feedback as a resource for artists. Instead of being an 
intangible virtue, feedback becomes embodied in the artwork. We should note, however, 
that this important step was not secluded and was pretty much in tune with its French 
context. Although cybernetics and its involvement with the arts would develop in Europe 
mainly via a British influence from the 1960s onwards, with names such as Roy Ascott 
and Mark Hamilton, it was in France that cybernetics was first discussed in an artistic 
environment. It was not only de Latil and other popular writers who professed cybernetics 
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as a French historical institution. Wiener’s own Cybernetics, for example, despite being 
the product of an MIT staff member and a work primarily bounded by Weiner’s 
institutional contractual obligations, was published some months earlier in France rather 
than in America. If there was an intense public debate in France, similar to the Soviet 
experience post-Stalin, it was because the general public was incredibly drawn to 
cybernetics ideas. As early as 1948, for example, only some months after the publication 
of Wiener’s book, there was a full-page article in Le Monde dedicated to the ‘new 
science’ with the subtitle ‘Towards a Governing Machine’. In this article, ‘the author, 
Dominique Dubarle, [similarly to de Latil] sticks close to the myth of the robot, 
predicting that man would be replaced by machine even for the functions which require 
man’s intelligence. Far from the technical questions linked to servomechanism, this 
perspective was clearly driven by a kind of technological optimism’ (Mindell et al., 2003, 
p. 75). 
Very much in tune with the article published in Brazil some ten years later, both 
de Latil and Dubarle professed a very particular kind of cybernetics, one much closer to 
the conception we have today than to its original intent. Even though Wiener himself 
would over time align his work with this very particular reading (and then turn against it), 
we cannot ignore his original programmatic emphasis: the reformulation of scientific 
institutions and methods. For the French press and public, still living under rationing and 
in a devastated country, the call for an optimistic technological future had a much wider 
appeal than simply a reformist impulse directed at the sciences. Their relationship with 
technology, which cybernetics in many ways represented, was tied up with the French 
national project following the devastation of the Second World War. Culminating with 
Brasilia, this same relationship can be seen in the Brazilian developmental and nationalist 
fervour of the same period. Likewise, the project of a true Soviet scientific enterprise, 
very dear to Stalin, followed the same pragmatic line of developing a modernising 
national narrative via a myth of supposedly historical and technological superiority. The 
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term that would later describes this post-war game, the arms race, only epitomised the 
competitive character of this sort of social process that invariably ties technological 
development to the modern nation state. Varying in degree but not in kind, this process 
could be seen in most industrialised countries at the time and persists today. Perhaps 
inaugurated in Victorian times by the Great Exhibition of 1851, these readings of science 
and consequentially cybernetics are products of Enlightenment ideals anchored in the 
belief in rationality and reason. The automata or robot, the most shocking result of the 
analogy between human and machine, would in the most optimistic narrative replace and 
surpass humans in the workplace and therefore free us from the mundane and miserable 
ordeals of our daily lives. The pessimistic narrative, by far the most popular one, is 
usually presented in literature and pop culture as the scientific products of humans 
turning against their creators: in these, Frankensteinian monsters and Terminators 
abound. 
Despite the pervasiveness of the rational formalist discourse, the adoption and 
framing of it by different individuals in many different local contexts is far from 
homogeneous. Nevertheless, its wide adoption, for better or worse, shows the extent of a 
predisposition to adopt a rather alien and technical concept into varying artistic practices. 
In West Germany, for example, prior to Bense’s information aesthetics efforts, 
cybernetics can be traced to as early as 1949 (Aumann, 2011, p. 17). Even the popular 
press took notice: ‘The German news magazine Der Spiegel first reported on cybernetics 
in 1950. It described cybernetics as the science of intelligent robots that could bring about 
a “second industrial revolution.” The article concluded: “A time could come when those 
super brains reign.” Cybernetics was the “magic” of this modern computer era and 
Norbert Wiener its prophet’ (Aumann, 2011, p. 18). Similarly to my previous examples, 
albeit manifested at an earlier date, the development of cybernetics in West Germany on 
the one hand resembles the Brazilian and French appropriation in that popular 
conceptions emphasised the human–machine metaphors as the ones professed by Der 
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Spiegel. On the other hand, West German scientists resembled their Soviet and American 
counterparts, who saw cybernetics as ‘clouded’ by unscientific or unspecific ideas. As 
Aumann succinctly points out: 
 
In the US, cybernetics left the field of science soon after its initial phase. Serious 
scientists no longer called themselves cyberneticists by the mid-1960s because 
the term had become a mass media phrase that covered all hopes and fears 
concerning the mechanization of thinking […] Whereas cybernetics became a 
popular culture term in the US, it was ideologically charged in the socialistic 
French society of the postwar era and even more in the countries of the Eastern 
bloc […] One part of the cybernetics ideology was present in all countries: The 
‘technocratic dreams’ of the 1960s found their scientific counterpart in 
cybernetics. The desire to rationalize, mechanize, and plan all social systems 
dominated debates all over the world. Representing this style of thinking, 
cybernetics was used as a weapon against irrational ideologies. It became the 
ideology of anti-ideologism, the science to interpret the modern mechanized 
world and guide people through it.94 (Aumann, 2011, p. 23) 
 
The sort of cross-cultural analysis seen so far illuminates particular national 
readings, very different in emphasis and nuance. From this point of view, cybernetics, 
particularly in its earlier forms, was indeed a nationally and culturally linked social 
phenomenon and not some sort of unified and international grouping, as it is usually 
perceived to be today. Similarly, cybernetics in artistic contexts cannot be taken for 
granted as a unifying narrative for so many different practices. Despite the pervasiveness 
of rational formalism and its optimistic attitude towards the technosciences, as 
exemplified by cybernetics and the various intellectual fields described above, the 
different appropriations acquire different forms and shapes according to each distinct 
national, artistic or intellectual context. We need to remind ourselves that, despite not 
mentioning computer art directly, those are the events that circumscribed it. Similarly to 
                                                      
 
94 This inherited problem with cybernetics in the US can then explain Jack Burnham’s assertion that 
‘early inquiries into the aesthetic implications of cybernetics took place primarily in Europe, whereas the 
United States lagged behind by five or ten years’ (in Shanken, 2001, p. 20). 
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the diverse ways in which cybernetics was adopted, early computer artists were also 
unlike each other. 
 
 
2.4 1965: Year one 
 
If we had to determinate a year for the emergence of computer art, that year would be 
1965. Despite such art being produced some time before then, with both digital and 
analogue computers, 1965 can be seen as the year when computer art made its public 
entrance within established artistic contexts via its first public exhibitions. This story is 
not new and many historians and artists have already described in detail this sequence of 
events. In order to comprehend the circumstances of its emergence, instead of simply 
restating these histories, I will concentrate my efforts on contextualisation. So far in this 
chapter I have mostly concentrated on the political and intellectual circumstances 
responsible for allowing computer art to be in the first place. Firstly, without the 
consequences of the Cold War for industry and national politics everywhere, especially 
under the auspices of the US, the institutions that were responsible for early computer 
would not have come to fruition or would not necessarily have allowed computer art to 
come to be in the exact way it did. Had the computing industry not developed hand in 
hand with the American military, for example, there would not have existed the push 
towards digital computers, which, as we have already seen, initially were not necessarily 
more productive and reliable than analogue ones. Secondly, we also need to remind 
ourselves that the very push towards digital computers was done under the assumption 
that it could help control the Cold War itself. Importantly, I am not talking about the 
control of military matters only. Rational formalism, a general intellectual and cultural 
disposition anchored in the belief in a particular instrumental rationality, provided both 
the rationale and the framework for a whole new set of academic disciplines and artistic 
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practices based on very broad assumptions: formalist, axiomatic and rational. Although 
this was not a consensual shift, the rational formalists were positioned very close to the 
centre of power, on the central stage of the Cold War: these were the intellectuals who 
provided the narrative, the methods of containment and the policies conceptualised in the 
light of international conflict. 
Now, while the circumstances described above may account for the development 
of computer art and later AST, these are not the only factors at play. Exogenous factors as 
they are – that is to say, exterior to the art world in question95 – they may have prepared 
the ground and allowed for a certain configuration between actors, institutions and 
technology, but we cannot assign computer art’s existence to those external factors only. 
Had the art world at the time been a strictly technophobic one, for example, computer art 
would not have had a chance to develop. That is not deterministic in the sense that this 
does not imply that no one would have created computer art. That is certainly not what I 
mean. The point here is that, given the available technology, there was probably someone 
who would have attempted computer art anyway, whether the art world was technophobic 
or not. The difference is that, from the point of view of a technophobic art world, no one 
would have cared about that art done with computers. All in all, what can be observed in 
the history of computer art is that, although not widely celebrated and in fact very much 
questioned, it was indeed possible to conceptualise and produce an art form with 
computers. In the end, and despite huge resistance, people commented on it and there 
were exhibitions, university departments, academics, publications and artists dedicated to 
it. What I want to stress is that there was indeed a positive attitude towards science and 
technology. It can undoubtedly be said, then, that part of the art world at the time was 
indeed technophilic. The rest of this chapter is dedicated to these technophilic tendencies 
and to computer art’s symbiotic relationship to them. 
                                                      
 
95 For more information on this topic refer to Chapter 1 (‘Method, Scope and Rationale’). 
  142 
Three exhibitions were produced over the course of 1965. Despite some 
differences, they had much in common. Surrounding these exhibitions was a sense of 
both bafflement and excitement, not all positive, regarding the purpose of arguably 
conservative plotted drawings. In order to understand the initial settings of these new 
cultural products, we should therefore proceed by looking at each individual exhibition. I 
intend to demonstrate the effects of both exogenous (Cold War and rational formalism) 
and endogenous (artistic technophilia) factors in relation to the art world in general. 
These factors together account for the emergence of computer art and were responsible 
for shaping both the content and discourse of these new artistic endeavours as much as its 
reception by both internal audiences and the general public. It is impossible, however, to 
talk about these first exhibitions and not to talk about the institutional and intellectual 
context of their main characters: Max Bense, Frieder Nake, Georg Nees, A. Michael Noll 
and their parent institutions. To ignore these propositions is analogous to ignoring the 
history of not only the exhibitions themselves but also the history of the ideas behind 
them. Turning a blind eye to the context of computer art’s birth, and focusing solely on 
the works and possibilities of the genre, would be the same as accepting a fully formalist 
narrative that, invariably, rejects any notion of temporality and influence of external 
factors such as political and material contexts. This section investigates the three first 
exhibitions of computer art. We will track their appearance chronologically, and, hence, 
we should first look at Georg Nees’ Generative Computergrafik. 
Opening on 5 February and running to the 19th day of that same month, this first 
exhibition was held at a gallery in the Technical College of Stuttgart, later renamed the 
University of Stuttgart. Under the guidance and curatorship of renowned philosopher 
Max Bense, this exhibition only featured works produced by the mathematician Georg 
Nees. The title today associated with this first exhibition, Generative Computergrafik, 
however, was not used at the time. This would be adopted by Nees himself some years 
later and refers to his 1968 PhD thesis, written under the tutelage of Bense and perhaps 
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the first thesis dedicated solely to the theme of computers and the arts96. Produced at 
Siemens, where Nees worked, these may be considered to be the first public events 
presenting visual algorithmic output – that is, abstract drawings plotted on paper. The 
gallery itself (Studiengalerie der TH Stuttgart) was part of Bense’s philosophy 
department and was founded by him in 1959. In regard to the works shown at the gallery, 
neither the artist himself nor historians are completely certain of which ones were shown. 
The only clue we have to this are the illustrations contained in rot19 (Fig. 8), a booklet 
series published by Bense’s department that in this specific edition contained a small 
passage written by Nees discussing some of his works97. Moreover, the same publication 
also contained Bense’s introduction to generative aesthetics, a text closely related to his 
larger, analytical information aesthetics theory. This first show was part of a colloquium, 
also organised by Bense, where he aimed to demonstrate the uses and practicalities of his 
rational method for both producing and analysing art (information aesthetics)98. His 
                                                      
 
96 These events have been retold time and time again in the literature. We will not gain any new 
insight by rephrasing them yet again. For a personal history, which provides the viewpoint of an eye witness, 
refer primarily to Nake (2008, 2009, 2010, 2013). For a description more concerned with the 
contextualisation of these first German exhibitions, see Klütsch (2007a, 2007b, 2012). For one of the first 
histories written on computer art, including the Stuttgart scene, see Franke (1985). In addition to these, I have 
added insights from personal emails and conversations between Nake and myself (Nunez, 2015) and an 
interview by Nees (2014). 
97 Nees (2014) tells us that both rot19 and the exhibition itself were a surprise to him. After a failed 
attempt to enroll for a PhD under Helmar Frank in Berlin, Nees was recommended to Bense. Nees then sent 
Bense the pictures that he was working on and a small text describing his method: these were the materials 
that made up both the exhibition and rot19. Despite our not knowing exactly which works were shown, rot19 
is a valuable source of information. 
98 Information aesthetics was ‘based on mathematician David Birkhoff’s attempts in the 1930s to 
define a numerically specified aesthetic measure as order in complexity’ (Oberquelle and Beckmann, 2008, p. 
21). Simplistically we could say that, if information aesthetics was concerned primarily with mathematically 
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‘generative aesthetic’ (Bense and Nees, 1965; Bense, 1971), nonetheless, was not 
produced without external references. Drawing heavily from information theory (Claude 
Shannon), cybernetics (Norbert Wiener), generative grammar (Noam Chomsky) and 
semiotics (Charles Sanders Peirce), Bense’s attempt was to rid art and aesthetics of all 
subjectivity and move towards a mathematical and analytical description of ‘aesthetical 
states’99. 
Even though Bense himself was a rather well-known and respected individual in 
the German art scene of the time, the show’s public reception was rather lukewarm if not 
outright hostile. This reaction was not necessarily directed at the artworks themselves but 
rather at their creative method. Nees had programmed a computer to draw and did not 
know, as might be expected, the results of his algorithms before committing his punch 
cards to the machine. What his work showed was, in fact, a visual representation of pre-
detailed arguments written in a specific computational language (ALGOL). Even though 
the actual work arguably required creativity, logical/mathematical for that matter, the 
product of this programming, its visual outcome, was lambasted as soon as it was 
considered art. If we cannot say that the critics aimed at the artworks themselves, neither 
can we say that their anger was related to the pretensions of Bense’s tentatively rational 
method for considering art practice and critique. By 1965 Bense was very well known for 
his positions and many at Stuttgart (and indeed beyond) knew of his theoretical work. He 
had been active for at least twenty years prior to this event. His position at Stuttgart was 
achieved when he was already an important character in post-war art, present mainly 
within the circles that had concretist concerns at their core. Indeed he was a leading figure 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
measuring art, Bense’s program for generative aesthetics, published in the small booklet rot19 (Bense and 
Nees, 1965), which accompanied this first exhibition, was interested in the creation of artworks informed by 
information aesthetics. 
99 For a complete discussion of Bense’s philosophical postulates, refer to Klütsch (2007a). 
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in the constructivist-oriented art and poetry movement, which reverberated well beyond 
West Germany’s borders, into Brazil, France, Japan etc.100. Bense’s connection with 
concretism and its rational/mathematical theorems can also be attested by his institutional 
links. As early as 1954, for example, invited by the Bauhaus alumnus Max Bill, Bense 
held a teaching position within the prestigious Ulm School of Design, itself an institution 
that favoured a rational approach and the use of semiotics. It suffices to say that Ulm, 
founded by Bill, saw art in the same utilitarian, rational and holistic manner that made the 
whole Bauhausian method legendary. Moreover, as Bense himself studied at Dessau 
Bauhaus, it is fair to say that, despite being a physical scientist by training (he had 
previously studied geology, mathematics, philosophy and physics at Bonn University), he 
was greatly influenced by a collection of old traditions: from the enlightened belief in 
rationality to the romantic the idea of Gesamtkunstwerk; from the abstractions of 
Kandinsky to Bill’s form-and-function designs; from Wiener’s cybernetics to Peirce’s 
semiotics; from art to industry and science (Walther, 2000). His output and influences are 
so vast that a separate thesis would be necessary to cover them101. 
Artist and mathematician Frieder Nake, in one of his many descriptions of this 
same event, might provide us with a clue to the rationale behind that terrible reaction by 
Bense’s own peers. In the context of a now famous verbal exchange between Nees and a 
member of the audience, Nake recalls the debate: 
 
                                                      
 
100 Both Max Bill and Bense, for example, were very close to the Brazilian concrete artists. Bill not 
only was awarded the first São Paulo Biennale award (in 1951) but is also considered a huge influence on 
local artists such as Waldemar Cordeiro (Amaral, 2006b, p. 216) and Almir Mavignier (Galanternick, 2010), 
his professor in Ulm. Bense, meanwhile, had a close relationship with the paulistas and even wrote a book 
commenting on his Brazilian travels (Bense, 2009). 
101 Döhl et al. (no date) have compiled a huge, freely available resource of Bense’s output. For a 
more focused study on Bense’s generative aesthetics, see Klütsch (2007a). 
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Tell me, Mr Nees, can you make your machine draw like an artist’s flow? Nees 
ponders for a moment. He is a calm, patient, friendly mathematician of about 
thirty-five years of age. Then he says, ‘Yes, I can. If you can tell me precisely 
how to define your way of drawing’. That is too much for the professors from the 
Academy of Fine Art. They leave, some slamming doors: ‘Who does he think we 
are?’ Bense tries to calm the tempers: ‘Please, dear friends, what you see here is 
only artificial art’ […] The opening would have gone as smoothly and amicably 
as any previous opening had it not been for a single but most sensitive detail of 
the situation – the questioning of one aspect of the artist’s existence […] the artist 
intuition and creativity. (Nake, 2009, p. 77) 
 
 
As a matter of fact, it was not the artworks, themselves quite traditional, nor the 
theoretical pretension of Bense’s work, a rational method for evaluating and practising 
art, that cause the furore. Contentiousness is found, therefore, in the very fact that the 
machine had produced those pictures, even though the programmer (Nees) had specified 
the parameters responsible for them. For Nake, himself a mathematician with artistic 
inclinations, it was the attack on a cherished characteristic of the art world that caused the 
uproar. Had the machine been hidden from the equation, the event would have unfolded 
differently. ‘Artificial art’, the term chosen by Bense in order to calm the nerves of the 
audience, was not only redundant since all art is artificial by nature but also 
representative of a deep apprehension and, in some ways, coherent with Bense’s 
expectations. As historian Christoph Klütsch summarises, artificial art 
 
on first glance looks like an excuse, but referred implicitly to artificial 
intelligence. This comparison, in combination with his manifesto on ‘generative 
aesthetics’ and Bense’s reference to the implications of Chomsky’s concepts, 
superseded the aesthetic theories of his time […] Just as Chomsky was looking 
for the laws of natural language, Bense was looking for the laws of aesthetics. 
(Klütsch, 2007b, p. 421) 
 
The title for rot19’s article, the ‘Project of Generative Aesthetics’ (Projekte 
Generativer Ästhetik), presented as a kind of manifesto for computer art, seemed to 
present a similar strategy, where the term ‘art’ is capriciously excluded. At the same time 
that it extrapolated Bense’s theory into the realm of a rational pursuit, conceptualised as a 
scientific analysis of human perception (since the very term ‘art’ is excluded from its 
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title), it seemed also to appease concerned artists (a view not necessarily shared by 
Klütsch but held by Nake). As Bense detaches the ‘aesthetic state’ of an artistic object 
from its very definition of art, he reveals his theory and program under a veil of 
scientificity and, under this same logic, manifests his predisposition against ‘art historian 
chatter’ (Klütsch, 2012, p. 67). In Bense’s own words: 
 
Today we have not only mathematical logic and a mathematical linguistics, but 
also a gradually evolving mathematical aesthetics. It distinguishes between the 
‘material carrier’ of a work of art and the ‘aesthetic state’ achieved by means of 
the carrier. The process is devoid of subjective interpretation and deals 
objectively with specific elements of the ‘aesthetic state’ or as one might say the 
specific elements of the ‘aesthetic reality’. These elements are pre-established 
and their appearance, distribution and formation is described in mathematical 
terms. Thus this new aesthetics is simultaneously empirical and numerically 
orientated. (Bense, 1971, p. 57) 
 
For whatever reason, it seems that it was not only Bense who was interested in 
keeping art out of the discussion. For Nees at least, the term ‘art’ had to give away to 
‘aesthetics’, although in his case the reason was a somewhat institutional problem, a 
different kind of external, institutional pressure that Bense never faced. We need to 
remind ourselves that the expensive machines producing these artworks were not 
intended to produce art. While Bense’s preoccupation with the term ‘art’ had a theoretical 
and, perhaps, political underpinning, for Nees it was a rather straightforward problem: his 
employees did not want to be involved with art since, for them, computers and 
engineering were their occupation. Unfortunately, we do not have any direct reference to 
pinpoint his hesitation. We can, however, reach this conclusion by conjecturing over 
some very important facts that are deceptively unrelated. Firstly, there is Nake’s own 
account, where he clearly repeats this argument, by stating that Siemens ‘did not want to 
be connected with the term [art] when the subject matter, from their point of view, was 
computers’ (Nake, 2008, p. 3). A personal friend of Nees, Nake reinforces my hypothesis 
by stating in another article (and also over personal emails) the idea that previous articles 
published by Nees in Bense’s journal Grundlagenstudien aus Kybernetik und 
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Geisteswissenschaft were ‘in terse, technical language, describing only the programming. 
Anything that could come close to the idea of art [was] carefully avoided’ (Nake, 2009, p. 
80). Another occurrence also supports this view. A. Michael Noll, another pioneer among 
computer artists (our next topic), also faced similar constraints at the hands of his 
employer, this time AT&T. Similarly to Siemens, although for different reasons, AT&T 
did not wish to be related to artistic practice and, hence, both Noll and Nees produced 
artworks in their spare time. Since AT&T’s Bell Laboratory, Noll and their subsequent 
role in the second exhibition are part of our next topic, this will have to wait. For now it 
suffices to say that they also disliked the idea of being related to artistic practices by way 
of computers. While we cannot be sure why Siemens disliked Nees’ activities, AT&T’s 
rationale was straightforward: it was a publicly funded monopoly that had a very clear 
mandate and consequentially it was also constantly afraid of losing its privileges via 
public inquiries and scrutiny. It is a pity that much of Siemens’ corporate history covering 
this period has not been researched as deeply as AT&T’s (at least in English, that is). Yet 
another piece of evidence for Nees’ reluctance may be found in the very content of his 
doctoral thesis, written under Bense’s guidance. Published some years later, in 1969, by 
the publishing arm of Siemens (Nake, 1998, p. 163), the thesis can be considered ‘as a 
practical proof of Bense’s aesthetic’ (Klütsch, 2007b, p. 423) and a technical piece that 
explored logarithms and their visual representations. Beware that, when I say it is 
technical, I am saying that it is primarily concerned with the technical aspects of 
computer-aided visual production, similarly to Nees’ earlier texts for Bense’s 
Grundlagenstudien aus Kybernetik und Geisteswissenschaft, and is hence a text 
concerned with the technicalities of production, from the coding itself to the plotter used. 
By using pseudo-random number generators to achieve the variability of the graphical 
outputs shown at the exhibition, Nees tried to put into practice Bense’s theorems of 
macro- and micro-aesthetics. In Bense’s words: 
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The metrical method of describing an aesthetic state uses numerical data in the 
same way as older schematics, i.e. theories of proportion in art. This method will 
establish the macro-aesthetic constitution of an art object, in other words, the 
composition dealing with form, figure and structure. The statistical method is 
involved with the concept of frequency or probability of appearance of elements. 
Also with numerically assessed characteristics of elements in their relationship 
and organization. Thus we arrive at the micro-aesthetic constitution of a work of 
art which can be used to arrive at, not the ‘principle of formation’, but the 
‘principle of distribution’. (Bense, 1971, p. 57) 
 
The reader may question the importance of this institutional link, between Nees 
and Siemens, as mere coincidence and may argue that the reason both Nees and Bense 
abandoned the term ‘art’ shows more a theoretical preoccupation than some obscure 
outside pressure. To that, however, can be replied that even though the institutional 
pressure was not explicitly shown it would, nevertheless, have had an important impact 
on how this early production would be read. The main point here is to ask: Why, if both 
Bense and Nees were not interested in art, would they show those computational 
compositions in an artistic environment? Why, given Bense’s relationship with the 
worldwide concrete art scene, would he abandon decades of his own artistic theories? 
Why would these artists frame those compositions, hang them up on walls and invite 
people – art people – to an opening if they were not interested in art? Again we should 
remind ourselves that these were images produced in an environment not interested in the 
frugalities of art and that this same company and not some art publisher published Nees’ 
thesis. Personally he was, from an early age, interested in art and considered himself an 
art enthusiast (Nake, 2009, p. 79). How could Nees justify the use of an expensive 
machine if not by using the ‘this is proper science, and hence good’ argument? Also 
noteworthy is the fact that it was only in 1987 that Siemens would gain an official artist-
in-residence programme102. Ironically, only five years after his first show, Nees would 
                                                      
 
102 Related to the changing nature of companies such as Siemens, and mirroring the fate of many 
artist-in-residence programs developed in the 1970s, Siemens’ program’s social value changed according to 
the tastes or trends of the time. The link to its arts programme (http://www.siemensartsprogram.com) has 
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participate in the first computer art section at the 1970 Venice Biennale (Franco, 2013b). 
Klütsch asserts that the abandonment of the term ‘art’ was a purely conceptual exercise, 
but I think material, contextual and testimonial evidence seems to contradict this. Both 
Bense and Nees were producing, thinking and proposing a new art; a different one but 
nevertheless art. 
The theoretical aim to distance themselves from the arts as defined by Bense – 
subjective and historical – was further eroded as the years passed by. The Venice 
exhibition mentioned above was one of the many produced in the following years. Other 
individuals eventually joined the circle of computer-oriented art and, for this first wave at 
least, two things kept this embryonic group together. Firstly, none of them were artists. 
Again institutional and material constraints played a huge part in shaping the early 
computer art world. Computers were complex, expensive and industrial machines very 
distant from the personal computers of today. Siemens was one of a handful of companies 
that had both the material resources necessary to own a computer and also the immaterial 
resources of individual knowledge that could operate the machine in a way apart from the 
obvious, for that required very specialised knowledge from its employees. For most of the 
industry, computers were giant calculators, used for very specific tasks and not thought to 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
vanished from the web. We can still find evidence of its existence in two documents, one on its Ukrainian 
website and the other on its archive website (Siemens, no date; Siemens Archive, 2008). This program and 
others now seem to have been substituted by a new foundation, established in 2008, the Siemens Stiftung, 
which focuses on ‘fields of basic services, education, and culture’ with the ‘aim to help people improve their 
living conditions’ (Siemens Stiftung, 2015). The history of artist-in-residence programs within industries is 
still in its infancy. For various perspectives on their qualities and problems, whether historical, practical or 
theoretical, see Shanken (2005) for a general overview; for a study of E.A.T.’s activities, refer to Goodyear 
(2004); for insights into AT&T’s Bell Labs, see Kane (2010); for artists within PBS, see Lovejoy (2004, pp. 
115–116); for more on E.A.T. in the context of the Pepsi pavilion in the International Exhibition of Japan, see 
Turner (2014). 
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produce art, for example. It is incredible that these engineers and mathematicians took an 
interest in art in the first place and roughly at the same time (technophilia was indeed 
very pervasive). More surprisingly, though, is that they actually managed to get away 
with it. I have not managed to find a single individual who was more severely 
reprimanded by their parent institution. There was institutional discouragement, from 
both AT&T and Siemens, for example, but it seems the tactic to associate the artistic 
output with some kind of scientific research, consciously or otherwise, worked quite well 
not only for Nees but also for Noll. More importantly perhaps, both also managed to enter 
a notoriously closed field. In the past hundred years, how many times have 
mathematicians and engineers been talked of as art pioneers? By claiming scientific 
concerns, these two individuals got away with it. They were, after all, claiming to resort 
to that all-powerful authority, the scientific one. Had they engaged in more romantic 
things such as ‘feelings’, the result of these works could have been their total dismissal. It 
is right to point out that, in certain institutions, given their internal culture, the mingling 
of art, science and technology was easier.  
Nees’ and Noll’s discourse of promoting science, then, was applied in a twofold 
manner. Firstly it allowed these new artists to continue their production within highly 
structured and goal-oriented institutions. That both Noll and Nees produced highly 
technical texts discussing their artworks should not be seen with surprise; it was with 
those texts, framing their production as legitimate science, that they managed to continue 
their experiments. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it was with the same 
scientific discourse that they managed to get within the art world. Here is where the 
intellectual context, a rational formalist one, is so important. The authority of their 
artwork cannot be found in the artworks themselves. Rather it was the discourse, a 
rational formalistic one, that provided both with the opportunity to break into both 
worlds, industrial and artistic. By resorting to the authority of science, they managed to 
convince both fields of the importance of their work. In other words, they become 
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legitimate in the eyes of their contemporaries. It is important to note that I am not 
proposing they were misleading their partners in art and industry. The opposite is true: 
they were true believers that computers could and would achieve proper (whatever that 
might mean) art-making capability. The name generative aesthetics, and not generative 
art, therefore, is indicative of a defined strategy. Nees, being a career engineer at the time, 
seems to have been reluctant to be remembered as an artist rather than a proper engineer, 
a fact that would in various ways affect his work at Siemens. At the same time, however, 
it could also provide him with a legitimate argument for both his experiments and his 
positioning within art. Bense, on the other hand, knew very well the implication of his 
theory. By excluding ‘art’ from the exhibition, he would rid the show of any vestige of 
subjectivity and at the same time reach a compromise with his artistic peers. Information 
aesthetics, after all, was not aimed at a subjective practice – that is, traditional art. Rather 
the opposite. Bense’s proposed aesthetic was an empirical science that could be 
numerically represented to behave in a similar fashion to the natural sciences, and his 
protégé, Nees, was only showing the practical output of that method: artificial art. Despite 
the fact that Bense’s circle was one of constructivist-concerned artists – belonging to the 
long line of Bauhausian thought (after the war centred in Ulm) that advocated both 
explicitly and implicitly for a rational method in the arts – his ideas might have seemed 
quite extremist to artists of his circle. Even though Bense did not have the same 
institutional constraints as Nees did (the academic setting was not per se critical of his 
positions), he also chose to soften the polemic in this exhibition103. Despite these 
precautions, the reaction could not have been worse. 
                                                      
 
103 Apart from the conflict in that first exhibition, Klütsch reminds us that ‘Art critics in the Stuttgart 
newspapers were furious, and an article in Der Spiegel (Germany’s most prominent weekly magazine at the 
time) published a one-page article about Bense’s aesthetic’ (Klütsch, 2007b, p. 422). 
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Meanwhile on the other side of the Atlantic, in New York, nearly simultaneously 
to the first exhibition, two engineers were presenting computer-plotted pictures in an 
artistic environment. Béla Julesz and A. Michael Noll’s exhibition Computer-Generated 
Pictures (Noll, 1994, p. 41) ran from 6 to 24 April at the Howard Wise Gallery. As 
expected, since in 1965 computers were extremely expensive and specialised machines, 
these two engineers, similarly to Nees, worked for a massive corporation, namely Bell 
Laboratories, part of AT&T, by then the biggest corporation in the world and owner of a 
monopoly in telephone infrastructure that would only be dismantled some twenty years 
later (Temin, 1989, p. 16 table 3). Despite this apparent similarity, their introduction to an 
artistic context could not have been more heterodox. Whereas Nees had effectively gone 
after Bense in order to exhibit, Julesz and Noll were invited to their show by almost pure 
chance. Accordingly, the rationales for the shows were completely different in emphasis 
and intentions. Not only were there differences between the German and the North 
American groups but there were also some differences between the two members of this 
exhibition. Between these two scientists, only Noll felt comfortable calling his creations 
art. Julesz, despite also producing visuals with computational apparatus, saw his works as 
part of an ongoing and rather successful series of experiments that focused on human 
cognition and, therefore, were not produced with any aesthetic interest (Noll, 1994, p. 
40). Ironically, it was Howard Wise who first approached Julesz, after seeing his work on 
the cover of Scientific American magazine (Noll, 2014a) (Fig. 9). This conflict resulted in 
a compromise and the title for the exhibition did not, therefore, contain the term ‘art’. 
Another reason for keeping the term ‘art’ at bay, similarly to the first German 
exhibition, was institutional interference. AT&T, in a similar fashion to Siemens, wanted 
to keep its distance from any unwanted publicity. That is not surprising. Given the fact 
that it was in effect a private company that had a state-backed monopoly, AT&T’s PR 
and legal department tried to discourage the exhibition in order to avoid any commentary 
regarding Bell Labs’ activities as non-scientific (Kane, 2010). ‘Hence an effort was made 
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by AT&T to halt the exhibit, but it was too late, since financial commitments had already 
been made by Wise’ (Noll, 1994, p. 41). After the failed attempt to halt the show, in 
another move to distance itself, AT&T granted permission for Noll and Julesz to 
copyright in their own names the pictures produced at their labs. Julesz might not have 
been interested in seeing his work as art but for Noll that was the intention all along. 
Differently from Julesz’s, Noll’s research was focused on sound rather than images. He 
was given an internship in the research department in 1962 and was responsible for the 
‘exploration of a new method for determining the fundamental frequency of speech’ 
(Noll, 1994, p. 39). In order to achieve his goals, he was given a new microfilm plotter. 
The plotter would be used to print the various graphs of speech data and one day, by 
mistake, a data plot was wrongly inputted into the computer. The product of this error 
resulted in a plot that Noll and a colleague jokingly described as ‘abstract computer art’. 
After that first error Noll would actively write code that would create these new abstract 
compositions, and so he continued, informally and ‘for fun’ (Noll, 1994). 
The venue of Noll and Julesz’s exhibition, the Howard Wise Gallery, is also 
markedly different from Stuttgart University. If the German venue indicated a concrete, 
rationalistic and academically oriented show, with Bense’s influence at the helm, the 
American one lacked the conceptual rigour of the German show and also had a more 
commercial, free experimental intention. Howard Wise was, first and foremost, an art 
dealer. Springing from a rather wealthy family, he is remembered as a patron of 
‘technological art’ (Glueck, 1989). Although not financially successful (Gaines, 2006), he 
was indeed an important patron of video and kinetic art. In a 1984 article in the journal 
Afterimage, part of a series dedicated to discussing the main benefactors of video art, 
Wise is the sole subject (Sturken, 1984). His On the Move, produced in 1964, was an 
exhibition intended to present to an American audience artists such as Agam, Calder, Le 
Parc, George Rickey, Takis, and Tinguely (Sturken, 1984). The Lights in Orbit 
exhibition, this time in 1967, presented ‘Jones, Le Parc, Mack, Piene, Takis, Uecker, 
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USCG, and Wilfred, as well as several artists who soon after began experimentations 
with television: Jackie Cassen, Rudi Stern, Earl Reiback, Thomas Tadlock, and Nam June 
Paik, who had been working with television since 1963’ (Sturken, 1984, p. 6). 
Wise’s interest was focused on technology rather than anything else. His 
‘genuine interest in new technologies soon led him to electronics’ (Sturken, 1984). 
Epistemologically, Wise and Bense are a world apart. Nevertheless both discourses, of 
rationality and technological experimentalism, have persisted in the vocabulary of 
computer art (and AST more broadly) to this day – a subject that will be discussed further 
later on. For now suffice to say that the combination of economic might, exemplified by 
both Siemens and AT&T, and the respective national contexts of post-war 
developmentalism resulted in artworks that, although sharing a certain aesthetic limited 
by its very primitive medium, emerged from completely different discourses. In other 
words, the lowest common denominator between these early cultural products was the 
material context and not, as usually portrayed, the art historical one. Whereas Nees 
actually pursued that new technology for art practice, appropriating Bense’s discourse 
originally intended for concretism, Noll stumbled on it by accident, for ‘fun’, and would 
only discuss art itself some years later in a series of technical memorandums produced 
within Bell Labs104 and sporadic articles in specialist journals. 
Despite the fact that Noll, differently from Nees, did not conceptualise his works 
within a certain artistic tradition, he still thought about his art process, albeit at a later 
date than that of the Howard Wise Gallery show. In general, his arguments for digital 
computer art (so called at the time in order to differentiate it from analogue computers) 
can be divided into two, interrelated ones: experimentation and process. The first 
argument, the ‘experimentalist’ one, similarly to the arguments of many AST 
                                                      
 
104 His own personal website contains a vast and rich source of original memorandums, patents and 
articles (Noll, 2015). 
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practitioners, aims to justify computer artworks as attempts to ‘explore the possibilities of 
the computer as an artistic medium’ (Noll, 1967, p. 89)105. For Noll the computer can and 
should be more than a utilitarian apparatus, and it is up to artists to engage with the new 
technology in order to decipher its possibilities106. The second argument explored by Noll 
is seen in the article ‘The Digital Computer as a Creative Medium’ (1967), where he 
discusses not only the possibilities of this new practice but also his rationale for it. In this 
paper Noll, in order to justify the use of the computer (and his ‘experiment’ with it), tells 
a little anecdote, attributed to Henri Matisse. In it he describes Matisse’s process as taking 
a 
 
blank white canvas, the French artist said, and after gazing at it for a while, you 
paint on it a bright red disk. Thereafter, you do nothing further until something 
occurs to you that will be just exiting as the original red disk. You proceed in this 
way, always sustaining, through each new gambit with the paint and brush, the 
initial visual excitement of the red disk […] even if we take it lightly, it can do a 
number of things for us. For one thing, it dispels some of the sense of mystery 
that hovers over the procedures of the creative person. It tells us something 
concrete and easily visualized about the creative process while emphasizing the 
role of the unexpected ideas […] Most of all, the Matisse anecdote suggest that 
the artistic process involves some form of ‘program’. (Noll, 1967, p. 90) 
 
 
We cannot be certain whether the German group had any influence on Noll’s assertion 
that the artist, in the end, is acting according to an internal set of rules, a program. This 
text, written in 1967, after both Nees and Noll had met in some previous exhibitions, 
perhaps represents this German influence; perhaps it represents an increasing awareness 
                                                      
 
105 This emphasis on experimentalism can be seen in the narratives of Shanken (2001), Paul (2003), 
Taylor (2004) and Salah (2008), to name a few. 
106 Again a matter of ‘exploration’; Taylor (2004, p. 151) would name this characteristic the frontier 
myth of computer art. Unsurprisingly, Noll had a very active pedagogic intention, and not only in computer 
art. The bibliography on his website (full of articles beginning with ‘The Introduction of…’) as well as his 
emphasis on exploration and experimentation seem to corroborate the myth (Noll, 2015). 
  157 
of artistic discussions of the day. Although Noll does not frame his works under Bense’s 
theory, he shares an assumption mostly specific to German computer art – that the artist 
works in a process-oriented manner. We have reason to believe that, despite the artists 
being aware of each other in 1967, Noll’s metaphor of the artistic method as a computer 
program predates their meeting. On 14 April 1965, while his exhibition at the Howard 
Wise Gallery was still going on, Noll published an internal memorandum that would 
become something of a statement of the confidence professed by the initial generation of 
computational artists. Later published in 1966 in the journal The Psychological Record, 
the article, titled ‘Human or Machine: A Subjective Comparison of Piet Mondrian’s 
“Composition with Lines” (1917) and a Computer-Generated Picture’ (Noll, 1966b), if 
read by the public present at the first exhibition in Stuttgart, would perhaps have caused a 
yet more aggressive reaction. In ‘Human or Machine’ Noll describes a simple and small-
scale study that pitted Mondrian’s Composition with Lines (1917) (Fig. 10) against one of 
his computer programs to determine the aesthetic preference of his peers at Bell Labs. His 
method was simple: 
 
Reproductions of both pictures were then presented to 100 subjects whose tasks 
were to  identify the computer picture and to indicate which picture they 
preferred. Only 28% of the [subjects] were able to correctly identify the 
computer-generated picture, while 59% of the [subjects] preferred the computer-
generated picture. (Noll, 1966b, p. 1) 
 
 
Noll’s experiment and process, then, are very different from the kind usually seen 
in artistic discourses. The Mondrian experiment depicts both his ideas (experimentation 
and process) together. With this paper Noll not only produced an analogy between human 
and computer, as equal entities, but also put into practice his experiment. If we cannot say 
that artistic canon or theory unites both artists, Noll and Ness can, nevertheless, be united 
by their position within a certain material and intellectual culture detached from artistic 
concerns. Early computer art at least – that produced between 1960 and 1965, before the 
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first exhibitions – was an art interested in a scientific experiment and not, as one may 
suppose, an artistic one. Despite sharing the noun ‘experiment’, these early computer 
artists were mainly interested in developing an aesthetic science. Noll may claim he did it 
for fun but, as his Mondrian experiment suggests, it was far from disinterested fun. 
Likewise Ness (who also professed an inherent interest in the arts), via Bense’s adoption 
of Birkhoff’s scientisation of aesthetics (Klütsch, 2012, pp. 67–68), also partook in this 
very specific kind of experiment. It is not that they were interested in investigating 
various new aesthetic states, as we would usually expect today when confronted by the 
claim of ‘artistic experiment’. They were attempting to formalise aesthetics and, in turn, 
to transform it in a proper, legitimate science. When looking at this production 
retrospectively, it is easy to misunderstand this very simple yet central distinction, 
between the scientific and aesthetic experiments. With computer art and AST 
practitioners becoming more intertwined with the artistic field and its discourse, this 
distinction seemed to dissipate in favour of the aesthetic kind. In his rather unscientific 
Mondrian experiment (since his sample stems from a small and homogeneous crowd), 
Noll typified the exact reason for the terrible reaction of Bense’s peers at the opening of 
Nees’ exhibition. In other words, not only could the computer create art but also, in some 
cases, its output might be preferred to the human one. The question posed to Nees at his 
opening is, therefore, reincarnated in Noll’s experiment. Recall the conversation between 
Nees and his public: ‘Tell me, Mr Nees, can you make your machine draw like an artist’s 
flow? […] “Yes, I can. If you can tell me precisely how to define your way of drawing.”’ 
Now, how could two people re-enact the same controversy without knowing each other? 
The answer, I argue again, lies in the material contexts of both individuals. The analogy 
between computer and human is indeed a very sensitive topic that can disgust people – 
not only then but also today. Moreover, it may also be seen as one of the reasons behind 
the terrible reactions of the art world towards computer art. Given the importance of this 
discussion, regarding the reception of this cultural production within a largely 
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technophilic field (the art one), we should look at it in more detail later on. At the 
moment, it is important to stress that, although Nees and Noll started from different ideas 
on how to practice and conceptualise computer art, they reached very similar positions on 
it: computer art is conducted experimentally and procedurally. That, by itself, is 
testimony to the importance of both artists’ material and institutional context, namely, the 
technoscientific field of a post-war world. This idea of experimentation is perhaps best 
summarised by Klütsch; he refers to Abraham Moles, who, together with Bense, was a 
pillar of information aesthetics and, consequentially, generative art: 
 
While traditional artists – according to A. Moles – work under the dictum of trial 
and error, computer artists follow the principle of experiment. No longer is the 
artist a person who might only search for a language of expression, trying out 
different forms of representation, discarding trials and learning from errors. 
Instead, computer artists set up an experimental situation, scientifically described 
and repeatable. (Klütsch, 2012, p. 72) 
 
It is important to note, then, that both their concept of experiment and their process are 
anchored in the concepts’ relationship with mechanistic conceptions of mind (the human 
and computer analogy). If by experiment they meant the scientific kind, what about 
process? In other words, what would lead Noll to produce his Mondrian experiment? We 
can, to begin with, discard the definition of Zlotnikov’s or the paulistas’ process and 
cybernetics, which in essence were working under a trial-and-error process. Differently 
from Noll and Nees, they did not wish a scientisation of art, nor did they take cybernetics 
to its extreme conclusion: that humans and machines were alike. Process, then, for early 
computer artists at least, should be seen in relation to the simple, repetitive, logarithmic 
acts that, in essence, were done by the computer. Humans, in this conception, are nothing 
more than Universal Turing machines and, appropriately, the artist acts according to their 
own internal program. For them processes are just consequences of a program, prior to 
the artwork itself, and embedded in both machines and humans alike. As Nake would 
later describe: 
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Each painter is a restricted picture generator. So is each picture generating 
computer program. At all times, artists have applied the same method most 
computer programs employ: they tried to vary a theme as often as possible in 
order to attain a ‘best’ (in their judgment) object. This method became 
particularly important in recent years with Bauhaus, concrete art, New 
Tendencies etc. (in Klütsch, 2012, p. 74) 
 
The analogy between humans and machines is, again, a recurrent theme in AST 
(and not computer art only) and will be seen throughout this thesis. These examples 
nevertheless, for now, show the limits of reading early computer art history from the 
point of view of current and previous artistic debates. It was the computer and the post-
war culture – rational formalistic, attempting an aesthetic science via formalistic methods 
anchored in human–computer analogies (a product of cybernetics) – that was 
characteristic of that production. Given that both emerged from the same material culture 
(and not an artistic one), as we saw, it is unsurprisingly that something else connects the 
two exhibitions: both were poorly received. Excepting one ambiguous review by the New 
York Times (Preston, 1965, in Noll, 1994 and Taylor, 2004), Noll’s exhibition did not sell 
a single work. Noll recalls spirited discussions, with great expectations, with Wise about 
how to split the revenue from sales (Noll, 1994, p. 41). If we are comfortable in saying 
that Wise, given his record, was interested not only in computers but also in technological 
opportunities in general and that, as Sturken (1984) characterised him as being a different 
kind of dealer – an anomaly in the 1960s American art world, in that financial gain was 
not the driving force of his career. Computer art historian Grant D. Taylor may offer 
some insight into this problem: 
 
Previously, computer art had remained within the confines of the technocratic 
periodical Computers and Automation. Once exhibited at the Howard Wise 
gallery, however, it was effectively thrust into the centre of the world art scene 
[…] However, this was no ordinary exposition of work created by artists working 
with new media. Apart from being organized by scientists and sponsored by a 
telecommunications giant, the exhibition was showing art generated by a 
machine. Emerging from the technical sphere, computerised art was inevitably 
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set on a collision course with the art community and its well-established 
paradigms of art production and meaning. (Taylor, 2004, p. 31) 
 
If on the one hand the German show was poorly received by its audience, the 
constructivist/concrete-oriented crowd, on the other hand the American experiment failed 
to provided its mentor, Wise, with what is the most important thing to any commercial 
gallery: commerce. We know that the argument used to lambast Nees was focused on the 
pretension of his ‘artificial art’. The idea of a rational, process-centred artistic practice 
could not be its problem since Bense was already known for exactly that. However, the 
erroneous idea that the computer could substitute for the artist is what provoked the 
outraged reaction of the German public. For Computer-Generated Pictures, however, the 
bar was set not by an academic and rather restricted academic group but by the larger art 
world itself. The exhibition’s public profile and impact, although negative, can be seen as 
impressive. Both The New York Herald Tribune and Time magazine held a very critical 
view of the show, by stating that its artworks did not have any aesthetic appeal and were 
simply ‘cold and soulless’ (Taylor, 2004, p. 32). I believe these negative reactions are not 
random unconnected events but in fact reflect something else, deeper than an artistic 
judgement and more broadly ingrained in the contemporary culture. Nake, my next topic, 
may clarify this uneasy relationship. 
Computergrafik (Fig. 11), the second exhibition of the so-called ‘Stuttgart 
school’ group, which started around December 1964 with Nees’ first publication in 
Bense’s Grundlagenstudien aus Kybernetik und Geisteswissenschaft journal (Klütsch, 
2012, p. 65), was the last show of digital computer art in 1965. The exhibition opened on 
5 November and ran up to the 26th of that same month (Klütsch, 2005), and it would be 
considered quite similar to the first German one if not for the introduction of one 
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character pivotal to the field back then and today: Frieder Nake107. Considered the ‘most 
radical computer graphic artist’ (Klütsch, 2012, p. 74), Nake has been a central figure of 
the field, not only as an artist but also as one of the most prolific writers of digital 
computer art. Nake was not a career engineer though, and, despite spending his early 
years in an internship at IBM, where he first had contact with computers, he is mainly a 
scholar. Again, not only did he contribute to the field as a practitioner and theoretician 
but he is also responsible for the preservation of those early years via a series of papers, 
interviews and websites. Today, differently from Noll and Nees, who eventually moved 
on in order to dedicate time to their engineering careers, he is still an active voice and has 
been chief researcher of an ambitious project responsible for preserving the memory of 
those early days (University of Bremen, 2015). 
Although he frequented Bense’s lectures and had a personal involvement with 
local artists, in a similar fashion to our other two artists, Nake encountered computer arts 
rather by accident. As one might expect from the first generation of computer artists, he 
did not formally study art. It was in his early days at Stuttgart Technical University that, 
according to him, the most important day in his life happened (Nake, 2013, 2h 10min). 
Recalling the events, Nake remembers when in 1963 one of his professors said to him the 
university was buying a ‘drawing machine’. This machine, a ZUSE Graphomat Z 64, 
constructed by computer visionary Konrad Zuse, did not have any software; it was up to 
Nake to develop it. Following the invitation by his professor, the young Nake found that 
opportunity incredible exciting and accepted without hesitation. After being put in charge 
of this task, he proceeded to develop a program to test the machine. Nake’s first 
preoccupation was to test the motors of the drawing machine; he realised that in order to 
                                                      
 
107 Most references in this subsection are based on personal emails between the author and the artist. 
Moreover, I also base my text on the long unpublished interview between Nake and Poltronieri (Nake, 2013). 
These, together with his various texts, provide a clear picture of his intentions at the time. 
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achieve this task he would need to systematically write a program that would allow the 
machine to draw in all possible directions. Knowing that this task would be too strenuous, 
and taking advantage of his research in probability theory, Nake recalled Bense’s lectures 
and decided then to combine the two: he would create something artistic and test the 
machine with it. 
It was during the first computer art exhibition, held at Bense’s Studiengalerie, 
that Nake first came in contact with another person producing pictures using the same 
method as him. As soon as he saw Nees’ prints he realised that his could also be seen as 
art and that he was not alone. Recalling the unrest of the first exhibition, with the 
accusations culminating with the ‘artificial art’ argument, Nake recalled his feelings at 
that moment: 
 
For me as a young and innocent witness of the scene, all this was exciting and 
puzzling. How seriously these famous people seemed to be talking something 
that, to me, was everyday and business as usual […] Sets, bundles and structures 
of straight lines, determined by calculated randomness and put on paper by a 
computer controlled drawing device – it existed all up there, at the centre, too. It 
had been my job as a student assistant to develop from scratch a basic program 
package to control the same Graphomat drawing machine that Nees had access to 
[…] Now I discovered that elsewhere, others had had similar ideas. But to top 
this, Nees had dared to exhibit same [pictures]? (Nake, 2002, p. 7) 
 
How, then, did the final show of 1965 happen at all, with both Nake and Nees 
together, since it was Nees who was Bense’s protégé? The story told by Nake seems to 
reveal a lot about the so-called ‘Stuttgart school’ and in reality seems to contradict the 
idea of a close-knit group. Wendelin Niedlich, a cultural reference in Stuttgart (Nake, 
2002), was the gallerist and bookseller responsible for exhibiting Nake for the first time. 
He had a personal and close tie with Nake and it was Nake who approached him first. 
Niedlich at the time was already an enthusiast of Bense’s work and, according to Nake, 
his enthusiasm was the reason he set up his store in Stuttgart. Knowing that Nake’s work 
somehow involved an idea of rationality and that it was close to Bense’s ideas, he 
accepted Nake’s proposal. Some days after this initial agreement, Niedlich approached 
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Nake with an idea: What about if Bense himself did the opening? Nake promptly agreed 
to the suggestion but, in a turn of events, there was a condition for Bense’s participation: 
Niedlich would also need to show Nees’ pictures alongside Nake’s. For Nake that was 
rather uncomfortable. This situation can be explained by the fact that the first time Nake 
realised that what he was doing was similar to Nees’ pictures he approached Bense, and 
then invited Bense to see his work and process at his studio (Nake, 2013, 1h 35min). This 
first approach, however, was not accepted, and Bense never turned up. Indeed, Nake 
recalls this first contact with Nees as a rather ‘sad story’ (Nake, 2013, 1h 35min). The 
exhibition, however, went as planned and Nake did not raise any objection to both Nees’ 
and Bense’s presence. After all, Bense was an icon for both him and Niedlich. Bense’s 
position as a thinker, an ideologue for rationality, reverberated deeply with Nake’s 
generation. According to Nake, Bense presented an alternative not only to current artistic 
discourses but also to Germanic culture itself. For Nake and his colleagues, who had very 
vivid images of the war, Bense’s rationality was an escape from the emotional appeal that 
the Nazis held over Germany. The rationality behind this is clear: emotions drove the 
country and its people to the Nazi regime; if the people had been rational, the crimes 
committed by the Nazis would never have happened. Radical rational ideology, in 
retrospect, was seen as a reaction to German fascism. Such was the lure of this ideology 
that Nake and others did not need to deeply understand Bense’s theories (Nake, 2013). 
The call for a rational art, as simple and incomplete as it sounds, was enough for them. 
Despite the exhibition going smoothly this time, something in particular bothered Nake. 
Neither Nees nor Bense were present. Someone else read Bense’s text at the opening. 
Nake felt insulted by this lack of commitment and came to understand the situation as 
Bense having a clear preference for Nees over him. 
If on the one hand both Nees and Noll had reservations with the term ‘art’, Nake, 
on the other, has always seemed more at ease with it. Despite his long reclusion from 
computer art after 1971 (a subject further discussed later on), Nake fully embraced the 
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field. And by field I mean not only computer art but also art in the broadest term. Perhaps 
because of institutional constrains, perhaps because of Bense’s ideas, it seems that Nees 
did not feel comfortable with being an artist as much as Nake did. Testament to Nake’s 
artistic commitment is his development as an artistic theorist. Whereas Nees, during his 
involvement with computer art, developed his work and thought under Bense’s 
rationalistic ideology, which in many ways wanted to detach this computer-oriented work 
from the larger art world, by proposing a paradigm shift towards the quantification of 
aesthetics, Nake, in time, sought to reconcile computer art with current artistic 
production. Nake may have started because of both Nees and Bense but, as we shall see, 
he did not confine his production to the purely rationalistic discourse. Not only that, in 
many ways Nake offered a break from Bense’s ideas and, with that, we may say that he 
was the first computer artist to attempt reconciliation between computer art and the larger 
art world. In order to understand his idea of computer art, we should look at the 
development of it. That is because, as noted previously, Nake began by following Bense’s 
project and, therefore, most of his earlier texts follow that same rationale. As Klütsch 
reminds us: 
 
As a mathematician, Nake is concerned about definitions. If we had a proper 
definition of art, we might enable the computer – a mathematical machine – to 
produce art […] This approach fits Bense’s program of a rational aesthetics to 
terminate the ‘art historian chatter’. A theory must be scientific, exact, and 
reproducible to describe aesthetic properties of a class of certain objects in the 
world. (Klütsch, 2012, p. 74) 
 
It is no coincidence that Nake’s early ideas reflect those of Nees, particularly the 
notion of a rationalistic procedure resulting in a view of human action as quantifiable. In 
this way, Nake drew a parallel between human intelligence/creativity and computer 
technology. Certainly this point is what truly annoyed artists at the first exhibition in the 
early months of 1965. There is, however, something rather cheeky in both Nees’ and 
Nake’s affirmation – a point of view that, if not looked into carefully, results in 
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computers and humans being considered identical (ironically, not the point of view held 
by Nake). Firstly, how can one describe exactly how a person behaves? If that is possible, 
then we can definitely mimic that person’s behaviour with a machine. Secondly, to have a 
machine mimicking a human being does not imply it is intelligent but, instead, implies 
exactly the opposite: the machine is not intelligent in the sense that it is cognitively aware 
of the problem and, consequentially, arrives at a result in the same way a human being 
does. It is merely, again, mimicking the human. Humans were never put aside in Nake’s 
ideas, neither were they deemed unessential. Nake’s own (emotional) explanations shed 
light on his view that ‘you can only program what you can describe’: 
 
Machines will never be intelligent; never […] What Nees’ anecdote [in the first 
exhibition] tells you implicitly is that we can program only what we can say but 
we cannot program anything else. That what cannot be expressed (the painter’s 
will, or action) cannot become a program […] What am I saying here? That 
function of the mind, that we can describe, we can turn into a program. We can 
do thousands different functions but we will still be different because we are the 
sum of all these functions. In the computer we find intelligent functions but we 
never find intelligence […] Intelligence goes beyond functions. The interpretant 
(man) is continuous. The interpretant is what we do individually and is 
subjective; there is nothing objective there […] why the hell would people 
believe or wish to create such a thing [artificial intelligence] when we know it is 
just a machine. I am not, therefore, a machine! (Nake, 2013, 54min, 1h 10min) 
 
This narrow and erroneous view of human intelligence, as it was understood by the public 
in the 1960s, can be traced back to the historical context of post-war computer science, in 
particular the idea of artificial intelligence (Salah, 2008). Salah describes the 
phenomenon of artificial intelligence as a tendency found in both philosophical and 
computer science communities against Cartesian dualism. Such was the importance of the 
theme, to find an appropriate definition for ‘intelligence’, that ‘the first and foremost 
effort to frame intelligence came from one of the greatest minds of the era’: Turing 
(Salah, 2008, p. 22). This effort, which consequentially sees parallels between the human 
mind and computational processes, in turn, leads one to draw uncomfortable conclusions. 
If machines are to some extent similar to humans, at what point can we distinguish 
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humans from them? How could humans, in an age of limitless automatons, even more 
capable than themselves, protect their perceived and rightful position as the ultimate 
‘creation’? The ghost in the shell, destroyed by the ideas of AI ideology, caused a strong 
reaction not only from the critics of early computer art but also in society in general108. 
Despite not being at all what Nake had envisioned, the very idea of computers invading 
one of the last bastions of humanity was enough to provoke such a disgusted reaction. 
Way before 1965, the idea of an artificial ‘electric brain’ thrived in both popular 
and academic culture. Wiener’s Cybernetics, for example, both in its original 1948 
edition and in its second edition of 1961, is full of metaphors of the brain and the 
computer. Tellingly, Wiener’s work, despite being written with a scientific and academic 
crowd in mind, was mostly adopted by artists and people in the humanities rather than its 
author’s initial public, the scientific community. Popular culture, on the other hand, not 
only compared the human mind and computational capacity but also, unsurprisingly, 
pitted them against each other in antagonistic fashion109. If Wiener and cyberneticists 
proclaimed the machine as equal in potentiality to humans, the view taken by popular 
culture usually takes the opposite view and, it seems, the larger art world, the traditional 
one, followed this tone. In these narratives the human usually wins, by submitting the 
machine to tests that are, in the human’s view, unmistakably human. Salah sums up this 
conflict nicely by stating that: 
 
With every attempt to move computers into the territory of human intelligence, 
the definition of intelligence or the understanding of human abilities changed. 
This poses an unsolvable dilemma, a dilemma Turing has foreseen and tried to 
                                                      
 
108 For more general and popular interpretations of the computer as well as its consequences, see 
Edwards (1996) and Julyk (2008). I shall return to this topic later in the text. 
109 A trend still presented in science fiction. I shall refrain, however, from discussing popular culture 
since, given the amount of material produced over the past fifty years, this would result in another whole 
thesis. 
  168 
avoid when he suggested to use the Turing Test. However, since the source of the 
problem is rather in the disinclination of humans to accept the capabilities of 
computers in taking on faculties that are attributable to humans only, even the 
Turing Test cannot offer a tangible solution. At the bottom of this disinclination 
lies the narration of humans as superior beings in the universe. This belief, which 
is obviously religious in its roots, shapes the world view of its adherents in such a 
way that there is no place for computers beating down humans in logical 
operations, let alone in more delicate traits like writing poetry, or making art. 
(Salah, 2008, p. 36)110 
 
Despite claims that computer art was ‘soulless’, Nake did not interpret it in this 
way. The human was pretty much an essential part of his artistic process. Bense’s 
generative aesthetics required, after all, a steersperson, in purely cybernetic terms, in 
order to select from the innumerable possibilities produced by the computer, in order to 
write the commands for the computer and in order to define the functions of each 
individual unit in this process. The randomness of the program, creating various pictures 
within the same logarithm, would result in an enormous amount of products that, in turn, 
had to be selected from, consumed by a human. If for Bense, by sheer force, the random 
characteristics of the computer could replace what is described in art as intuition (Salah, 
2008, p. 43), for Nake the human participation, its feedback, was as important as the final 
piece itself. And how could we describe this ‘selection’ if not as subjective? This 
‘communicative process’ would require therefore not only the artist but also a critic, who 
would ‘digest’ the artwork and produce something else, a critique, as they consumed the 
artwork (Nake, 2013, 40min). The artist, in turn, would consume (read) the critic’s 
product and produce a new work of art and so on… Despite acknowledging that this kind 
of schema is too simplistic (Nake, 2013, 48min), the cybernetic feedback then is not only 
seen happening within the artist but also between the whole community of artistic 
                                                      
 
110 How timely, then, that at the time of this writing a computer program managed for the first time 
to pass the infamous Turing test only for it to be dismissed, yet again, as insufficientevidence of machine 
‘thinking’ (BBC, 2014). In retrospect, Noll’s ‘human or machine’ ‘experiment’ can also be seen as playing 
with these same anxieties. What else could it be, if not a different method for a Turing test? 
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interested people and/or institutions. Conversely, if the final picture, being a visual 
representation of the program’s output, is nothing more than the product of its human 
creator and governor, the picture itself is but a simple unit in this whole system. From that 
Nake extrapolates that the program itself, the code, where intentions are described and 
defined, although probabilistically, must be the most crucial element in this whole 
endeavour. This emphasis on the program, its process and its dematerialised character, 
differently from Bense’s intention, puts the computer art right back in the path of 
traditional artistic discourse. If rationality, as proposed by Bense, had sprung from 
constructivist theories, the perceived programmatic qualities of the computer frame 
computer art, for Nake, not in the constructivist tradition but in the conceptualist one. 
Although preceding the actual term ‘conceptual art’, computer art, according to Nake, is a 
direct continuation of Marcel Duchamp’s inquiries (Nake, 2008). This repositioning of 
computer art, from a concrete to a conceptual art reading, is also explored by, for 
example, Shanken (2001), Paul (2003), Lovejoy (2004) and Taylor (2004). These 
readings, as well as Nake’s, pay homage to Sol LeWitt’s writings (2003a[1967], p. 846) 
in which the ‘idea becomes a machine that makes art’. Taylor (2004) is the author who 
has most scrutinised those claims, both by conceptual and computer artists. The adoption 
of conceptual but not of computer art into the artistic canon, we shall see later on, 
provides a valuable example of artistic technophobia and its rationale. 
It is important to stress that my intention is not to judge the merits of these 
attempts. For the purposes of this thesis it is much more interesting that these attempts 
were made in the first place. Later on I will describe how computer art evolved through 
these original events. The legitimatory discourse is, consequentially, of the utmost 
importance in this endeavour since, as I will show, it has divided the field of computer art 
(and later AST) into different and sometimes antagonistic points of view. For now it 
suffices to say that we should understand Nake’s late approach in two separate lights. 
Firstly, his attempt to frame computer art within conceptual art does not wholly reject 
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rationalism but, instead, admits the failure of information aesthetics insofar as it wished 
to quantify aesthetic properties. This mature discourse, rather different from his early one, 
reflects, it seems, Nake’s position not only in relation to Bense’s work but also in relation 
to his own. Again, for Bense, the whole purpose of information aesthetics was to rid art 
of subjective criteria and, by positioning computer art within conceptual art, Nake in 
essence brings forth this same subjectivity. The second point of interest is concerned with 
the fact that, by approximating computer art with conceptual art, Nake firmly posits, 
albeit retrospectively, computer art back at the centre of the artistic discussions of the 
1960s, in particular those relating to Jack Burnham’s Beyond Modern Sculpture: The 
Effects of Science and Technology on the Sculpture of Our Time (1968), responsible for 
bringing forth the discussion of systematic approaches to a North American audience, and 
Gene Youngblood’s Expanded Cinema (1970), responsible for conceptualisations of 
video as a possible means of art making and for making what is perhaps the first 
connection between conceptual and computer art. If Nake had made this connection 
earlier in his career, computer art perhaps could have had a different standing today. 
Finally, we can say that Nake did indeed change the discourse of computer art. His late 
reaction against much of the early dogmas not only presented an effort to position 
computer art back within ‘art’ but also showed an unusual effort to position computer art 
within the artistic discourse and not, as is commonly argued, as something rather different 
from art in general: 
 
The failure of information aesthetics is due to its most fascinating starting point: 
the radical idea of an aesthetics of the object. All subjectivism was to be banned 
from aesthetics: the focus was to be on measure rather than value judgment, 
number rather than feeling, mathematics rather than psychology. An aesthetics of 
the object was supposed to produce methods of measuring the object such that a 
quantitative feature vector would replace the aesthetic object in any matter of 
value judgment. Information aesthetics failed when it became clear that 
information was no objective measure, but rather a subjective construct. The 
constructivist notion of information as an emerging quality when systems adapt 
to their environment turned information aesthetics into an extreme case of 
European scientific imperialism. (Nake, 1998, p. 163) 
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Augusto de Campos, one of the main exponents of Brazilian concrete art (and poetry), in 
1966 wrote an article, originally published in the daily Correio da Manhã (Campos, 
1974, p. 13), commenting on the apparent conflict between two groups: one, as he saw it, 
traditionalist and nationalist, and the other modern and international; between 
‘traditional’ Brazilian popular music and bossa nova and iê-iê-iê112 supporters. Although 
a visual artist, a concrete poet, he saw in this conflict a reflection of a larger, for him 
unrecognised trend, between the clash of old and new traditions. In rather prophetic 
terms, he declared that: 
 
The new mass media – newspapers and magazines, radio and television – finds 
its foundational matrix in the metropolis which, via its ‘centrals’, irradiate 
information to thousands of people in regions ever more numerous. The universal 
inter-communicability is ever more intense and unstoppable, in such a way that is 
impossible for any citizen, over the course of his daily routine, to go about 
without being confronted with Vietnam, the Beatles, strikes, 007, the moon, Mao 
or the pope. For this very reason it is impossible to profess an enduring 
nationalism to movements, trends or popular manias that flow and reflect 
everywhere. (Campos, 1974, p. 286, my translation) 
 
 
This vision, commenting on the development of Brazilian popular music, although it 
seems as detached from computer art as it can be, expressed a sentiment present 
                                                      
 
111  Part of this section was presented at the Computer and Art History 29th Conference – 
‘Conformity, Process and Deviation: Digital Arts as “Outsider”’ – at King’s College in 2014. Some elements 
were also presented at ‘Medical Images and Medical Narratives in Late Modern Popular Culture, 2nd 
International Conference on Medical Imaging and Philosophy’ at the University of Ulm in 2014. 
112 Iê-iê-iê was the name given to pop and Western-inspired rock songs that, although not as 
internationally recognizable as bossa nova, were immensely popular in the Brazilian 1960s. 
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everywhere at the time, computer art included. The post-war world, for almost two 
decades, was one permeated by a feeling of change. Before the counter-culture 
reverberated in people’s minds, together with a wave of protest that would swipe the 
world, an optimistic frame of mind came to dominate people seemingly everywhere. 
Among the new technologies emerging at the time, it was perhaps the computer that was 
most seen with suspicion (Julyk, 2008; Turner, 2006). Yet proponents of a new society, a 
modern one, such as Augusto de Campos, would not have found these developments 
troublesome. The opposite was true: for him and other artists, usually placed within 
rational formalist efforts, these developments should be celebrated, embraced and not 
countered. One question emerges, then, from this scenario of technological optimism. 
Given that Brazil was at the time riding a wave of technological optimism, led by 
desenvolvimentismo policies, which aimed to foster Brazilian modernisation, allied with 
the wish of the Brazilian artists (especially in the São Paulo context) for a new rational 
art, where was a Brazilian computer art? Perhaps a better way to recast this question 
would be simply to ask: Given Brazilian artists’ previous engagement with concrete art, 
why were the first computer artists American or German and not Brazilian? 
From the point of view of artistic discourse, given its concrete tradition, we may 
argue that Brazil was more prepared to accept and develop computer art than the Unite 
States. The mathematical pretensions of Brazilians, like those of their German 
counterparts, could, for example, be thought of as a precursor to the rational formalism of 
early computer art. It is difficult to imagine how abstract expressionists could be 
interested in the mathematical precision of computers113. The similarity between Brazilian 
and West German artists, with their quest for a precise aesthetic, then, raises a simple but 
important question: Why did Germany produced Nees and Nake while Brazil produced 
                                                      
 
113 Although, as Turner (2008) pointed out, mechanistic ideals reverberated well with American Cold 
War artists. 
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no computer art pioneer, given that Bill and Bense were widely known among, discussed 
by and influential for Brazilian concrete artists? Given the similarities between concrete 
artists in São Paulo, Ulm and Stuttgart, surely computer art would find a safe and 
welcoming home in the southern hemisphere. Cybernetics, information aesthetics, 
mathematical pretension and technological optimism: Brazil seems to have demonstrated 
all the conditions necessary for the development of computer art. Yet, computer art would 
appear in the country only in the late 1960s and, then, by just one artist, Waldemar 
Cordeiro114, himself part of the concrete movement, who had a solo show for his 
computer art only in 1971. To explain why Brazil did not have computer artists in the 
1960s we should not, as expected, rely on art historical narratives. The answer to this 
question, hence, is absolutely mundane: without computers there cannot be computer art. 
Although computers were bought by Brazilian companies as early as 1957 (Pereira, 
2014), these were sporadic and isolated investments when compared to the North 
American market. It was only after 1960 that computers would be present in cities other 
than São Paulo (Pereira, 2014). As we have seen, Brazil was not a recipient of aid money, 
which was instead being poured into Europe and Japan, and, consequently, found it 
difficult to keep up with the technological development of the wartime Allies. That, 
alongside the lack of technical knowledge just to operate those complex machines, 
rendered the computer curious and rare, almost inaccessible in Brazil (Cardi, 2002, p. 53). 
When we relate the development of computer art to various factors, exogenous and 
endogenous to art, we are not just attempting to historically describe the artistic 
movement but also aiming to explain why it happened in the first place. From this wish 
we can conclude that, although the artistic context, endogenous to art, was important in 
the development of computer art and later AST, since it would result in different practices 
                                                      
 
114 Cordeiro’s first solo exhibition of computer art, Arteônica, will be seen in more detail in Chapter 
3. 
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in Germany and the US, it was not itself essential to computer art and AST’s initial 
development. Computer art could, for example, develop in completely different scenarios, 
as with Ness and Noll, but it could not develop without the material support available to 
these artists. Hence we may say that political opportunity, the national context of 
different artists at the time, was hierarchically more determinant in the emergence in 1965 
of computer art than artistic discourse. 
Looking at, for example, the different institutional links of these diverse artists 
can further exacerbate the question of exogenous factors and artistic production. In other 
words, why did computer art developed at Bell Labs, for example, and not at IBM? IBM 
was, after all, the biggest computing company in the world. It was IBM that developed 
most of the computers used in early computer art (Taylor, 2004, p. 60). It seems natural 
that it would be from its ranks that the majority of computer artists would emerge. We 
know, however, that this was not the case. It was within Bell Labs that not only computer 
art developed but also the broader AST efforts were initiated. Although a research space 
theoretically focused on improving the American telephone system and technology, Bell 
Labs was responsible for a huge amount of basic research, from physics to chemistry, 
from electronics to material science. Not being bound by strict corporate codes and 
targets, something of a hallmark at IBM, Bell Labs allowed its management to promote a 
very open culture. The computing industry itself, despite being mostly dominated by IBM 
back then, owes much to Bell Labs. Given its special status, a state-backed monopoly, ‘in 
part to satisfy federal regulators, Bell Labs made information about transistors available 
at a nominal cost’ (Ceruzzi, 2003, p. 65). Had the transistor been created somewhere else, 
it would have been impossible to disseminate the technology necessary to computer art as 
quickly as was the case. This knowledge of the then unreliable transistor, which 
substituted the vacuum tubes in analogue computers, allied with its work for the military, 
‘laid the foundation for other companies, who after a decade of development finally 
began to supply commercial computers using transistors’ (Ceruzzi, 2003). 
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Noll, for example, fondly recalls his days at the ‘Labs’ (Noll, 2014a, 2015), and 
mourned the time it changed, for fear of federal prosecution concerning its monopoly115. 
To be blunt, what IBM lacked was freedom. John R. Pierce, Noll’s boss and executive 
director of the Lab, himself an engineer with artistic pretensions116, was so open and 
supportive of the use of computers for aesthetic purposes that, also in 1965, he published 
an article in Playboy magazine titled ‘Portrait of the Machine as a Young Artist’ (Pierce, 
1965). If we know that AT&T was not necessarily thrilled with Noll’s experiments, even 
granting him the copyright of his works (Noll, 1994, p. 41), we can assume that Pierce, 
being the executive director of the Lab and holding power and prestige within the 
institution, not only allowed but was also supportive of artists in the Lab. In fact many 
                                                      
 
115 Noll’s recollection is revealing of the kind of feeling he had: ‘After a two-year sojourn in 
Washington working on the staff of the White House’s Science Advisor, I returned to Bell Telephone 
Laboratories in 1973, but it was already starting to become a different place. The management that I had in 
the 1960s had changed: John R. Pierce (formerly executive director of communication principles) had left, 
and William O. Baker (formerly vice president research) had been promoted to president. Their replacements 
and other appointments in the research area, in my opinion, simply did not have the vision and wisdom of 
their predecessors – and this filtered down the management chain. Although I was again in the research area, 
the freedom to pursue risky projects had diminished. AT&T also began to put pressure on the research area to 
become more relevant […] Walking the long hallways of the Murray Hill facility, I could feel that the 
environment had changed, with an emphasis in my research area on the short-term practical. The 
government’s anti-trust action against the Bell System was having an effect – long before the actual Bell 
breakup occurred in 1984’ (Noll, 2015). 
116 Pierce was a musician and one of the first computer musicians. Together with other Bell Labs 
colleagues, he even published an album in 1962 and another in 1970 (Pierce, 1996). The Bell Labs history 
has been seen in many details in an assorted collection of books. I am mainly basing my narrative on the very 
revealing The Idea Factory (Gertner, 2012). For more information on the visual art being produced within the 
Labs, see Kane (2010).  
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artist–engineers who emerged from the Labs corroborate this view117. The engineers at 
Bell Labs, literally, could afford to produce art. It is important to stress that this theory 
does not assume the inexistence or the impossibility of someone producing computer art 
at IBM or other computerised companies such as Siemens. Nees contradicts that. What I 
am saying, instead, is that it was only because of the relaxed attitude of Bell Labs 
management and the lack of market pressure that computer-oriented art and music could 
develop in one of the most important research centres of the post-war era. IBM’s 
engineers may well have thought about or wished to produce art with computers but, 
given their professional commitments, as well as managerial pressure, as exerted over 
Nees in Siemens, the probability of computer art’s development within its walls was 
much smaller than at Bell Labs. The computers provided by these companies can be 
defined, in essence, as resources for early computer art. The companies should, then, be 
thought of as unknowing or tolerant patrons118. 
If we can say that computer art emerged from, first, the specific geopolitical 
configuration of the post-war world and, second, the development of digital computers 
                                                      
 
117 Noll, Klüver and others discussed the positive reaction and feedback from management at length 
in 1998 (Spivack et al., 1998). According to Noll another person held responsible for this highly liberal 
environment was William O. Baker, vice president of research. According to Noll ‘more than anyone else 
[Baker] was responsible for the environment within the research area at Bell Labs’ (Noll, 2014b). 
118 Likewise, the magazine Computers and Automation, which ran an annual contest for computer 
art, can also, despite being a trade magazine, be seen as a resource for the early computer artists. Different 
from the later journal Leonardo, which was mainly targeted at an artistic audience, Computers and 
Automation did not in any way see itself as an art magazine. Many of its ‘artistic’ pictures, for example, were 
merely the result of scientific experiments created within commercial companies, many with military 
contracts. For more information on this see Franke (1985, p. 97) and Taylor (2004). We can actually look into 
the magazines thanks to the work of the Bitsavers collective, which since the 1990s has been compulsively 
collecting all kinds of materials from early computer history (Bitsavers, 2014, 2015). I cannot stress enough 
the size of its archive and the amount of work its members have done. 
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and the military–industrial complex, which unknowingly hosted early computer art, the 
same cannot be said of the rationale behind those artworks shown to the public in 1965. 
These artworks, despite being created with the tools of the military–industrial complex, 
are not militaristic or commercial in any sense. Can we frame their rationale and even 
their impulse, then, within cybernetics? Despite being read by, for example, Bense’s 
information aesthetics or concrete poets, the short is answer is no, we cannot frame this 
work within cybernetics. First, Cybernetics, Wiener’s book itself, was not equally 
understood by everyone, least to say computer artists. The examples provided over the 
course of this chapter demonstrate that yes, cybernetics was indeed engaged by artists in 
various contexts but, as a useful master frame, it is too varied, too inconsistent in its 
adoption, too general to be considered the rationale behind these artworks. Ness was 
engaged with it via Bense and never directly. Palatnik, despite claiming reading it, 
misquoted its intentions, erroneously attributing to Wiener a book on Gestalt that never 
existed. Artists from Brazil, France and the USSR read it differently, usually according to 
their national contexts, and do not portray a single, unifying picture of cybernetics. Noll 
specifically denies any interest and in fact is quite critical of its misapplication (Noll, 
2011)119. Can we, then, claim that the impulse to use computers for artistic purposes was 
the product of C. P. Snow’s calls for the dissolution of barriers between the two cultures, 
the humanities and the sciences120? Klütsch for example, when commenting on the works 
                                                      
 
119 According to him: ‘I was well aware of Cybernetics by Wiener, but his theories had nothing to do 
with my computer art. Years later I heard of the work by Moles – but his work had no influence or relevance 
to my computer art, then or now. In my opinion, information theory has been misapplied to the arts to which 
it has no relevance then or now. Dr. John R. Pierce of Bell Labs wrote much about this kind of misapplication 
of information theory, and Pierce certainly influenced my opinion’ (Noll, 2011). 
120 Snow’s highly influential 1959 lecture (Snow, 2000), republished as a book in 1961, will be seen 
in more detail later on. As a historian put it: ‘Snow matters to historians today because he mattered to 
contemporaries then’ (Ortolano, 2008, p. 144). 
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of the Stuttgart computer artists, describes the two cultures debate as providing ‘a frame 
within which to formulate the new artistic approach, which was based on scientific 
methods and aesthetic experiments’ (Klütsch, 2007b, p. 424). When scrutinised, however, 
this claim seems rather simplistic. The fact that Noll and Nees were scientists (engineers 
is perhaps more appropriate) does not equate to a ‘bridging’ between the two separate 
cultures. Sometimes, in fact, the opposite is true: Bense wished to make art into a science 
and, with that, create a new, rational art form. If anything his methods seem intended to 
alienate artists and not, as Klütsch’s reading suggests, to bring the vocabularies of art and 
science closer to one another. Two different processes are at work here. First there is how 
people today frame that old debate, as simply being an attempt to unite the discourses of 
two different fields. Second, arising from this is the misrepresentation of Snow’s idea, 
which, really, proposed neither a union nor a common understanding. Snow’s lecture was 
more about the superior morality of the scientific culture, more about the inevitability of 
science, and more about the perceived lack of recognition coming from the ‘traditional 
culture’ than, simply, a call for greater understanding121. It is important to remember, for 
example, that Bense’s information aesthetic predates Snow’s lecture. Since Bense’s work 
was the product of his long engagement with concrete art, how could we attribute it to 
Snow’s provocations? We simply cannot. Here is where I believe the wide influence of 
rational formalism is most clearly seen. It was rational formalism, and not cybernetics or 
the ‘two cultures’ debate, themselves products of a faith in rational, axiomatic, formalistic 
proposals, that characterised the development of the early rationale of computer art. 
Computer art, as much as cybernetics or the ‘debate’, was a product of a moral discourse 
that credited rational formalism as the main episteme for truth. It was this superior moral 
                                                      
 
121 I highly recommend Collini’s (2000) and Ortolano’s (2008) works as guides in comprehending 
the (English) context of Snow’s work. Again, because Snow’s lecture would be pivotal to AST in general, I 
will not discuss it in this section. 
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authority of a particular understanding of science that was claimed by these artists. 
Denouncing the ‘literary intellectuals’, Snow, like Augusto de Campos at the beginning 
of this conclusion, paints a picture of a conflict, between new and old traditions, between 
modern and traditional views of the world, between those who advance and those whose 
hold us back. Perhaps more importantly, Snow addresses the lack of recognition by those 
in the intellectual pole who, invariably, could not comprehend the changes and 







                                                      
 
122 Professing a confidence typical of post-war technocrats and rational formalists alike – since in 
many ways the first is the product of the second – Snow argues that: ‘Literary intellectuals at one pole – at the 
other scientists, and as the most representative, the physical scientists. Between the two a gulf of mutual 
incomprehension – sometimes (particularly among the young) hostility and dislike, but most of all lack of 
understanding […] Non-scientists tend to think of scientists as brash and boastful. They hear Mr T. S. Eliot, 
who just for these illustrations we can take as an archetypal figure, saying about his attempts to revive verse-
drama that we can hope for very little […] That is the tone, restricted and constrained, with which literary 
intellectuals are at home: it is the subdued voice of their culture. Then they hear a much louder voice, that of 
another archetypal figure, Rutherford, trumpeting: “This is the heroic age of science! This is the Elizabethan 
age!” […] What is hard for the literary intellectuals to understand, imaginatively or intellectually, is that he 
was absolutely right’ (Snow, 2000, pp. 3–5). 
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Chapter 3: From computer art to AST 
 
The previous chapter was dedicated mainly to the contextual (geopolitical) and discursive 
(rational formalism) aspects of computer art. I have described and explained the impact of 
exogenous factors responsible for the development of an artistic form but we have not 
seen, as yet, the results of the 1965 computer artists’ claims to the status of art. We have 
just scratched the surface of these developments, of positioning computer art and later 
AST within art. If the highly pervasive effects of technological optimism allowed 
computer art to emerge, what would happen when that tide changed? In other words, if 
the technophilia of the 1950s and early 1960s allowed it to be in the first place, what 
would happen to computer art in the increasingly technophobic late 1960s and 1970s? 
The picture emerging from computer art’s public and critical response, we shall see, is a 
mixed one. On the one hand artistic developments stemming from technophilia definitely 
failed to be included in the larger artistic debates of the time. The art world was simply 
too distrustful of computer art’s achievements to consider them part of its canon. On the 
other hand, however, this very dismissal provided its members, true believers in the 
(good) use of technology and science, with the opportunity to rally the field’s troops into 
dedicated and specialised institutions that, over time, would become more and more 
detached from the art world. Computer art and, right afterwards, ‘art and technology’ 
attempts, perhaps best exemplified by the organisation Experiments in Art and 
Technology (E.A.T.), may have failed to stir the art world to their cause. This failure, 
however, had a silver lining since this very dismissal only reinforced these practitioners’ 
belief that the larger artistic world did not comprehend the scope of technological change 
happening in that period (and indeed today). This chapter, finally, deals with the 
emergence of the AST field as proposed by this thesis: a relatively autonomous artistic 
world, born out of the technophilic culture of the 1950s and early 1960s, that matured in 
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the technophobic late 1960s and 1970s and, in many ways, proposes a different art 
altogether from anything that came before. 
The years following 1965 were of great importance for computer art and 
consequentially AST. It seemed at the time that, given the frenetic attention given to the 
newly developed artistic world and some record-breaking exhibitions, the ideas proposed 
by early practitioners were indeed resonating with both publics and artists themselves. An 
increasing number of exhibitions, publications and meetings dedicated exclusively to 
computer art marked the apogee of the field but also, paradoxically, its increasing 
dismissal by the larger artistic field. This paradox, of increasing growth but also of 
increasing criticism, was crucial for the later development of AST as an independent and 
detached field of artistic practice. Consequentially, this should be part of the effort of this 
chapter: to recognise not only the rationale for this criticism but also the structural effects 
of it in the field of AST itself. In order to achieve this objective, I shall review some key 
events following the fated year of 1965 and, moreover, link those events and criticisms of 
them to the larger trends both in the cultural sphere in general and within the artistic 
world of the period in particular. As noted, artistic practices do not evolve within a 
vacuum and are, undoubtedly, connected to the world at large. We should not forget, 
then, that, despite some old conceptions regarding the ‘uniqueness’ of computer, digital, 
electronic, new media or technological art, the AST world as a whole was not only 
affected by larger cultural and material trends but also made possible – in its present form 
– by these exogenous events. That is not to say that this discussion will forget the 
endogenous factors inherent to the art world itself. These are also crucial in that they both 
informed the criticism aimed at computer art and informed the discourse of theoreticians 
in favour – via a legitimising discourse – of computer art and its eventual consequence, 
the AST field. By ‘endogenous’ I mean, of course, new artistic discourses, resources 
(institutionalisation) and practices that, according to the supporters of AST, attempted to 
position it within the artistic canon – something that, despite this wishful thinking, did not 
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happen. The reader might think, within this perspective, that the effort of these theorists, 
artists and institutions was, and still is, then, useless! Since according to this narrative 
AST never achieved full recognition, as its supporters claimed it should, why even 
bother? The question of legitimacy, however, is never a straightforward problem. Despite 
still sitting at the fringes of contemporary art, the very fact that it persists, that it is still 
going after more than fifty years, is in itself a sign that, for some at least, technophilic 
discourse and artistic practice not only resonate but also are connected in an important 
way. Their divorce, material and discursive, as we shall see, evolved not from a grudge 
between AST enthusiasts and frustrated mainstream art world participants (only). It was 
also a matter of institutionalisation, of new structures being created in order to 
accommodate a cultural product that, despite having supporters, did not find a home 
within established artistic structures. Not only their discourses were different: materials, 
methods and, eventually, internal criticism also diverged from larger artistic debates. This 
distancing, evolving from the very situations created by computer art itself, gave rise to 
the problem of legitimacy still central to many voices within the field. Unfortunately for 
those active today, their inherited field cannot easily be changed. 
The criticisms of computer art (and subsequently AST) then were so varied that it 
is difficult to demonstrate all of the propositions. In fact, these varied criticisms and the 
inability of computer art to be accepted have, ironically, informed much of the historical 
narratives of the field today: that it is soulless; that it is mathematically rigid; that it 
anthropomorphises machines; that its scientific propositions are useless; that it has a 
utopian and naïve tendency; that it is socially disengaged; etc.123. As we shall see, the 
                                                      
 
123 To my knowledge Taylor (2004) is undoubtedly the historian who has best mapped those 
criticisms and, as he remarks, they were not only put forwards by outsiders but also by members of the 
computer art world itself. While Akbar (2008) provides a compelling case in regard to a more ‘ontological’ 
rationale, her text is rather focused on its own arguments, whereas Grant (2004) provides a wider view of the 
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pattern of these anti-discourses, in the same fashion as exemplified by studies of counter-
movements, are not only ongoing but also proportional to the attention raised by the pro-
discourse group (computer art and AST world members). Hence, the more attention AST 
gained, the more it was criticised124. The reader must remember, however, that when I 
speak of a movement I am using a different definition from that of art historians, who, 
inevitably, search for patterns in both discourses and aesthetics in order to define a 
movement of some sort. An important distinction must be made with regard to Taylor’s 
approach or even characterisation regarding the development of computer art. For him, as 
an art historian, following Nick Lambert’s suggestion, it is difficult to characterise 
computer art’s position as a movement because: 
 
Since its inception, the term has been employed in a variety of contexts. As the 
computer became the new experimental medium, it was employed within a 
constellation of practices, including visual arts, film, choreography, poetry and 
music. The term ‘computer art’ has over time denoted different artistic practices 
[…] This has led commentators, with vastly different perspectives, to define 
computer art’s essential character in relation to their artistic goals. The multiple 
definitions mirror the various practices. (Taylor, 2004, p. 7) 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
problem. Given the novelty of these systematic approaches, I am certain that over time the subject will 
become ever more clear. I should also name Shanken (2001), Rosen (2011b) and Franco (2013b) as good 
references. As the chapter develops I will look at some of these individual criticisms according to this thesis’ 
own narrative. 
124  This assertion is constructed from the work of Meyer and Staggenborg (1996). However, 
differently from classic social movements, which in essence fight over broader social changes, art worlds 
seem to defend the artistic status of highly specialised cultural products, exemplified for example in studies of 
cinema (Baumann, 2007b), jazz (Lopes, 2002) or, yet, impressionism (White and White, 1993). 
Consequently, conflict for art worlds and their movements are different from the face-to-face, heated and/or 
broader debates stemming from ‘normal’ social movements. As such, a ‘counter-computer art’ is not to be 
found as an organised effort but, rather, developed as a criticism directed at the new field and made by 
established figures of the art world. For a more in-depth discussion of my method, as well as of the 
similarities between artistic and social movements, refer to Chapter 1 and Baumann (2007a). 
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Following my previous assertion that, in computer art history, the lowest 
common denominator for the field is its material and not its art historical or theoretical 
configuration, we may assert that the same can be said of AST. Furthermore, my 
definition of ‘movement’, following the sociological field that studies the broader 
phenomenon of social movements, requires only collective and organised action whereas 
agreement between its members can be very weak. Perhaps better summarised by those 
interested in the impact of external factors affecting cultural fields, this perspective can 
also be seen as concerned with how ‘the symbolic elements of culture are shaped by the 
systems within which they are created, distributed, evaluated, taught, and preserved’ 
(Peterson and Anand, 2004, p. 311). Therefore, the very debate over definition within 
computer art, regarding its unity, particularity or otherwise, seems indicative of not only 
theoretical tension between its members but also the creation of a group of people 
interested in this discussion in the first place. Moreover, if the channels where discussion 
is held (journals, institutions, books…) and the sites of exhibitions and meetings 
(specialist festivals, museums, university departments…) are the same for all conflicting 
denominations, how can we divide the field? The answer, for us, is that we should not125. 
Having said that, we also need to remind ourselves that, by 1968, two different 
and sometimes competing discourses had emerged. Both, in a sense, were attempting to 
direct the future of the field. Despite sharing many of the institutional settings available to 
discourses, despite this internal conflict never being realised directly and despite both 
discourses being disregarded by the larger artistic community, both were preoccupied 
with defining differently the aims of computer art and this was highly dependent on 
context. On the one hand we have an ‘experimentalist’ discourse, originating from an 
Anglo-American context and much less interested in rigidly defining the broad 
                                                      
 
125 Refer to Chapter 1 for a better discussion of the definition of ‘movement’. 
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developments in computer art. This discourse answered C. P. Snow’s call for action (both 
for and against it) and, as such, it had a broad appeal beyond the artist–technologist type. 
This broad interplay between artist, scientist and engineer is in essence what would define 
the AST world for years to come. On the other hand, however, we have a discourse that 
called for a strict definition of computer art, originating from the discussions instigated by 
its concrete art context, which we may label as ‘purist’. This discourse was not as 
interested in the collaboration between artists and scientists as such but, instead, aimed to 
reform art and society, following the calls for a completely rational artistic practice, 
which antagonised not only the ‘romanticism’ of art but also its market. By the beginning 
of the next decade, following the devastating effects of late 1960s’ technophobia and anti-
technocratic sentiment, one of these propositions, the experimentalist one, would have 
become dominant within the field and, in turn, would also inform the development and 
rationale behind future institutions created exclusively for it. 
 
 
3.1 The cultural turn: From utopia to dystopia 
 
On December 2, 1964, just before noon, more than five thousand students 
streamed into an open-air plaza in front of the University of California at 
Berkeley’s Sproul Hall. As they sat down on the pavement, one of their leaders, 
Mario Savio, stepped up to a microphone. With the towering gray columns of 
Sproul behind him, he tried to articulate what he and his audience had mobilized 
to fight. The university, he shouted, was an ‘autocracy.’ Its Board of Regents was 
a ‘Board of Directors,’ and its president, Clark Kerr, was a ‘manager.’ Extending 
the corporate analogy, he argued that the faculty were little more than 
‘employees’ and the students, ‘raw material.’ But, shouted Savio, ‘we’re a bunch 
of raw material that don’t mean […] to be made into any product, don’t mean to 
end up being bought by some clients of the university […] We’re human beings.’ 
With that, he uttered three sentences that would come to define not only the Free 
Speech Movement at Berkeley, but the countercultural militancy of the 1960s 
across America and much of Europe as well: ‘There’s a time when the operation 
of the machine becomes so odious, makes you so sick at heart, that you can’t take 
part, you can’t even tacitly take part. And you’ve got to put your bodies upon the 
gears and upon the wheels, upon the levers, upon all the apparatus, and you’ve 
got to make it stop. And you’ve got to indicate to the people who run it, to the 
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people who own it, that unless you’re free, the machine will be prevented from 
working at all.’ (Turner, 2006, p. 1) 
 
Turner, in this beautifully crafted paragraph, not only opens his book tracing the 
development of what some may call the ‘Californian ideology’ (Barbrook and Cameron, 
1996)126 but also perfectly describes the mood of many in the counter-culture: machines 
not only were spectres of a failed social order but ‘also referred to a social world that had 
become increasingly organized around information and information technologies’ 
(Turner, 2006, pp. 11–12). With that in mind, it is important to stress that when I 
reviewed the reasons that made it possible for computer art to emerge – that is, Cold War 
politics, industrial and policy changes and the growth of rational formalist discourse – I 
did not mean to paint a static and inflexible portrait of society. Those events narrated in 
the previous chapters in fact predated computer art’s first public appearance127, and those 
appearances, especially in regard to rational formalism, could in fact be seen as the 
epitome of those dramatic events in the artistic field. The general mood of those 
preceding years was of an optimistic kind, especially in the US, and an attitude towards 
                                                      
 
126 We should note that, despite their similarities, Turner does not agrees with Barbrook and 
Camoron’s narrative of the origin of the Californian ideology: ‘this ubiquitous set of beliefs did not in fact 
grow out of the legacy of the New Left, as Barbrook and Cameron suggested. Rather, a close look at Wired’s 
first and most influential five years suggests that the magazine’s vision of the digital horizon emerged in large 
part from its intellectual and interpersonal affiliations with Kevin Kelly and the Whole Earth network and, 
through them, from the New Communalist embrace of the politics of consciousness’ (Turner, 2006, pp. 208–
209). As for the Californian ideology itself, this ‘heterogeneous orthodoxy for the coming information age’, 
created by ‘a loose alliance of writers, hackers, capitalists and artists from the West Coast of the USA’, 
‘promiscuously combines the free-wheeling spirit of the hippies and the entrepreneurial zeal of the yuppies’ 
(Barbrook and Cameron, 1996, pp. 44–45). 
127  We had, obviously, computer art being produced before 1965. When I refer to a ‘public 
appearance’ I mean in the context of an artistic exhibition. Before that it was technical, small publications 
such as Computers and Automation that were responsible for showing the first works of computer art. 
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the future saw not only an American hegemony in the West as naturally arising from the 
end of the war but also an ontological change in the view of both society and policy, as 
exemplified by the rise of rational choice theories and their influence on policy, as 
controllable, predictable and, hence, harmonious. Resting on the assumption of 
technoscientific optimism lay a deterministic belief in ‘exponential technological growth’ 
(Krier and Gillette, 1985, p. 405). Perhaps better exemplified by the adoption of and 
certainty in Moore’s Law (National Research Council, 1999, p. 26), then and now 
(Ceruzzi, 2003), as a way of predicting the development and cost of integrated circuits 
within a chip, this optimistic attitude held strong for most of the 1950s and a great part of 
the 1960s as well. In the historiographical literature, this belief is usually attached to the 
attitudes and ideals of a liberal class in the American elites – attitudes and ideals that, 
nevertheless, were also adopted later by their allies. As previously seen, it comes as no 
surprise that many in the computing industry were part of this same liberal consensus that 
ruled American policy both at home and abroad128. It is important to stress that optimism 
in the 1950s was also tied to the broader economic situation of the US and its allies’ 
economies. There was huge growth not only in absolute GDP but also in GDP per capita, 
which reflected the colossal growth in consumer expenditure over the period of 1950–
1973, in both the US and other Western economies (Jones and Zeitlin, 2008, pp. 404–
407). Under American hegemonic influence, the prosperity of its allies would function as 
a deterrent to communist sentiment and, following a rational formalist logic, ‘American 
                                                      
 
128 The term ‘liberal’ itself has been a matter of debate. Similarly, the narrative of the 1960s in 
relation to conservatism and the emergence of radicalism is also a focus of intense historical debate. 
However, this text adopts the classification ‘liberal’ in the sense of non-isolationist, technologically 
progressive and strong industrial and social policies, in the form of renewed welfare capitalism and social 
policies as adopted by President Johnson in his Great Society. The common point to those narratives, 
however, is the importance of international conflict and internal unrest in the 1960s. For a much better take 
on this historical politics see Heale (2005). 
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opinion generally viewed the transition to a society of abundance as a problem of 
engineering, not of politics’ (Maier, 1977, p. 615). This exported social engineering in the 
form of foreign aid, monetary reorganisation (Maier, 1977) or even modernisation theory 
for third world countries (Bockman, 2006) can also be seen in the rise of rationalistic 
social sciences129 sustaining the American consensus and against the communist lure, 
which for a period resulted in actual economic growth. Despite some disputes within 
economic scholarship over the reasons and details of Western Europe’s economic growth 
post-war, principally focused on Germany’s miracle, the fact remains that, especially 
during the 1950s and in general, a massive economic recovery occurred (Sohmen, 1960; 
Dumke, 1990; Reichel, 2002; Temin, 2002; Vonyó, 2008). This, it seems, helped to 
propel optimism to a new high and, in truth, who could blame those who were optimistic? 
North America had come out of the war intact; its hegemony was clear for all to see; 
people were witnessing rapid technological development, rising living standards and 
increasing consumption… there was even a glamorous space race! 
Western Europe and Japan, on the other hand, despite coming out the war 
devastated, in time also experienced huge economic development, anchored in both the 
Marshall Plan and nationalistic policies both in industry and science130. This prosperity, 
                                                      
 
129 For more on the history of rationality within the social sciences, regarding its intellectual 
forebears – Hayek, Popper and Schumpeter – see the prologue of Amadea’s (2003) Rationalizing Capitalism 
Democracy. See also Maier (1977) for a more general historical account of American policies. And, one 
could also consult Erickson (2010) for a more general study of the mathematical assumptions of 
policymakers. 
130 Since most of these narratives have been seen in the previous chapters, I shall contain my 
enthusiasm for them and only provide some references that may previously have been left out. For a history 
of post-war optimism in Britain and Japan, respectively see Hennessy (2007) and Forsberg (2000). For a 
general history of science policy in the European theatre, see Krige (2006); for a focused perspective on a 
single country, West Germany, consult Beyler and Low (2003). It is important to remember when talking 
about economic policy that West Germany was quite an anomaly since, differently from most of the US’s 
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allied with the perceived communist threat, was not only responsible for the large liberal, 
anti-communist consensus in American policy but also shaped the public opinion at home 
and abroad. There was a clear idea within American minds not only that the US was both 
better developed and more educated but also that the Soviet Union was more militarily 
belligerent, a sentiment shared by its Western allies (Quester, 1978). It was under this 
cloud of optimism and perceived foreign threat that computer art first developed. We 
need to remind ourselves of Nake’s commentaries in relation to Bense’s rationalism 
(alluring since it provided a way out of the 1930s and 1940s emotional excesses) and 
Noll’s embrace of computing as a way of mimicking human behaviour (as in his 
Mondrian experiments) in order to picture this scenario. Although without outright 
support from their respective employees, early practitioners could only develop these 
unusual ideas because they were, after all, within the American hegemonic sphere: the 
computers were American; aid money came from America; scientific communities 
developed on the western side of the Iron Curtain and under the protection of NATO. 
Despite the importance of local contexts, which informed the framing of those new 
products, such as in the case of cybernetics, early computer art was a Western131 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
allies, it was a radical non-interventionist government and, despite American liberal rhetoric, even more so 
than the US. For a variety of articles concerned with the economic history of Germany and Japan in the post-
war period, focused on businesses, see Kipping et al. (2003). Also note Forsberg (2000) for an economic and 
political history of Japan’s post-war growth. Finally, for an overview of European developments, see the 
enormous work of Judt (2005). Common to all these narratives is a story of riches and incredible growth, 
which, in a sense, was also part of the US strategy of Soviet containment, as we previously saw. 
131 That Western characteristic is true only of 1965 and before. From the late 1960s non-Westerners 
and people from non-aligned countries would join the fore. Although they were few in number, if compared 
to the central countries of the Western alliance, the reader should recall the Computer Technique Group in 
Japan; the works of the Spanish artists coming out of the University of Madrid (Alés, 2000), still living under 
General Franco; the work of Waldemar Cordeiro in Brazil; and also Vladimir Bonacic in the former non-
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phenomenon that simultaneously developed on both sides of the Atlantic. Had the Soviet 
Union been able to free itself from social realism or its early campaign against 
cybernetics, perhaps it would also have figured within this beginning. Who else on the 
planet would have the resources to ‘play’ with computers if not people involved in 
institutions with a reasonable amount of resources? In time, as seen with Cybernetic 
Serendipity, E.A.T. and many of the artist-in-residence programs that sprang up after the 
mid-1960s (subjects to be discussed next), companies would support those practices. For 
a time, computer art really seemed to incorporate (in the minds of its adopters) and 
embody the possibilities of new technological development and scientific knowledge. 
This material backing had, however, to be interpreted in a way that could justify 
computer art: this was the beginning of the ‘end of historical chatter’ of Bense’s pro-
rational and formalist narrative; the exploration of computing possibilities of Reichardt’s 
Cybernetic Serendipity; the anti-capitalist and humanistic vision of Meštrović’s 
Tendencije; the computer as the logical continuation of Waldermar Cordeiro’s concretism 
etc. It was not only computer art, as one might expect, that was influenced by this 
worldview. Goodyear, for example, reminds us that the larger art world was also infected 
by this technophilia: 
 
In response to the Soviet threat, American education emphasized science and 
technology, while influential theorists such as C.P. Snow, Reyner Banham and 
Marshall McLuhan stressed the need for interconnection between art, science and 
technology. In 1967, engineer Billy Klüver, co-founder of Experiments in Art 
and Technology (E.A.T.), argued that ‘the new interface between artists and 
engineers…has not developed only out of the historical relationship between art 
and technology. It has rather been born out of the direction and the nature of 
contemporary art itself.’ Klüver’s observation fits with the responses by artists 
Dan Flavin, Robert Morris and Allan Kaprow to a 1966 questionnaire circulated 
by art historian and critic Barbara Rose to assess the ‘Sensibility of the Sixties’ 
[…] Such opinions were consistent with viewpoints expressed by several pop 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
aligned Yugoslavia. Over the course of this chapter these may feature briefly again. Despite them, however, 
AST was initiated (and defined by) mainly Western European and North American actors. 
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artists in the decade […] The drive to combine art with new technology inspired 
numerous exhibitions. These included: The Machine as Seen at the End of the 
Machine Age, at the New York Museum of Modern Art in 1968, held with Some 
More Beginnings, at the Brooklyn Museum of Art, Cybernetic Serendipity, at the 
Corcoran in Washington, D.C., in 1969; Software Information Technology, at the 
Jewish Museum in New York in 1970, and Explorations at the Smithsonian the 
same year. (Goodyear, 2008, p. 169) 
 
Developments more associated with the larger AST world, for example, were 
also intoxicated by this pervasive optimism. This dream of a technophilic and rationally 
controlled world indeed was contagious and, as Turner remembers, not only did E.A.T. 
have over six thousands members and seventy-eight corporate sponsors by 1969 but also 
for  
the members of E.A.T., as for the computer designers, game theorists, and war 
planners of the Pentagon in that era, cybernetics mapped the world as it was and 
should be: an information system that transcended the limits of biology and 
technology, simultaneously freeing individuals and integrating social groups. It 
was a system ostensibly without politics. It was in many ways an ideal 
technocracy watched over by engineers and managed through communication 
machines. (Turner, 2014, p. 71) 
 
The faith in a stable, self-regulated technocratic order can also be seen in the public 
perception at the time. From 1950 to 1960 the chief preoccupation of the American public 
was international conflict and defence (Hibbs, 1979). In fact, 1960 is the most extreme 
example of preoccupation with the communist threat since it not only marks the peak of 
this trend but also marks the lowest point in the concern of public opinion towards 
internal politics and social problems. According to one meta-study, (fantastically) almost 
no interviewees regard social problems or the economy as problematic, whereas almost 
all of those regarded the international conflict as the main problem (Hibbs, 1979, p. 706). 
It is as if the external conflict not only created the conditions for the belief in rational 
control and closed world narratives, such as the one described by Edwards (1996), but 
also created the conditions for utopian beliefs, based on the idea that the US had in fact 
reached a kind of progress unmatched by any other country in the world or in history. 
What else could explain the perception that there were no internal problems? It seems to 
me, however, that as truthful as it is that the general mood was optimistic, the numbers 
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collected by the Gallup poll and other sources in the same paper (Hibbs, 1979) were not 
really representative of the whole public or political spectrum. What is common to all the 
exhibitions described by Goodyear and also the ones seen over this chapter is that, as 
early as the mid-1950s, cracks started to emerge within the optimistic, technophilic, 
rational formalistic, liberal American-led consensus of the world and these were, in fact, 
becoming public. Despite this glimmering and naïve optimism, social problems were still 
present, perhaps no more so in segregated, white-dominant and sexist American post-war 
society132. 
Examples of this growing tension, both in cultural productions and in society 
itself, are not rare. Racial discrimination, hitherto ignored by the majority of the (white) 
public, not only became visible but its proponents and adversaries also became more 
vocal (Tyson, 1998). Literature, in the form of dystopian narratives, highlighted the 
                                                      
 
132 As Turner elsewhere reminds us: ‘Gender boundaries stiffened, racial tensions slipped from 
public discussion, and leaders and citizens alike came to dread a vague but seemingly pervasive Communist 
menace. As Paul Edwards has demonstrated, computers played a central role as both tools and symbols in this 
period. In Washington, government planners used computers to model the possible effects of nuclear 
holocaust; in North Dakota, Alaska, and elsewhere, air force generals used computers to track potential 
attacks on the US. In both cases, the planet was transformed into a closed informational system for purposes 
of military command and control. Cognitive psychologists in turn began to imagine that the brain was a form 
of digital hardware and its actions a form of software, that thinking was a type of computing and memory 
simply a matter of data retrieval. Together, such analogies supported what Edwards has called a “closed 
world discourse.” Within this discourse, the mind of the individual man and the command centers of 
America’s nuclear defence establishment both seemed to be mechanized tools of management and control. 
Both seemed devoted to maintaining firm boundaries—national in the case of the military, masculine in the 
case of individual military leaders. The world in which they lived and worked seemed to be dominated by 
large, bureaucratic organizations. Like their leaders and like the information machines upon which they 
depended, these organizations seemed to many to be closed, unfeeling systems’ (Turner, 2006, p. 171). 
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abnormality and insanity of a rigidly rational and bureaucratic world 133 , numbing 
capitalism, the perils of control and standardisation; as Moylan describes: 
 
By the 1950s, [science fiction] texts such as Frederik Pohl and C. M. Kornbluth’s 
Space Merchants and Kurt Vonnegut’s Player Piano shifted dystopia’s 
fascination with questions of state power into an interrogation of the economic 
and cultural sphere shaped by the postwar partnership of a revived capitalism 
(spreading by way of its commodification systems into all aspects of daily life) 
and the new imperial power of the United States (eliminating opposition not only 
by the lure of the good life of suburbia and consumer goods but also by the 
weapons of loyalty oaths and anti-communist witch-hunts). In this conjuncture, 
dystopia again proved adequate to the task of catching not only the extent of the 
human and ecological devastation brought by the latest configuration of 
capitalism and imperialism but also of finding the seeds of opposition within the 
tendencies and latencies of that existing social system. (Moylan, 2000, p. xvi) 
 
Computer art might have emerged among the optimistic and technophilic sense 
of utopian control arising from the end of the war but it did not come into the public and 
the art world until much later, only after 1965, and initially in only small doses. It was 
only with shows such as Cybernetic Serendipity, which attracted a lot of popular and 
press attention, and with Tendencije 4, which tried to reconcile and create a space for 
computers within an already established and large artistic framework, that computer art 
really became a subject worthy of attention for external participants. The problem for 
those internal to the movement was that by 1968 public mood had already changed, 
spurred not only by increasing protests around the Western world but also by the dramatic 
development of the Vietnam War and worsening economic conditions134. Computer art 
                                                      
 
133 Booker, for example, traces this disenchantment with utopianism in both the literature and cinema 
of the ‘long fifties’. Invoking Joseph Heller’s novel Catch-22 as a paradigmatic example of this process, the 
absurd military bureaucracy of the same novel ‘stands in for all of the forces that sought to enforce normality, 
routine and regimentation in American society in the 1950s’ (Booker, 2002, p. 33).  
134  These worsening conditions were not only present in the US. Europe, too, had been 
deconstructing the narrative of infinite material progress: ‘Even before the effervescence of the Sixties had 
subsided, the unique circumstances that made it possible had passed forever. Within three years of the end of 
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relied on that rational formalist, optimistic and naïve discourse in order to legitimise 
itself. It did indeed appear to be riding under the veil of such discourses, but, 
unfortunately for those in the field, material development in the form of widespread 
computing technology was a little too late. Its patrons, the massive tech companies of the 
Western world and academia, in a very short space of time became known not for their 
capacity to shape a bright new future but, instead, for being an integral part of the 
military–industrial complex that so much embodied American imperialism and a 
disenfranchising capitalist rationality. As Mario Savio, the student leader mentioned on 
the first page of this section, summarised the feeling, people felt like ‘little more than an 
IBM card’ (in Turner, 2006, p. 2). The effects of the cultural turn on AST varied but, in 
effect, changed the rationale of some groups and events, towards an anti-capitalistic 
discourse, concerned with the dehumanising effects of technocracy in society, while at 
the same time preserving some of its scientism – that is, the aim of quantifying and 
rationalising all aspects of human experience, including art. Over the course of this 
chapter I shall review some of the changes provoked by this technophobic and pessimistic 
turn that, invariably, resulted in many people abandoning the field by the beginning of the 
1970s. 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
the most prosperous decade in recorded history, the post-war economic boom was over. Western Europe’s 
“thirty glorious years” gave way to an age of monetary inflation and declining growth rates, accompanied by 
widespread unemployment and social discontent. Most of the radicals of the Sixties, like their followers, 
abandoned “the Revolution” and worried instead about their job prospects. A few opted for violent 
confrontation; the damage they wrought – and the response their actions elicited from the authorities – led to 
much nervous talk of the “ungovernable” condition of Western societies. Such anxieties proved overwrought: 
under stress, the institutions of Western Europe showed more resilience than many observers had feared. But 
there was to be no return to the optimism – or the illusions – of the first post-war decades’ (Judt, 2005, p. 
453). 
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3.1.1 Experimentalism: Cybernetic Serendipity and E.A.T. 
 
The newly formed computer art field, developing firstly from the earlier 1965 exhibitions 
and, after, from a cohort of publications and exhibitions following that year (and some, 
like the computer art contest in Computers and Automation, even predating it), would 
achieve its biggest exhibition some three years later, this time in London135. Cybernetic 
Serendipity (1968) (e.g. Fig. 12, 13), held at the Institute of Contemporary Arts (ICA), 
with Jasia Reichardt as its curator, was perhaps the best example of an exhibition that 
symbolised the dynamic between supporters and critics, grabbing attention and 
consequentially criticism, mirroring movement and counter-movement dynamics. 
Predominant in the historical accounts of the field today and since, this exhibition, even 
for today’s standards, not only was heavily financed but was also a great success among 
the general public. The first of its kind in the UK, Cybernetic Serendipity ran from 2 
August to 30 October 1968. Over the course of only seven weeks it ‘packed in 40,000 
London art lovers, schoolboys, mathematicians and Chelsea old-age pensioners, and from 
admissions alone […] all but recouped its $45,000 cost’ (Time, 1968). In total, more than 
                                                      
 
135 It is important to remind the reader that I am not interested in mapping all exhibitions, events and 
publications dedicated to computer art or AST over this period. Apart from the references given so far, this 
work has also been done (in different contexts) by edited works and articles such as Franke (1985), Dietrich 
(1986), Kac (1986), Giloth and Pocock-Williams (1990), Shanken (2001), Lovejoy (2004), Taylor (2004), 
Mason (2008), Oberquelle and Beckmann (2008), Brown et al. (2009), Douglas (2009), Nake (2009), Kane 
(2010) and Rosen (2011a). In a sense, however, since there is no single unified overview of those first years, 
all those collections must be read in order to avoid overlooking a specific context or artist. Japan, for 
example, is notoriously absent from this list. To my knowledge no complete study has been done so far of the 
works of the Computer Technique Group. I am sure that in the next few years this list will only increase, with 
up to now hidden contexts and artists becoming included. 
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60,000 people visited the ICA (Reichardt, 1968a). The exhibition’s intention was, as 
described by its name, to make chance discoveries using cybernetic devices, or, as the 
Daily Mail exuberantly wrote at the time, ‘to use computers to find unexpected joys in 
life and art’ (in Usselmann, 2003, p. 389). If there was one blockbuster exhibition within 
computer art’s early history, this certainly was it. Strikingly different from its 1965 
predecessors, in size, staging and scope, this show seemed to herald a bright future for the 
contested art practice. 
If computer and tech companies some years earlier were wary of being attached 
to something as unproductive and detached from its products as art, over Cybernetic 
Serendipity there was certainly a change of mood in this respect. Despite the ICA initially 
having financial problems, according to Reichardt, the exhibition went ahead with the 
help of the well-connected Sir Herbert Read (the ICA’s president) and Sir Roland 
Penrose (the ICA’s chairman) (Reichardt, 2009, p. 77). In addition, while over time a 
number of collaborators joined in, following a public announcement in 1966, it seems 
that, without the financial backing of IBM, the show would not have gone ahead 
(MacGregor, 2009, p. 85). While the 1965 events were mostly an academic or 
experimental affair, held in an academic environment/experimental gallery and allowed 
(but not supported) by Siemens and AT&T’s Bell Labs, Cybernetic Serendipity was held 
at the same space as IBM (which provided computers, money and a whole section on the 
history of computing), Westinghouse, Calcomp, Bell Telephone Labs, the US Air Force, 
the US State Department, General Motors and Boeing (these last two closing the 
exhibition with two separate presentations) (MacGregor, 2009; Reichardt, 1968b). In 
time, many corporations would house artist-in-residence programs136, publish texts about 
computer art (sometimes referred to as ‘computer graphics’, in order to highlight its 
                                                      
 
136 Examples of artists within industries can be seen in Harris (1999), Candy and Edmonds (2002), 
Shanken (2005), Eleey (2007) and Turner (2014). 
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practical aspects)137 and, as this exhibition shows, directly support the idea that computers 
could make art. 
According to Reichardt, ‘some 350 people were involved in making the 
exhibition possible, 700 press invitations were sent out, 3000 people attended the private 
views […] lectures were given twice a week between August 8 and October 17’ 
(Reichardt, 2009, p. 78). Participants included John Cage, the Computer Technique 
Group, Charles Csuri, Roger Dainton, Edward Ihnatowicz, Kenneth Knowlton, Bruce 
Lacey, Frank Malina, Gustav Metzger, Edwin Morgan, Frieder Nake, Nicholas 
Negroponte, Lowell Nesbitt, A. Michael Noll, Nam June Paik, Charles Pask, James 
Seawright, Jean Tinguely, Tsai Wen Ying, John H. Whitney, Iannis Xenakis and Peter 
Zinovieff (MacGregor, 2009; Reichardt, 1968b). Works shown ranged from prints (such 
as the ones made in 1965) to poetry, music, film, sculpture, installations and paintings. So 
huge was the scope of the show it is indeed difficult to exhaust or narrow it. There was a 
sense that the popular press at the time had a generally positive reaction to it (Reichardt, 
2009, p. 80; Usselmann, 2003, p. 390) and it was not only reported in the UK but also 
internationally. Despite these positive reviews, some ambivalence can also be found. In 
the review for the New York Times, for example, despite claiming the show to a ‘mind-
stretching experiment’, its reviewer also affirms that ‘no one is rushing in to claim that 
the results are great art – not quite yet anyway – but like children with a new toy, they 
(the artists) are falling over themselves to demonstrate the possibilities that are opened 
up’ (Thompson, 1968). Independent art historian Rainer Usselmann has, so far, best 
mapped those criticisms: 
 
                                                      
 
137 Among others we have Siemens publishing Georg Nees’ thesis and IBM France publishing a 
survey of computer graphics (Franke, 1985, pp. 107–110). 
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Mario Amaya, in the Financial Times, pondered: ‘I am left with the sneaking 
suspicion that much of this exhibition has little to do with art as such. In fact, the 
show seems to be telling us more about what art is not, rather than what it could 
be’. More to the point, Michael Shepard in the Sunday Telegraph found that ‘this 
exhibition … serves to show up … a desolation to be seen in art generally – that 
we haven’t the faintest idea these days what art is for or about’. Robert Melville 
from the New Statesman went even further: ‘The winking lights, the flickering 
television screens and the squawks from the music machines are signaling the 
end of abstract art; when machines can do it, it will not be worth doing.’ 
(Usselmann, 2003, p. 391) 
 
Categorising the works mostly under the banner of ‘fun experiments’, these reviews do 
not critically engage the subject in the same way a normal review would do. The works, 
after all, were just experiments, not worthy of serious artistic consideration. There were 
some who, like Wiener himself138, saw danger in blind acceptance of cybernetics and its 
precepts: 
 
Could it be that the ICA’s ‘happy accidents’ flourished so well because they were 
staged in an atmosphere of breathtaking naïveté? Only a few lone voices seem to 
acknowledge the more serious and inevitably unhappy accidents that litter the 
history of cybernetics. ‘Do not be fooled,’ cautioned Michael McNay of the 
Guardian in a rare critical review of the exhibition: ‘Norbert Wiener … knew 
better. He published the first treatise on the new science not very long after the 
holocausts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, yet he felt able to predict for cybernetics 
a destiny as fateful as for the atom.’ ((Usselmann, 2003, p. 391) 
 
The questions raised were not only against the perceived technological obsession 
and corporate propaganda. Much was said about the naïve139 way in which AST artists 
employed their technology. After all, it was military technology developed during a 
nuclear arms race and designed for conflict rather than art. According to critics, none of 
the works presented at the ICA posed a serious question to the social context in which 
those technologies were created. The first lines of a review in Time magazine sum up the 
                                                      
 
138 This affirmation is a nod to his highly precautionary book God and Golem, Inc. (Wiener, 1964). 
139 Unsurprisingly, this was the same argument used by Leavis in order to rebuke C. P. Snow’s ‘two 
cultures’ claims (Collini, 2000), a topic to be introduced shortly.  
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general mood: ‘Can computers create? Maybe not, but many of their programmers have a 
lot of fun trying to make them behave as if they could’ (Time, 1968). This ambiguity 
towards computers in art can also be seen among staunch supporters. Reichardt in 1971, 
for example, wrote that perhaps ‘computer art may not be art in any sense’ (in Salah, 
2008, p. 84), which should have sounded like a real blow to any intention by computer 
artists to be seen as such. This defensive mood, as if taking a precautious position, 
guarding oneself against future and certain attacks, is also seen in a special edition of the 
magazine Studio International, which solely covered the exhibition and is even today 
seen (wrongly) as the catalogue for Cybernetic Serendipity. In it Reichardt affirms that 
‘the computer is only a tool which, at the moment, still seems far removed from those 
polemic preoccupations which concern art’ (Reichardt, 1968b, p. 71). Why, similarly to 
Bense and Ness at that first public exhibition, was Reichardt so reluctant to call the 
products worthy artistic endeavours? It is worth noting that Reichardt, similarly to Bense, 
was originally involved with concrete art. In one of those moments that seem to be just a 
coincidence, Bense, visiting Reichardt’s concrete art exhibition (Between Poetry and 
Painting) in London in 1965, and asked what her plans were for afterwards, to which she 
replied, none. ‘Look into computers, he said’ (Reichardt, 2009, p. 77). So she did, and 
three year later we had Cybernetic Serendipity. The relationship between Reichardt and 
Bense, however, does not explain the former’s reluctance in relation to the very subject of 
her exhibition. We know, for example, that Bense’s reluctance resulted from a political 
stance (not wanting to alienate his peers), a theoretical perspective (the information and 
generative art concepts) and institutional factors (Siemens’ reluctance). Reichardt, as far 
as we know, did not have any constraints. Her position, in fact, seems closer to the more 
naïve approach proposed by Noll at the Howard Wise Gallery. Although still having 
political and institutional constraints (because of Julesz and Bell Labs), the second 1965 
exhibition, Noll’s, was also defined as ‘experimental’ and not the embodiment of an 
already defined theory of art (Bense’s informational theory). For Reichardt the exhibition 
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worked as a forum, a space where creativity could be shown away from the art and where 
the possibilities of the digital computer could be explored without necessarily worrying 
about ‘art’ itself140: 
 
The fact that the exhibition was approachable on a number of levels was most 
fortunate because it meant that it could be enjoyed by the layman without 
simultaneously seeming offensively simplistic to the experts. Since no claims 
were made that the various manifestations aimed at art, there was virtually no 
discussion as to whether this was or was not an art exhibition. Surprisingly many 
adults and certainly all children found the question ‘Is it art or not?’ irrelevant 
[…] Both the exhibition and the lectures which dealt with the main theme of 
Cybernetic Serendipity were designed to dispel some of those prejudices which 
caused many intelligent people to believe that the computer is a threat to those 
whose intellectual abilities and creative powers may no longer be in demand as 
their role is gradually taken over by the artificial intelligence machines. The 
exhibition demonstrated the possibilities and limitations inherent in the uses of 
computers. (Reichardt, 1968a, p. 176) 
 
Reichardt’s experiment, of seeing what people could do with that new 
technology, as a way of dispelling prejudices towards the computer, similarly to the 1965 
exhibitions, usually is framed as a response to C. P. Snow’s ‘two cultures’ lecture (Snow, 
2000 [1959]). According to some commentators, today ‘the “two cultures” figures in 
accounts of popular science, public policy, the sociology of knowledge, postwar British 
history, intellectual history – and much else besides’ (Ortolano, 2008, p. 144). So, it is 
fair to question again, as done in the previous chapter, how good this frame is? If in the 
previous chapter we saw that the 1965 exhibitions could not be thought of as responses to 
                                                      
 
140  Although at the time Reichardt seemed to emphasize the experimental character of these 
artworks, today she strongly denies such an uncertainty in relation to the denomination of that exhibition as 
‘art’. Although admitting some uncertainty, she recently claimed that she ‘opted for the word art and stood by 
it as firmly as possible’ (Reichardt, 2009, p. 71). Perhaps previous claims regarding the nature of the show as 
an experiment were related more to the fact that Reichardt was unsure about the quality of the attempts and 
not so much about their status as art. In other words, it was not that she did not believe those products to be 
art but that, instead, she doubted their quality. This same ambiguity is seen, for example, in her 1968 Studio 
International essay ‘Computer Art’ (1968a). 
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Snow’s lecture, this time around the relationship between the two events seems more 
valid. In a sense Reichardt, by proposing to dispel the prejudices towards the computer, 
was simply reflecting Snow’s belief that the ruling class valued ‘traditional culture’ 
instead of the natural sciences by way of prejudice. Again, it must be stressed, Snow was 
not interested in bringing the two cultures together for the sake of the artistic or 
humanities community. According to Collini (2000), Snow’s lecture was primarily a 
conversation regarding the English context of classes, which, from his point of view, had 
a biased attitude against the natural sciences and in favour of the humanities. For him, 
following a centuries-old debate between the two, only the humanities were considered 
worthy by the elite. Hence, 
 
He saw science as the great hope in a world which the traditional elites had 
mismanaged and led into economic depression and to the brink of a second 
devastating war. He also saw it as the one true meritocracy, in which sheer ability 
could overcome social disadvantages to obtain its true reward. And, in more 
parochial terms, the young Snow developed an antipathy to ‘literary 
intellectuals’, especially to what he identified as their snobbish and nostalgic 
social attitudes, which was never to leave him. (Collini, 2000, p. xxiii) 
 
If we can say that Snow’s call was based on his optimistic attitude towards 
science, I believe the same can be said of Reichardt’s project. As she herself pointed out 
at the time, Cybernetic Serendipity was ‘prematurely optimistic’ (Reichardt, 1968b, p. 5). 
Optimistic about what then? I believe there is evidence to comprehend this optimism in 
two ways. Firstly, as Reichardt suggests over and over again, she believed that new 
technology, and in particular the computer, could somehow be used as a way to liberate 
and expand the tools available to artists. Even if the results of Cybernetic Serendipity or 
previous computer attempts were not all that revolutionary, she asserted that, in due time, 
a true great computer art would appear (Reichardt, 1968b). Secondly, and perhaps not as 
clear as the first point, Reichardt perceived technology and science as neutral entities. In 
other words, despite the turning tide of technophobia, Reichardt, because she believed in 
the inherited power of computing technology and science, thought its subject to be value-
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free and disinterested development. Commenting on the reception of the exhibition, she 
wrote: ‘what computers do is help people to respond to things: this comment by John 
Gormley of The Tablet was extremely relevant. In the context of the exhibition the 
computer is seen as a neutral tool, so much so that only man’s intentional endeavour 
brings about some result’ (Reichardt, 1968a, p. 177). 
In hindsight, Reichardt’s assertion that the computer was value free and neutral 
was very naïve. Affected by the technophilia of her peers, it was perhaps impossible for 
her to realise how merciless the computer was coming to be perceived in the eyes of not 
only the artistic community but also the general public. Every AST action, by the end of 
the 1960s, would be scrutinised (Goodyear, 2008). The fact that major players of the 
military–industrial complex were present at Cybernetic Serendipity did not help her case. 
She portrays these artists and Cybernetic Serendipity itself as heroic but, for an increasing 
share of the population, they were anything but. Here is where, ironically, the criticism 
directed towards Snow and Cybernetic Serendipity converges. As interesting as the wish 
to frame AST within the two cultures debate is the lack of commentaries regarding the 
Leavis–Snow controversy (Gerhardi, 1962; Collini, 2000, 2013; Edgerton, 2005; 
Ortolano, 2005, 2008). As important as Snow’s lecture was the counter-reaction to it. 
Frank Raymond Leavis, a prominent if blunt literary critic based in Cambridge, was 
already due to retire from his post as reader when Snow first published his lecture, in 
1962. Known for his ferocious humanist convictions, which dismissed, for example, the 
works of H. G. Wells (Collini, 2000) as technocratic141, Leavis, according to Collini, 
found in Snow the personification of everything that was evil142 (Collini, 2000): 
                                                      
 
141 Collini informs us that in 1932, as a reviewer of Well’s latest book, The Work, Wealth, and 
Happines of Mankind, ‘Leavis also rehearsed the same refrain about the limitations of the technocratic vision 
of human well-being: “the efficiency of the machinery becomes the ultimate value, and this seems to us to 
mean something very different from expanding and richer human life” [and in the same publication, while 
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That Snow’s novels enjoyed, in the late 1940s and 1950s, a considerable réclame 
in the London literary world was, in Leavis’s eyes, further damning evidence of 
their meretriciousness. And that world, the world of ‘literary London’, of smart 
cocktail parties, of reviews in the Sunday papers, of the latest ‘view’ propounded 
in the New Statesman or on the BBC’s Third Programme, was a world in which 
Snow had come to move easily and with increasing fame. But Snow was also a 
technocrat, a spokesman for what Leavis regarded as the ‘technologico-
Benthamite’ reduction of human experience to the quantifiable, the measurable, 
the manageable. And Snow had blundered across one of the most sensitive 
terrains in twentieth-century English culture: the assessment of the human 
consequences of the Industrial Revolution. (Collini, 2000, p. xxxiii) 
 
Moreover, as Collini continues: 
 
Leavis treated Snow’s fame as a symptom, a ‘portent’, of how contemporary 
society had largely lost the ability to frame anything like an adequate description 
of the values which could give life a meaning. The language of ‘prosperity’ and 
‘rising standards of living’ had come to fill this void, and Snow was the prophet 
of the consumer society. Leavis was particularly incensed that Snow, who 
appeared unshakably confident of the benefits of industrialisation, should have 
dismissed as ‘Luddites’ those nineteenth-century authors who had raised doubts 
about the human cost of the Industrial Revolution. (Collini, 2000, p. xxxiv) 
 
In a vicious lecture in 1962, also published later as an article, Leavis not only 
discredited Snow’s claims on literary terms, by criticising his novels, but also attacked his 
sense of moral superiority, which invariably placed the technocratic vision above all else. 
In other words, Leavis denounced Snow’s naïveté, for believing that the material 
revolutions of the present and past were somehow improving the human condition. An 
attack on the scientism of both Snow and his supporters, Leavis’ lecture in a way 
anticipated the arguments that would be used against computer art and AST. The latter’s 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
attacking another writer he states that:] ‘“He believes with implicit faith that [science] will settle all our 
problems for us. In short, he lives still in the age of H.G. Wells”’ (Leavis in Collini, 2000). For more on this 
subject, see Edgerton (2005 and Ortolano (2005). 
142 An adjective also directed towards Wells (Paul Nurse in Bragg, 2013). For a more Leavis-centred 
narrative, see Ortolano (2008). 
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‘technological determinism’ and ‘naïve teleology’, which posited the newly emerged 
field as the ‘culmination or end point of art’s technological evolution […] like society’ 
(Taylor, 2004, p. 245), similarly to Snow’s propositions, would immensely suffer into the 
late 1960s. Not only were the discourses for and against AST mirrored by the Leavis–
Snow controversy but the careers of both Snow and AST itself suffered similar 
consequences. In his personal life, for example, Snow, having previously been part of 
Wilson’s Labour government as minister of technology and knighted in the 1950s, 
experienced 
 
various disillusionments as the 1960s turned into the 1970s. Wilson’s 
government lost its lustre, Snow’s novels lost their audience, and that 1960s 
optimism was replaced by a gloomy sense of despair […] The significance of this 
story is not merely a matter of one man’s dashed hopes, but rather the way that it 
tracks (and thus enables us to track) the rise and fall of the broader social 
attitudes to which his reputation had been tied. (Ortolano, 2008, p. 145) 
 
It is unsurprisingly that we can use the Leavis–Snow controversy as a proxy of computer 
art’s and AST’s eventual fate. It, despite being as far away from the visual arts as it could 
be, nevertheless reproduced the larger debates being played out in England and elsewhere 
– that is, the argument that science and technology in post-war societies was a morally 
superior endeavour to the ‘literary cultures’ since it promoted material progress. Wishing 
to amend the situation, part of Snow’s diagnosis for this British bias towards ‘intellectual 
luddites’ was found in the educational British system, which, Snow believed, ought to be 
reformed towards an universal and scientific orientation143. This constant call for reform, 
                                                      
 
143 One of the most pressing calls for Snow was the reformation of the educational system in Britain. 
In his lecture, he declared: ‘Why aren’t we coping with the scientific revolution? Why are other countries 
doing better? […] In some ways, as I said before, the Russians and Americans are both more actively 
dissatisfied with theirs than we are: that is, they are taking more drastic steps to change it […] The differences 
between the three systems [UK, US and USSR] are revelatory. We teach, of course, a far smaller proportion 
of our children up to the age of eighteen: and we take a far smaller proportion even of those we do teach up to 
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manifested as a wish to change the institutions of the state, for Edgerton (2005), 
characterised the technocratic movements that Snow represented. This critique of 
institutions, a current and ever-present narrative within British (and perhaps other 
nations’) ‘declinism’, espouses the view that ‘the relative decline of Britain was due to 
British failings [and] almost always took those failings to be ones which more, and more 
powerful, technocrats would have avoided’ (Edgerton, 2005, p. 187). In their efforts to 
achieve their intentions, of elevating science above all else, Edgerton (2005) places 
technocrats such as Snow and many others under the banner of anti-historians. These 
anti-historic strategies, embodiments of the technocratic culture of the time, both in the 
UK and abroad, ‘involve[d] a gross distortion of the historical record by denying the 
strength of technocracy, and overestimating the significance of opposition to [it]’ 
(Edgerton, 2005, p. 188). Snow, by affirming that science was, in effect, subjugated to 
elites concerned more with intellectualism (of the literary kind), at once erased the 
importance of science in Britain and reinforced the idea that science ought to have a 
central position within government and indeed society. The pervasiveness of technocratic 
ideals, for both the left and right, before the cultural turn of the late 1960s, for Edgerton 
(2005), is attributed to those ideals’ malleability since ‘both the left and right were very 
nationalistic about technology’ (Edgerton, 2005, p. 200). Mirroring the adoption of 
cybernetics, which, as we saw repeatedly in Chapter 1, was adapted in order to 
accommodate national narratives, technocracy in Britain, and by extension Cybernetic 
Serendipity and reactions to it, must be read not only as an art historical phenomenon but 
also as a cultural national one that, nevertheless, was intertwined with the anti-
                                                                                                                                                     
 
the level of a university degree. The old pattern of training a small élite has never been broken, though it has 
been slightly bent’ (Snow, 2012, p. 34). 
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technocratic and technophobic feeling that had emerged by the end of the 1960s 
throughout the Western world. 
It is important to note that Leavis, for one, did not oppose science per se (Collini, 
2000; Ortolano, 2005). What he attacked was the moral pretension of technocratic 
discourses. He believed that technocrats were interfering with what he considered human 
affairs – that is to say, with life144. The emphasis on science and materialism, for him, was 
then a symptom of a larger malaise, which affected all modern existence and which, as 
his answers to Snow demonstrate, must be ferociously attacked. Ironically, two years 
before Cybernetic Serendipity and at the heart of the US military–industrial complex, 
another experimental event would invert the logic behind Snow’s calls and, in a way, 
would concur with Leavis (although I believe he would have completely dismissed this 
link). Founded by two Bell Labs employees (Billy Klüver and Fred Waldhauer) and two 
established artists (Robert Rauschenberg and Robert Whitman), this time around the 
experiment would not be centred on computer-generated pictures or artist–engineers with 
deep technical knowledge. Instead the proposal was something rather different: to bring 
artists and engineers together in order to collaborate. At first sight this may have seemed 
a realisation of Snow’s call – that finally someone had realised that artists ought to be 
taught the benefits of industrialisation and science. It could also be assumed, because 
Klüver’s and Rauschenberg’s project attempted to bring both groups together, artists and 
technocrats, that this was an experiment in Cybernetic Serendipity’s terms – that is to say, 
an experiment willing to show the possibilities of new technologies and, consequentially, 
‘designed to dispel some of those prejudices which caused many intelligent people to 
believe that the computer is a threat to those whose intellectual abilities and creative 
                                                      
 
144 Ortolano (2005), reading Leavis, characterises his use of ‘life’ as denoting a human creative and 
spontaneous act. This good and proper human life, then, was what was being diminished by Snow’s 
technocratic ideals of material progress. 
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powers may no longer be in demand as their role is gradually taken over by the artificial 
intelligence machines’ (Reichardt, 1968a, p. 176). Truth be told, none of the above 
characteristics, after some examination, seem to fit this 1966 development. Experiments 
in Art and Technology, or simply E.A.T., was a group that certainly made an impact not 
only within the infant AST but also in the arts in general (albeit very briefly). E.A.T. in 
fact had developed from an earlier experimental exhibition, 9 Evenings: Theatre and 
Engineering145 (e.g. Fig. 14, 15, 16, 17), which was held at the 69th Regiment Armory in 
New York in October 1966146. E.A.T.’s goal from the beginning, as Klüver, a career 
engineer at Bell Labs and now seen as E.A.T.’s driving force (Goodyear, 2004) 
summarises, ‘was to provide new materials for artists in the form of technology’ (in 
Candy and Edmonds, 2002, p. 8). This simple task, however, hid some very unusual 
intentions. 9 Evenings, differently from the first shows of 1965, received a vast amount of 
attention and, in a way, can be seen as a precursor to Cybernetic Serendipity: some of the 
artists present there were also present at Cybernetic Serendipity147 . Moreover, like 
Cybernetic Serendipity, the show attracted a big crowd: ‘The main breakthrough in Nine 
Evenings was scale. Everybody in New York was there. Practically every artist […] and 
about 10,000 spectators saw it’ (Klüver in Candy and Edmonds, 2002, p. 9). Despite this 
                                                      
 
145 There are some good references for this show and the organization itself. However, their rather 
recent publication and the fact that many are PhD theses reinforces my view that E.A.T. and 9 Evenings: 
Theatre and Engineering are becoming major landmarks in the construction of the AST canon. Shanken 
(2001), Candy and Edmonds (2002), Goodyear (2004), Taylor (2004), Dyson (2009) and Turner (2014) 
provide good overviews of E.A.T. and Klüver himself. Although Klüver’s and E.A.T.’s archives seem very 
well organised, via the Daniel Langlois Foundation for Art, Science, and Technology and the Getty institute, I 
have not had the resources to check them personally. For some insights into this archive, though positively 
biased, consult Oppenheimer’s (2011) PhD thesis and the foundations’ own websites.  
146 E.A.T. itself would be formed right after this exhibition (Klüver, 2000). 
147 The most illustrious example being John Cage, who had also published in the Studio International 
special covering Cybernetic Serendipity (Reichardt, 1968b). 
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similarity, something very noticeable differentiated 9 Evenings from Cybernetic 
Serendipity and from the 1965 exhibitions. It did not contain computer artists per se – that 
is, no artist had the command of technology, computing or otherwise, necessary to 
produce the performances and artworks shown on that occasion. Neither did it contain 
computer plotter drawings such as the ones done by Nake, Nees and Noll. It was 
primarily a combination of established artists performing live art and not, as previously 
shown, computer graphics hanging on a wall. Such was the effort to bring those two 
separate groups together that, according to Shanken, the artists, the dancers and the 
composers148 ‘benefited from 8500 engineering hours (worth an estimated $150,000) 
provided mostly by Klüver and his colleagues at Bell Laboratories’ (Shanken, 2001, p. 
78). An expensive experiment indeed! The lack of artist–engineers is even more 
noticeable when we think of Klüver’s intentions. He was not, as one might expect, 
promoting the use of computers or new technologies in art only. In fact the computer 
itself was seen as a peripheral concern in E.A.T. (Franke, 1985; also in Taylor, 2004, p. 
43)149 . 9 Evenings, like Cybernetic Serendipity two years later, was not purely an 
aesthetic experiment either. Obviously that is not to say that there were not aesthetic 
results. The fact that there were artworks resulting from these experiments points to 
consequential aesthetic results. What I want to point out is that any aesthetic production 
was primarily the result of a discourse and not its final objective. Regarding possible 
artistic merits, Reichardt, for example, was surprisingly dismissive; for her, Cybernetic 
Serendipity dealt with ‘possibilities rather than achievements, and in this sense it is 
                                                      
 
148 John Cage, Lucinda Childs, Öyvind Fahlström, Alex Hay, Deborah Hay, Steve Paxton, Yvonne 
Ranier, Robert Rauschenberg, David Tudor and Robert Whitman (Shanken, 2001, pp. 77–78). 
149 Nevertheless, as Klüver remarked earlier in that year, the computer was ‘the great initiator of all 
this technological soul searching’ (in Turner, 2008, p. 18). 
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prematurely optimistic [as] heroic claims150 [cannot] be made because computers have so 
far neither revolutionizes music, nor art, nor poetry, in the same way that they have 
revolutionized science’ (Reichardt, 1968b, p. 5). Likewise E.A.T., while not necessarily 
dismissing aesthetic results, was first and foremost interested in a specific kind of 
experiment that, as we shall see, was quite different from the one proposed by Cybernetic 
Serendipity. As Lovejoy remarks, ‘Aesthetically and technically, Nine Evenings was less 
than anticipated, but it proved that collaborations between artists and engineers were 
possible’ (Lovejoy, 2004, p. 69). 
If we can say that 9 Evenings was not attempting the use of computers or new 
technologies per se and neither was it interested in aesthetic results only, was it simply 
trying to put artists and engineers together with no further ambition than the collaboration 
itself? Was the collaboration alone what characterised the experiment? Shanken begins 
his discussion of E.A.T. by pointing to one of John Cage’s statements that, as he rightly 
points out, ‘exemplifies some of the prevalent attitudes held by artists toward art and 
technology in the 1960s’ (Shanken, 2001, p. 79)151. From Cage’s point of view ‘the artist 
was the progenitor of a revolutionary heritage who, through collaborations between artists 
and engineers, would transfer this revolutionary element to the technical servants of 
                                                      
 
150 We should note that the negation of heroism here is from an artistic point of view. Reichardt and 
the Studio International special portray the show as heroic in the sense that it is far fetched, visionary. 
151 Full quote: ‘I want to remove the notion of the separation between the artist and the engineer. I 
think that the engineer is separate from other people simply because of his very highly specialized 
knowledge. If the artist can become aware of the technology, and if the engineer can become aware of the 
fact that the show must go on, then I think that we can expect not only interesting art, but we may just very 
well expect an interesting change in the social order. The most important aspect of this is the position of the 
engineer as a possible revolutionary figure. And it may very well come [to pass] as a result of the artists and 
engineers collaborating. Because the artists, for years now, have been the repositories of revolutionary 
thought. Whereas the engineers, in their recent history, have been employees of the economic life. But in 
relating to the artists, they become related to a revolutionary factor’ (Cage in Shanken, 2001, p. 79). 
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commerce and industry’ (in Shanken, 2001, p. 79). Believing in the artist’s capacity to 
change the social order, Cage then typified the growing anxiety of the late 1960s. This 
anxiety, a product of both the further development of the Cold War and growing social 
unrest, created an environment that mobilised artists across many different contexts. 
Although this narrative has so far focused on the organisational discourses – that is to say, 
the rationales and objectives of those who organised either Cybernetic Serendipity or 9 
Evenings – it must not be forgotten that all the individuals involved had their own 
personal reasons for participating in these events. Turner (2008), for example, explores 
the rationale for artists in the US wishing to participate in E.A.T.: 
 
For almost 20 years, newspapers and magazines had been filled with the 
suggestion that if humans admitted their fundamental likeness to information 
processors, if they turned over even a portion of their work to those machines, 
they would be deprived of their independence and exiled from the social world of 
the factory. But over the course of 9 Evenings, some 10,000 audience members 
glimpsed a world in which artists shared their creative agency with an assortment 
of devices, procedures, programs and communities […] together, artists and 
engineers made visible a world in which giving some portion of one’s autonomy 
over to electronic devices for communication and control resulted in the creation 
of new experiences – experiences not of humiliation and defeat, but of playful 
agency in and among probabilistic systems. (Turner, 2008, p. 18) 
 
For Turner, then, one of the reasons behind the artists’ engagement with E.A.T. 
was an attempt to construct a ‘collaborative social style specifically opposed to the 
hierarchies of the automated factory’ (which Turner names ‘Romantic automatism’) 
(Turner, 2008, p. 6). This attempt, against a social order if we use Cage’s terms, is far 
from the rational formalist discourse celebrated some years earlier. Here the situation is 
inverted – that is, Snow’s postulate is inverted. According to this new discourse the 
scientist, in order to be revolutionary, must change. It is not the arts that ought to learn 
from the sciences but, instead, it is the sciences that ought to learn from the arts. This 
complete reversal of attitude becomes even more shocking if, for example, proclaimed by 
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someone from the technocratic world itself152 . Although affirming that ‘art cannot 
contribute anything to science’ (Klüver in Goodyear, 2004, p. 626), Klüver himself 
‘argued that art could redefine the goals of engineering, while technology could expand 
the possibilities of art’ (Klüver in Goodyear, 2004, p. 627). In an interview from 1995 
with Garnet Hertz, Klüver does not allow any space for misinterpretation 153  (my 
emphasis): 
 
H: I have a quote here… ‘Klüver saw many parallels between contemporary art 
and science, both of which were concerned basically with the investigation of 
life… a vision of American technological genius humanized and made wiser by 
the imaginative perception of artists…’ Does that accurately describe your goal? 
 
K: Well, it could be said better than that… The way I see it is that artists provide 
non-artists – engineers or whomever – a certain number of things which non-
artists do not possess. The engineer expands his vision and gets involved with 
problems which are not the kind of rational problems that come up in his daily 
routine. And the engineer becomes committed because it becomes a fascinating 
technological problem that nobody else would have raised. If the engineer gets 
involved with the kinds of questions that an artist would raise, then the 
activities of the engineer go closer towards that of humanity… Now, this is all 
sort of philosophical – in practice, it has to do with doing it. 
 
H: So, is technology a transparent medium that artists should be able to use… 
there’s not really a moral side to technology? 
 
K: Well, no. The artists have shaped technology. They have helped make 
technology more human. They automatically will because they’re artists. 
That’s by definition. If they do something it automatically comes out human. 
There’s no way you can come out and say that if art is the driving force in a 
technological situation then it will come out with destructive ideas. That’s not 
possible. But what happens, of course, is that the artist widens the vision of the 
engineer. 
 
                                                      
 
152 It is important to stress that, following Turner (2008), the automated and self-regulated utopia of 
cybernetics was still present. What had changed, from the points of view of the opposing sides of the two 
cultures, was who should change: instead of the humanities moving closer to the sciences, Klüver was 
proposing the opposite. 
153 A point that both Shanken (2001) and Goodyear (2004) also affirm but that they learned via their 
personal communications with Klüver. 
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H: And so artists can provide a conscience or humanizing element to the 
technology? 
 
K: Yes, that’s what I mean … but that’s saying it too much. There might be 
other consciousness that comes from other sources than art. I think there is a huge 
consciousness inside technology that hasn’t been tapped. (Hertz and Klüver in 
Candy and Edmonds, 2002, p. 9) 
 
 
Just the fact that Klüver did not seem to comprehend technology as a morally neutral 
entity would alone posit E.A.T. in diametrical opposition to Reichardt’s technological 
assumption (of neutrality). That, however, is only half the story. This interview, 
conducted decades later, directly contradict his own position back in 1968 where, in true 
rational formalist fashion, he proposed an axiomatic structure for technology, stating that 
‘technology is neutral. It possesses no inherent values, value judgments, teleological 
direction, or normative goals. It is a tool’ (Klüver in Dyson, 2009). Moreover, although 
E.A.T. and Klüver do seem to oppose the social order they also – albeit for varying 
reasons – collaborated with the military–industrial complex154. This dilemma, of wishing 
for social change and at the same time collaborating with the status quo, was seen in 
many corners. As Shanken puts it: ‘this dilemma plagues the political consequences of art 
and technology in general. For how can an artist use technology in a way that does not 
aestheticise it or otherwise reify the elitist social relations of technocracy?’ (Shanken, 
2001, p. 100). E.A.T. was certainly not alone in this and between 1965 and 1971 a huge 
number of responses were given to the topic of the current situation of artists operating 
under an increasingly technical society and/or the continuously evolving (or decaying 
according to the opposite view) world order155. The experimentalist exhibitions of early 
                                                      
 
154 A similar problem can be seen over MIT’s GRAV. For more, consult Wisnioski (2013). 
155 Shanken reminds us that, in the US alone, between 1966 and 1972, there were ‘nine evenings: 
theatre and engineering; Software, Information Technology: Its New Meaning for Art; The Machine as Seen 
at the End of the Mechanical Age; Cybernetic Serendipity; Art and Technology; Some More Beginnings; and 
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AST, arriving shortly after the computer art exhibitions of 1965, may have either sided 
with Snow’s or Leavis’ arguments but, in the end, they all used in some way or another 
the very same architecture established by the military–industrial complex. By wishing to 
reform either the artist, the artist’s practices, or society and science via the structure 
central to the Cold War era, these exhibitions were neither defining an artistic movement 
(with specific stylistic criteria) nor a cohesive discourse, via a central theoretical 
authority. Although promoting two different solutions, both E.A.T. and Cybernetic 
Serendipity in this context were then acting according to a perceived cultural problem 
(the increasing centrality of the technosciences and their precepts) and not, as we may 
expect from a classically defined artistic movement, an aesthetic proposition. 
Following this increased contestation, between those who seemed to profess the 
technocratic principles of a new society and those opposed to it, between the status quo 
and the counter culture, Dyson (2009) sees the rhetoric of E.A.T. developing ‘according 
to its quickly changing context’. Following this observation she divides E.A.T. ‘rhetoric’ 
into three stages. Firstly, as she notes, ‘Klüver emphasized the transformative potential 
not only of art and science, but of culture as a whole, through collaborations between 
artists and engineers’ (Dyson, 2009). This is what this thesis dubs the experimentalist 
discourse of E.A.T., its raison d’entre, not as an aesthetic experiment but as a social one. 
Second in her division we find the stage where E.A.T. ‘foregrounds the ethical, 
environmental and social aspects of technological change while focusing on the 
individual’ where ‘Klüver repeated technology’s main post-war promise to increase the 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
Magic Theatre. They took place at such prestige institutions as The Museum of Modern Art, New York; The 
San Francisco Museum of Modern Art; The Los Angeles County Museum of Art; the Institute of 
Contemporary Art, Boston; the Chicago Museum of Contemporary Art; the Corcoran Gallery; The Walker 
Art Center; the Brooklyn Museum of Art; the William Rockhill Nelson Gallery; and the Jewish Museum’ 
(2011, p. 76). On top of this list we should add the Artist Placement Group in the UK (Bishop, 2012, chapter 
6) and New Tendencies, in the old Yugoslavia, my next subject. 
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amount of leisure time’ while at the same time he ‘channelled the traumas produced by 
massive technological change into the pursuit of happiness’ (Dyson, 2009). Finally, 
Dyson identifies E.A.T.’s involvement with the ideals of what she calls ‘technological 
democracy’, which in many ways resembles Turner’s (2008, 2014) perception of the 
same movement156, where E.A.T. becomes ‘involved in humanitarian, environmental, 
educational, media communications and third world development projects’ (Dyson, 
2009). While making these distinctions, between the different phases of E.A.T.’s 
discourse, Dyson rightly acknowledges the difficulty in discerning what was ‘written only 
for the eyes of corporations liable to sponsor his projects, or whether they are expressions 
of deeply held beliefs, or tools for constructing an overarching philosophy’ (Dyson, 
2009). This difficulty, I believe, aligned with the fact that only a few years separate 
Dyson’s ‘rhetoric’ phases, seems to indicate a diffuse discourse rather than an all-
encompassing philosophy. Not only are the references cited by her separated by only a 
few years, between 1967 and 1970, but also some of the ‘phases’ she indicates overlap 
within the same year. How can she, then, divide so neatly the discourse of E.A.T.? While 
there seems to have been a development of its emphasis, from hazily defined social 
experiments to technological democracy (or as Turner would see it a technocratic form of 
government), E.A.T. was always interested in an undefined potential art that nevertheless 
emphasised a strong social engagement that, for some at least, would propose a new 
direction for art. This development hence does not speak of an artistic movement that 
possesses X, Y or Z aesthetic qualities. Similarly to the proposition of Cybernetic 
Serendipity of a new direction, where aesthetics is secondary to the experiment itself, 
E.A.T. would reimagine not only society but also the artist’s position. E.A.T. may have 
changed its tone and emphasis over time but its intention remained the same: social and 
                                                      
 
156 Although she describes Turner’s ideas in relation to the utopia of these projects, Dyson misses his 
emphasis on the technocratic, decentralised and cybernetics-led aspects of this new democracy. 
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artistic reform via an experiment focused on the transformative (positive) aspects of 
technology. As Rauschenberg declared: ‘it is obvious that we live in a technical society, 
where it is the technologist who plays the key role and the artist who remains isolated on 
the periphery. As such, the artist’s days are numbered unless we can adapt to the 
technical framework of his time’ (in Dyson, 2009). 
The difficulty arising from the study of such events is characteristic of an attempt 
to give form to something that is in itself formless. If I had proposed to define an AST 
movement, in the art historical tradition, my mission would have been pointless. Again, 
similarly to the developments seen in Chapter 1, the material, cultural and political 
context are what should be analysed. It is only by understanding their engagement with 
technology and science, and both their vocal and silent support for it, that we can 
construct a minimally cohesive set of patristic practices. Without such support any 
attempt would be fruitless since, as the literature of the field portrays, each individual 
event proposed a different solution to the situation emerging from the material and 
cultural contexts of the late 1960s. 
In time, however, each of these experiments would dramatically fail. Their 
failure, exemplified by their non-insertion into the artistic canon, a measure of artistic 
legitimacy, only reinforced the picture of a growing dissatisfaction with the paradoxical 
dilemma faced by proponents of AST. Despite distancing herself from these 
‘preoccupations which concern art’ (MacGregor, 2009, p. 91), Reichardt, for example, 
would not escape, as computer art pioneer Paul Brown latter realised, the ‘kiss of death of 
computer art’ (Brown, 1996; also in Taylor, 2004, p. 3). In fact, ‘so endemic was the 
cynicism towards computer art that Reichardt’s career was thwarted when she received 
negative treatment from the art establishment after her involvement with computer art and 
her curatorial role in Cybernetic Serendipity’ (Taylor, 2004, p. 134; see also Fernández, 
2008). Even as late as 2008, in Art Journal (College Art Association), a central 
publication within the traditional contemporary art world, an article highlights that 
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‘scholars writing about curatorial work consistently exclude Cybernetic Serendipity’ 
(Fernández, 2008, p. 7). One might be tempted to relate this terrible fate only to 
Cybernetic Serendipity’s naïve conformism but, as E.A.T.’s (vague) politics show, that 
was far from the truth. Jack Burnham, a curator and critic for Art Forum at the time, 
responsible for the disastrous 1970 Software exhibition157 held at the Jewish Museum, 
might seem a strong advocate for AST but, ironically, he later recalled 9 Evenings with a 
hilarious but bitter quote from a theatre critic stating that it ‘was not so much an 
experiment in theatre and engineering as it was an experiment in sociology, since it 
would take a particularly perverse audience to sit through and endure anything so feeble’ 
(Burnham, 1980, p. 203). Yet, for E.A.T., this sarcastic criticism was surely not the worst 
to come. E.A.T. kept growing and by 1968 it ‘had over six thousand members’ while by 
1969 it ‘had found seventy-eight corporate sponsors, including IBM, Xerox, Atlantic 
                                                      
 
157 As Shanken posits: ‘It must be noted that in many respects Software was a disaster. The DEC 
PDP-8 Time Share Computer that controlled many of the works did not function for the first month of the 
exhibition due to problems with, ironically enough, the software […] The show went greatly over budget, 
which put the Jewish Museum in a precarious position financially. The Jewish Theological Seminary 
procured funds to save the foundering institution, but dictated a radical shift in the museum’s mission, which 
precipitated Karl Katz’s dismissal as its director and its demise as a leading exhibition space for experimental 
art. The show was scheduled to travel to the Smithsonian Institution, but that venue was cancelled […] Like 
Nine Evenings before it, and many subsequent exhibitions, the failure of the technology to work contributed 
to increasing public disappointment and impatience with Art and Technology. While works of art have 
always been more or less successful according to some set of criteria, the idea of the art simply “not working” 
was unfamiliar to audiences. Moreover, given the technological accomplishments of the period – such as 
putting a human being on the moon – the failure of technology to function in artistic contexts made artists 
appear to be amateurs dabbling unsuccessfully with materials better left to engineers’ (Shanken, 2001, pp. 
119–120). In a very honest text (and usually within AST), Burnham himself would later recall the various 
problems: the lack of art world support, the technical and financial difficulties, the conservatism of the 
pictures and artworks, all leading to him abandoning any pretension to artistic exhibition and instead focusing 
on an ‘educational, viewer interactive’ show (Burnham, 1980, p. 207). 
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Richfield, and Schlumberger’ with each spending over ‘$1,000 a year to subscribe to the 
E.A.T. newsletter and to gain access to its list of artists and engineers’ (Turner, 2014, p. 
71). Such was the confidence of (and in) E.A.T. that in 1970 it presented a highly 
ambitious project that, in time, proved to be its downfall: the Pepsi Pavilion at the 1970 
International Exhibition in Osaka (Fig. 18). Turner (2014). The exhibition related E.A.T. 
to Turner’s broader research into the appropriation of cybernetic discourse by the 
counter-culture, reminding us that for PepsiCo executives E.A.T. presented a great 
marketing opportunity: ‘even as they worked with the artistic styles of the counterculture, 
they sought out the leaders of corporate America. This was just the sort of cross-cultural 
fusion Pepsi’s executives were looking for. After all, they too were seeking to attach the 
products of mainstream American mass production – in this case, soda pop rather than 
engineered devices – to the legitimating cool of the counterculture’ (Turner, 2014, p. 71). 
Not only was E.A.T. proposing a new social order, in tune with the changing time, 
differently from other artistic groups, which may have caused problems, but also E.A.T’s 
 
emphasis on collaboration, technology, and creativity aped the interdisciplinary 
ideology of the Cold War military research world. Its model of individual agency 
and collective coordination brought to life the cybernetic ideals of Norbert 
Wiener. For the members of E.A.T., as for the computer designers, game 
theorists, and war planners of the Pentagon in that era, cybernetics mapped the 
world as it was and should be: an information system that transcended the limits 
of biology and technology, simultaneously freeing individuals and integrating 
social groups. It was a system ostensibly without politics. It was in many ways an 
ideal technocracy watched over by engineers and managed through 
communication machines. (Turner, 2014, p. 71) 
 
E.A.T.’s conundrum, of aiming at social change by fantastically distancing itself 
from traditional politics158, in time, would catch it out. With the exhibition highly over 
                                                      
 
158 That is not to say, of course, that E.A.T. did not have its own politics. 
  218 
budget and after many delays, one month after the opening Pepsi fired E.A.T.159. That 
seemed to be a sign of times to come. One critic, commenting on one of the art and 
technology programs at Expo’70, claimed that during the term of the project ‘there 
occurred the My Lai massacre, the Chicago Democratic Convention riots, the 
assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy, the invasion of Cambodia, the 
student killings at Kent and Jackson State. While these convulsions were taking place, 
inflaming the radicalism of our youth and polarizing the country, the American artists did 
not hesitate to freeload at the trough of that techno-fascism that had inspired them’ 
(Kozloff in Lee, 2004, p. 24)160. By 1972 E.A.T.’s membership would have halved and, 
as Burnham notes: 
 
Outside New York City, artist members of E.A.T. began to grumble that they 
were merely statistical fodder for E.A.T.’s grant proposals and that most of their 
serious requests to E.A.T. were simply ignored or bypassed with form letters. 
Once the word penetrated the art world that E.A.T. was an ‘elitist’ organization, 
simply catering to the needs of its own staff and a few favoured big-time artists in 




                                                      
 
159 While for Burnham that was the reason for E.A.T. being fired, for Turner the motifs are clouded 
and not as clear as they seem. 
160 Taylor reminds us of another fantastic example of this visceral reaction: ‘In 1971, Max Kozloff in 
his Art Forum piece Multimillion Dollar Art Boondoggle, gave what Burnham describes as the “most vicious, 
inflammatory, and irrational attack ever written on the art and technology phenomenon. Kozoff depicted the 
artists involved in the “lavishly funded” A&T project as “fledgling technocrats, acting out mad science fiction 
fantasies,” while the more sophisticated artists he envisaged as cynical opportunists’ (Taylor, 2004, pp. 100–
101). 
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3.2 Revolutionaries: New Tendencies 
 
Another exhibition with computers at the forefront would take place in 1968, this time in 
Zagreb, at the time part of non-aligned Yugoslavia and, hence, a seemingly strategic 
place bypassing the Iron Curtain and positioning itself neither with the West nor with the 
communist bloc. Also plagued by internal criticism, heavily under the influence of 
rational formalist discourse and having developed from concrete-art-like discourse and 
containing works by the usual suspects (Bense, Nake, Ness and Noll), the exhibition 
Tendencije 4, despite the most obvious connection (the use of computers), was a very, 
very different exhibition from its Anglo-American counterparts. First and foremost this 
was an event that developed within an already established artistic movement: New 
Tendencies161. A pan-European network of mostly young, male and politically concerned 
artists with an abstract and concrete-oriented artistic production, New Tendencies would 
attempt to bring together artists from various countries into a set of events known as New 
Tendencies. It is important to note, however, that this is not to say that before New 
Tendencies there was a close and communicative community of pan-European 
constructivist-oriented artists. Pretty much the opposite is true. Although their aesthetics 
indicate otherwise, they were mostly unaware of each other and due credit should be 
                                                      
 
161 The history of this movement, conceptualised as the last avant-garde (Rosen, 2011b, p. 25) in a 
very modernistic fashion, is incredibly well documented in one of the most consistent and complete books 
ever written about the world of computer art. Tracing not only the origins of the group but also its 
development, via an assorted collection of letters, essays and photos from most participants, Rosen’s work is 
indeed – and sadly – the one book that appears close to a complete overview of any movement in computer 
art to date. A Little-Known Story (published by ZKM) is undoubtedly the primary source for anyone 
interested in these developments. Hence, I will not attempt to detail the group’s development and will, 
instead, focus on some interesting documents and discussions from its fourth exhibition, Tendencije 4, where 
the computer was, rather abrasively, adopted. 
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given to New Tendencies: it was only in Zagreb that a more or less cohesive network was 
formed. The artists themselves were surprised to find not only that there were many 
similar concrete-oriented developments at the time but also that they were grouped so 
well in Zagreb (Denegri, 2011, pp. 20–21)162. 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the context of these meetings. These 
were artists who lived under the ‘spirit of resurging optimism spreading through the ranks 
of the young generation of artists that developed in the consolidated social situation of 
renewed Europe’ (Denegri, 2011, p. 21). Fiercely opposed to abstract expressionism 
(Rosen, 2011b, p. 27) and its romantic individualism, New Tendencies was a group that 
quickly developed as an organisation, supporting a series of events over the course of the 
years and, as an artistic movement, proposing a politicised anti-capitalist discourse and 
abstract, rational artistic practice. This internal change, culminating in the entrance of the 
computer as a subject and support in 1968, reflected an internal dispute over how to 
frame the production of so many artists and groups into a single narrative163. 
A character already seen in this thesis, Almir Mavignier, instigated the first 
exhibition, in 1961164. The story is told in detail by Mavignier himself and Matko 
                                                      
 
162 One of the participants, and a member of the Italian Gruppo N, Manfredo Massironi, described 
the impact of such a surprise: ‘This exhibition, the response which was quite limited among critics, was of 
exceptional significance for the artists, above all because it provided an opportunity for meetings between 
many artists from diverse parts of Europe who, not being personally acquainted, could witness for themselves 
the striking affinity of their works. Although they were not aware of what, in fact connected them, it was for 
them a moment of great enthusiasm’ (in Denegri, 2011, p. 21). 
163 So much for the camaraderie describe by Massironi in the previous footnote! 
164 Participating artists in this first exhibition were: ‘Marc Adrian [AT] Alberto Biasi [IT] Enrico 
Castellani [IT] Ennio Chiggio [IT] Andreas Christen [CH] Toni Costa [IT] Piero Dorazio [IT] Karl Gerstner 
[CH] Gerard von Graevenitz [DE] Rudolf Kämmer [DE] Julije Knifer [HR (YU)] Edoardo Landi [IT] Julio 
Le Parc [AR/FR] Heinz Mack [DE] Piero Manzoni [IT] Manfredo Massironi [IT] Almir Mavignier [BR/DE] 
François Morellet [FR] Gotthart Müller [DE] Herbert Oehm [DE] Ivan Picelj [HR (YU)] Otto Piene [DE] Uli 
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Meštrović in Denegri (2011) and Rosen (2011a). In short, as previously highlighted, New 
Tendencies happened as a result of a chance encounter. Mavignier, having then just 
completed his studies at Ulm (under Bense’s tutelage), while visiting some friends in 
Zagreb, accidentally met Meštrović, an art historian who is regarded as the ideologue of 
the movement on an international level (Denegri, 2011, p. 24). Meštrović, impressed by 
his new friend’s academic pedigree, and Mavignier, impressed by Meštrović’s 
knowledge, concurred with each other about the lack of any single and distinctive 
movement appearing in the recently closed Venice Biennale (1960). Questioned at a 
symposium as to whether he knew of any hitherto unknown movement, Mavignier 
responded that ‘to get wind of still unknown movements, one has to go to artists’ studios 
and get acquainted with artists who are experimenting with new ideas and new materials 
– artists like […] François Morellet, Gruppo N, Enrico Castellani, Heinz Mack, Otto 
Piene’ (in Denegri, 2011, p. 20). In order to confirm his own opinion, Mavignier, chosen 
as curator for this first New Tendencies event, proposed an exhibition with the same 
name (Denegri, 2011)165 (e.g. Fig. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27). 
The second (1964–1965) and third (1965) exhibitions, although maintaining the 
abstract, patterned and geometric compositions common to the first show, were marked 
by an intense internal debate and, eventually, a reorientation. Manfredo Massironi, for 
example, who some years earlier had celebrated the unexpected similarity between many 
different artists identified by Mavignier (in Denegri, 2011, p. 21), on the occasion of the 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
Pohl [DE] Dieter Rot [DE] Joël Stein [FR] Paul Talman [CH] Günther Uecker [DE] Marcel Wyss [CH] 
Walter Zehringer [DE]’ (Rosen, 2011a, p. 65). 
165 There is a curious omission in Mavignier’s list: no Brazilian is mentioned. In the letters he wrote 
to Meštrović, however, he is clear that for ‘those who live in Brazil […] the invitation should be made 
through the Museu de Art Moderna in Rio de Janeiro, who will pay the costs of shipping canvases’ 
(Mavignier, 2011, p. 60). The reason why there is no Brazilian apart from Mavignier, for me, then, is an 
unsolved mystery. 
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second exhibition declared that it had ‘first and foremost, a rigorous selection of 
participants’ that reflected the ‘difficult search for a common ground of understanding in 
order to create a large unitary international movement’ (in Denegri, 2011, p. 22). 
Following a series of encounters and meetings to which not all participants of the first 
exhibition were invited, the movement seemed to crystallise its intentions over social 
reform. Meštrović, for example, wrote that ‘the danger of going astray and deflecting 
energies is always present; the prism of social contradiction keeps refracting them and 
deflecting them from the only effective way – penetration of social structures. The 
breaking down of social barriers, mental rigidity, routine schemes and all resistances of 
non-reorganised production conditions […] comprise the historical necessity of art and no 
means are superfluous to it in performing this task’ (in Denegri, 2011, p. 22). Yet, two 
years later, he would plainly state that within the movement ‘a crisis broke out’ (in 
Denegri, 2011, p. 22). Within this increasingly politicised atmosphere the movement 
became ‘exceedingly activist, expansionist, and in some individual theoretical positions 
even extremely doctrinaire’ (Denegri, 2011, p. 23). 
Denegri (2011) reminds us that Meštrović, being the most vocal and militant of 
all the members, increasingly moved New Tendencies towards the scientisation of art. 
His texts, widely applauded by the activist members of the movement, called for an art 
that demanded ‘to debunk the dominant influence of the art market, which speculated 
with art, treating it contradictorily both as a myth and as commodity’ (in Denegri, 2011, 
p. 25). Subjectivism, irrationality and mystification of art, under this discourse, became 
synonyms for capitalist art market manipulations and commodification: only rationality 
could help New Tendencies achieve the objective of a new art. For New Tendencies’ 
members, following a Bauhausian rationale of art and industry, art should not only adopt 
new industrial materials but also be democratised. The romanticism of the author, for 
them, was seen as a myth that should also be combated. The personal discourses calling 
for this new pure and revolutionary art proliferated. As early as the first exhibition, 
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Meštrović, for example, heroically called for a ‘new beginning’, ‘to rise straight up into a 
clearing’ and spoke of the impossibility of a ‘fresh start without total purging’ 
(Meštrović, 2011a, p. 68). Others concurred. Castellani said that they were not ‘interested 
in expressing subjective reactions’; Le Parc commented that whoever ‘makes art becomes 
aware of the flagrant contraction in his social position’; Morellet declared that New 
Tendencies was ‘at the eve of a revolution in the arts that is as great as the revolution that 
exists in science’; Piene declared that the most meaningful art is the one with ‘purity of 
light, pure colour’ etc. (all in Adrian et al., 2011, p. 82). Unsurprisingly, given these new 
clear programmatic intentions, the exhibition that was originally called New Tendencies, 
in plural, became New Tendency, in the singular, from its second edition onwards. 
Despite these short examples, nowhere was the radical disposition of New Tendency – 
thereafter named in the singular – more clearly expressed as in the catalogue of its second 
exhibition, in 1963. In a prophetic essay Meštrović, by then a more influential figure 
within the group than Mavignier, summed up all the concerns expressed by its individual 
members and, at the same time, created a framework for the new New Tendency. ‘No 
other text was distributed as widely within the framework of the New Tendencies as this 
essay’, which reappeared many times with translations in ‘Croatian, French, Italian and 
German’ (Rosen, 2011a, p. 114). Given its importance, a long quote is necessary (my 
emphasis): 
 
How should we then comprehend and understand that social problems 
cannot be solved without ideological clarification, that is, without acceleration 
of inevitable historical processes and, that scientific discoveries are, in a 
historical sense, not truly efficient or valid until they become the common 
property of society, that in all this art is a necessary and accessory fact of human 
moral awareness […] 
How, by schematically defining our historical situation as [a] phase in 
which the classical formations of capitalist society are being dismembered and 
dissolved by an inner revolution of the productive forces, which are increasingly 
and against their will coming closer to understanding the inevitable process of 
socialization as the world’s historical perspective and to understanding the 
ideological implications of this process within the problem of alienation as 
impairing comprehension of the real expression of this period, no matter 
whether the alienation originated in the prevailing laws of commodity value or 
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from a privileged position within the state apparatus, how should we then 
comprehend, resolve, and implement the fundamental social problem: equal 
distribution of all material and spiritual goods? 
First of all we should understand that this a necessity, not just theoretical 
[…] This necessity should finally be recognized also in all insights of science 
into nature and the world, which sooner or later will become the transformation 
and organization model for human society and its inner structure. 
However, it is science with all its successes that demonstrates how 
estranged it is from man, as representative of its kind, and how alienated one 
human can become from another […] Humans have permitted science to free 
itself of their control, and also to free itself of self-control; they have thus 
relinquished the possibility to acquire power over themselves and science. For 
this reason we must not neglect science, but make the vast experience contained 
in it our own. 
Currently, most is achieved by objectifying this experience by turning 
into technical and industrial systems and production practice […] At the same 
time this hinders the realization of possible human values and the general 
historical process of humanization of the world […] 
Art has a sense even when its pure expressiveness in the form of the 
ethical sense of extreme human confrontation with the insoluble […] it has a 
markedly constructive sense especially when it is expressed as a positive attempt 
at understanding historical realities and the laws of transformation and existence 
of the world and society […] Art is the first to sense a new time within time […] 
And, finally, who can deny that art is the first to point to what is decaying […] 
At the beginning of the century there were thinkers, ‘ideologists of 
formal rationalism’. Whom we could call prophets of the modern art […] 
They saw, for example, that the machine is not something we can ignore; that 
its logic is not only valid for bankers and captain of industry, and that it would 
[be] fatal if it were only adopted by them […] Misuse turned their ideas into 
utopias; they had to capitulate before political reality […] At that point, innate 
human nature screamed in a primal and painful way, frantically seeking an echo 
in the wastes and hollow lap of matter […] 
The New Tendencies emerged spontaneously in this climate that was first 
felt by Old Europe. A positive relationship towards scientific insights is a 
tradition of pioneers of modern architecture, of Neoplasticists, of Bauhaus 
followers. Although this tradition had not lived to the full, it stayed alive […] 
On this level, logically, the very notion of art must undergo a decisive 
change and be erased as such, while art should be subjected to necessary 
scientization. (Meštrović, 2011b, pp. 114–117) 
 
Whether or not artists in the early twentieth century seemed inclined to 
celebrate166 science and technology, Meštrović makes the case for a more restrained 
                                                      
 
166 Such celebration, as we know, is usually accompanied by its denouncing. In introducing the early 
modernism and its interaction with the material changes of the period, in the now classical Art in Theory 
(2003), Harrison and Wood remind us that ‘however different they may have been, the variant responses of 
depression and exhilaration are two sides of the same coin’ (Harrison and Wood, 2003, p. 129). 
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relationship with science/technology. For him, a particular science that does not take part 
in his revolution is not an ‘efficient or valid’ science. Although paralleling Klüver’s (late) 
discourse, in calling for a ‘humanization’ of the scientific field or by highlighting that 
science freed ‘itself of control’, Meštrović here goes even further in his intentions. He 
proposes science and technology as means of achieving a revolution, in Marxist terms167, 
against the capitalist order and for the ‘distribution of all materials and spiritual goods’. 
Meštrović’s argument, in fact, anticipates the mood of the 1970s within the field. The 
idea that technology dehumanises us, however, can be traced back to the alienating 
aspects of Fordist capitalism, as understood by Marxist criticism, in the image of the 
assembly line, for example, and similarly used by Leavis against Snow’s calls (as seen in 
the previous section). Philosophers such as Flusser (2007), definitely not a Marxist define 
the technology of the industrial revolution as adapting humans to its need. The tools that 
preceded this revolution (e.g. a hammer) were extensions of the human. Conversely, the 
machines of the industrial revolution, especially in productive spaces such as the factory, 
were of a different and new kind of cosmology: in the factory, the human was fulfilling 
the will of the machine and not otherwise. Despite not referring directly to the factory or 
to the assembly line, Meštrović does refers to the alienating aspects of capitalism and the 
perceived fact that technology had freed itself, which, I believe, frames the problem of 
technology (and science) within the idea that it must be brought back under control168. 
Meštrović in fact is giving a diagnostic of the situation as he sees it. In other words, he is 
framing the development of technology in a negative light, in that he perceives the 
increasing autonomy of science as detrimental to a ‘humanization of the world’. The 
                                                      
 
167 Morellet and Molnár (2011[1963]), for example, further emphasise the revolutionary aspects of 
abstract art by asserting that it ‘does not appear to us to contradict the principles of dialectical materialism. 
Quite the contrary; by its historicity, as least, it is an excellent illustration of that philosophy’ (2011, p. 138). 
168 The perception that there is a dehumanisaing effect of technology is a huge topic that unfortunate 
cannot be dealt with here. For a very brief contemporary and introduction, see Haslam (2006). 
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prognosis169 proposed by him, also very clear, is simple: artists and art ought to take 
control back. If one did not answer his call, he warns, the result would be fatal. Meštrović 
in this text is then playing a double game. Similarly to others in the field before him, and 
similarly to others in the field today, he is both picturing a problem and offering a 
solution. What distances him from his contemporaries, however, is that he does not frame 
computing technology, or science/technology, within the realm of possibilities, of 
experiments. For him it is not, as Bense proposes, a matter of changing art. Also 
differently from Noll or Reichardt, it is not a matter of experimenting with new 
possibilities. Actually, it is all the above but even more: it is about changing society, art 
and science. If those other two intentions, of changing art and experimenting with 
technology, had had an appeal, had resonated with a certain public up to the late 1960s, 
we can say that Meštrović is radicalising even more these previous experimentalist 
claims. In the light of rational formalistic optimism, the simple ideas of changing art and 
experimenting with technology were not only possible but also inevitable. After all, in the 
minds of their proponents, cybernetics, linguistic, game theory etc. had moved towards 
this objective, towards scientisation. For Meštrović, however, there was not a speck of 
optimism – perhaps only a light at the end of the tunnel. If for the optimistic trend of 
formalism the social world in general was not a concern, for Meštrović the opposite was 
true. His ‘fundamental social problem’, clearly, was both the end game and the higher 
motivation in his aesthetic concerns. This fundamental problem, however, was kept as if 
dormant during the long 1950s. The exaltation of human rational capabilities embodied in 
the new discoveries and products of the post-war era seemed to herald a new age, a 
                                                      
 
169 Both the diagnosis and prognosis of perceived problems are a central feature of the mobilisation 
of social movements. It is via these discursive techniques that movements mobilise and retain their members, 
and act via those members (Benford and Snow, 2000; Snow, 2004, 2008; Benford, 2013). Likewise, a 
discourse’s resonance – that is to say, its capacity to mobilise social actors – can be thought of as an aspect of 
a its (and its speakers’) legitimacy. 
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technocratic one, full of promises that, at the time, appeared to be dawning. This 
revolutionary discourse, which ironically later in the decade would be branded as 
reactionary, can then be seen in a table produced by Morellet and Molnár (2011 [1963], p. 
139) where they oppose the characteristics proper to ‘progressive’ and ‘reactionary’ 
tendencies: a ‘confidence in rationality and logic as fundamentals’ against ‘trust in the 
irrational’; a ‘confidence in progress’ against a ‘denial of progress’; ‘scientific research’ 
against ‘works of art designed to be private property of a wealthy class’; the ‘use of 
modern industrial materials’ against the ‘use of precious or traditional’ ones; and a belief 
‘in experimental art’ against ‘the unique, unchangeable, and non-controllable work of 
art’. This naïve optimism, clearly, one day had to end, and so it did. Discourses such as 
that of Umbro Apollonio, secretary general of the Venice Biennale, professing that 
‘anyone who thinks that technology can separate us from transcendental art, or that the 
machine will eventually come to dominate and overpower us merely shows that they have 
not understood the intrinsic meaning of the historical changes we are going through’ 
(Apollonio, 2011, p. 116), would become less and less commonplace. 
Fatefully, despite this revolutionary call, New Tendency members eventually 
were led to a period of fame and art market success that caused an inevitable existential 
crisis within the movement. Denegri tell us that ‘between June and October 1963, parallel 
to the second exhibition of the New Tendencies in Zagreb, the IV Biennale 
Internazionale d’Arte was held in San Marino’. At this event, organised by Giulio Carlo 
Argan, Pierre Restany and Vicente Aguilera-Cerni, ‘the participants of the Zagreb 
exhibition – the ZERO group and Gruppo N – carried off most of the top awards’ 
(Denegri, 2011, p. 23). It was not long before these awards resulted in more specific 
results. Now New Tendency was ‘involved in […] international art affairs’, in 1965 the 
‘American market did not ignore it: in 1965, William Seitz organised for the MoMa The 
Responsive Eye, which, according to Massironi, amounted to a ‘first class funeral’ (in 
Denegri, 2011). How could the revolutionaries of some years back get involved in such a 
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commercial show? From the point of view of the movement’s own discourse, there were 
many glaring problems. Firstly, its politics were completely stripped out. According to 
Galimberti (2012, p. 81), Gruppo N, for example, which was associated with ‘the most 
innovative group of Marxist thinkers in 1960s Italy, the operaisti (workerists), which 
featured figures such as Antonio Negri’, was integrated into another movement, the op 
art, which discursively did not have anything in common with New Tendency170 . 
Moreover the exhibition, ‘which amounted to the first contemporary art blockbuster’, saw 
the work of its artists being ‘applied to dresses, plates, carpets, fashion magazines, album 
covers and concert stage sets’, while ‘the critics and the public ignored the fact that these, 
now popularized works, had once been created as a means to reconstruct the value system 
of the art world’ (Rosen, 2011b, p. 27). Worse still, as Galimberti (2012, p. 81) tells us, 
the curator would state that ‘impersonal fabrication is [here] extended to anonymity of 
authorship and almost to socialism’, then immediately reassuring his Cold War audience 
by proclaiming that ‘these artists are not revolutionaries; they aspire to full cooperation 
with the modern world’ (in Galimberti, 2012, p. 81). Sell-outs, collaborators and 
capitalists: that is how they would have felt. This and their participation in the Venice 
Biennale and documenta III caused artists to wonder whether they had ‘simply ended up 





                                                      
 
170 In this example we can see the limits of stylistic and aesthetic readings of formalist art history, 
which, by missing the discursive aspects of artists, tend to posit different and opposed groups under the same 
umbrella. 
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3.2.1 Purists: Tendencije 4 
 
It was this crisis of confidence, more than its own righteous discourse, that led New 
Tendencies towards the computer. The exhibition following the rather uncertain Nova 
Tendencije 3 (1965), Tendencije 4171, initially scheduled for 1967 (following the biannual 
format since its first edition), did not happen. The organisation of the movement, which 
seemed to have dispersed by 18 December 1967, via the actions of its Yugoslavian hosts, 
seemed to reach a new term: ‘computer art’ (Rosen, 2011a). The new event was renamed 
Tendencije 4: Computers and Visual Research (e.g. Fig. 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 
37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43) and from then on a new figure would emerge as the discursive 
head of this event: Abraham A. Moles. Note that, like the exhibitions of 1965, ‘art’ is 
conspicuously missing from the title. The reason, this time, was certainly a theoretical 
one and not an institutional constraint since this exhibition, more than any previous New 
Tendency one, was completely focused on the scientisation of art. Another important 
difference, as we can see, is the lack of the adjective ‘new’ (nova) from the title. That, as 
we shall see, reflected the organiser’s certainty that the computer was not a new, future 
development but, instead, that it was the actual, present state of the art – despite the rarity 
of computers at the time. Some explanation is necessary. Moles, together with Bense, can 
                                                      
 
171  Tendencije 4, similarly to previous New Tendencies events, was not confined to a single 
exhibition but consisted of many interconnected events. Its main exhibition, which would open only in 1969, 
was mostly defined and fought over, however, over its colloquies and symposiums. Moreover, apart from the 
event itself, there was the introduction of a magazine, bit international, where many of the presentations 
conducted in these meetings were published. These magazines and their articles are the major components 
that make up the historical documents concerning New Tendencies and its involvement with the computer. 
Understandably, Rosen’s incredible book (2011) draws heavily from bit international. For a comprehensive 
timeline of these developments, refer to Klütsch (2005), Fritz (2008a, 2008b, 2011b) and Rosen and Scholl 
(2011). 
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be considered one of the fathers of information aesthetics and its attempts at quantifying 
aesthetic phenomena. Although they differed in their methods, they can be said to have 
been attempting the same result albeit via different means172. In fact, it could be argued 
that ‘the fourth Tendencies exhibition (1968/69) was marked by a further penetration of 
the idea of a theory of information and exact aesthetics’ (Fritz in Klütsch, 2005). 
Moreover, ‘the artistic use of computers was a “last try” of the Tendencies movement to 
synchronize its goals as the “scientification of art” and “bettering the society” and [the] 
historical movement of 1968’ (Fritz in Klütsch, 2005). Moles, like Bense, was an 
academic, and he held the chair of social psychology of communication at Strasbourg 
University. Naturally, the fourth event then had a colloquy in which Moles presented his 
ideas for the future of New Tendencies. In his new role as mentor, for him the goal of 
Tendencije 4 was clear: ‘to establish the bases of the new orientation in artistic 
development’ (Moles, 2011b, p. 263). Acknowledging the previous successes of New 
Tendencies, of creating a network of similarly oriented artists, he affirmed that, 
nevertheless, ‘a further step is necessary’ (Moles, 2011b, p. 263). Differently from 
Meštrović’s prophetic rhetoric, his rationale was simple and direct: ‘This is to take into 
account and come to terms with the technological revolution in the field of art’ (Moles, 
2011b, p. 263). This preoccupation with science and technology, as he rightly posits, was 
a central concern within New Tendencies. Moreover, for him, it was also attached to 
another topic dear to New Tendencies: the ‘relationship between art and society’, which, 
within the spectre of technological development, was seen as part of a ‘sociocultural 
evolution’ (Moles, 2011b, p. 263). Perhaps in a nod to experimentalist Anglo-American 
developments in computer art, Moles denounced what he saw as a common 
misunderstanding in the ‘modern art’, between trial and experiment. A trial, in his 
                                                      
 
172 A complete study on Moles’ and Bense’s methods is offered by Klütsch (2007a). 
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conception, is a failed, small part of a long, rigorous experiment. Consequentially, for 
Moles a true experiment is not a free-for-all game, and instead must be based on 
 
systematization, exploration of the range of possibilities [where] it differs 
essentially from the mere trial, from this multiplicity of trials that we have 
witnessed over the past […] in which no serious analysis was made of the reasons 
for which something was good or bad […] Experimentation is study, study in the 
field of possibilities, defined by constraining laws or by an algorithm, which is to 
say, by a succession of intellectual steps toward the achievement of a definite 
goal. (Moles, 2011b, p. 264). 
 
Here, Moles sweeps aside all work that is not, in essence, computable, algorithmic. 
Moreover, regarding his conception of the correct, good art, and by extension a good 
experiment, a clear objective – his ‘definite goal’ – must be stated in advance. Although 
the exhibition also presented works that were not made with computers, the emphasis on 
scientisation and strictly defined experimentation put forward the computer artists as 
central figures in this new reorientation. Moles, like Bense before him, saw the computer 
as heralding a new era not just for society but for humans as well. This transformation, 
credited to the rise of the ‘machine’, presents a new revolution ‘more important than the 
mechanized revolution that inspired Karl Marx, a revolution of automation, of artificial 
thought, of symbiosis with machines, of mastery of communications’ (Moles, 2011b, p. 
264). This ontological transformation, a direct product of cybernetics’ dissolution of 
borders, between human and machine, between human and other entities, as seen by 
Hayles (1999)173, would reaffirm the secondary character of the artist. The artist, no 
longer manipulating matter (Moles, 2011b, p. 265), becomes an operator (in Flusser’s 
terms), a manipulator of abstract symbols with the machine, the computer, responsible for 
the experiment in itself. This, for Moles, ‘brings out the role of machine-based art as 
                                                      
 
173 This new ontology, of the posthuman, is the subject of the conclusion of this chapter. 
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successor to geometric art’ (Moles, 2011b, p. 264)174. Hence, ‘through these criteria, 
which the New Tendency has brought to the fore, a new form of artwork is emerging’ 
(Moles, 2011b, p. 264). 
Throughout his presentation Moles does not, however, dwell on the nature of his 
objective. Since all good art ought to have a ‘definite goal’, what is this goal? Is it just the 
experiment in itself, or is it something else? Despite affirming that New Tendencies, as a 
movement, had ‘brought out the essential values of contemporary art, such as rigor of 
execution, construction of significant form, and appropriateness of means to ends’ 
(Moles, 2011b, p. 263), he warns that this ‘form’ ‘insist[s] upon having its own criteria’ 
(Moles, 2011b). Apart from the obvious answer, that the definite goal was good art as 
described by Moles (rigorous, significant and appropriate), resulting then in a circular ad 
infinitum answer, I believe that the problem may be clarified by looking at the first 
edition of bit international, also from 1968. It is in these other documents that I believe 
we can find the way out of New Tendencies’ own criteria. Bit international was 
published by the organisers/hosts of New Tendencies, the Galerije grade Zagreba. 
According to its editors, in a suggestive editorial titled ‘Why Bit Appears’, bit 
international’s raison d’entre was ‘to present information theory, exact aesthetics, 
design, mass media, visual communication, and related subjects’ (Basicevic and Picelj, 
2011, p. 294). Given its wish for an exact aesthetics, this first edition was consequentially 
focused, unsurprisingly, on the work of both Bense and Moles. Bense, who had not 
participated in that first colloquy where Moles specified his plans for the future of New 
Tendencies, republished a text (originally printed in 1966) where he specified the 
objectiveness of his exact aesthetics. According to him, when one ‘speaks of modern 
aesthetics’, one speaks of ‘mathematical and empirical procedures’ that, ‘unlike classical 
                                                      
 
174 Similar interpretations of these events have been put forward by Klütsch (2005) and Fritz 
(2008a). 
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aesthetics’, rest not on a philosophical but on a ‘methodological concept’, which, as we 
saw in the previous chapter, ‘is oriented on objective rather than subjective problems’ 
(Bense, 2011, p. 296). Birkhoff’s mathematical measurement of aesthetics considered this 
objective and aimed to quantify aesthetic value via a formula where the (good) aesthetic 
measurement (M) is derived from the ratio between order (O) and complexity (C), 
resulting in the function M=O/C. Following this formula, Bense attempted to reach 
objectivity via a formalisation that could give a definite result, a definite answer, that 
explains artistic worthiness. As Klütsch readily realises, however, Bense could not 
‘explain why very low values for O or C would be considered high aesthetic values’ 
(Klütsch, 2012, p. 68). Moles, who also used Birkhoff’s mathematical measurement of 
aesthetics, albeit in a different form, according to Klütsch, also reached a similar impasse. 
We can conclusively say that, given the lack of explanation for a particular judgement of 
worthiness, both methods aimed at an objective that, in fact, it was impossible to achieve. 
Despite both authors arguing in bit international about the objective of art (Moles’ 
‘definite goal’), and despite both pursuing an exact aesthetic measurement that 
theoretically would be objective, neither could provide an explanation of their own 
exercise. The incapacity to provide an explanation for a supposedly good artwork, as 
demonstrated by Klütsch, is even more problematic since: 
 
whereas Bense adhered to the original equation, M=O/C, Moles modified the 
formula into M=OxC, with drastic implications. If you take low order (O) and 
low complexity (C), for Bense the measurement (M) can still be high, but with 
Moles’s modification it would be at a minimum. If both values C and O are high, 
Bense gets a comparatively low measurement (M), while Moles gets a maximum. 
(Klütsch, 2012, p. 68) 
 
Despite the formula’s shortcomings, both authors, playing with the authoritative 
discourse of science and rational formalism, were constantly adamant regarding their 
formulas’ propositions. In that same publication Bense, for example, continued to argue 
for a generative aesthetics, as seen in the previous chapter, while Moles called for a 
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permutational art (Bense, 2011; Moles, 2011a). For the purposes of this research it is 
relatively unimportant to scrutinise their position. Instead, given the comparative 
endeavour of this thesis, it is better to understand how these formalist discourses were 
translated into New Tendencies and, in turn, comprehend how this new orientation for 
New Tendencies compares, for example, with the propositions of Cybernetic Serendipity 
or E.A.T. Consequently, as we saw in the previous section, if the Anglo-American 
discourses of computer art/AST had not gone through a process of elimination – that is to 
say, of demarcation between new and old practices, of attempting to demonstrate the 
good and the bad in artistic production, an exercise primarily focused not on a scientific 
effort as it was determined by both Bense and Moles but, instead, an exercise that defined 
a pure, new and good way of producing art – the propositions raised by the different 
strands of information aesthetics presented at Tendencije 4 were attempting exactly this: 
separation. That is not to say, obviously, that Anglo-American propositions were not 
attempting to define a group of cohesive artistic methods; they had, after all, the computer 
as their lowest common denominator. The idea of experimentation (for example), 
expressed in both Cybernetic Serendipity and Tendencije 4, traces a strong line between 
these two groups. While both advocated the use of computers, they did so for different 
reasons. Another example of Tendencije 4’s restrictive, purist approach to an idea of a 
new art can be seen in the reaction of previous New Tendencies members. Moles’ 
assertions, as one can expect, given their displacement of the traditional artist and their 
advocacy of (unrigorous) trial and error, were not readily accepted by the previous New 
Tendencies members. As Rosen (2011b, p. 29) reminds us, ‘the burden of the task of 
reviving the movement was perhaps perceived by the organizers, but not by the guests’, 
who, in effect, only vaguely knew of previous New Tendencies activities. During the 
colloquy some voices raised objections towards this new orientation. Artists who had 
previously argued for a reorientation regarding the position of the artist, swept along by 
the logical extensions of their own ideas, were now surpassed by the invited artist–
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scientists, saw themselves in a precarious position. If one could not program, if one did 
not partake in that new art process, what would remain? 
In the first colloquy Alberto Biasi, co-founder of Gruppo N and an active 
participant in old New Tendencies gatherings, stated very clearly his opposition to the 
computational developments of New Tendencies. In this lecture, titled ‘Situation 1967’, 
he described what he believed was a sectarian split within New Tendencies, between 
those who believed art should educate, those who believed art should be formalist (in the 
sense of only referring to itself, without an expressive meaning) and those who saw art as 
a ‘continuous evolution of phenomena’ (resulting in kinetic art). The split, according to 
his narrative, was being resolved back in 1965 when, before Tendencije 4, abruptly, the 
movement ‘virtually ceased to exist’ (Biasi, 2011, p. 268). The culprit for this sudden 
disbandment was ‘both economic circumstances and, above all, […] a common lack of 
determination to prevent individualistic divergences’ (Biasi, 2011, p. 268). According to 
Biasi: 
 
Yugoslav friends who had initiated the movement and who lived under a socialist 
economic system, had not foreseen the realistic issues of individuals survival 
besetting their Western friends would create all kinds of motives for competition 
among artists living in countries with a capitalist economic structure […] There 
was a desire that traditional theories of art should be replaced by a mode of 
understanding and working that would be more in line with new scientific 
thinking about nature and human life […] These words might also seem the 
express the opinion of many of my Western friends who took part in the previous 
New Tendencies exhibitions. We certainly cannot fail to take your program into 
account, but at the same time, we must also consider the situation of the capitalist 
economic world […] Everyone has seen that the consequence of increased 
mechanization is increased exploitation of man by man. Increased automation has 
not diminished man’s exertions or given him greater freedom at work. On the 
contrary, it is used to rationalize exploitation. Artists cannot remain indifferent to 
these conditions […] Perhaps for all these reasons artists from the previous New 
Tendencies exhibitions have not come to Zagreb. (Biasi, 2011, pp. 268–269) 
 
Biasi’s lecture denounces two problems within the movement, problems that in a 
sense were taken as subject by the New Tendencies and its new orientation towards 
computing tech. The exaltation of ‘scientific trends’, despite being directed initially at the 
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‘inconsistency of previous metaphysical systems’ (and an objective they all shared), also 
put an emphasis on the processes used by the capitalist system, which, according to Biasi, 
was responsible in the case of Western artists for both their hardship and their 
commodification. What was initially a split in the movement then became a split between 
those who applauded the exploitative scientific developments and those previous 
participants who were ‘disillusioned’ (Biasi, 2011, pp. 268–269). True artists, for him, 
could ‘not remain indifferent to these opinions’. Nake, one of the participants of that first 
colloquy, seemed to take this as a rather personal attack – of all people, it was strange that 
he went against Biasi (since Nake too was very politicised and left oriented). 
Surprisingly, it seems that he saw himself as both the target of Biasi’s critiques and an 
avatar of the scientific establishment. The colloquy was his first participation within the 
movement as he was ‘appointed’ by Bense as a representative of the production being 
made in Stuttgart whereas Bense went to the ICA to help Reichardt prepare for 
Cybernetic Serendipity175. Perplexed by Biasi’s assertion that no artist could support 
technological development, he spoke back: 
 
Mr. Biasi has told us that there are no artists here today. That is not quite right, 
and yet perhaps the following is symptomatic: Here at the speaker’s desk it is 
mainly scientists or scholars who make an appearance, or at best artists like Kurd 
Alsleben who work primarily as scientists. This seems to me to be a problem of 
the Tendencies. On the one hand, artists are at a loss as to how to proceed, and on 
the other, there are scientists who are making efforts to penetrate art. Mr. Biasi 
has broached a special problem of the artists: the problem of automation. This 
problem is not, however, the artists’ problem alone […] It is senseless to make 
private declarations here. If we want to do that, I could talk about how we stood 
in front of the gates of factories, how we demonstrated, held tech-ins, built 
barricades […] Therefore, I would now like to say something that we won’t 
perhaps like to hear. We shouldn’t demonize automata. Computers exist, and we 
would be making a great mistake if we ran away from them. I think it would be 
much better if we brought as many ‘leftists’ as possible together with computers 
                                                      
 
175 This information is available in Nake’s interview with Poltronieri. However, according to Marc 
Adrian (in Medosch, 2012, p. 163), Bense was worried that Yugoslavian authorities would arrest him on 
charges of fleeing the German Democratic Republic. 
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[…] Therefore, we must in the first place go and work on computers – but then 
not make the same mistakes as do those on the ‘right’. We must, for example, 
stick to the following program: rationality in the service of humankind. The 
problem of Tendencije 4 appears to be the following: Should the Tendencies 
make the attempt to bring together artists and scientists? Should the Tendencies 
make the attempt to bring about a symbiosis between discursive and intuitive 
thought? I continue to think that this makes sense; but I don’t know whether 
further discussion will yield other results […] I could envisage the following: The 
exhibition in May of next year will be approximately as planned – but, for 
example, only those scientists and artists will be admitted who are committed to a 
certain social idea […] The London exhibition Cybernetic Serendipity addresses 
mainly the individual’s instinct to play. Why shouldn’t the Zagreb Tendencies 
address the social consciousness? I think the discussion has been opened. (Nake, 
2011b, pp. 270–271) 
 
 
Nake’s answer shows that the adoption of the computer within New Tendencies was far 
from a tranquil affair and instead quite the opposite was true: there was certainly a 
tension between the old and the new, computer-oriented members, as well as the 
orientation towards a further scientisation of the artistic practice. It was not only the 
political aspects that divided the old and new guard. From a practical point of view, how 
could the previous artists, with no previous knowledge of digital computing, adapt 
themselves to this new reality? In fact, as we have seen, tensions already existed as early 
as 1965 between the old members of the movement, and, according to some, there was 
actually the end of New Tendencies as a program, consequentially giving birth to the 
Tendency. According to Medosch176, ‘a gap was discovered between the artist’s desire to 
                                                      
 
176 Armin Medosch (2012) in his PhD thesis, in a sense, does a disservice to this debate. Despite 
offering a comprehensive historical account of New Tendencies and presenting a series of interviews with 
many responsible for the New Tendencies events, he slips in his assertions that computer artists and 
Tendencije 4 were merely replicating the discourse supported by the military–industrial complex. By 
expanding on Martin’s Organizational Complex (2005), he finds that artists such as Noll merely ‘carried 
within themselves the logic of corporate research which primarily demonstrated possibilities of technology’ 
(Medosch, 2012, p. 172). That may be true in the case of architecture; after all, architects are commissioned 
applied artists who, ultimately, must comply with their employer’s wish. People like Noll or Ness were 
indeed interested in the possibilities of this new medium but they were not mere automatons following 
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conduct research and their actual capacity to do so, between a programme oriented 
towards the most advanced level of industrial production and the actual level of technical 
execution of artworks’ (Medosch, 2012, p. 153). This drift, between intention and actual 
production, allied with the fact that most of the social intentions were being absorbed by 
simple participation in the art market, was ‘fatal’ for the first participants. Signs of 
tension were everywhere, even before Tendencije 4: not only were patterns produced by 
the members being sold in the high street but also Le Parc, for example, ‘accepted the 
first prize at the Biennale of Venice in 1966 in the painting category as an individual, and 
not as a member of GRAV’ (Denegri in Medosch, 2012, p. 154), his previous group. 
Computers only added a new problematic layer in an already uneasy partnership. Jerko 
Ješa Denegri, another vocal and influential art critic within the movement and the Zagreb 
scene, found incomprehensible that Nake could affirm the use of rationality in the service 
of human kind since ‘never before had the world been so shaken in its scientifically based 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
institutional constraints. This smacks to me of a kind of institutional determinism that, by now, should be 
regarded as both outdated and misleading. In Noll’s case, to simply state that the corporation he worked at 
‘had an institutional interest in giving its products the appearance of something benevolent and humanistic’ is 
not only simplistic but also plainly wrong because, as we have seen, there was a strong resistance both in 
AT&T (because of its monopolistic position) and Siemens to early computer art. That situation changed, of 
course, with the free publicity of Cybernetic Serendipity – which even then had problems raising cash. In 
another misleading proposition, with regard to the ‘growing availability’ of software (Medosch, 2012, p. 175) 
being used by those artists, Medosch temporarily seems to forget that the works of pioneers were, in many 
circumstances, written from scratch – that is to say, there were no software or graphical packages as we know 
today – something that Medosch himself acknowledges later on (Medosch, 2012, p. 179). It seems that 
Medosch is more interested in his own politics than research since, for him, the use of software was a 
‘specific version of commodity fetishism’ (Medosch, 2012, p. 176). Moreover, as we will see later in this 
text, participants in Zagreb and elsewhere were not ‘blind to the role of the military’ (Medosch, 2012, p. 176). 
Instead a colorful debate emerged in Zagreb and elsewhere, with artists such as Cordeiro and Csuri making 
clearly antiwar work and others abandoning AST altogether. 
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rationalism’ (Denegri in Medosch, 2012, p. 187). He was, clearly, reflecting on the 
protests of 1968 particularly and on the tumultuous late 1960s in general. Over the course 
of the years the discourse within the Zagreb meeting and exhibitions would change 
towards a more critical one, rather than the blindly optimistic discourse of the mid-1960s, 
which emphasised the novelty of the movement. The broader changes in society, away 
from the capacity of art world members to influence it in any way, once again would 
dictate the way computer art would be seen. If New Tendencies’ initial discourse was 
aimed at the formalisation of artistic theory, via information aesthetics, or the simple 
exploration of technology by its artists, as in Cybernetic Serendipity, in time those ideas 
would be antagonistic to the art world in general, which, affected by the protest wave of 
the late 1960s and by international conflicts, would also turn against a rational formalist 
discourse that represented the old, overtly capitalist, seemingly technocratic, American 
hegemonic order. The computer, in this picture, would become a symbol of this old, 
oppressive technocratic order and, consequentially, became something that should be 
contested. Even in the US, ‘as Americans lost confidence in this premise, as their 
optimism about the future became tinged with pessimism, the foundations of society’s 
support for science – and scientists’ faith in themselves – eroded’ (Smith, 1990, p. 77). 
That the attack of Biasi seems focused on the computer itself is by no means 
unexpected. Rosen’s remarks on this topic are revealing since, as she demonstrates, 
‘information aesthetics, as defined by Bense and Moles, was not introduced to the New 
Tendencies initially as a theoretical operating manual for computer [but instead] it has 
been spread among artists’ circles without direct reference to the computer since the end 
of the 1950s’ (Rosen, 2011b, p. 31). Likewise, the ideas previously professed by Bense 
and Moles, ‘of precision, unambiguousness, objectivity, and intersubjectivity with the 
natural sciences’, reverberated with the original New Tendencies’ calls for 
‘demystification and transparency’ (Rosen, 2011b, p. 31). Moreover a central aspect of 
information aesthetics, of programmability, was well received by New Tendencies 
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members. Rosen highlights that Morellet, for example, ‘insisted that the pictorial element 
should be based on controllable elements, whereby systematic progress would be made 
by following a program’ (in Rosen, 2011b, p. 33) while Mavignier ‘emphasized that the 
programmed permutation, which he mechanically elaborated precisely after having set 
the program, led to results about which he would have otherwise remained ignorant’ 
(Rosen, 2011b, p. 33)177. Albeit working on a very simple form of ‘program’, these 
attempts are, in essence, similar to an algorithmic progression. 
Despite the similarities between previous New Tendencies processes and 
information aesthetics, the fact that the computer came to represent all that was wrong 
with the status quo led computer art to an increasingly precarious position within New 
Tendencies. The problem of the computer within the movement had two components. 
The first one, as described above, focused on the image of the computer as a proxy of 
technocratic capitalism. The second problem, much more mundane, was based on the 
premise that artists were not, in fact, that much interested in the computer itself. The 
reason for this detachment is also twofold: not only were computers incredibly rare to 
come by, given their cost and complexity at the time, but they were also incredibly 
complex to operate. ‘In effect, only very few New Tendencies artists were so dissatisfied 
with merely imitating programming “mimetically”, that they actually decided to use the 
computer as a tool by establishing collaborations with engineers [and yet] fewer in fact 
learned to program an electronic computing machine themselves’ (Weibel, 2011, p. 47). 
It has been argued, for example, that only one artist, Vladimir Bonačić, (temporarily) 
embodied Cordeiro’s claim that computer art would replace concrete art – yet even he 
doubted information aesthetics (Fritz, 2011b). Although some would continue to profess 
the moral superiority of a scientifically oriented art (as in Snow’s calls (Horvat-Pintaric, 
                                                      
 
177 Thanks to YouTube we can actually see Mavignier demonstrating this kind of ‘program’ today 
(Galanternick, 2010). 
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2011[1969])) or the pervasiveness of the computer in society and New Tendencies’ 
positive relation to it (following Moles’ call (Putar, 2011a)) or yet the possibilities of the 
technology as envisaged respectively by Nake and Nees (Kelemen, 2011), by the end of 
the 1960s a change had already occurred. Questions began to appear so frequently that 
one would be tempted to doubt the whole reorientation towards the computer. Umberto 
Eco, for example, previously an imposing figure with his arte programmata, now would 
assert that ‘the experiments in aesthetics performed with electronic devices [were] 
enormously valuable, but not for the future of art’ (Eco, 2011[1969], p. 416). Others 
raised the question of the discrepancy ‘between the possibilities of programming and the 
possibilities of realizing program’ (Gerstner, 2011, p. 419). Some, like Metzger, as will 
be seen in further detail later on, denounced the idea that technology is neutral and called 
for its responsible use (Metzger, 2011[1969]). Others would even be willing to directly 
contradict and point to the shortcomings of information aesthetics (Hlavacek, 
2011[1969])178 or, yet, demonstrate an ‘extreme’ scepticism in relation to it while, at the 
same time, declaring computer art to be ‘dead end’ (Benthall, 2011[1971], p. 465). Of all 
objections, however, one certainly surpassed the others. The problem with this objection, 
in fact a presentation given at a New Tendencies colloquy held in June 1971 and titled Art 
and Computers 71, was not so much its message but its messenger, Nake. Bluntly titled 
‘There Should Be No Computer Art’, this presentation, which Nake did not even deliver 
himself but instead relied on Jonathan Benthall of the Computer Art Society in London to 
do it, marked, I argue, the end of computer art’s first wave, which lasted from 1965 until 
1971. It was roughly from 1971 that the context of attempts at AST, including computer 
art, would become more and more contested by the artistic world and by the field’s own 
members. Nake’s text only added to the growing impression that computer art was on the 
wrong side of the debate, between protesters and governments. If Nake, who some years 
                                                      
 
178 This source, in fact, it is surprisingly vicious and coherent in its attacks. 
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earlier had rashly condemned Biasi’s comments, had now become a vocal critic, despite 
being one of the three pioneers to kick start computer art back in 1965, what was left for 
other enthusiasts? This text, which will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.3, also 
highlighted internal fractures within the group. Some months later, in October of that 
same year, Nake’s presentation would be published in the Computer Arts Society 
newsletter, PAGE, which was edited by none other than Gustav Metzger, an artist whose 
staunchly anti-war discourse was nevertheless concerned with the (humanistic) 
appropriation of technology and science before ‘the entire globe could be wiped out by 
nuclear, biological, and other weapons’ (Metzger, 2011, p. 422). This backlash, anchored 
in the increasingly pessimistic and technophobic cultural field of the 1970s and 1980s, 
would inevitably not only distance those enthusiasts of Snow’s proposal but also anyone 
willing to merge new technologies or scientific methods into artistic production. As a 
result, previous and new members who believed in the ideas developed during that earlier 
period would become more and more isolated. Eventually, as a result of the creation of 
institutions that could accommodate their artistic and intellectual aspirations, this distance 
led the group to a situation of relative independence from the larger art world. 
 
 
3.3 Internal conflict and people abandoning the field 
 
Nake’s fiery pseudo-presentation in Zagreb, as previously mentioned, was also published 
in the Computer Arts Society (CAS) bulletin, PAGE, at the time edited by Gustav 
Metzger. Before we proceed into Nake’s objections, some context is necessary179 . 
                                                      
 
179 Not much has been written regarding the foundation and functioning of CAS itself. PAGE, its 
bulletin/newsletter, is certainly the best source from which to reconstruct the events of the society and its 
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Brought to life by an informal meeting at the 68th Congress of the International 
Federation for Information Processing, by participants mostly interested in using 
computers for musical composition, the society was formed right after Cybernetic 
Serendipity, in March 1969. It was Cybernetic Serendipity that, according to Sutcliffe, 
‘helped the CAS to extend its membership, especially among people in the arts’ (2009, p. 
181). In order to mark its official introduction, an exhibition, Event One, held at the 
Royal College of Art, was agreed (Lansdown et al., 1969; Sutcliffe, 2009, p. 180). That 
event, like many others in this field, was not particularly well received180  and, as 
expected, ‘the art press largely ignored CAS’ (Sutcliffe, 2009, p. 181). Although the tide 
against computers had already fully turned, and despite the silence from the artistic 
world, ‘by April 1970 there were 254 members in the United Kingdom and 123 overseas 
members from sixteen countries, almost half of them from the United States’ (Sutcliffe, 
2009, p. 178). The reason for that, argues Sutcliff, ‘was that CAS filled an emerging 
need, and there was no similar international group’ (Sutcliffe, 2009, p. 178). That, as we 
know from E.A.T.’s example and AST in general, is just half-truth. Whereas CAS had 
over 300 members, E.A.T. had, by 1969, ‘over 2,000 artist members as well as 2,000 
engineer members willing to work with artists’ (Klüver, 2000). One may argue that the 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
members. Apart from PAGE there is also a number of good articles edited into White Heat Cold Logic 
(Brown et al., 2009), including Ford (2009), Mallen (2009), Sutcliffe (2009) and Swade (2009), which guide 
us through the anecdotes and motifs of people who were involved in CAS’s early history. This narrative is 
based on these recollections. Additionally, we can find a lot of information, including most of PAGE’s 
editions, on the CAS’s website (www.computer-arts-society.com) and at the CACHe project, hosted by 
Birkbeck University (www.bbk.ac.uk/hosted/cache/archive). 
180  According to Sutcliffe, the Guardian largely misrepresented the exhibition by calling it a 
‘theatrical outrage’ and ‘a day of programmed japes’. Also according to him, the same newspaper published a 
response letter from Sutcliffe himself in which he affirmed that Event One’s ‘immediate aim [was] to show 
something of the possible creative uses of computers in a number of arts’ (Sutcliffe, 2009, p. 181).  
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corporate support explains the discrepancy between the two organisations; after all 
E.A.T., via Klüver’s industrial links and pragmatic leadership (Dyson, 2009), was indeed 
very well supported whereas CAS had a much lower profile181. That may well be a reason 
but, as Sutcliffe posits, the reason for this gap lies deep within the proposals of both 
endeavours. On the one hand E.A.T., from its idea of proposing a link between artists and 
engineers, had not asked for a deeper engagement with technology or science; it would 
enable artists to work alongside engineers but the artist would not need to learn the 
principles behind the chosen technique. That was what the partnership aimed at, since 
each element, artist and technologist, would contribute their own expertise. On the other 
hand, CAS, since it was actually much more defined, as a computer society, demanded 
deeper knowledge from its participants. It would cater, as Sutcliffe proposed, to ‘an 
emerging need’ – that is, the know-how, the capacity and the support to work with 
computers. It is easy to forget how difficult it was to get your hands on a computer; 
needless to say, the skill necessary to work with one was scarcer still. George Mallen, 
CAS’s first treasurer, for example, records CAS ‘running Sunday morning programming 
session at Telcomp’s office in London for artists’ (Mallen, 2009, p. 193). Even today, 
when computers are ubiquitous and programming techniques widely available and much 
simpler, I cannot envisage many artists participating in such sessions182. 
                                                      
 
181 It is interesting to note Sutcliffe’s (2009, p. 181) explanation regarding the financial backing of 
ICL (International Computers Limited) in terms of the benefits it caused the company. According to him its 
head of communication ‘saw computer arts as good publicity’ because it gave the company ‘a human face to 
an industry that many people saw as threatening’. Dyson (2009) also attempts to explain the support of 
E.A.T.’s tech companies in similar terms, whereas for Turner (2014) Pepsico got involved with E.A.T. 
because of its relationship with the counter-culture.  
182 Its initial booklet (Lansdown et al., 1969), for example, clearly states as CAS’s ‘first major task’ 
the ‘mutual education of artists and computer scientists’. Although CAS stressed that ‘there is no need for an 
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People like Nake represented this kind of artist–programmer, who was (and still 
is) a rarity within artistic circles. CAS in a sense, because of its close links with the 
British Computer Society, nurtured this kind of artist engaged with computing and not 
simply with ‘new technology’, as E.A.T. would do it. Moreover, differently from 
E.A.T.’s relationship with big artistic names of the time (initially mostly from New 
York), CAS was not so judgemental in relation to artistic merit. Sutcliffe, for example, 
affirms that ‘general philosophy in the CAS was to not be judgemental; aesthetics was a 
word never to be used’ (2009, p. 182). That lack of artistic pedigree, together with the 
highly demanding computational techniques183, certainly did not help CAS to achieve the 
kind of popularity that E.A.T. initially had with artists. Its initial booklet (Lansdown et 
al., 1969), for example, to my knowledge the first material to be published by CAS and 
where the society was first publically presented, was not composed or signed by artists or 
people central to the artistic world and had only Reichardt, curator of Cybernetic 
Serendipity, as an art world proxy. The names and their institutional affiliations were 
John Lansdown (Ian Fraser and Associates), George Mallen (System Research Limited), 
Alan Mayne (Creative Enterprises Limited), Robert Parslow (Brunel University), Ian 
Pickering (Architectural Association), Jasia Reichardt (Institute of Contemporary Arts), 
Beverley Rowe (London University) and Alan Sutcliffe (International Computers 
Limited). 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
artist to learn to program’, it also posited that the artist ‘must learn the areas of feasibility’ (Lansdown et al., 
1969).  
183  Herbert Franke, whose 1971 (reprinted in 1985) book can be seen as one of the first 
comprehensible publications on the field, in its preface for the first edition highlights that ‘computer art is 
hindered by a difficulty unknown in other art forms: its practice requires a certain elementary mathematical 
and technical knowledge’ (Franke, 1985, p. x). It is important to note that Franke and his translator, Metzger, 
were also CAS members. 
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Despite all of the achievements attributed to CAS184, it can be argued that Nake’s 
debate within PAGE, as well as Metzger’s involvement as its editor, were CAS’s most 
meaningful contributions to the field from a historiographical point of view. There are 
two reasons for this argument. First, given the importance of CAS for computer art 
practitioners, and given Nake’s position as a central figure in the newly formed field, 
since he was one of the three original artists to have exhibitions in 1965, his proclamation 
against computer art can be seen as a heavy blow for new and late entrants to the field, 
including CAS itself. The response that it generated (soon to be discussed), today and 
then, reflects the importance of both the statement and Nake’s position in the field. 
Second, Metzger’s participation and eventual desertion, which could be seen superficially 
as a mere curiosity or coincidence, is not only indicative of his wish to engage computers 
in order to humanise technology (to be discussed next, and similar to Meštrović’s initial 
position) but is also a reflection of the growing discomfort generated by the union of 
computers and art. 
That both Metzger’s and Nake’s criticisms converge is, nevertheless, surprising. 
Metzger, for one, was never really interested in computer graphics. He was not interested 
in programming, nor in its graphical output. Later he would reaffirm this position by 
stating that he ‘did not see the point of making very crude lines on a bit of paper – which 
was the computer art of the time’ (Metzger in Ford, 2009, p. 166). For him the computer 
was the future but not in its present, late 1960s, form (Ford, 2009, p. 166). He would 
envisage the computer as an ‘integral element’ (Ford, 2009, p. 165) in his practice of 
auto-destructive art185 but, differently from Nake, who emphasised the computer and its 
                                                      
 
184 As seen, for example, in Mallen (2009) and Sutcliffe (2009). 
185 Notoriously, his involvement with technoscientific methods (and particularly chemistry) can be 
seen as early as 1960, in his now infamous acid paintings (Wilson, 2008). In a manifesto written a year later 
he would state that ‘Auto-destructive art and auto-creative art aim at the integration of art with the advances 
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code, mathematical rigour and algorithmic practice were not what Metzger thought 
interesting. According to Ford (2009, p. 165), Metzger saw the computer as a possible 
link, via the artist, between ‘art, technology and society’ (Ford, 2009, p. 165). He would 
then, via the computer, ‘re-channel the destructive potential of the computer’ (Ford, 2009, 
p. 165) since, for him, the computer was more than a merely innocent and neutral tool: 
‘Today death is fed into, processed and administered by the computers’ (Metzger in Ford, 
2009, p. 165). It is indeed ‘impossible to isolate his practice as an artist from his 
engagement in different kinds of political activism’ (Wilson, 2008, p. 177). Unlike 
Metzger’s constant anti-war campaign and highly politicised artistic practice, Nake, as 
previously seen, was never overtly vocal regarding his own political beliefs. The 
emphasis in his early work, similarly to Bense’s or Nees’s work, is always placed on 
rationality and/or technical discussions186. The first signs (at least in the literature) of 
Nake’s politics emerged out of his debate with Biasi at Tendencije 4 187 . Yet, 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
of science and technology’ (in Wilson, 2008, p. 187). As Wilson (2008, p. 189) posits: ‘In the following few 
years, his recognition of an auto-creative art within auto-destructive art, allied to the position he had adopted 
as an artist who produces no objects, led him to an increasingly close identification with science whereby his 
view of the studio as laboratory became actual.’ Moreover, Metzger’s earlier involvement with the Signals 
group, which stated that it catered ‘for all those who believe passionately in the co-relation of the arts and 
Art’s imaginative integration with technology, science, architecture and our entire environment’ (Wilson, 
2008, p. 191), is further evidence of his interest in technoscientific subjects.  
186 Despite this, for Nake, Bense’s rationality had a political aspect since it encapsulated the German 
post-war attitude, which would contrast with the manipulation of euphoria and emotions perpetuated by the 
Nazi regime. This point was only expressed in his interview with Poltronieri (Nake, 2013) and has never been 
stated in writing.  
187 We should remember that at this debate (Biasi, 2011; Nake, 2011b) Nake stressed, like Metzger, 
the necessity to engage with technology. For him ‘we should not demonize automata’ since ‘computers exist 
and we would be making a great mistake if we ran way from them’ (Nake, 2011b, pp. 270–271). When 
perceiving that Biasi attacked his leftist credentials, Nake reminded his opponent that he ‘could talk about 
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notwithstanding their artistic differences, both Nake’s and Metzger’s politics would 
eventually converge. Even before the famous ‘There Should Be No Computer Art’ (Nake, 
1971), cracks seem to have emerged between those members of CAS who uncritically 
supported the computer and those who, like Metzger and Nake, grew wary of it. In a very 
short notice published in May 1970 in PAGE, more than one year before the ‘There 
Should Be No Computer Art’ text and presentation, Nake publically announced: 
 
STATEMENT TO PAGE 
I stop exhibiting for the present (last exhibition, in form of a retrospective, with H 
de Vries at the Swart Gallery, Amsterdam). 
Reason: it looks as if the capitalist art market is trying to get hold of 
computer productions. This would mean a distraction from visual research. 
Exhibiting in universities etc., is different as it helps to communicate 
communications is essential to research. 
The actual production in artistic computer graphics is repeating itself to a 
great extent. Really good ideas haven’t shown up for quite a while. 
Frieder Nake. London. 16, April, 1970. (Nake, 1970) 
 
It is important to read this letter in the context of PAGE itself. During its initial editions, 
one could barely notice any political interest from its editor (Metzger). The first two 
issues, PAGE 1 and 2188 (Fig. 44, 45), were bulletins in the literal sense; they contained 
nothing more than a few announcements and a repetitive text regarding the society itself. 
Similar to CAS’s initial leaflet in 1969, both editions mostly talked about the society 
itself and only added some very few remarks regarding courses, meetings, publications 
and workshops. However, from its fourth edition (Fig. 46), in August 1969, things 
changed. Firstly, PAGE’s design became more free and less like an advert from a social 
club. If we did not know better, it would have seemed that Metzger had only become 
editor then. Some editions, like the ones from November 1969 and July 1971, were 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
how we stood in front of gates of factories, how we demonstrated, held teach-ins, built barricades, printed and 
distributed leaflets’ (Nake, 2011b, p. 270). 
188 PAGE issue 3 is missing from both the CACHe and the CAS archives. 
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beautifully designed yet ostentatiously unhewn. Secondly, the content of PAGE, still 
mostly dedicated to announcements and calls for exhibitions and events, had nevertheless 
acquired some longer, rather opinionated texts. The first longer article featured in PAGE 
4, signed by the artist and founder of the Artist Placement Group (APG), John Latham 
(1969), discussed, for example, the motifs and workings of his group189. PAGE 5 (Fig. 
47) had a Wittgensteinian review of Noll’s writings190 along with a section dedicated to 
publications received; PAGE 6 explored the computer music of the time (Mathews, 1970) 
and reviewed the 1969 Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) computer art, 
                                                      
 
189 In it he stressed that ‘there was a situation where the financial structure virtually controlled the 
forms of art, that is into “painting”, “theatre” and so on. It had done so because collection of cash required it 
in those forms. The shop, the gallery market, box office and doors, these devices all led to a belief that there 
was such a thing. Now, the artists’ decision to make something interesting happen regardless of whether it 
could pay off – always a key element – has becomes part of the facts of life, an essential in the structures of a 
total, in contrast to a purely monetary economy’ (Latham, 1969). Ironically, in 1972 Metzger would turn 
increasingly critical of APG for ‘trying to steer two mutually opposed groups together into dialogue (young 
artists and powerful corporations)’ (Bishop, 2012, p. 170). Bishop in fact is right on target when she places 
APG into ‘a familiar tendency during the late ’60s. Early APG documents reference examples in Europe as 
comparative models: in France, the Groupe Recherche d’Art Visuel, who were sponsored by industrialists 
interested in the exploitation of techniques and visual phenomena; in Holland, the Philips electricity company 
worked directly with an artist to make robot art; in Italy, competitions were sponsored by Esso and Pirelli; 
while in Britain, various sculptors were working in new materials that demanded close collaboration with 
steelworks (Eduardo Paolozzi), nickel laboratories (John Hosking) and glass fibre manufacturers (Phillip 
King). In the US, Experiments in Art and Technology (E.A.T.), set up in 1966 by the Bell Labs scientist Billy 
Klüver in collaboration with Robert Rauschenberg, aimed to bring science to the service of artistic 
innovation, while on the West coast in the same year, curator Maurice Tuchman established the Art and 
Technology programme at LACMA’ (Bishop, 2012, p. 166). For more on Latham and APG see Shanken 
(2001) and Bishop (2012). 
190 Which, in its digital version at least, is unfortunately too damaged to be read properly. 
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Music & Film Festival (Burnham, 1970a)191. PAGE 7 had an article that both presented a 
computer artwork and called into question, from the point of view of an art professor, the 
necessity of artists engaging in and learning programming (Nash and Williams, 1970). 
It was only in May 1970, in PAGE 8, more than a year after the first edition was 
published, that Metzger published Nake’s statement. That edition of PAGE is particularly 
interesting not only because of Nake’s first sign of dissatisfaction with the field he helped 
to create but also because of some other small notes scattered here and there. At first sight 
the first small note, besides Nake’s statement, does not seem to relate to that personal 
take on the field. That would be wrong. The editor in fact seems aware of this connection. 
This small note described CAS’s participation in an event that just had happened, the 
Computer Graphics 70 international symposium, held at Brunel University between 13 
and 16 April 1970. According to the specialised press the event would concentrate ‘on the 
various applications of graphic systems’; furthermore, ‘firms participating in the exhibits 
are expected to demonstrate and discuss fully interactive graphic display, alphanumeric 
display terminals, hard-copy plotting and automatic drafting machines [etc.]’ (Computer 
World, 1970, p. 46). Moreover, according to the same article and a quoted survey, 
Computer Graphics 70 (CG70) was responding to a ‘strong delegate interest in 
applications’ and, hence, 
 
the provisional program schedule includes the following: Computer Graphics 
Comes of Age, Economic and Other Fundamental Issues Facing Computer 
Graphics, management information systems, computer-aided design, hospital 
information and monitoring systems, computer-aided instruction, architectural 
applications, new hardware display techniques, data structures and remote 
displays, graphics languages, computer-generated animation, text processing, and 
pattern recognition. (Computer World, 1970, p. 46). 
                                                      
 
191 Note that the author, Burnham, was the curator of the troubled Software exhibition previously 
mentioned. Following his relatively positive review of the ACM show, since it was plagued by some 
technical difficulties, a problem too common then and now in this kind of show, Burnham also talks about his 
own exhibition. 
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Despite the myriad subjects, the small article did not contain a single reference to CAS’s 
activities. It seems, retrospectively, odd for artists so socially concerned to exhibit in such 
an environment. At the same time, who would believe that engineers would be interested 
in the crude plotted graphics produced by many members of CAS? Nevertheless, in 
Metzger’s words, ‘according to the lady in charge of the Press Room at CG70, there was 
a greater demand for off-prints of papers by members of the Computer Arts Society than 
any others’ (Metzger, 1970a). The attentive reader may then question: Where is the 
connection between CG70 and Nake’s statement? CG70 after all, despite being narrated 
by Metzger as a success, seems more similar to a trade show where companies could 
showcase their technology, CAS’s participation just an out-of-the-ordinary situation that, 
invariably, seemed exiting to bored delegates. The connection between CG70 and Nake’s 
statement, I believe, is clear: Nake did not sign the statement from Stuttgart or Montreal 
(where he had been working alongside Leslie Mezei) but instead from London. More 
surprising still is that the statement is dated exactly on same day as the last day of the 
symposium, 16 April 1970. Not only that but Nake was also one of CAS’s international 
members present at CG70 (Metzger, 1970a). Hence we can infer that Nake’s statement 
was written on his way back to London from Uxbridge, on his way home to Brunel 
University or even right before the end of the symposium itself. Perhaps following 
Metzger’s enthusiasm for the CAS session at CG70, which, despite involving members of 
industry, was held in an academic environment, Nake decided to abandon what he termed 
as the ‘capitalist art market’ (Nake, 1970). It seems that the academic world where he 
presented had become more engaging for him since, in his view, ‘the actual production in 
artistic computer graphics is repeating itself to a great extent. Really good ideas haven’t 
shown up for quite a while’ (Nake, 1970). 
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Despite claiming he would halt his artistic activities and instead would focus on 
‘visual research’192 (Nake, 1970), Nake would participate in one last exhibition in June of 
that same year and this time it was a big one: the 35th Venice Biennale. It seems that, 
since the statement for PAGE was written some forty days before the Biennale’s opening 
and assuming that, given the complexity of such exhibitions, Nake would have been 
engaged with it way before his statement in April, his statement can be seen as addressing 
the fact that computer art would heavily feature in that same event. In 1970 the 
Biennale193, arguably the central event in the art world calendar, was not a simple, 
business-as-usual event. First and foremost the 1970 show was an answer to the 1968 
protests that had troubled its previous iteration. Answering calls for a ‘democratisation of 
art’, this Biennale attempted ‘an exhibition entirely devoted to “experimental art” and 
included a large selection of early computer art [that] st[ood] between the apolitical 
shows organized in English-speaking countries […] and the more politically driven 
shows organized in the Eastern European block, in particular Zagreb’ (Franco, 2013b, p. 
120). Franco stresses that the Biennale’s proposals did not, however, manage to dispel 
attendees’ discomfort at the computers within its settings 194 . She summarises the 
problem: 
 
                                                      
 
192 Not coincidentally the subtitle for the first Tendencije 4 colloquium. 
193 Francesca Franco has dedicated a whole thesis to this subject. It was reprinted as short articles in 
Franco (2013a, 2013b).  
194 As Franco posits: ‘In presenting the experimental show the organizers, especially Apollonio, 
demonstrated a defensive attitude […] To confer the experimental show academic recognition, Apollonio 
invited a number of internationally renowned scholars to contribute to the exhibition catalog. These included 
German philosopher Max Bense and Swiss art historian René Berger. Most of the Italian contributors to the 
1970 Venice Biennale’s general catalog demonstrated a cautious and sometimes fatalist attitude toward the 
relationship between art and technology’ (Franco, 2013b, p. 125). 
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On the one hand, computer-generated art was considered by most of the 
contributors as a positive alternative to the dominance of technology over 
humankind and to consumerism – in other words, a new way to express the vital 
function of art in society. On the other hand, this positive attitude seemed to 
coincide exactly with the emergence of the first symptoms of the problem related 
to the commercialization of computer art. (Franco, 2013b, p. 128) 
 
More important for us is the fact that, as noted by Franco (2013b), Nake was not alone in 
seeing the increasing commercialisation (in the Venetian context) of computer art. 
Another computer art pioneer would lambast the field in January of that same year. 
Haruki Tsuchiya, of the Computer Technique Group in Japan, would publish a letter in 
which he stated that: ‘This may be an exaggeration, but I say that computer art is a revolt 
against the whole of technology […] Today, new relationships between engineers and 
artists are expected for computer art. It has become a thing of the past for me’ (Tsuchiya 
in Franco, 2013b, p. 129). Even in PAGE 8 itself, Metzger, in another small note, this 
time regarding the upcoming Biennale and its computer involvement, sarcastically 
introduced the exhibition by questioning the reader and recalling the previous problems 
faced by the Biennale: ‘Remember the cops; the rioting students the protesting artists in 
1968? Well, the Venice Biennale will open its doors for the 35th time around 25 June this 
year’ (Metzger, 1970b). 
From PAGE 8 onwards the tension between internal critics, eager to point to the 
shortfalls of computer art both as an artistic practice and as a moral problem, and internal 
supporters, who pointed out that using computers in the arts was an experiment and that 
we ought to engage technology in order to humanise it, would only become more 
apparent195. Moreover, as seen in Tsuchiya’s example and in the discussion above of New 
                                                      
 
195 Another way to rephrase this dichotomy would be to posit both extremes on a spectrum where, on 
one end, people perceived technology (and science) as value-free (i.e. mere tools whose good or bad uses are 
determined by humans), and, on the other end, those who argued that computers and their industry were 
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Tendencies, the growing questioning was not only seen among previously politicised 
artists such as Metzger (UK) or a disgruntled German pioneer (Nake). For example, the 
next PAGE, issue number 9, edited by the CAS’s Dutch branch, CACHe, announced a 
colloquium self-explanatorily named ‘Creative Expressions of a Society Conflict’; 
contained a coded game named Netherlands in 2 Minuten in which the reader deciphers a 
message in Dutch highlighting contemporary problems (apartheid, babies, computers); 
and reprinted a comment by a ‘Philips computer man’ that declared that ‘the use of 
computers may delay the fall of a police state by one century’, a pessimistic sentence to 
which the editors added, ‘By how much may it advance its rise?’ (Geurts and Meertems, 
1970). Over the course of the following editions a certain ironic attitude regarding the 
main focal point, the computer, would coexist alongside unabashedly positive articles. In 
PAGE 11, for example, one year before Nake’s controversial article, Metzger published 
another long piece titled ‘Social Responsibility and the Computer Professional: The Rise 
of an Idea in America Part 1’ (Metzger, 1970c). Metzger, drawing on his previous 
preoccupation with nuclear disarmament, attempted a quantitative study of the pages of 
the Journal of the ACM, the journal Communications of the ACM and the magazine 
Computers and Automation (Metzger, 1970c). In this article his objective was to trace the 
number of times the computing industry appeared in those publications in relation to the 
creation of weapons of mass destruction and other ethical issues. From 1955 to 1970 he 
counted the instances of such discussions in the pages, months, editions and years of 
those publications in order to demonstrate the development and increase of ethical issues 
within the industry itself. His intention was not only to trace this increase but also to 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
nothing but charged with intentionality, and had been since prior to the tools themselves, and hence were 
inherently bad for society both as proxies of a capitalist system and tools for mass murder.  
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‘enable the movement to make further progress’ (Metzger, 1970c)196. It is important to 
remember that Metzger never seemed an easy fit for CAS. Although publishing in 
Reichardt’s collection (Reichardt, 1968b) and participating in the exhibition, he had 
previously criticised Cybernetic Serendipity197. In the same article where he criticised 
Cybernetic Serendipity, he would also call for ‘E.A.T. to refuse to collaborate with firms 
producing napalm and bombs for Vietnam. (Of course, practically any technically 
advanced industry in the big nations contributes directly or indirectly to war preparations 
– here is the central and irresoluble dilemma of technological art)’ (Metzger, 1969a, p. 
108, italics in the original). 
If Metzger’s ‘central and irresoluble dilemma’, a moral one, was what troubled 
him, Nake would focus his criticism on the artistic merit of computer art as well as the 
morality of art itself. In PAGE 18 (Fig. 48), when he published the lecture given by 
Benthall in his place at one of the New Tendencies colloquies198, Nake would describe 
                                                      
 
196 Tellingly, as Ford highlights (Ford, 2009, p. 173), there was never a Part 2 of this text. Moreover, 
also noteworthy was the fact that it was distributed at CG70, which, in turn, was attended by ‘key 
representatives of the military–industrial complex: General motors, Lockheed Georgia, Mobil Oil 
Corporation, Royal Navy, Ford Motor Company, Space Flight Center, Boeing, Sperry Rand and Unilever’ 
(Ford, 2009, p. 169). 
197 Metzger’s condemnation, also highlighted by Ford (2009) and used as the title for his informative 
text ‘Technological Kindergarten’, is pretty straightforward: ‘We are faced by this prospect – whilst more and 
more scientists are investigating the threats that science and technology pose for society, artists are being led 
into a technological kindergarten’ (Metzger, 1969a, p. 108, italics in the original).  
198 The differences between the version of the lecture that is transcribed in A Little-Known Story 
(Rosen, 2011a, pp. 466–468) and the PAGE version are minimal. The whole content and the central idea, that 
computer art was artistically useless and that art itself was corrupt, are intact. The lecture was given in June 
1971 and the PAGE article was published in October of the same year. Since PAGE did not have numbered 
pages, I will refer to the transcript, which should make it easier for readers to check references and direct 
quotes. 
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the field of computer art as an emergent one, highlighting the change from the small 1965 
exhibitions into the larger 1968 ones. He remembers that, since then, ‘Art magazines are 
full of articles, exhibitions are held everywhere, seminars are offered by art schools, 
books are published, portfolios are sold’ (Nake, 1971, p. 466). As for the artists 
themselves, he notes that either they ‘surrender to the pressures of the new techniques or 
laugh at the results’ while being ‘humiliated by the attitude of scientists when they 
attempt to communicate with them’ (Nake, 1971, p. 466). In this context, he posits that 
‘debate centers around the question “Is it art?” [and hence] the discussions is heated, 
often extremely ignorant and biased, shows virtually no progress, and is highly repetitive, 
although […] the little knowledge of computers that one needs was published several 
years ago’ (Nake, 1971, p. 466). Also remembering he has seen it all, being one of the 
initiators of the field, he straightforwardly remarks that he found it ‘easy to admit that 
computer art did not contribute to the advancement of art, if we judge advancement by 
comparing the computer’s products to all existing works of art’ (Nake, 1971, p. 466). For 
him ‘the repertoire of results of aesthetic behaviour has not been changed by […] 
computers’, and, despite some ‘new interesting methods’, computer art amounted to 
nothing more than a fashion (Nake, 1971, pp. 466–467). Returning to the motif seen in 
his previous note in PAGE 8, he blames the artistic system via the figure of the art dealer 
and sees computer art as: 
 
emerging from some accident, blossoming for a while, subject matter for shallow 
“philosophical” reasoning based on prejudice and misunderstanding as well as 
euphoric overestimation, vanishing into nowhere to make way for the next 
fashion. The big machinery, still shrouded in mystical clouds, is used to frighten 
artists and to convince the public that its products are good and beautiful. Quite 
frankly, I find this use of the computer ridiculous. (Nake, 1971, p. 467) 
 
Given that artists, emphasising the concept of ‘real’ artists, were sometimes 
comprehending and accomplishing ways to bypass the traditional artistic system, Nake 
particularly found it odd that ‘outsiders from technology’ would step in to attempt to 
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rescue the world of art ‘with new methods of creation, old results, and by surrendering to 
the given “laws of the market” in a naïve and ignorant manner’ (Nake, 1971, p. 467). 
Questions such as ‘Is a computer creative?’ or ‘Is a computer an artist?’, which as we 
know have accompanied computer art from its beginning, were not ‘deemed serious 
questions, period’ (Nake, 1971, p. 467). In fact, given the problematic state of the world, 
Nake saw those questions as ‘irrelevant’ (Nake, 1971, p. 467). Because of its irrelevance, 
he believed that there was no need for art anymore and, in particular, there was ‘no need 
for computer art’ (Nake, 1971, p. 467). Going back to the New Tendencies concern of 
research, or artistic investigation, as in the subtitle of the first Tendencije 4 colloquium, 
Nake thus found that this research ‘should be directed by the need of the people’ and not, 
as in the traditional artistic setting, ‘for the rich and the ruling’ (Nake, 1971, p. 467). 
Nake’s criticism, albeit different in emphasis from Metzger’s usual critique, definitely 
seems to have touched PAGE’s editor. Although it was not in itself a novelty, Metzger’s 
design dedicated ample space to ‘There Should Be No Computer Art’; it ran 
uninterrupted for the whole first page, interrupted only by a picture of another artist, 
Gottfried Jäger, holding one of his own prints (of unknown origin to the editor). In this 
picture Jäger’s print covers most of his body, leaving only his barefoot feet and face; a 
cheeky caption for the photo questioned the reader: ‘The Emperor hath clothes?’ (Fig. 
48). 
Metzger, despite his constant questioning and criticism, was never (at least as far 
as the literature is concerned) told off. In fact CAS seemed to regard him as a kind of 
moral compass, someone who would provide its ‘social conscience’ (Mallen, 1972a), as 
if there was a need for someone external to computers to think over the social issues that 
‘insiders’ would disregard. If Metzger, himself considered the moral compass of CAS, 
was never clearly contradicted, the same cannot be said of Nake’s positioning. For a least 
a year after ‘There Should Be No Computer Art’ was published, letters would still be 
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published answering his criticism199. To my knowledge, no other commentary in the early 
field reverberated as much, as long and as publically as this one. Two months after its 
publication, in PAGE 19, which was not edited by Metzger but rather by the CAS 
chairman, Alan Sutcliffe, himself (Sutcliffe, 1971), a rather direct and antagonistic 
answer was given to Nake. Written by John Lansdown, at the time secretary of CAS, 
‘Computer Graphics ӆ Computer Art’200 attempted to counter each of Nake’s arguments 
regarding computer art but, nevertheless, steered away from the moral issues of art itself, 
ironically the central point of Nake’s discussion. Lansdown began his reply by 
remembering the importance of Nake’s position. According to him, ‘no-one who takes an 
interest in the aims and objections of the CAS can afford to ignore anything that Frieder 
Nake says. His note in PAGE 18 is an important personal statement which has to be taken 
into account by anyone who devotes any part of his life to the “creative” use of 
computers’ (Lansdown, 1971). Yet, according to him (italics in the original): 
 
Nake has fallen into the same trap which ensnares so many writers on the subject: 
that of equating computer art with computer graphics […] If this were not so he 
could not make the statement that ‘the repertoire of results of aesthetic behaviour 
has not been changed by the use of computers’. This may be the case in graphics: 
it is certainly not the case in the rest of the field […] The work of computer-
composers not to say Metzger’s as yet unrealized ‘Five screens with computer’ 
should not be ignored in this context. In every case ‘the repertoire of results of 
aesthetic behaviour’ has certainly been changed by the use of computers […] 
                                                      
 
199 People would criticize and partially support him in PAGE 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26 and 27. Some of 
these will be seen shortly. The discussion, usually in detriment to Nake’s position, was followed by attacks 
from John Lansdown (CAS secretary and founder), Alan Sutcliffe (CAS president and founder), John H. 
Whitney (artist/animator and first IBM in-residence artist) among others. 
200 I suspect, following Lansdown’s tentative title and arguments, which in effect distanced the 
plotted graphics of early practitioners from those interactive objects discussed by him as the true form of 
computer art, that Herbert Franke’s seminal 1971 book Computer Graphics – Computer Art was its influence. 
The difference between the symbols (≠ and –) does not seem to be a mere coincidence since in PAGE 20 
Franke would also partake in the discussion generated by Nake’s text. 
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However, unlike the graphicists to whom the output is of prime importance, 
many of the ‘Proceduralists’ of which I count myself a member, feel that, in 
computer art more than any other, the object is the process. We see the computer 
as a device for performing procedures and this is not quite the same as Bense’s 
‘Art as a model for art’. (Lansdown, 1971) 
 
Lansdown, by providing examples of computer art that do not have a graphical output, 
dismisses Nake’s arguments regarding the non-contribution of computers for artistic 
means. What he is trying to show is that, differently from Nake’s assumptions, there were 
indeed new aesthetic possibilities only made possible by the computer. As we have seen, 
despite also being critical of computer art, Metzger’s attack was allowed, even supported, 
since it did not claim the end of computer art. Nake’s position, however, was much more 
directed at the field itself. It claimed not only that computer art did not contribute 
aesthetically to art but also that, by serving the usual art market or its business-as-usual 
model, it had become a concept that should simply cease to be. This view was obviously 
bound to clash with members of CAS; they, after all, argued for a computer art. 
Lansdown in the same article, for example, dismissed the idea that British computer 
artists were interested in graphics. Without pointing at Nake’s German heritage, via 
Bense’s and Nees’ emphasis on graphical output, Sutcliffe recalled a CAS exhibition 
dedicated to graphics where he noted that there were no British artists involved. At the 
risk of alienating CAS’s international element, Lansdown affirmed that: ‘We in Britain 
seem less concerned with graphics than with music and works for performance’ 
(Lansdown, 1971). 
 As important as Lansdown’s arguments are, it is also important to note the 
absence of any argument against Nake’s moral criticism, which was directed at art itself 
and not at computer art only. Over the following issues of PAGE, replies were also 
focused on the definition of computer art instead of being discussions of art itself. What 
should have been a discussion of the position of the artist became instead a discussion of 
who was an (computer) artist, about who produced interesting works and about what 
computer art should be. In PAGE 20, for example, in an indirect contribution to the 
  260 
discussion (since he did not name Lansdown or Nake directly), Herbert W. Franke, artist, 
scientist, writer and the first historian of computer art, would highlight the dangers of 
‘artificially created boundaries’ between computer art and other ‘areas’ (Franke, 1972). In 
PAGE 22, the first issue made by CASUS, the American branch of CAS, its ‘U.S. 
Chairman of Visual Arts’, Gary William Smith also pitched in on the conversation. 
‘Having recently become involved in the creation of computer assisted art’, he agreed 
with Nake’s201 statement that ‘there should be no computer art’ (Smith, 1972). His reason 
for this, however, was not related to Nake’s moral arguments. For Smith, the artist should 
take the blame for being commodified since ‘if an artist produces work of sufficient 
strength and integrity, no art dealer can turn it into a shallow fashion’ (Smith, 1972). 
Moreover, his problem with the label ‘computer art’ was a problem of someone ‘involved 
with art nearly all [his] life’ (Smith, 1972): computer art, for him, was just art; the prefix 
‘computer’ should not negate it being subject to the same ‘rigorous standards’ as non-
computer-assisted art (Smith, 1972). In PAGE 24, another artist, John H. Whitney, who 
was an IBM artist in residence by then, asserted that: 
 
the computer is quite useless as a tool for that kind of art which must exist as a 
static image […] Smith, Nake, Maurice Tuchman and many others, including 
editors of engineering oriented computer trade journals, are entranced with the 
‘real’ artist syndrome: If only a real artist could use the computer – we’d have 
real art. (Whitney, 1972) 
 
Sometime before these criticisms Nake himself had replied directly to 
Lansdown’s commentaries. As early as PAGE 21 he tried to clarify his arguments by 
backtracking on some of his assertions regarding the changes to the ‘repertoire of results 
of aesthetic behaviour’ (Nake, 1972) – that is, new forms of aesthetics being created 
                                                      
 
201 He described Nake as being the ‘somewhat […] great old man of computer assisted art’ (Smith, 
1972). 
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because of the computer. Nake’s mea culpa, since for him these changes were never 
significant, only served the purpose of reinforcing his main argument that ‘the results of 
computer art should be re-interpreted’; that computer art aesthetics should bring ‘art back 
to the world’; that ‘traditional’ art (its system) was ‘tied with the bourgeois class’ etc. 
(Nake, 1972). Sarcastically titling this answer ‘Technocratic Dadaists’, Nake affirmed, 
that, if his call were not answered, the computer artists would: 
 
deny and replace the traditional ways of artistic production and see this as a 
revolutionary step; but, in effect, they only create a new artistic style – nothing 
more. The Dadaists were bourgeois; they honestly believed in their revolution; 
they ended up with just another style whose products can be sold and assigned a 
place in bourgeois art history. (Nake, 1972) 
 
As we have seen above, Nake’s clarification fell on deaf ears. The field that he 
had inaugurated together with Bense, Nees and Noll had moved on. By 1971 it had 
become chaotic and heterogeneous, as more and more people flocked into the field, each 
proposing a different view, understanding and definition of that strange artistic 
production. Not only was there a larger trend towards engagement with technology in 
particular and science at large, as seen in the US, but also gone were the days when Bense 
or Moles, for example, would be seen as central theoretical figures by European 
participants. Moreover, in culture at large, the optimistic, naïve and utopian attitude 
towards technology, which invariably had been responsible for the 1965 events in the first 
place, had all but vanished. Rosen reminds us that Bense’s theories were created against a 
background of ‘unconditional acceptance of the way of life of western industrial states 
after the Second World War as technical existence’ (Rosen, 2011b, p. 31). At the end of 
the 1960s, however, this very same assumption was being questioned not only within the 
field of computer art but also by civil society at large, and in this context Bense’s 
 
provocation of bourgeois post-war culture by mathematical aesthetics had lost its 
edge in the politicized atmosphere of 1968/1969. The clash between Joseph 
Beuys and Max Bense during a panel discussion in Düsseldorf in 1970 was the 
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visibly spectacular finale to the project of a rational, mathematically oriented 
aesthetics that had sought to demystify art and the artists. (Rosen, 2011b, p. 39) 
 
Not only there were internal cracks within the movement, given the different 
ideas proposed by new members, but outside pressure also affected its internal 
configuration. The examples provided here are but a few. There is nothing, however, that 
better illustrates the disappointment of a great part of the AST field than the mass 
demobilisation that followed the end of the 1960s. Metzger, who never managed to finish 
his Five screens project, abandoned PAGE in November 1972 in its twenty-sixth issue. 
After that, as Ford highlights, ‘the subsequent issues of PAGE veered away from overtly 
political issues’ (Ford, 2009, p. 173 note 28). Nake would abandon the field until 1984, 
returning only after the collapse of the Soviet Union; during that time, he would hide his 
past involvement with computer art (Nake, 2013, 1h 48min). Nees would continue to 
develop his work as an engineer rather than as an artist (Nake, 2013). Noll, despite saying 
that ‘in the early 1960’s the digital computer offered great hope’ (Noll, 1970, p. 10), 
would in 1970 affirm, remembering 9 Evenings, that ‘artists could not cope with 
technology’ (Noll, 1970, p. 13) and that ‘unfortunately, science and technology have 
become exploitable commodities used as artistic gimmicks’ (Noll, 1970, p. 12); he later 
went back to academic and engineering work, as shown by his own website (Noll, 2015) 
and by Nake’s recollections (Nake, 2013). Mezei, an important figure in the North 
American scene, would by the late 1970s completely abandon academia and the computer 
in order to dedicate himself to becoming a multi-faith minister (Nake, 2005b). For Mezei: 
‘Computer Art, as many new endeavors, [had] reached a plateau of stagnation after an 
exhilarating start full of promise […] In any case no exciting new ideas and results have 
appeared in the last few years; the next wave of creativity in this field is probably still a 
few years away’ (Mezei, 1976). ‘While the seeds of his disenchantment with Art and 
Technology [could] be seen’ already in 1969 (Shanken, 2001, p. 118), Burnham, 
organiser of the Software exhibition, would in 1980 publish a self-explanatory article 
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titled ‘Art and Technology: The Panacea that Failed’. In it he would enumerate the failure 
of previous AST attempts, such as E.A.T., Cybernetic Serendipity, CAVS and ‘Maurice 
Tuchman’s five-year symbiosis at the Los Angeles County Museum (1967–71)’, namely 
the ‘Art & Technology’ program (Burnham, 1980, p. 242). In retrospectively looking at 
these developments, in 1980, Burnham concluded that ‘only within the past ten years 
have we begun to accept the possibility that technological solutions are not universal 
panaceas’ (Burnham, 1980, p. 246). Helmar Frank, a former PhD student of Abraham 
Moles (Klütsch, 2007b, p. 421) and later an active participant in information aesthetics, 
nevertheless ‘gave up and concentrated on education and psychology’ (Nake, 1971). 
Jonathan Benthall, a critic who had had a column on art and technology at Studio 
International and was, together with Metzger, one of the signatories of the Zagreb 
Manifesto (seen previously), left the field to concentrate on anthropology. In his words: ‘I 
later felt I had exaggerated its [artificial intelligence, technology] importance from a 
philosophical point of view […] I left because I felt avant-garde contemporary art led to a 
dead end […] you have to go to a lot of blind alleys before you find anything interesting’ 




3.3.1 Conventions: Why conceptual but not computer art? 
 
Seen retrospectively, it is incredible that computer art survived the late 1960s and early 
1970s. Not only was the field plagued by internal conflict over its own definition and 
self-criticism but the larger artistic world was not kind to it either. The technophobic 
cultural shift of the late 1960s, which had caused some members to propose a new 
direction for the field, had also positioned the larger artistic world in diametrical 
opposition to AST in general and not only computer art. Moreover, the exogenous 
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cultural shift that had affected the discourses arguing for art, science and technology was 
also responsible for changes in some AST artworks themselves. In other words, even 
works of computer art started to change around this time. From abstract compositions 
based on pseudo-random generators, resembling those products of concrete and 
constructivist artists, the new production that started to emerge was beginning to 
experiment with figurative and sometimes explicitly political subjects. Perhaps the most 
famous example in the literature is Charles Csuri’s Random War (Fig. 49, 50), from as 
early as 1967, where images of toy soldiers are randomly distributed over the paper and 
divided into two opposing factions: one red and the black. Stretched across the page are 
the names of those soldiers and the result of their imagined conflict: dead, missing, 
injured etc. ‘Ohio State University administrators, faculty, and staff, as well as famous 
people of the time, such as Ronald Reagan and Gerald Ford, become soldiers in Csuri’s 
Random War, clearly suggesting war’s indiscriminate nature’ (Glowski, 2006, p. 76). 
Winner of the 1967 Computer and Automation contest (of which the previous recipients 
were Nake in 1966 and Noll in 1965) with another figurative work, Sine Curve Man (Fig. 
51), Csuri may be seen as anticipating the problems facing computer art. Instead of 
presenting the geometric abstractions of early winners and participants, as in Nake’s and 
Noll’s case, Csuri won the prize with a rather disturbing decomposition of a man’s face. 
In the same year, in 1967, his computer animation ‘Hummingbird received an award at 
the fourth International Experimental Film Competition in Brussels. Thereupon, the 
Museum of Modern Art in New York purchased the film for its permanent collection’ 
(Rosen, 2006, p. 39). Csuri was quite different from most early computer artists. He had a 
classical artistic education but at the same time had fought in the war, and the National 
Science Foundation financed his projects in the same way most military research was 
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done at the time202. What differentiated him was his understanding of the computer as just 
another tool. As Rosen explains: 
 
Charles Csuri’s concept of art only seemed to resemble the militant ideas of ‘the 
computer as artist.’ Csuri never called into question the authority of the human 
artist. He did not cultivate the rhetoric of the extinction of the subject, of a 
transhuman art. As much as he explored the computer, the machine itself as a 
symbol of rationality and discipline never stood in the centre of his reflection. 
The computer was a tool, which he tried to master and enhance. Foremost in his 
mind was that the relationship between man and machine was always, to a certain 
degree, reciprocal, and that in the process of taming, so to speak, the one who 
tames is transformed as well. (Rosen, 2006, p. 40) 
 
Despite showing an alternative to computer art done at the time, by not alienating 
his art from the social context of the time and by seeing the computer as just another tool, 
Csuri, because of his attachment to the computer and despite his early successes in 
traditional artistic institutions, was nevertheless seen in the same way as other computer 
artists of the time. He recalls the situation as one of intellectual isolation: 
 
Nobody in the art would talk to me […] and it took me three years before I could 
get a paper published on the ideas of computers and art [When] I finally got 
published, guess where? In the International Journal of Electrical Engineering. 
In hindsight […] I can’t believe I was not kicked out of university. (Csuri, 2009, 
my translation) 
 
As in Brown’s ‘kiss of death’, Csuri felt that the very mention of the computer revolted 
people and alienated him from his artistic peers. These terrible reactions compelled Csuri 
to produce a whole series of drawings reflecting the attitudes he faced. Hosted at The 
Ohio State University’s Charles A. Csuri Project (Advanced Computing Center for the 
                                                      
 
202  Another already established artist who later migrated to computers was Harold Cohen. 
Coincidentally, his work as also supported by the National Science Foundation (Feigenbaum, 1984). 
However, Cohen had a completely different take from Csuri on the relationship between artists and 
computers. For more see Nunez (2015). 
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Arts and Design, 2007), these sketches portray demons, dismembered people, computers 
and automatons in a macabre fashion that reminds one of early medieval drawings (Fig. 
52, 53). However, no other item in this same collection more represents the antithetical 
nature of computers and art than a letter from Artforum. An attempt to present the work 
of Csuri to its editor failed miserably: ‘When Matthew Baigell, assistant professor at the 
Art History Department of The Ohio State University, in 1967, sent an article to the 
journal [discussing Csuri’s works], he received a two-sentence answer from Philip 
Leider, one of the editors, which illustrates the atmosphere in those days’ (Rosen, 2006, 
p. 40). Because of Csuri’s attachment to the computer, and despite his early successes in 
traditional artistic institutions, the letter read: ‘Thanks for the enclosed manuscript on 
Chuck Csuri. I can’t imagine Artforum ever doing a special issue on electronics or 
computers in art, but one never knows’ (Leider, 1967). 
The fact that Csuri was rejected by the art world is not surprising. Apart from the 
bad reputation given to computing at the time, something else, this time endogenous to art 
world concerns, was at play. Computer art, given its novelty (and perhaps even today), 
required a specialised kind of knowledge that no one in the traditional arts possessed. 
Despite the theoretical efforts of Burnham (1968a, 1970b), Reichardt (1968b), 
Youngblood (1970) and many others, active participants in the traditional art world who 
attempted to justify computer art or AST attempts, computer art introduced a lingo that 
was not part of the artistic vocabulary. Each one of these (and others) had developed a 
line of thought that justified the computer as a natural development within art history203. I 
                                                      
 
203  As Taylor correctly points out, ‘what becomes apparent is that commentators follow the 
modernist convention of historicising “new” artistic trends by showing how they had evolved from past 
forms. Computer art, which at the time was an incommensurable object, was given legitimacy through its 
connections to the modernist movement and was thus authenticated within the history of art. In the future, 
conceptual art and the history of photography would also be employed to legitimise the claims of computer 
art’ (Taylor, 2004, p. 78). Some of these attempts will be seen over the course of this section. 
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will not attempt to map all these arguments since this would render yet another thesis. 
What I want to stress, however, is that, despite this effort, computer art did indeed present 
serious problems for art world participants. Exogenous cultural factors may have played 
an important and crucial role in determining the fate of AST but we should not in any 
circumstances forget that the conventions of the art world were (and are) not ready to 
accommodate this kind of artistic proposal; that is, the art world lacked even the most 
basic understanding of what a computer was, let alone of computer art and its algorithms. 
‘Conventions’ may seem a derogatory word for some. After all, the very logic of 
avant-garde is supposedly focused on the overpowering of old conventions in favour of 
new, challenging ones. The truth, however, is that not all conventions are thrown out 
when a new style emerges. I am not, then, talking about stylistic conventions but of 
deeper, simpler and mundane ones. Let’s picture a scenario where we have side by side a 
collection of artworks hung on a wall. They were produced over the past two hundred 
years and, loosely, represent different points in the history of art. Let’s assume that they 
are, for example, neoclassical, romantic, impressionist, expressionist and cubist paintings. 
When we stand within a hall and look at them, the changes between neoclassical, 
romantic, impressionist, expressionist, cubists and so on may seem revolutionary and, in 
an art historical sense, they certainly are. The problem here is that between all those 
changes, between all those pictures, some conventions persisted: they are all artworks, 
paintings in our case, realised via a technology of pigments and brushes, conceived by a 
unique individual, usually within the confines of a rectangular area, mainly on canvas, 
and later framed and exposed on a wall either privately or publically. Stylistically these 
artworks may be completely different and a world apart, but their basic features 
nevertheless persist. By and large computer art, when initially produced in 1965, 
mimicked those conventions. We should be not surprised, again, that Nake’s and Noll’s 
earliest experiments were done with previous artistic styles in mind, those of Klee and 
Mondrian respectively. Neither should we be surprised that they hung their works on a 
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wall and called them art: that was what people did when they created pictures. Now, for 
Nake, Nees, Noll and other computer artists, there was no question regarding their 
situation. They had written a program, a logical and algorithmic description of processes, 
which in turn resulted in the pictures seen at the time. The creation of the artwork was 
theirs and not, as people saw, the computers’. However, for the general public and for the 
art world’s traditional members, that was never a clear fact. They never understood that 
computers were stupid things, only capable of very fast calculations, that could not think 
for themselves204. These simple programs did not account for intelligence, ever205. Even 
some computer artists got mixed up about this. Taylor reminds us that ‘Noll’s Mondrian 
Experiment had questioned the belief that creativity is “the personal and somewhat 
mysterious domain of man”’ and that ‘Kawano felt that the computer artist never 
produces the work of art; rather the computer [does], programmed with “artificial 
creativity”’ (2004, pp. 78–79). Some like Bense, albeit for different reasons as seen 
earlier in this text, helped to portray this idea of artificial intelligence – which in a sense 
equates to imagining the machine as an intentional agent – by proposing the term 
‘artificial art’206. Retrospectively, it was only in some circumstances that it became clear 
that the computers did not have agency, as exemplified by Nees’ ‘controversial’ answer 
                                                      
 
204 This is a subject that, in itself, would result in another thesis. Luckily for us Salah (2008) does 
very good work in mapping out the philosophical discussions regarding machine agency, which, in fact, is 
attached to the very notion of consciousness. Her Discontents of Computer Art is the perfect introduction for 
those interested in both the philosophy of the discussions and its relation to computer art. 
205 A point that artists still disagree upon, including it seems Harold Cohen, up to his death in April 
2016 
206 Taylor reinforces this narrative, of computer creativity, by recalling a quote from an influential 
artificial theorist, Marvin Minsky, which proposes that ‘human creative process is no different in kind from 
what happens in their machines. An artist has an algorithm in his head just as much as a computer does. They 
go on to dismiss free will as an illusion, no different from random choice, so the chance element in their 
programs should complete the equivalence of human and computer artistic creation’ (in Taylor, 2004, p. 86).  
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in that first exhibition of 1965; and, as we know, even then that was not clear enough. 
The confusion over whether a human or a machine had created the artwork perhaps did 
more harm to the field than any other misunderstanding. It would create the intolerable 
situation of, firstly, computers threatening a perceivably (very) human activity and, 
secondly, breaking a key convention: that of human agency. Art, after all, is produced by 
humans and not by inanimate objects or animals. People had questioned the authorship of 
art before, but never had the human been completely taken out of the picture (no pun 
intended)207. As Rosen explains, 
 
the art audience was at a loss with computer-generated art. Ken Knowlton 
described this perplexity: ‘The machinery which intervenes between artist and 
viewer precludes a great deal of normal communication. Even at the first stage – 
the punched card – one cannot tell whether the card was punched tenderly or in 
fury.’ For those who had no insight into the computing process, computer art 
remained largely inaccessible. In addition to this helplessness resulting from a 
lack of knowledge on a technical level, the aesthetic theories of computer art did 
not enter the contemporary art discourse beyond a more general discussion of art 
and technology. No cultural authority tried to challenge computer art’s aesthetic, 
to develop it and to spread a certain understanding. (Rosen, 2006, p. 40) 
 
In the socially charged and increasingly technophobic atmosphere of the 1960s, 
people felt threatened by computers perhaps as much as by nuclear annihilation. That was 
very obvious, for example, in the works of science fiction novels. Salah, whose 
observations concur with my interpretation that computers threatened the convention of 
human agency in the arts, demonstrates, for example, that: 
 
the striking fact in these [science fiction] stories is that no matter how much a 
robot tries, it can never become human [and is] almost always pictured as capable 
of mimicking humans and having human faculties […] The fear of computers, 
the fear of intelligence in an ‘other’ that is capable of thinking and creating, 
played a role in forming a certain reluctance to associate any kind of art with 
                                                      
 
207 Perhaps the most vocal supporter of an artificial intelligence program in the field was Cohen and 
his AARON software, which has been continually updated over the years. For more on Cohen see 
McCorduck (1990). 
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computers in the public mind. Obviously, there were other problems, most 
importantly the fact that a normative definition of art involves the intentions of 
the artists. (Salah, 2008, pp. 35, 42) 
 
Salah’s ‘normative definition’, a convention by all means, although it speaks of a 
convention regarding art itself and not, as one might expect, regarding a style, genre or 
medium, stands above all the other stylistic conventions that computer artists attempted 
consciously or otherwise to adopt. We have already seen, for example, how the efforts of 
the European pioneers were partially inspired by Bense’s theories, which, given his 
personal history, were closely related to the concrete movements of both Europe and 
South America. Concrete art may never have been central to the artistic world of the time, 
which was then centred in New York rather than in any European city (and naturally 
reflected the interests of the North American developments of first abstract expressionism 
and then pop art), but concrete art was never deemed un-artistic or non-art at all; perhaps 
it could be considered bad art but it was still art. Computer art on the other hand, by 
confusing the very paradigm of human agency, had its very label as ‘art’ questioned. In 
this context, it is unsurprisingly that one of the points raised by Nake in his PAGE 18 text 
stressed that the ‘debate centers around the question “Is it art?” [while the discussion] 
shows virtually no progress’ (Nake, 1971). For him agency, although he would still 
favour the coding itself more than the final pictorial object, was never a worthy question. 
Despite interpreting computer art as a development parallel to concrete art, or yet, 
as in Csuri or Cordeiro’s (Fig. 54) case, by highlighting social themes over computer 
artworks, computer art still struggled over its own legitimacy. In the late 1960s through 
the early 1970s, however, a new discourse attempted to legitimise computer art via a 
different narrative. In this new attempt computer art became not the inheritor of 
modernity, via concrete art, but a representative of one of the most successful new 
practices of post-war art: conceptual art. Indeed, even today conceptual art has been 
described as the most closely related artistic form to computer art (Tamblyn, 1990; 
Popper, 1993; Shanken, 2002; Paul, 2003, p. 11; Weibel, 2005, p. 338; Nake, 2010; 
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Taylor, 2014, p. 46). If we accept, according to the literature, that computer art is closely 
related to (or in fact a development of) conceptual art, we must also assume that 
something must have happened along the way in order to justify that previous negative 
reaction. From an art historiographical perspective, claims regarding the proximity 
between conceptual art on the one hand and computer art on the other must be followed 
by two questions. Firstly, regarding its validity, were the perceived characteristics of 
conceptual art, as developed in the late 1960s, similar to the ones proposed by (some) 
computer artists? Following this, then, it is fair to raise a second question: Since both art 
practices allegedly share so many characteristics and concerns, why was one accepted by 
the art world while the other languished at the periphery208? 
We know that the pictorial computer art and mainstream art, at least at the time 
and given the misunderstanding of the former, could never be reconciled given the 
former’s human agency problem. Nevertheless, as Taylor (2004, p. 46) demonstrates, 
there are instances were both artworks, conceptual and computer, are incredibly similar209 
                                                      
 
208  As Salah rhetorically asks: ‘The art world had seen enough abstraction and all sorts of 
geometrical designs, be it under the name of Abstract Art, Constructivism, Op Art, Suprematism, or Abstract 
Expressionism. It was ready to accept artistic instances without the presence of artworks, as in the case of 
Happenings, Flux, and Conceptual Art. If abstraction was not the issue, then what was it that Computer Art 
really lacked?’ (Salah, 2008, p. 51). 
209 Here Taylor is speaking of two strikingly similar artworks, one by Manfred Mohr, P 159A (1973), 
and Sol LeWitt’s 122 Variations of Incomplete Open Cubes (1974). As he sees it ‘Rosalind Krauss, Lucy 
Lippard, or Donald Kuspit, who all wrote on LeWitt’s cubic work [nevertheless] prejudged [Mohr’s] work on 
the grounds of its computational basis’ (Taylor, 2004, p. 46). Moreover, as Taylor also correctly points out, 
‘in LeWitt’s words, conceptual art was “emotionally dry” and looked “hard and industrial” [while] computer 
art evoked similar descriptions’ (Taylor, 2004, p. 47). We should also note some limits to this comparison. As 
Taylor again correctly posits: ‘The most substantial difference, however, is the disassociation by LeWitt and 
most other conceptual artists with the reductivism and rationalism of mathematics. As LeWitt stipulated, 
conceptual art does not have “much to do with mathematics, philosophy or any mental discipline”’ (Taylor, 
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(Fig. 55, 56). What was it then that made computer art and conceptual art produce such 
similar outputs? As early as 1962, as Taylor points out, ‘Umberto Eco coined the term 
Programmed Art to describe the formalised trends in European conceptual based art’, 
while, moreover, both art practices ‘appealed to the same concepts of objectivity and the 
will to detach the art object from the idea’, as in the case of Nake’s emphasis on 
algorithms rather than the final output (Nunez, 2015) or the processes of LeWitt. 
‘Moreover, both worked with seriality and permutational sequences’ (Taylor, 2004, p. 
44). 
Even computer art’s overreliance on scientism, as proposed by the (failed) 
quantitative proposals of Bense and Moles, had given away to a more relaxed attitude 
towards the acceptance of irrationality or intuition in computer art. This change in attitude 
could already be seen, for example, at the 1973 Tendencije 5 exhibition, which, instead of 
focusing solely on research and computers, added, for the first time, the theme of 
conceptual art to its subtitle210. Moreover, as artist Radoslav Putar suggests, the working 
title of Tendencije 5 debate ought to be titled ‘The Rational and Irrational on Visual 
Research’ (Putar, 2011b, p. 482). The very possibility of irrationality or subjectivism in a 
previously computer or concrete art event was already a game change211. If we look back 
at, for example, Bense’s and even New Tendencies’ discourses some years earlier, we 
will see, as previously demonstrated here, that the idea was precisely to rid artistic 
practice of any kind of personalism, subjectivism or irrationality. Hence, the very 
possibility of discussing these dogmas should not be taken lightly. As Putar highlights, 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
2004, p. 49). Moreover, through statements such as that conceptual artists are ‘mystics rather than 
rationalists’ (LeWitt in Taylor, 2004, p. 49), conceptual artists are distanced even further from the radical 
formalism of computer art. 
210 Tendencies 5: Constructive Visual Research; Computer Visuals Research; Conceptual Art. 
211 Once again the reader should recall that this was exactly the discussion between the paulistas 
concrete and the cariocas neoconcrete artists. 
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‘the rational and the irrational do not have the connotation of terms which mutually 
exclude one another’ (Putar, 2011b, p. 482). Yet another very clear example of this 
reorientation towards conceptual art, even in AST developments entirely focused 
elsewhere than the computer itself, is Burnham’s Software exhibition, previously seen in 
this text. Although not a prior supporter of the rational formalist tendencies especially 
seen in Europe and South America, the similarity between his and Tendencije 5’s 
proposals is remarkable. As Rosen explains, Putar may have only ‘implicitly indicated 
that one might also describe processes of Conceptual art as data processing. Whether the 
concept linking the computer and Conceptual art, as developed by […] Burnham […] was 
known to him, remains uncertain’ (Rosen, 2011b, p. 39). It is important to remember that 
Burnham was not only a supporter of post-war technology and art; as Shanken reminds 
us, Burnham ought to be seen ‘as the pre-eminent champion of art and technology of his 
generation’ (Shanken, 2001, p. 107). Some context is necessary in order to comprehend 
Shanken’s claims. Burnham was not an outsider in relation to the art world. Pretty much 
the opposite is true. He was a writer (1968–1970) and associate editor (1972–76) on Arts 
magazine and a contributing editor (1971–1972) to Artforum (Shanken, 2001), the same 
magazine that had previously answered a submission of a paper on Csuri to say that it 
would never produce a special on computers and arts. 
But what did Burnham actually propose regarding that problematic Software 
exhibition? So far we have only seen that it did not end well, either for the Jewish 
Museum or its curator. Could this rejection by the art world be related to its theoretical 
proposal, of reading AST productions (such as computer art) through the lenses of 
conceptual art? And was Burnham, as one reviewer at the time described it, drawing 
‘upon the prestige of these disciplines [of concept art]’ (Mallary, 1970, p. 189)212? 
Software’s principles were spelled out over a short period between 1968 and 1970, in 
                                                      
 
212 That is, riding on the successes of conceptual art. 
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various articles and two books: Beyond Modern Sculpture: The Effects of Science and 
Technology on the Sculpture of This Century (Burnham, 1968a) and The Structure of Art 
(Burnham, 1970c)213. The latter book, which features heavily in the AST literature today, 
was described by one reviewer214 at the Leonardo journal215 as being a ‘manifesto, not a 
history’ (Lynton, 1970, p. 108). Burnham’s 1968 Artforum article, ‘Systems Esthetics’, 
which may be considered the biggest attempt by an art world member216 to legitimise the 
production of AST, can be argued to surmise Burnham’s manifesto. To begin with, 
Burnham depicted the world then in a transitory state, from ‘an object-oriented to a 
system oriented culture’ (Burnham, 1968b, p. 31, original emphasis). This change, a 
‘morphological development’, as in Kuhn’s paradigmatic change, founded over the 
‘nature of current technological shifts’, created a ‘dichotomy’ between the ‘finite, unique 
work of art’ and ‘conceptions which can loosely be termed unobjects’ (Burnham, 1968b, 
p. 31). These unidentified ‘unobjects’, which may include ‘kinetic and luminous art, some 
outdoor works, happenings and mixed media presentations’ (Burnham, 1968b, p. 31), 
pertaining to a new, as yet to be named category, are the result of the intuition of artists 
who have ‘grasped’ the ‘present age[’s]’ distinctions. Among the many changes caused 
by technological development, Burnham does seem to recognise a shift that people would 
                                                      
 
213 For a short introduction to these works, from an art historical point of view, see Skrebowski 
(2006). 
214 Surprisingly, the same reviewer, Norbert Lynton, was both a Guardian reviewer and the head of 
art history of my school, Chelsea. Unfortunately he died in 2007 (McNay, 2007). 
215 A central AST institution that shall be discussed in the next section. 
216 When I say ‘biggest’ I am talking both literally and metaphorically: literally because Burnham 
was one of the most active writers to support AST, both in his books and articles, and metaphorically because 
Burnham, in a sense, was a central figure within Artforum, the art world’s publication par excellence. 
However, ‘for a writer who was a significant theoretical force in his day – sitting on Artforum’s masthead 
alongside Lawrence Alloway, Annette Michelson, Michael Fried and Rosalind Krauss – Burnham’s work is 
now relatively obscure’ (Skrebowski, 2006, p. 3). 
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today label as moving towards the ‘information society’ where ‘in the automated-state 
power resides less in the control of the traditional symbols of wealth than in information’ 
(Burnham, 1968b, p. 31). Narrating this change towards an understanding of our social 
and natural world as similar entities, and borrowing much from cybernetics’ 
understanding of such change, Burnham highlighted that, because of growing 
information, the world had become more and more complex. Hence, ‘the priorities of the 
present age revolve around the problems of organization’ (Burnham, 1968b, p. 31). For 
Burnham and for others who subscribed to cybernetics’ tenets, the insight that everything 
could be seen as information, although not spelled out by him within this text, reflects 
Wiener’s initial insight when designing the anti-aircraft systems previously mentioned; 
that is, human, machine and nature are just parts of a system rather than separate, distinct 
units. In this new paradigm the aesthetic impulse, previously justified by the use of art 
objects, seemed to him ‘naïve’ (Burnham, 1968b, p. 31). Differently from the previous 
rational formalists, however, he recognised the new aesthetic impulse now ought to be 
based on two assumptions: 
 
The specific function of modern didactic art has been to show that art does not 
resides in material entities, but in relations between people and between people 
and the components of their environment […] 
In an advanced technological culture the most important artist best 
succeeds by liquidation his position vis-à-vis society […] At the outset the artist 
refused to participate in idealism through craft […] Instead the significant artist 
strives to reduce the technical and physical distance between his artistic output 
and the productive means of society. (Burnham, 1968b, p. 31) 
 
Fantastically, Burnham in effect rejects the most extreme view of previous rational 
formalism in favour of a very particular reading of cybernetics itself – which as we 
previously saw was used to justify the deterministic and quantifiable experiments of early 
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computer artists217 – while, at the same time, stressing that in this vision of society artists 
should not ape the ‘syndrome of formalist invention in art, where discoveries are made 
through visual manipulation’ (Burnham, 1968b, p. 31). A testament to the degree to 
which scientific theories can be translated by the artistic field, this complete 
reformulation of cybernetics as understood by rational formalists is important in itself. 
This constant game, of reinterpretation, of translation, from one field to another, 
unsurprisingly, was also conducted over Burnham’s own work. His late recognition 
outside the circles of AST can be seen in recent attempts at his ‘recovery’ (Skrebowski, 
2006); in the labelling of his work as ‘visionary’ (C. A. Jones, 2012); in readings of his 
work as ‘prophetic’ among a ‘burgeoning interest in systems amongst artists and writers 
on art’ (Halsall, 2008, p. 99); in work highlighting his ‘prescience’ while acknowledging 
the prevalence of his thought ‘in the design world’ (Jones, 2011); in examinations of his 
oeuvre as the harbinger of a ‘new aesthetic’ (Paul and Levy, 2015, p. 36); and so on218. 
                                                      
 
217  This rejection becomes clearer in Beyond Modern Sculpture, where Burnham, while 
acknowledging that Europeans were the first to investigate cybernetics for artistic purposes, argues that those 
Europeans did not achieve a concept for a new art form. In his words: ‘In 1958 the scientist Abraham Moles 
published his Theori de l’information et perception esthétique. Moles points to some conclusions about the 
limits of modern communication as defined by information theory; he lays down aesthetic conditions for 
channelling media; yet he does not attempt to construct a style, a means, a message or a new art form. Less 
elaborate, but more ambitious in intention is Max Bense’s Programmierung des Schônen, published in 1960. 
For the experts, at least, Bense’s work categorizes the various philosophical, mathematical and literary 
approaches to text analysis, with particular emphasis on the statistical methods of information theory. Bense 
also does not attempt a new art form’ (Burnham, 1968a, p. 344). 
218 For a comprehensive review of Burnham’s historiography since the 1990s, see Shanken (1998, 
2009). As Shanken posits: ‘Historical and critical writing addressing these aesthetic theories began to emerge 
in the 1990s and accelerated in the 2000s, when a number of exhibitions and symposia were devoted to 
related themes. These include: Open Systems: Rethinking Art c. 1970 (Tate Modern, 2005); Systems Art 
(Whitechapel Gallery, 2007); Imaging by Numbers (Block Art Museum, Northwestern University, 2007); and 
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The irony behind it at all, for me, is extraordinary. With Burnham having been 
disregarded some fifty years ago because of a bias against computing technology in 
particular and all things scientific in general, today people in the larger art world, while 
maintaining an active interest in him, may claim for example that ‘Burnham hinted at, but 
never comprehensively followed through on, a disarticulation of systems theory from its 
techno-industrial deployment [and] in so doing he only suggested the conceptual 
possibilities that systems theory might offer a critical art practice’ (Skrebowski, 2006) – 
that is, sorry, Burnham: close but no cigar. 
In conclusion, despite all the apparent similarities between concept and computer 
art, today and then AST did not find its profile raised by its new narrative, which moved 
away from rational formalism and closer to the late 1960s and early 1970s concerns of 
the art world: in effect, anti-formalist in nature and emphatic about the dematerialisation 
of the art object. Even a possible nod to computer art such as Burnham’s affirmation that 
‘It no longer helps to display a system as a static entity’ (Burnham, 1968a, p. 131) – that 
is, the graphical output of algorithms – could not satisfy the already ingrained and 
widespread certainty that, ultimately, computers – and science by extension – were bad 
for art. While computer art primarily had the problem of human agency against it, larger 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
Pask Present (Atelier Farbergasse, Vienna, 2008). Specialized scholarly publications also mushroomed in the 
2000s, including Roy Ascott’s Telematic Embrace: Visionary Theories of Art, Technology, and 
Consciousness (Berkeley: University of California Press: 2003), Charlie Gere’s Art, Time and Technology 
(2006), Francis Halsall’s Systems of Art (2008), White Heat Cold Logic: British Computer Art 1960–1980, 
and the forthcoming The Art of Systems. Paralleling the entry of this historical recuperation into museum 
contexts, scholarly writing on the subject has entered into more mainstream academic discourses, as in 
Pamela M. Lee’s Chronophobia (MIT Press, 2004), my own Art and Electronic Media (Phaidon, 2009), and 
in recent work by prominent art historians including Caroline A. Jones at MIT and Claus Pias at the 
University of Vienna. To borrow a line from Hans Haacke’s proposed 1971 work ironically dedicated to 
Norbert Wiener, “All Systems Go!”’ (Shanken, 2009, pp. 160–161). 
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AST developments were, as we have previously seen, branded as supporters of the 
military–industrial complex. As Rosen, after paraphrasing Samuel Beckett’s rhetorical 
question ‘What matter who’s speaking?’ into ‘Does it matter who’s calculating?’, simply 
states: ‘It made a difference if the artist or the computer calculated’ (Rosen, 2011b, p. 
35). The infallible connection to the material world of technosciences was responsible for 
the scorn of Burnham’s ideas. The merit on which Burnham and all others were judged, 
despite claims to the contrary, was not based on aesthetic, art theoretical, philosophical, 
taste, stylistic, conceptual or any other considerations219. AST and earlier computer art 
were (and perhaps in a sense are) judged by their simple and not necessarily true 
affiliation with the technoscientific world. The merit observed was and is based on moral 
and political assumptions, and not artistic ones. This ensuing situation, best summarised 
by Shanken in his thesis, was that: 
 
Public skepticism towards the military–industrial complex after May 1968 and 
amidst the Vietnam War, the Cold War, and mounting ecological concerns, all 
contributed to problematizing the artistic use of technology – and the production 
of aesthetic objects in general – within the context of commodity capitalism. 
Conceptual Art, on the other hand, with its assault on the modernist object, 
                                                      
 
219 One could add to this list of problems, between computer art/AST and the art world, the 
relationship between AST and the art market. Although I believe this is not a central issue here, since taste 
and hence demand itself are proxies of capital – both social and economic, as seen in Bourdieu (1996) – the 
simple fact that the art object in computer art, as argued many times by artists in the field, can be thought of 
as centred on coding itself and not its visual output is quite problematic for a market that strives at the 
exchange between capital and theoretically unique objects. Here, again, the comparison between computer 
and conceptual art is illuminating. Since both affirm the dematerialisation of the art object, it is interesting to 
note that where computer art struggled conceptual art succeeded. Since this thesis is most concerned with the 
production of art and not its consumption, I shall not continue on this line of inquiry. Having said that, 
consumption – or the lack of it – may in the future prove pivotal for the development and narrative of AST. 
For an introduction to the economic field concerned with art consumption, see Heilbrun and Gray (2001), 
Ginsburgh and Throsby (2006), Zorloni (2013) and Horowitz (2014).  
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became increasingly central to a variety of artistic discourses, ranging from Post-
Minimalism to Performance and from Installation to Earthworks […] Conceptual 
Art, in fact, had become so well absorbed into the international art market by 
1974 that Sarah Charlesworth, Michael Corris, Joseph Kosuth, and Mel Ramsden 
initiated The Fox, (1975–6), in order ‘to establish some kind of community 
practice [for] the revaluation of ideology.’ The disjunction between the critical 
and public reception of Conceptual Art and Art and Technology in the early 
1970s contributed to exacerbating distinctions between these two artistic 
tendencies, rather than to identifying continuities between them. For it stands to 
reason that artists, critics, dealers, curators, and collectors invested in 
internationally prestigious Conceptual Art would want to distance themselves 
from any association with Art and Technology, which, for the reasons explained 
above, had become increasingly peripheral to contemporary artistic concerns. 
(Shanken, 2001, pp. 145–146; see also Taylor, 2004) 
 
 
So, if conceptual art, despite its similarities with computer art, had become the 
norm, what happened to the hundreds of individuals who were actively engaged with 
AST efforts? Since they were certainly not part of the artistic discourse and its historical 
development – literally peripheral in their positioning, or, as in the case of computer art, 
not considered to be art at all –how could they survive? That is our next subject: the 
institutionalisation of AST. 
 
 
3.4 A persistent field: Institutionalisation 
 
The clear division of conceptual art, on one side, and computer art and AST, on the other, 
not only illustrates the tortuous path of artistic legitimation but also highlights the utmost 
failure of AST – computer art included – to achieve that legitimation in the eyes of a 
large majority. Yet, despite this failure, why are we still talking about things such as 
digital art, new media art, art and science and so on? How has a completely renegade 
artistic practice, which in some cases may (wrongly) not be considered art at all, persisted 
over time? How come an art form, not accepted as such by the high priests of the art 
world, has flourished despite not being accepted as such, as art? Despite their production 
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being branded as non-art, as in computer art, or bad-art, as in later AST developments, 
people still kept working, producing, writing and showing artworks pertaining to this 
once small sub-culture. The result of this continuous effort, helped and supported by 
various patrons, academia and industry, allowed AST to flourish despite and in defiance 
of art world precepts. Here is the paradoxical existence of AST: while fighting for a 
recognition that never came, it became institutionalised and, consequentially, 
autonomous. New values, theories, ideas; new institutions, dedicated spaces and 
publications; its own awards, heroes and myths: whole new sets of organisations were 
deployed in order to accommodate and support AST. Had its rejection never occurred, 
had the earlier pioneers succeed, we would not be talking about AST as a separate 
burgeoning field but, instead, as a note on a page in some obscure art history book – AST 
would be, perhaps, passé. Here I argue that no other example better demonstrates the 
detachment of AST practices from the larger art world than its own specialised 
institutions. In other words, it is by looking at AST’s institutions that we can clearly see 
its eventual autonomy being constructed apart from the larger art world. 
First things first: when I say that AST developed into a whole new world, I am 
not saying it is completely detached from the art world. In fact the opposite is true. AST 
is art and, hence, it still relies on some conventions and institutional arrangements just as 
‘traditional’ contemporary art does in order to proliferate. We can think about some AST 
exhibitions, for example, as being pretty much in tune with the white cube of 
contemporary art; AST uses institutions such as museums and galleries in order to 
accommodate its production; and AST has the usual reliance on the system of awards, 
which theoretically are expressions of quality as well as consistency with a certain kind of 
value. AST is, in other words, art – as long as people recognise it being worthy of such a 
label. Think, for example, of cinema, or opera, or theatre, which are still recognisable 
artistic forms, albeit of a different kind from the visual art that we are referring to: these 
are not judged, shown, preserved or distributed in the same way that visual, contemporary 
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art is. The theories, methods of evaluation, venues and even vocabulary used to describe 
these art forms are different from those of other visual arts. These are, nevertheless, 
recognised as art but perhaps not pertaining to the label ‘contemporary art’. AST, 
similarly to those, is recognised as an artistic form but also, it can be argued, does not 
pertain to visual, contemporary art. Please beware that we must understand the 
‘contemporary’ in ‘contemporary art’ as a label and not a simple adjective. As we know 
there is a category of cultural products (loosely) defined as contemporary. The boundary 
of this field, of contemporary art, while not rigidly defined, since intersections with 
different artistic and cultural forms may occur, is still nevertheless present. Things do not 
simply pertain to contemporary art at will. The act of labelling something as ‘art’, 
‘cinema’, ‘dance’, ‘opera’, ‘contemporary’ etc. is, then, a negotiated process, between the 
many different agents of the pre-existing field: artists, curators, institutions, historians, 
critics, philosophers and so on. What demarcates the boundary of those different 
domains, then, is this negotiation: an ongoing process that is never fully agreed upon and 
that does not demand a full consensus. It suffices that a group of people agrees about it 
for the label to be at least partially successful. That is what happened to AST. While it 
was not fully recognised or considered worthy, a (large) group of individuals nevertheless 
agreed about it. AST may have failed to convince the art world of its worthiness to be 
labelled as contemporary art, but it still succeeded in producing a consensus about its 
importance for a minority. Hence, many of its institutions have persisted over time. 
Of all AST’s persistent institutions, no other has endured or succeeded as much 
as Leonardo: The Journal of the International Society for the Arts, Sciences and 
Technology, the next subject of this thesis. AST, while not wholly similar to 
contemporary art, still shares much of its structure with visual contemporary art. It has 
performances, art objects, installations and so on. It has awards, museums, degrees and 
exhibitions. What differentiates AST from contemporary art, then, must be something 
else, something that resides not in simple stylistic or institutional conventions. The fact 
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that there are occasions when the boundaries of these two fields are blurred makes this 
task, of demonstrating the detachment and autonomy of AST, even more difficult. 
Leonardo, however, aids our research both as an example and as a case study: apart from 
its being the embodiment of collective activity, of AST’s supporters, it is in this kind of 
institution that the discourses of AST are shaped and become detached from 
contemporary art. Founded in Paris by artist and research engineer Frank Malina back in 
1968, the journal was created with the explicit objective of ‘addressing the two cultures 
debate’220 (Malina, 2008, p. 2) and it has outlived many of the labels proposed by AST’s 
members and outsiders over the years. Although open to all artists, from any kind of 
background (Malina, 1968a), in its early editions there was already the sense that the 
journal favoured the ‘eggheads’ (Gray, 1968). The journal might have been open to all; 
its target audience, however, it was clearly not your average artist. Its articles, from its 
earlier editions to today, are quite precise, technical texts and not poetic, speculative ones. 
Leonardo is, even today, not a space for wild manifestos or provocative essays; in fact, it 
resembles an ordinary academic journal, with all the expected conventions from 
referencing to an emphasis on clarity. An emphasis on academicism can also be seen in 
the content of the articles themselves, usually very much concerned with projects aiming 
at rationalising artistic practice, similarly to the rational formalist efforts previously seen 
in this thesis. We have, for example, in its first edition, a text by the designer and 
architect Stanley Tigerman discussing the ‘fundamental characteristics’ of ‘man-made 
diagrams’ – that is, ‘horizontal planar forms’ – ‘to better understand the role they will 
play in the forthcoming computerised world’ (Tigerman, 1968, p. 35); the discussions of 
                                                      
 
220 According to Malina’s son, Roger, the current editor of Leonardo, his father and C. P. Snow were 
friends at the time (Malina, 2013, p. 422). 
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L. Alcopley 221 , the pseudonym of Dr Alfred Copley (Lambert, 1992), a medical 
researcher and artist interested in the formal discussion of his own work as structures and 
non-structures (Alcopley, 1968); and a text by Gillian Wise, a constructive-oriented artist 
bent on formally analysing the components and the internal dynamics of the forms 
contained in her own work (Wise, 1968). 
This assumption, in which artists ought to write clearly about their own work, can 
be seen in Malina’s first editorial, published in Leonardo’s first issue of 1968. In this text, 
taking its clues from the technoscientific world very close to him, and despite himself 
being an artist, he perceives a gap in the market for artists to discuss their own work. This 
situation, regarded by him as a failure, is seen as ‘partly due to the highly individual 
character of artistic expression, but also because a strong opinion has held sway that 
artists should leave verbal description of and analysis of their work to other professions’ 
(Malina, 1968a, p. 1). Again equating an artistic rationale with a technoscientific one, 
Malina understood this reluctance as a matter of ‘secrecy’, of keeping one’s trade secrets 
hidden from public eyes. Scientists, in his view, ‘who are no more skilled than artists with 
the written word, are expected to write about original aspects of their work’ (Malina, 
1968a, p. 1) and, hence, so should artists. He believes there is a benefit in this direct 
communication, in educating the young in order to prevent ‘needless re-discovery and 
repetition of errors [that] can only be minimized by the free disclosure and exchange of 
information’ (Malina, 1968a, p. 1)222. ‘Stringent editorial guidelines’ against what Malina 
perceived as a ‘romantic, anti-rational climate’ widely present ‘among the practitioners 
                                                      
 
221 A book about him was published posthumously by Pergamon Press in 1993 with the most 
appropriate title: One man – Two Visions: L. Alcopley – A. L. Copley, Artist and Scientist. 
222 Regarding the idea that rationality and science can contribute to art, or that both must find 
common ground, one text in this same first issue affirms otherwise and, ironically, it was written by a 
biologist and not an artist (Waddington, 1968). 
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and teachers of the visual fine arts’ (Malina, 1978, p. 1) became a central tenet of the 
journal. That would hardly change over the years223. 
Apart from Leonardo’s enthusiastic embrace of science and its conventions, 
another aspect is clear in its early editions: almost no articles debated the cultural climate 
of the time. Despite some notable exceptions224, appearing too sparsely over time, 
Leonardo, very much like PAGE after Metzger, did not worry about present problems 
and was instead focused on the possibilities of the future. That Malina himself was 
investigated for supposed links with the (US) Communist Party by the FBI perhaps may 
be used to explain this absence225 in its inception. Nevertheless, I do not think that was 
                                                      
 
223 We can see this continuity not only among the articles but also among the editorials of Leonardo 
itself, such as in Malina (1983, 2001, 2008), Ione (2007) and Babcock (2009). 
224 Among its earlier editions we can name articles such Egbert’s (1970), which attempted to explain 
the idea of avant-garde in both artistic and political contexts, Shields’ discussion (1973) of the validity of an 
idea of ‘black aesthetics’ (considered by him as futile) and also Phillips’ (1973) concern over the ‘elitism’ of 
populist artistic forms. Those and others, however, were shy in comparison to Metzger’s politics in PAGE. 
225 His son Robert keeps these files on his own personal website but you may also find them on the 
FBI’s website (FBI, n.d.; Malina, n.d.). In a rather illuminating article, Johnson (2014) describes Malina’s 
investigation: ‘Was Malina in fact a communist? In 2009 I studied Malina’s considerable FBI file, and I also 
went through his papers at the Library of Congress. The records show clearly that Malina was likely a 
member of a Los Angeles branch of the Communist Party in the late 1930s. His FBI file, for instance, 
contains a copy of a 1939 application to the Communist Party, in what appears to be Malina’s handwriting. 
He was also no fan of capitalism. In a 1936 letter to his parents, he wrote, “Events in Europe are certainly 
leading to another war. There seems to be only one hope, overthrowing of the capitalist system in all 
countries and an economic union of all nations.” Of course, at the height of the Great Depression, countless 
academics, artists, professionals, and others held such views […] As for espionage, there was perhaps reason 
to at least suspect Malina. Several security breaches occurred during his tenure at [the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory], the most significant involving classified lab documents that turned up in the hands of a Russian 
courier. According to a 1942 FBI report, at least five unnamed informants identified Malina as a possible spy; 
the report concluded that “the loyalty of the subject would be questionable if he had to decide between our 
  285 
the only reason. Malina’s background as a scientist, including his friendship with C. P. 
Snow, as well as his emphasis on rationality point to a figure in the mould of Bense, 
intent on demystifying art and the artist rather than commenting on the social issues of 
the time226 – in a sense, a person more rational formalist and less political. Leonardo over 
the years became more attuned with its social context, but that was never a central issue 
within its pages. It is important to note that the journal did also present opposite points of 
views, usually debated in the letters section. Ultimately, however, Leonardo never had a 
Metzger. To read its editorials, even today, is to peek inside the rationale of Snow’s two 
cultures and its time227, preceding the technophobe turn of the 1960s; as both Salah 
(2008) and Taylor (2014) correctly point out, we can say that the dream of bringing both 
fields together is what is most dear to Leonardo. Yet, as Salah demonstrates, Leonardo, 
despite aiming for scientific clarity, did not achieve its desired result: 
 
the demand for an ‘analytic’, scientific language was never satisfied, and the 
published articles were below the stands of scientific research, even though they 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
form of government and that of Russia.” J. Edgar Hoover himself repeatedly prodded the U.S. attorneys to 
indict Malina, which they finally did in December 1952, for failing to disclose his Communist Party status to 
the government. His U.S. passport was also revoked. And yet, despite numerous investigations from 1942 
until 1960, the bureau never found any evidence of spying or of more than a passing interest in communism. 
More likely, Malina was just one of the thousands of wrongly accused Americans ensnared by the Red Scare 
of the early 1950s. The indictment against him was dismissed in 1954, and his passport was restored four 
years later’ (Johnson, 2014). It was perhaps this campaign against him, plus the fact that the US government 
had abandoned his previous work in rocket science for (Nazi) German designs, that made Malina move 
permanently to the arts (Johnson, 2014). 
226 In fact some of Leonardo’s articles were deliberately engaged in the explanation, uncovering and 
demystification of art and artists themselves. Examples can be seen in Souriau (1968), Osborne (1971), 
Ferren (1972) and Lynes (1972). 
227 I say ‘its time’ because, as we have seen previously, there is a tendency to rush to attribute to 
early computer art the same preoccupation, as in Klütsch (2007b).  
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had the necessary cosmetic outlook. This brings me to my core argument: 
Leonardo did not deliver the equivalent of what could be tagged as ‘scientific 
standards in humanities’ […] What is required of empirical research, most 
importantly refutability and reproducibility was never required of humanities 
studies […] Leonardo did not attempt to create a similar set of rules, which 
would be meaningful for humanistic tradition, but rather echoed the policy of 
empirical research in demanding a scientific look in the papers it published […] a 
closer look reveals that this façade conceals shabby attempts to be more scientific 
that either resulted in pseudoscience, or at best, approaches that are much closer 
to humanities than sciences […] Leonardo did not become a bridge between arts 
and sciences. Instead it created a new culture, closer to sciences than arts. (Salah, 
2008, pp. 93–94) 
 
This new culture ushered in by Leonardo, perhaps a ‘third culture’228, resulted in 
a product that is classically defined neither as art nor as science. Leonardo’s editorial 
guidelines, I argue, have then been responsible for the creation of a new set of 
conventions, from pseudo-scientism to an emphasis on future technoscientific scenarios 
that do not match the preoccupations of ‘normal’ contemporary art. Anchored by a 
technophilic belief that society is (once again) changing rapidly, it is up to these new 
artists, the new Renaissance people, to tackle these new mysteries. Evidently Leonardo’s 
own name, borrowing from Da Vinci, positioned its members as enlightened individuals 
engaged at the heart of an increasingly and rapidly changing society anchored in new 
technologies and scientific discoveries (Malina, 1983). Similarly to the diagnosis of 
                                                      
 
228 This third new culture is best explained by Salah with reference to ‘John Brockman, who in his 
book “Third Culture” (Brockman, 1995) interviewed several leading scientists about their theories in 
particular, and about the nature of scientific inquiry in general. Brockman’s hypothesis was that, since the͒
predominant culture of the 21 century is science, a direct link between scientific research and the general 
public should be established […] The name “Third Culture” is a direct reference to Snow’s introduction to 
the second edition of “Two Cultures”. Published in 1963, “The Two Cultures, A Second Look” forecast a 
third culture that would emerge from the gap between the two cultures and take up the task of providing 
communication between the two. Although Brockman borrowed Snow’s term, his definition of the third 
culture is crucially different than Snow’s definition. In Brockman’s opinion, a new scientific intelligentsia 
was coming into being, who by-passed the “literary intellectuals” and directly addressed the culture at large. 
His aim was to provide the medium for this communication’ (Salah, 2008, pp. 102–103). 
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E.A.T. or C.A.S., then and again, the remedy of many of its articles is devoted to the 
education of new recruits, promoting ‘the advancement of artistic research and academic 
scholarship at the intersections of art, science, and technology’ (Leonardo, 2015). 
Already in its earlier editions, and before the creation of the Leonardo Education and Art 
Forum, which provided the previous quote, articles would pore over the subject of the 
failings of the educational system and/or how to prepare the next generation for the future 
to come (Draper, 1969; Sonntag, 1969; Adiseshiah, 1970; Lipman-Wulf, 1972)229. 
Although I have not touched on the subject, the relationship between computer 
art practitioners and the Leonardo community is worth mentioning. This relationship, a 
very ambiguous one230, can be exemplified by Malina’s 1971 commentary, in which he 
demonstrated a ‘very critical attitude towards the output of computers’ (Malina, 1971, p. 
263). Computer art, strangely enough, despite appearing only intermittently in Leonardo 
(Salah, 2008, p. 88), is at times portrayed sympathetically (Holloway, 1972) and at other 
times critically (Thompson, 1974); in short, for much of the 1970s and 1980s computer 
art was hesitantly commented on. That is not to say it was not commented on at all. The 
opposite here is true: even pedagogical texts were published in Leonardo (Turnbull, 
1971). In this context it is also important to stress the continuous and constant 
participation of one of the most vocal supporters of computer art, Herbert W. Franke, 
                                                      
 
229 Apart from the articles themselves, it is not rare to stumble on letters from pedagogues, teachers 
or educational institutions (Foster, 1968; Kondratiev and Kovda, 1968; National Advisory Council on Art 
Education, 1969; Ray and Jones, 1969). 
230 Salah (2008, p. 88) is similarly surprised by this ambiguity precisely ‘because Leonardo defines 
itself as a bridge between arts, sciences and technology’. Apart from the examples shown in the text, it is also 
worth mentioning the discussion between two editors, Roger Malina (1989) and David Carrier (1988) on the 
merits and demerits of computer art. 
  288 
who had an enormous output over the years 231 . This continual albeit sometimes 
intermittent presence makes computer art a central part of AST, as illustrated by 
Leonardo. We could also add Salah’s remarks that point to Leonardo’s close relationship 
with other computer art institutions even today: 
 
It supports prominent Digital Art websites like Rhizome or Digital Art Museum, 
and organizations like Digital Art Saloon. This support manifests itself in 
different types of connections. For example, in order to publish on the Rhizome 
web, one needs to get into contact with the editor of Leonardo. Digital Art 
Museum is granted a special permission by Leonardo to duplicate vital papers on 
Computer Art that were (first) printed in the journal. Every year, Leonardo 
publishes a special issue on Digital Art Saloon edited by the organizers of the 
event. Furthermore, through the Science, Technology and Arts organization, 
specifically founded for this purpose, Leonardo coordinates events to bring 
scholars from different disciplines under one roof. (Salah, 2008, p. 89) 
 
 
Although Taylor (2004), for example, pictures computer art separately from the 
art and technology efforts of Leonardo232, he also finds the trope of the renaissance, and 
Leonardo itself, as central to the ‘movement’ of computer art. Correctly, though, he 
realises that Leonardo’s principles promoted self-reliance and not the artist–scientist 
collaborations of earlier attempts such as E.A.T., and this, in turn, would inform many in 
the next generation, resulting in the figure of the artist–programmer as ‘an agent of 
cultural conciliation’ (Taylor, 2004, p. 105). A result of the previous (failed) attempts at 
uniting artists, engineers and scientists; cheaper and more available computing; and 
                                                      
 
231 Just to name a few: Franke (1971, 1972, 1974, 1975a, 1975b, 1976, 1977, 1981, 1986, 1987, 
1996, 2003) and Franke and Helbig (1992). Apart from the contributions of Franke and others, we should also 
note the specials of Leonardo and SIGGRAPH, a subject to be covered by the end of this section. 
232 An affirmation that I have disputed previously, not from a classical art historical point of view but 
from a sociologically inspired method, on the basis of the ‘lowest common denominator’ argument of the 
material (technoscientific) and intellectual (rational formalism) contexts that inform much of the rationale 
behind both practices. 
  289 
perhaps more importantly an ‘emphasis on computer literacy in universities and colleges’ 
(Taylor, 2004, p. 106), this new enlightened artist would combine artistic insight and 
scientific knowledge, embodying the renaissance dream pointed to by Leonardo. Perhaps 
best exemplified by Harold Cohen (Nunez, 2015), these new entrants were not in the 
beginning as technically or mathematically proficient as the first wave of computer artists 
(e.g. Nake, Nees and Nees) yet they managed to produce highly complex artworks while 
taking advantage of the educational establishments dedicated to computers and the arts. 
In this sense, then, the pedagogical efforts of CAS and Leonardo were indeed successful. 
Since the efforts of such institutions attracted a new generation into the field, we were 
bound to see its reflection in the academic world itself. Not only people in AST were and 
are very active in academia, from Bense to Nees and from Cohen to Malina, but also the 
universities themselves were in fact the laboratories where people could develop their 
work. Artists did not need to partake in industry, as in the Bell Labs of E.A.T. and Noll, 
but instead, given the increasing popularity of the machine, the tertiary education system 
became the host of many developments. Here I believe that it is Mason (2008, 2009), by 
mapping the influence of both cultural and educational institutions over British computer 
art, who provides the best case study of this relationship between the educational 
institutions that nurtured computer art and its individual actors. Reminding us that 
‘although a surprising amount of activity did take place [and] most of it existed largely 
outside what may be considered mainstream art world’ (Mason, 2009, p. 246), Mason 
argues: 
 
One of the main characteristics of British computer arts of the 1970s was that it 
involved artists who either learned to write code themselves or built up a working 
relationship with scientists, engineers, or technicians, at a time when the 
computer itself was at a formative stage. By the early 1970s, the major route into 
computer arts was through a select number of art schools. These provided not 
only education and training but, in some cases, career incubation, employment, 
research facilities, and networking opportunities. In a few institutions, at least, 
the result was that artists had the opportunity to access expensive and specialized 
computer equipment and technical expertise (generally belonging to science and 
maths departments) for the first time […] Thus at a polytechnic, it was 
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theoretically possible to study art and craft (technology) together, as in the first 
public art school at South Kensington in 1837. (Mason, 2009, p. 255)233 
 
It was not only in academia and publications such as Leonardo, however, that 
AST developed independently from the larger art world. Its relationship with industry, as 
in its early days, was and is also very much present. Let’s take, for example, the 
relationship between computer art specifically and trade/academic associations such as 
SIGGRAPH, which has supported computer art via a system of exhibitions, talks, 
seminars and awards since 1981 (Prince, 1989). ACM/SIGGRAPH, or the Association 
for Computing Machinery’s Special Interest Group on Computer Graphics, founded in 
1969, by 1998 was ‘a large, professional society with the word’s most impressive 
computer graphics conference’ with a total income of ‘more than $12 million’ (Williams, 
1998, p. 48): computer graphics and not computer art is, quite literally, its trade234. 
                                                      
 
233 The development of computer art in the UK, via its links with academia, resulted primarily from 
‘a sympathetic social and political climate […] The computer manufacturing industry was reorganized, the 
use of computers in higher education was examined, and the education sector itself was reformed. Under 
Harold Wilson’s “White Heat” government, post-war expansion of science funding was massive […] Science 
and technology seemed the talisman that would, through modernization, solve the problems of what was 
perceived as slow economic growth and decline’ (Mason, 2009, p. 246). The reader should also recall that, 
despite Mason’s affirmation that the UK was an exceptional example, it was not the only one. Wisnioski 
(2013), for example, traces the development of AST in MIT’s Center for Advanced Visual Studies, whereas 
Enrique Alés (2000, 2003) dissects the origins of computer art in the Centro de Cálculo de la Universidad de 
Madrid. We have also the work of Shanken (2005), which succinctly but extensively maps many other 
different interactions. From this point of view, of academia supporting an artistic practice, since the centres of 
research and production were not relegated to traditional artistic departments, we can say again that the state-
led push towards science, in the UK and elsewhere, is what made these developments possible.  
234 Accordingly, its contribution to industry has also been important: ‘The development of virtual 
reality, for example, benefited enormously from the creation of SIGGRAPH, the ACM’s special interest 
group for computer graphics. This organization brought together university and industry researchers, as well 
as users of computer graphics, from a variety of fields (e.g., arts, entertainment, medicine, and 
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Nevertheless, SIGGRAPH’s involvement with the computer art field, in fact, can be 
traced to an even earlier time, if we consider that Computers and Automation, the same 
magazine that awarded the first prizes in computer art, was founded by Edmund C. 
Berkeley, populariser of the idea of the electronic brain and the founder of both ACM 
(SIGGRAPH’s parent institution) and Computers and Automation (Denning, 1988). 
Another symbol of its importance for the field can be seen in Leonardo’s attention to 
SIGGRAPH’s exhibitions and events, publically announcing and discussing them as in 
the example of the memorable 1989 Leonardo Supplemental Issue. The importance of 
this issue as well as of SIGGRAPH’s exhibition is well documented by Taylor (2004), 
who posits the exhibition as a central event in the history of computer art as an idea: 
 
1989 was a pivotal year in the history of computer art. Two crucial proceedings 
took place: the annual Siggraph conference and CAA meeting which together 
provided the genesis for a number of wide ranging and ideologically diverse 
journal articles […] these articles reframed the reception and understanding of 
the computer and its future role in the arts. The conference proceedings, and the 
articles which followed, responded to a crisis of confidence surfacing within the 
entire computer art project […] At the close of the decade, commentators and 
critics began a comprehensive evaluation of computer art in the face of what 
appeared to be computer art’s abject failure in gaining acceptance into the 
artworld. Antagonism and frustration surfaced in a series of polemic events and 
articles, which solidified into a position opposed to the modernist ethos of 
conservatism and technological utopianism that was such a dominant part of 
computer art discourse […] The computer, as it became increasingly accepted in 
its new pluralistic form, proved a valuable postmodern art tool.
 
This had 
profound effects for the 1990s, especially in discourse surrounding ‘new media 
art’ and ‘digital art’. As computer art became increasingly contested the term 
effectively becomes nebulous, prompting artists and critics to invent more 
descriptive terms. This fragmentation meant that computer art never again held 
the exclusive position it once enjoyed. The discourse lost much of its historical 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
manufacturing). Its annual conferences have become a show-case of new technology and a primary forum for 
exchanging new ideas’ (National Research Council, 1999, p. 141). 
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importance to the new paradigms (such as ‘digital art’) that co-opted computer 
art’s history for its own genealogy. (Taylor, 2004, p. 194)
235 
 
Although the following discussion is interesting in itself, since it demonstrates 
the substitution of one nomenclature, ‘computer art’, with another, ‘digital art’, as an 
attempt to renew a field damaged by a lack of legitimation (Taylor, 2004, p. 194)236, for 
the purposes of this thesis it is more important to look at where it happened: at events 
such as SIGGRAPH and within the pages of publications such as Leonardo – not in 
traditional art world biennales, publications, museums or books. By the end of the 1980s 
the institutions dedicated to AST, which had emerged from the cultural onslaught of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, were more than established institutions. These were not only 
proliferating but also becoming bigger, richer while at the same time being followed by 
other newer institutions237. A quick Google search for the terms ‘digital art’, ‘new media 
                                                      
 
235 This transformation, from computer to digital art, is well documented in the fifth chapter of 
Taylor’s PhD thesis (Taylor, 2004). We should not forget that, in the mid-1980s and towards the mid-1990s, 
even before ‘digital art’ became the predominant label, ‘electronic art’, as in the work of Popper (1993) and 
the formation of the Inter-Society for the Electronic Arts (ISEA) in 1990 (and also supported by a special 
issue of Leonardo), held some currency. These different labels, with different emphases and theoretical 
assumptions, however, never managed to bring the field together. As demonstrated previously in this thesis, 
any attempt to unite the works of a heterogeneous group of artists by aesthetic criteria that do not necessarily 
correlate to the artworks in question is doomed to failure. Again, I believe, it is better to understand these 
developments according to their lowest common denominator and their institutions rather than a constructed 
aesthetic criterion. 
236  Although Taylor posits this questioning of computer art, by quoting articles such as Ken 
Knowlton’s ‘Why It Isn’t Art Yet?’, as a problem that is decidedly of the late 1980s, as we previously saw the 
problem existed since the early days of computer art. Concerning this fact, I believe it is better to understand 
the change from computer art to digital art as the peak of a long-standing problem and not as a new 
phenomenon, which is most certainly not the case. 
237 Among the new members, it is worth mentioning Ars Electronic, founded in 1979, which had 
among its founders no less than Herbert Franke. Similarly to in SIGGRAPH, however, the line between 
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art’, ‘art and technology’ and so on reveals an enormous variety of festivals, biennales 
and institutions dedicated exclusively to such practices. Moreover, commercial and 
industrial links are not only present in the institutional arrangements of professional 
societies but are also seen in engagements between artists and industry (Shanken, 2005; 
Mason, 2009). It is as if a full circle has appeared: first scientists entered the art world 
because they created art with industrial technology, and then it was artists who entered 
industry via their use of industrial technology. As Mason explains, the ‘downturn in 
public sector funding in the 1980s coincided with a rise in demand from the commercial 
sector for sophisticated graphics, which were rapidly becoming more easily produced by 
a computer than by traditional methods, thus encouraging a move for some artists into 
private sector freelance or part-time contract jobs’ (Mason, 2009, p. 258). 
Supported indirectly by the state and via the academic world, and promoted by 
industry, AST had, after the cultural turn of the late 1960s, developed its own network of 
institutions in order to survive. That today we have a massive variety of labels to describe 
its actions, always at the fringe of the art world, its market and its institutions, is only 
testimony to its continuous development and heterogeneity, similarly to and despite art 
itself. From this perspective, in light of the field’s isolationist tendencies, it is 
unsurprising that Leonardo itself, as a journal, can be thought of as knitting together a 
close community via its articles and editorial guidelines. As Salah demonstrates with a 
smart use of statistical data via both text mining and analysis, ‘only about 45% percent of 
[Leonardo’s] papers have art related subjects’ (2008, p. 95). Moreover, and perhaps even 
more characteristic of such an insular impulse, is the fact that circa 39 per cent of its 
articles reference the journal itself (Salah, 2008, p. 96, tables 1, 2) and not another journal 
or source. Humanities journals and authors have been shown to have a lower propensity 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
artistic and industrial/commercial application was blurred. For example, its annual award Prix Ars 
Electronica, awarded since 1987, is usually shared between members of the AST community and industry. 
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for self-referencing (e.g., compared to fields pertaining to the life or natural sciences) 
(Snyder and Bonzi, 1998; Hyland, 2003), as they tend to rely on sources other than 
traditional journals. Only a few other humanities journals self-reference as much as the 
articles in Leonardo; the average rate is around 20 per cent (McVeigh, 2002). Although 
high self-referencing can be attributed to smaller and newer fields, for Leonardo that is 
not the case238. 
By 1996 a different landscape had emerged. Given the pervasiveness of 
computing technology and growing knowledge of it, especially via the Internet, that is not 
surprising: the biggest obstacle to learning and using the computer had finally been 
broken. Nevertheless, in the same year an influential media theorist, Lev Manovich, 
proposed in a provocative blog post at Rhizome, and long after the institutional debate 
that relegated computers to a part of a larger digital art discourse, a simplistic, short, 
incomplete but yet catchy text titled ‘The Death of Computer Art’ (1996). In summary, in 
this text he claims that the convergence between computer art and the art world will never 
happen (Manovich, 1996). The reason for this, and here is the catchy part, is that they 
belong to different worlds: ‘Duchamp-land’ and ‘Turing-land’. Although simplistic in the 
sense that he does not acknowledge the structural basis for the development of his 
Turing-land (as seen throughout this thesis), he is right in positioning Turing-land’s 
output as diametrically opposed to that of Duchamp-land239. In order to demonstrate this 
                                                      
 
238 It is interesting to note that Salah does not further develop these numbers, which are used to 
exemplify (correctly) the characteristic of a new field produced around Leonardo. Both this technique and its 
insights, I believe, may produce valuable results in the future. Moreover, corroborating the thesis that 
computer art is central to AST and vice and versa, after art (45.6 per cent) and psychology (15.2 per cent), 
computer science (8.4 per cent) is the third most common topic over Leonardo’s pages, surpassing traditional 
artistic subjects such as the humanities (4.6 per cent) and even philosophy (2.1 per cent) (Salah, 2008, p. 96). 
239 I honestly do not consider his rationale, simplistic and reductionist, to be a worthy effort. Since it 
is impossible to find the full text today (only excerpts found in Rhizome), and since most of the links to it 
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argument, the next section will focus on one example: the treatment of genetics by both 
AST and contemporary art. 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion: The persistence of optimism 
 
Within the cultural field usually described as contemporary art there is one marginal sub-
group, which I label AST, that has embodied a unique discursive position within its 
parent field240. This discourse, which we may refer to as pro-science and technophile, 
although not unique to AST, does seems at odds with the technophobic discourse of the 
broader artistic world241, which is why we may regard it as unique within contemporary 
art. This division, although not homogeneous across the whole artistic field, is the central 
concern of this case study. Hence, the conclusion of this chapter investigates how 
different artistic discourses and practices interpret and represent scientific thought. 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
have been removed and he has not published it since, I think he does not value it either. For more on this text, 
though, see Graham (2009) or Taylor (2014, p. 251). 
240 Part of this section was presented at the CHArt 2014 Conference (King’s College) and at the 
Medical Imagining International Conference (Ulm University), and is forthcoming in the collection titled 
Popular Culture and Biomedicine: Knowledge in the Life Sciences as Cultural Artefacts. 
241 Although this thesis stresses the importance of technology in the uneasy liaison between these 
two fields, we cannot forget that this is not computer art’s only problem with the art establishment. An 
idiosyncratic set of conventions or even the lack thereof, seen previously and as understood by Becker 
(2008[1982]), also contributed to this tension. Even pioneers in computer art, such as Herbert Franke (1985, 
p. 153), recognised this as a problem. In some other cases, such as the Stuttgart group led by Bense, a 
completely new set of conventions, and their respective values, was proposed (Klütsch, 2007a, 2007b, 2012). 
Needless to say, the previous section has explored the consequences of these new values: the creation of new 
institutions dedicated exclusively to this practice. 
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Working as proxies of this larger struggle, between AST and contemporary art, the result 
of this inquiry shows that artists generally positioned within AST not only understand 
science differently from their artistic peers but also represent it in a very particular and 
positive way: whereas AST artists see science and technology as beneficial, empowering 
and, ultimately, progressive tools that can improve our human condition, artists in the 
larger art world see technology and science as proxies of an increasing technocratic, 
dehumanising society that promotes the idea of unregulated progress and poses a threat to 
the last sanctuary of humanness: art itself. One of the reasons for this division, as I have 
previously argued, is the result of AST’s problematic and continuous development as an 
independent art world, beginning with the 1960s computer art ‘movement’, and as a 
technophilic cultural field. Achieving relative success in an increasingly culturally hostile 
environment, computer art expressed the technocratic spirit of previous decades in a 
moment when this very spirit was losing momentum. Inheriting computer art’s nurturing 
mechanisms – industry and academia – as well as much of its rationale, AST has come to 
embody and continue early computer art’s technophilic position within a broadly 
technophobic artistic field. The main points of this conclusion are hence threefold. 
Firstly, I historically ground today’s division, between artistic technophilia and 
technophobia, as a consequence of exogenous cultural changes and not only endogenous 
artistic ones242. Secondly, by stressing the importance of larger cultural changes in the 
artistic perception of science, I show that these oppositional artistic discourses are not 
only produced by individual dispositions but are also the result of historically constituted 
                                                      
 
242 Also referred to as opportunity spaces or ‘political opportunity’ (Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996; 
Meyer and Minkoff, 2004), these exogenous factors are larger historical, social, intellectual and material 
changes outside the scope of the artistic world in question. For an overview of the benefits and limits of this 
concept applied to the study of artistic worlds, as well as further conceptualisation, see Baumann (2007a, p. 
52; 2007b, pp. 21–52). For more information on the conceptualisation of art as a collective activity, consult 
the first chapter. 
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collective frames243 employed in order to justify one’s art. Thirdly, as we examine recent 
AST discourse and demonstrate its institutional resilience despite larger artistic 
opposition, we will find that its current position resembles that of authors positioned 
within the transhuman field, indicating not only a mere coincidence but, I believe, a 
larger cultural trend. 
Before we proceed the reader should recall that AST, which encompasses labels 
such as digital art, computer art, electronic art, art and science, new media art and so on, 
refers to artists and aestheticians who invariably discuss, produce or criticise artworks 
created with the help or within the scope of technologies created after the Second World 
War. Moreover, in addition to this continuous engagement with technoscientific 
developments and discourses, we also find AST in the institutions dedicated to its own 
promotion. Usually displaying an emphasis on information technologies, the digital 
computer being the most obvious one, AST’s members cannot be easily grouped as a 
single ‘art historical’ movement if not without reference to their use of such technologies, 
methods and institutions – as demonstrated extensively over the course of this thesis. 
Resulting sometimes in a naïve and exacerbated scientism that has persisted over the 
years, AST in fact is not a term that describes or defines a group of closely connected 
individuals but rather a term that works as an umbrella term, uniting those distinct 
cultural products of post-war art that emphasise the connections between art, science and 
technology, both as an artistic subject and as a medium. It is not my intention to provide 
an art historical definition of this field. This has been done many times before and a 
consensus has never been achieved. With the label AST I am aiming at the lowest 
common denominator. A restrictive term would be self-defeating to the endeavour of this 
                                                      
 
243 A concept also drawn from the social movement literature, collective action frames developed 
from the work of Goffman (1986) and can be seen as ‘sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate 
the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization’ (Benford and Snow, 2000, p. 614). 
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thesis since, differently from art theoretical studies, I am not interested in an aesthetic 
proposition. Instead, I focus on the material, discursive and institutional links uniting 
those artists and theoreticians into a single albeit loose group. It is also important to note 
that this combination of words – ‘art, science and technology’ – is not proposed out of 
thin air and follows the subtitle of the most enduring publication dedicated to AST: 
Leonardo: The Journal of the International Society for the Arts, Sciences and 
Technology, today published by MIT Press. Leonardo, I argue, has followed and shaped 
AST since its very early days; this case study will provide an example of such influence 
on a micro-level – that is, that of the artwork itself. 
In order to demonstrate that AST artists today are in a position of veiled conflict 
with many in the artistic field, I will compare the artworks and discourses of three 
different individuals. One of them, Eduardo Kac, is a representative of AST practices; the 
other two, the duo Jake and Dinos Chapman, represent the larger artistic world. The 
rationale for this choice is clear: all of them share the propensity to discuss and interpret 
genetics. The result of this comparison demonstrates that, on the one hand, we have a 
technophilic group, AST, which assumes that scientific developments are not only normal 
but also central to artistic debates. Its rationale, even today, is centred on the argument 
that, since science cannot be stopped, artists are obliged to make its progress more 
humane. It mainly perceives technology as neutral and concludes that it is up to us to 
make sure it is put to good use. On the other hand, we have a larger, as yet more 
artistically dominant, technophobic group. This group belongs to the larger contemporary 
art world and assumes technology and science to be proxies of an increasing technocratic, 
dehumanising society that not only promotes the idea of unregulated progress but also 
poses a threat to the last sanctuary of humanness: creativity and art. This group refers to 
AST as naïve and utopian since neither science nor technology are neutral. 
First let us focus on the Chapmans’ artwork Zygotic Acceleration, Biogenetic, 
De-sublimated Libidinal Model (1995) (Fig. 57). An unsettling but also kitsch sculpture, 
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this creature looks everywhere; there is no place where you can escape from its many 
faces. Its body is a confusing interconnected amalgam of human forms. Sexual organs, 
both male and female, are distributed unevenly across its many faces. On its many legs, 
there are sneakers instead of feet. Despite its youngish looks, according to the duo, these 
are not children: ‘Our organisms are genetically mature and dislike being called children. 
They wear sneakers so that they can run fast like super-powered nomads’ (Chapman and 
Chapman, n.d.). There is a strong and well-defined strategy in Zygotic Acceleration, as 
well as other works from the duo, that seems to be absorbed and understood by all its fans 
and critics: its capacity to visually shock and spark a debate on the limits of 
representation (Stallabrass, 2006, pp. 102–103; TATE Liverpool, 2006; Grunberg, 2007). 
Intended to be a commentary on our modern morality and the body (Grunberg, 2007), the 
Chapman duo’s work uses mannequins of deformed children as a way of inciting a 
reaction from the viewer. Clearly involving some avant-garde ideas of shock value, it is 
interesting to note that, for the supporters of both brothers, art theory is used as a form of 
defence against claims of sensationalism (Stallabrass, 2006, p. 102). Zygotic 
Acceleration, however, apparently does not aim to criticise genetics or other ‘anti-
humanist viruses’ (Chapman and Chapman, n.d.). Jake Chapman succinctly exposes this 
idea by affirming that the brothers ‘work analytically rather than critically. We aren’t 
trying to solve genetic engineering problems when we deal with the subject of cloning’ 
(in Kunsthaus Bregenz, 2005). 
Despite their claim that they are not interested in commenting on genetics itself, 
Zygotic Acceleration epitomises the popular reading of genetics as an immoral and 
monstrous practice. Its immorality stems from the proposition that genetics, in this 
understanding, is an ‘anti-humanist’ threat. The monstrosity of its result, the deformed 
children in Zygotic Acceleration, is then used against the viewer, who, consequently, 
ought to be disgusted by it. In other words, the Chapmans’ aesthetic strategy attempts to 
use this (perceived) terrible humanist threat, genetics, as a way of achieving a desired 
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moral panic (Chapman and Chapman in Grunberg, 2007, p. 11). Not only do they 
establish genetics as sinful but they also choose to engage with it knowing that it will 
cause their desired result: moral panic. When they say that they do not want to resolve the 
‘genetic engineering problem’ it is because, from their point of view, this problem is not 
theirs. Their intention is to use these ‘problems’ to excite reactions from viewers. 
Genetics, by its very use, as a trigger of moral panic, is defined and represented as a 
horrendous practice and not something to be celebrated or even discussed. It has already 
been defined as such. They may say that they ‘work analytically rather than critically’; 
however, this is not what we see in action with Zygotic Acceleration, itself a very critical 
depiction of genetic engineering. 
It is true that their career is not solely dedicated to the theme of genetic 
engineering as a trigger of ‘moral panic’. They have also used their well-known shocking 
strategies to discuss other topics such as capitalist and postcolonial institutions (as seen in 
The Chapman Family Collection, 2002) and war (as seen in the Disasters of War, 1993, 
and Hell, 2000, series). What unites those works, apart from their obvious attempt to 
shock, is the conversation around topics such as modernity and its consequences244. The 
idea of rationalisation, though not clearly expressed, can be found under the veil of visual 
aggression that made the duo so famous. Consequentially, it is no coincidence that their 
choice of McDonalds, as one of the targets in The Chapman Family Collection (Fig. 58), 
mirrors recent attempts to recast the Weberian notion of rationalisation of contemporary 
society via the work of sociologist George Ritzer and his book The McDonaldization of 
Society (1996). Another evidence of such a play on the idea and precepts of 
                                                      
 
244 Jake Chapman hints that even their technique, a rather traditional one, partakes in this dialogue. 
Their work ‘parasitically, or vampirically, depends upon all the forms of art production which should, under 
the conditions of progressive modernity and liberal humanism, have been buried for being Luddite or non 
teleological. So our excavation of all these zombified art techniques visit the healthy, vital, modernist body 
with all the diseases which give it its momentum’ (in Chapman and Baker, 2003, p. 8). 
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rationalisation can be found in Ubermensch (Fig. 59), from 1995. In this sculpture we 
find theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking atop a fake hill in his wheelchair and, as a 
newspaper critic points out, it is ‘clearly not a homage to Hawking’s intellect or courage’ 
and rather ‘stresses his carnal weakness and mocks the idea that his mind has somehow 
conquered matter’ (J. Jones, 2012). In another newspaper article, from 2007, the brothers 
are accused of being anti-Enlightenment and against all kinds of ‘reason’. Reading their 
work as a ‘pure expression of postmodernist philosophy’ (Hari, 2007), the author believes 
something rather sinister is in play: ‘They vandalise and ridicule the fruits of reason […] 
Some foolish critics have praised the “moral anger” in the Chapmans’ work, directed at 
“injustice and cruelty”. Precisely the opposite is the case. This is immoral anger, 
celebrating injustice and cruelty as transgression’ (Hari, 2007). 
One could indeed be tempted to understand the Chapmans as mockers and 
vandals of modernity, rationality and even Enlightenment ideals. What we cannot forget, 
however, is that theirs is a position pretty much in tune with the artistic debates emerging 
from the late 1960s, present not only in the arts but also in culture in general. The 
technocratic, rational and positivistic world being condemned and used by the Chapmans 
is precisely the world condemned by the counter-culture. Genetics, along with capitalism 
and technocracy, then, are portrayed as diseases facing individuals and societies and, in 
turn, are used as aesthetical artifices that should – in theory – wake people from their 
‘artificial sleep’ (Grunberg, 2007, p. 28). The duo undoubtedly sit at the centre of what 
we have so far labelled as the art world. They have works commissioned by institutions 
such as the Tate, they are part of numerous private collections such as Saatchi’s, their 
works are constantly exchanged for hundreds of thousands pounds, they are highly visible 
in the specialist press, they are represented by highly prestigious galleries, etc. It would 
be naïve to consider these artists as marginal ones. Their prestige indicates a resonance 
with art world concerns and, despite some dissonant voices as exemplified by the critics 
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above, the fact is that they are central participants in the contemporary art world. The 
same, however, cannot be said of our next artist. 
As Roger Malina remarked in 2001, Leonardo today receives ‘texts from a new 
generation of artist-researchers, artists very well versed in contemporary science or 
technology’ (Malina, 2001, p. 293). Holding to the tradition of 1960s technophilic artists, 
these new artists still struggle to bridge the two cultures. Aiding their effort, and central 
to many technological developments ever since, we locate, again, computing technology. 
According to Malina, ‘the shared language and tools of computer science have provided 
the basis for shared approaches for problem solving, new collaboration environments and 
ultimately the beginnings of overlapping epistemologies’ (Malina, 2001, p. 293). Eduardo 
Kac, our next artist, fits perfectly with the figure of the contemporary AST artist as 
painted by Malina. Despite being distant from the centre of the art market and institutions 
that usually legitimise production within contemporary art, Kac is central to the AST 
practices that emerged out of the early computer art of the 1960s. Very academically 
active (like his predecessors), averse to visual shock and not very much discussed within 
traditional art institutions, Kac is a central figure of our technophilic art world, the AST 
one, and is regarded as the creator or exponent of the bioart practice. Although not 
specifically looking for the kind of shock value operating in the previous example, Kac’s 
projects are, to say the least, anything but easy. In fact, the artwork that I shall now focus 
on not only generated a huge response but was also the reason for a dispute that itself 
exemplifies the contentious nature of the genetic engineering. Born in 2000, Alba (Fig. 
60), the glowing rabbit, according to Kac 
 
is an albino rabbit. This means that, since she has no skin pigment, under 
ordinary environmental conditions she is completely white with pink eyes. Alba 
is not green all the time. She only glows when illuminated with the correct light. 
When (and only when) illuminated with blue light (maximum excitation at 488 
nm), she glows with a bright green light (maximum emission at 509 nm). She 
was created with EGFP, an enhanced version (i.e., a synthetic mutation) of the 
original wild-type green fluorescent gene found in the jellyfish Aequorea 
Victoria. (Kac, 2000) 
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Alba was shown for the first time in France in 2000. Surrounding her birth, there 
was worldwide media frenzy and a heated debate regarding the nature of Kac’s artwork. 
Differently from the previous example, the shock related to Kac’s work was not caused 
by its aesthetics. Instead, what most horrified people was the very idea of creating a 
living, genetically altered animal for art’s sake. If compared to Zygotic Acceleration, 
Kac’s GFP Bunny project – in which Alba was obviously central – is impossible to 
describe simply as an art object and can better be understood if divided into parts or 
modules. According to Kac, ‘Alba is undoubtedly a very special animal, but I want to be 
clear that her formal and genetic uniqueness are but one component of the “GFP Bunny” 
artwork. The “GFP Bunny” project is a complex social event that starts with the creation 
of a chimerical animal that does not exist in nature’ (Kac, 2000). Alba, in other words, 
was not herself an artwork. Instead, Alba was just a component, a starting point for an 
event that led to the artwork. In Kac’s words, the intention of this event was to produce a 
sequence of dialogues between ‘professionals of several disciplines and the public’ (Kac, 
2000). Perhaps related to his background as an academic (similarly to many AST artists), 
Kac’s art project relies heavily on his theoretical writing. In his paper describing the GFP 
Bunny project, Kac looks at the history of the human and rabbit relationship, arguing that, 
contrary to popular notions, humanity has always interfered with the animals’ evolution 
(Kac, 2000). Despite the complexity of his artwork, Kac seems clear about its intention 
and objective. In true Leonardo fashion, and resembling Malina’s wish for artists to 
clearly discuss their own work, Kac’s website hosts many articles, examples and records 
related to the GFP Bunny project, written both by himself and others. The strategy here is 
to engage the public with his artwork and spark a debate on the issues raised by genetic 
engineering and transgenic organisms. In this case, GFP Bunny’s medium is not just an 
important aspect of Kac’s work but rather it is essential. Aside from the rabbit herself (if 
we regard her as a medium), there is an interaction between the artist and the public that 
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is achieved by a series of public interventions, objects, debates, articles and recordings, 
all accessible via Kac’s website (Fig. 61, 62, 63, 64). 
Curiously, the controversy involved not only Kac but also his collaborators. In 
the popular press, the ethical issues concerning new genetically modified organisms were 
very much alive. Under the spectre of Dolly the sheep, genetically modified crops and 
mad cow disease, the debate developed within a partisan, rather bleak atmosphere 
(Dickey, 2001). Perhaps because of negative public opinion or perhaps because of honest 
ethical concern, despite helping Kac with the creation of Alba, the French state-funded 
research centre INRA (Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique) at the last minute 
rejected the use of Alba outside the walls of its laboratories. Ironically Alba, the key 
element in Kac’s artwork, ended up like any other scientific animal in captivity. In an 
article for Wired magazine, Christopher Dickey describes the tug-of-war involving Kac 
and his scientific collaborators (Dickey, 2001). In a sarcastic account of the conflict 
between artist and scientists, Dickey exposes the ways in which the public reacts and 
expresses itself. Again, that old Frankenstein myth is very much remembered. Searching 
for public reactions to GFP Bunny, we see that the idea of monstrous chimeras was 
involved in much of the discussion, expressing itself in both the press and academic 
circles. Kac’s radical approach not only exposed a bitter discussion about genetics as a 
whole but also had the effect of causing a debate on art’s (and science’s) responsibility 
and ethics. 
Kac’s appropriation of genetics is very different from the Chapmans’. Not only 
do these artists differ in their opinion concerning it but they also represent genetics 
differently. The artistic representation and use of genetics offer the opportunity to discuss 
opposing practices that, otherwise, do not seem to have anything in common. Likewise, 
by contrasting Kac’s and Chapman’s artwork it is also possible to peek into the rationale 
of these artists’ field: respectively, AST and the broader art world. Juxtaposing the 
qualities of GFP Bunny and Zygotic Acceleration, we find opposing discourses in relation 
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to genetics, in particular, and science, rationality and technology more generally. While 
Zygotic Acceleration reutilises the representation of genetics as immoral and monstrous 
in order to criticise public assumptions of rationality and morality, GFP Bunny contests 
the very idea of this negative representation. On the one hand, the Chapmans’ use of 
‘anatomical transgression’ (Chapman and Chapman, n.d.) is used to question the viewer, 
not genetics itself. Kac, on the other hand, intends to question the public’s understanding 
of genetics. Positioned in different art worlds, each one with its particular historical 
development, the artworks speak for two distinct artistic practices: one, sympathetic to 
genetics, does not represent but appropriates genetics for artistic purposes (GFP Bunny); 
the other, opposed to such engineering, appropriates not genetic techniques but instead its 
representation as an immoral practice (Zygotic Acceleration). AST and Kac, with their 
roots found in the rational rigours of institutions such as Leonardo, is then positioned in 
exact opposition to the precepts demonstrated by the Chapmans. Whereas the Chapmans 
are active participants in places such as the Tate Modern, Kac is, unsurprisingly, a 
member of Leonardo’s editorial board and an active member of the AST community. 
Showing both resilience and – albeit localised – success, these technophilic 
practices demonstrate a propensity both to be contentious in nature and to reverberate 
with a certain section of the art public – one that constitutes in itself a rather detached and 
specialised group. In other words, AST still exists despite being criticised by the 
members of the art world and, at the same time, owes its existence to this very criticism: 
in order to prosper, AST enthusiasts had to separate from traditional artistic institutions 
and, in the process of doing so, created a new field for people willing to further the field’s 
ambitions. Ironically, the idiosyncratic technophilia of AST members, despite going 
against its parent field, is the reason for its growth into a specialised artistic field. Had 
AST members adopted the pessimistic discourse of other art world members, who would 
have represented the technophile among them? It should come as no surprise that AST is 
rarely seen in traditional visual art courses and instead is taught in specialised higher 
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education courses, usually by these same practitioners. The same observation can be 
raised with regard to the publications and festivals usually presenting those same artists. 
While, for example, the Chapmans enjoy huge success in commercial galleries and major 
art museums, AST artists are historically presented (but not exclusively) in specialised 
institutions. At the same time that we are not endorsing this division we cannot, however, 
pretend it does not exist. Since AST has been rejected by most of the art world, does this 
separation denote that artistic technophilia is something of a peripheral position, relegated 
to certain close-knit groups and technology enthusiasts only? Perhaps not anymore. AST 
has grown, from its very humble academic beginnings, to have hundreds of dedicated 
festivals, university degrees and awards. Lately the field seems to have found a new 
confidence that is reminiscent of the early practitioners’ calls for a new art for a new 
time. Some even affirm that the Venice Biennale, perhaps the central event in the art 
world calendar, has shown a tendency to display and comment on posthumanism, albeit 
‘not of the technological variety’ (Auslander, 2004, p. 54), in some of its past editions. 
Despite not being centred at the heart of art’s canonical attempts, AST artists not only 
find space for their technophilia but also manage to prosper and survive within a 
theoretically hostile environment: a technophobic art world. 
It is important to remember here that Kac, in fact, is rather moderate in his 
technophilic position. At times, he seems very questioning of possible abuses of 
technology and, again, reiterates the position so common in his field that artists have a 
responsibility to ethically discuss future scientific possibilities (Kac, 2007c)245. If we 
                                                      
 
245 Kac, in his book Signs of Life (2007, p. 12), which celebrates bioart, stresses that the ‘writers 
and artists whose work forms this anthology don’t see their role as commentators chronicling or illustrating 
the burgeoning biotech culture. Rather, their work is engaged in shaping discourse and public policy, and in 
stimulating wide-ranging debate. The writers and artists in this collection also reveal an acute awareness of 
the ethical questions associated with biotechnology.’ 
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want to find extreme artistic technophilia, we should look at the work of other artists, 
such as Orlan or Stelarc (Fig. 65, 66, 67). For these artists, genetic engineering is not a 
matter to be debated. They do not wish to discuss the positive or negative aspects of it. 
For them any scientific development, including genetics, is an aim, a right. Their 
objective is clear: to enhance humans. It is in artists such as these that AST’s technophilia 
becomes something else, something more vocal, moralistic and sometimes even 
sanctimonious. Stelarc specifically, highly active in the AST field, seems to offer the 
clearest apology for enhancement. Seeing genetic engineering, cybernetic implants and 
other yet-to-be-discovered technologies as part of an imagined arsenal against our 
obsolete body, Stelarc can be argued to be a quintessential transhumanist. The 
philosopher Keith Ansell Pearson (1997), for example, tried to distance Stelarc’s work 
from this optimistic, technologically oriented strand of transhumanism (philosophical 
posthumanism), towards the more cautious and questioning view usually but not always 
held by cultural transhumanists, but it is difficult to deny the artist’s own words246. 
Pearson may indeed seem right in saying that Stelarc’s work resembles the kind of 
posthumanistic thought sponsored by himself, more concerned with the dissolution of 
boundaries than technological utopia. However, when we look at Stelarc’s own discourse, 
it is unfair to the artist to assume that he is not at all interested in the tech-optimistic edge 
of transhumanism shunned by Pearson. Stelarc, as we know, is no naïve adopter and is 
very clear in his texts about his intentions and expectations247. Moreover, arguing that our 
body can no longer match the strenuous necessities of our new world, Stelarc asks: 
                                                      
 
246  For a discussion regarding the similarities and differences between transhumanism and 
posthumanism, as well as their historical development, see Miah (2009), Hauskeller (2014a, 2014b) and 
Ranisch (2014). 
247 In fact, in this same text quoted above, Pearson makes this assumption by stating that ‘Stelarc’s 
most famous statement, that “the body is obsolete” comes perilously close to the dubious accounts of 
evolution provided by techno neo-Lamarckians that I have been keen to criticise’ (1997, p. 227). In a kind of 
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How can the body function within this landscape of machines? […] Perhaps it’s 
now time to design the body to match its machines. We somehow have to turbo-
drive the body-implant and augment the brain. We have to provide ways of 
connecting it to the cyber-network. At the moment this is not easily done, and it’s 
done indirectly via keyboards and other devices. There’s no way of directly 
jacking in. Mind you, I’m not talking here in terms of sci-fi speculation. For me, 
these possibilities are already apparent. What do we do when confronted with the 
situation where we discover the body is obsolete? We have to start thinking of 
strategies for redesigning the body. (Stelarc, n.d.) 
 
Although sharing a certain technophilic predisposition, Kac’s and Stelarc’s 
artworks are not in any way precursors or central to today’s transhumanist debates. 
Instead, both artists are reminders of the importance of the subject for certain social 
groups and in culture in general. In fact, as observed by Hauskeller (2009, 2013), the 
subject is even becoming mainstream. Cinema, literature, video games, the arts… all 
those different cultural domains can provide useful examples through which to discuss 
technophilic (and technophobic) discourses. Questions regarding the future of scientific 
development, it seems, have become central to many cultural agents (again). I am not 
certain why, how or when this shift occurred; in order to answer this question, a whole 
different effort should be proposed. What seems clear is that, despite not being a 
consensual shift, as exemplified by the artistic output of the Chapmans, technophilia and 
its most extreme position, transhumanism, do resonate for some people. In relation to 
GFP Bunny, for example, Kac recalls that ‘in the beginning people were quite worked up 
about it; there was a greater concern and fear than exists now […] The discussion now is 
more philosophical; the sense that some impending doom is about to happen has 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
self-censorship that seems selective, later in the text Pearson states that, although in his own writings Stelarc 
attempts to provide an agenda to guide the utilization of future technologies, he is not, ‘however, interested in 
his legislations concerning the future but rather with his art-praxis and with the modes of “becoming” 
contained within it’ (1997, p. 231). 
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completely vanished’ (in Anke et al., 2008, p. 307). The growth in technophilia, not only 
in the arts but also in culture at large, I argue, is one of the reasons for the expansion and 
resilience of AST. A convergence in discourses from different fields, such as 
philosophical transhumanism and AST, illustrates this larger cultural trend. 
On his webpage Kac (2000) attempts to ethically justify GFP Bunny by arguing 
that humans have always meddled with the genetic development of rabbits248. According 
to his narrative the GFP Bunny project breaks no social or ethical rule since ‘humans 
have determined the evolution of rabbits for at least 1400 years’ (Kac, 2000)249 . 
Notwithstanding its validity, we also find a similar argument within transhumanist 
circles. Transhumanists and AST artists, at first, may seem to share only the call for a 
new, improved human. Their desire for human improvement, however, is not the only 
thing that relates these two distinct fields. Kac’s description of genetics, for example, as 
another normal/natural step in our will for knowledge, is reminiscent of Bostrom’s (2005) 
assertion that ‘human desire to acquire new capacities is as ancient as our species’. Both 
authors in this case base their arguments on the assertion that humans have always looked 
for ways to improve their own condition. Whereas Kac highlights humanity’s constant 
attempts to change other species for its own needs, Bostrom stresses that humans have 
always looked for ways to improve themselves. Although employing different narratives, 
Bostrom’s and Kac’s historical accounts define the progression and adoption of new 
scientific advances as normal, natural human tendencies250. 
                                                      
 
248 Kac also justifies his projects ‘artistically’, using both art historical and art theoretical examples 
that link his practice with previous artistic periods and ideas. In order to maintain a cohesive text, I will not 
discuss those arguments and instead shall look at his ethical assertions. 
249 A similar historical argument is made elsewhere (Kac, 2007a, 2007b). 
250 By dissecting the discourses of some notable transhumanists, Hauskeller highlights that they 
usually ‘presuppose a normative conception of human nature’ where there is ‘an argument that proceeds from 
a claim about what some being’s nature is to a conclusion that tell us what this being ought to do’ (2009, pp. 
  310 
With an eye on the prize (the improvement of humans), both authors end up 
equating normalcy to virtuousness. One product of this hypothesised human nature251, 
also commonly found in both AST and transhumanist discourses, is the idea that 
scientific and technological development has been accelerating over the years 252 . 
Following a mode of thinking perhaps popularised after Moore’s Law, Bostrom (2002, 
2005), Kac (2007a; 2007b) and Kurzweil (1999) – to name a few – assume and anticipate 
this theoretical scenario of ever-faster scientific and technological progress by proposing 
a discussion of its possible threats. Although Kac contends that genetics is not inherently 
immoral, his artwork can be seen as an attempt to discuss the future scenarios advanced 
by the ever-faster scientific discoveries. Particularly worried about governmental and 
corporate control of future techniques, Kac argues that ‘art can, and should, contribute to 
the development of alternative views of the world that resist dominant ideologies’ 
(2007b, p. 164). Kac’s artistic and academic work, then, wishes to propose genetics as a 
‘critically aware new art medium’ against the perceived threats of an impending 
‘biotechnology revolution’ (2007b, p. 180). This cautionary reaction to faster 
development, again, is mirrored by transhumanists. Bostrom’s conceptualisation of 
‘existential risks’ (2002), for example, is another case where theoretical output, despite 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
10–11). In this conception, the normative behaviour of humans is to enhance and, consequently, from this 
same understanding of natural human behaviour, Hauskeller’s transhumanists argue for transhumanism as a 
natural human act.  
251 For some, such as Kurzweil, progress is not only human but also part of the natural, physical 
world. The wish for scientific development is then not only a desirable human trait but also a naturally 
occurring phenomenon: ‘once life takes hold on a planet, we can consider the emergence of technology as 
inevitable’ (1999, p. 24). 
252 ‘Progressivism’, in Ranisch’s (2014) terms. As we previously saw, this is a tendency present in 
almost all discourses attempting to justify AST or computer art as normal artistic or technological 
developments. 
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coming from people who advocate enhancements, is done in order to address possible 
future threats. Ultimately, both authors see their work as mandatory, as a duty they must 
undertake. For Kac art should address the whole set of problems that may be created by 
genetic engineering; the alternative would be no improvements in our condition at all or, 
yet, a catastrophic abuse of its ‘political and economic power’ (2007a, p. 2): 
 
The success of human genetic therapy suggests the benefits of altering the human 
genome to heal or to improve the living conditions of fellow humans. In this 
sense, the introduction of foreign genetic material in the human genome can be 
seen not only as welcome but as desirable […] Rather than embracing a blind 
rejection of the technology, which is undoubtedly already a part of the new 
bioscape, citizens of open societies must make an effort to study the multiple 
views on the subject […] Inasmuch as this seems a daunting task, drastic 
consequences may result from hype, sheer opposition, or indifference. (Kac, 
2000) 
 
Raising a similar argument, Bostrom, in his transhumanist declaration, affirms that: 
 
In planning for the future, it is mandatory to take into account the prospect of 
dramatic progress in technological capabilities. It would be tragic if the potential 
benefits failed to materialize because of technophobia and unnecessary 
prohibitions. On the other hand, it would also be tragic if intelligent life went 
extinct because of some disaster or war involving advanced technologies. (2005) 
 
For both, then, there are not one but two possible disasters: the misuse of ‘advanced 
technologies’ or, perhaps even worse, our ‘blind rejection’ of their possibilities. The very 
possibility, not the certainty, of enhancing oneself is what drives both calls for action. 
The pro-enhancement stance of transhumanists and AST artists, then, rests on the 
likelihood of a future advancement and not on something concrete and actual. These 
possible future scenarios, supported positively by the belief that science will ever 
improve and negatively by the possibility of its misapprehension, point to a question that 
these authors pre-emptively answer: Would you prefer the fantastic, limitless future of an 
enhanced humanity or the hypocritical negation of what humans can achieve? Their 
  312 
answer is not only positive, of course, but also proactive (Ranisch, 2014), since policy is 
constantly an objective253. 
Differently from the larger art world, which suspiciously and sometimes 
ambiguously represents these possibilities254, AST artists go to lengths when trying to 
justify their technophilic position. The conclusion reached by Kac, that improvement via 
genetic engineering is desirable, rests on two different and consequential assumptions. 
First, he sees genetic engineering as a natural consequence of human will and agency. 
Genetic engineering, then, is seen just as an extension of ancient breeding techniques that, 
according to his narrative, have always been part of human development. Second, if this 
interaction with other species also changes humans along the way, we cannot consider 
humans, or other species, as finished entities. Humans, subsequently, can also be affected 
by those same techniques developed towards other species. If we perceive deficiencies in 
humans, then, why not to improve them in the same way we did with animals? Kac’s 
human, like his transgenic rabbit, is far from a final product. As demonstrated by Hayles 
(1999) in her historical account of posthumanism, the very same intellectual culture 
arising from post-Second World War developments, pivotal events for both AST and 
transhumanism, supported a discourse (via cybernetics) that understands the self as 
information and hence bounded not by its body but by its system: 
 
Of all the implications that first-wave cybernetics conveyed, perhaps none was 
more disturbing and potentially revolutionary than the idea that the boundaries of 
the human subject are constructed rather than given. Conceptualizing control, 
communication, and information as an integrated system, cybernetics radically 
changed how boundaries were conceived […] Seen from the cybernetic 
                                                      
 
253 Kac, for example, in his Signs of Life (2007), describes its contributors as not seeing ‘their role as 
commentators chronicling or illustrating the burgeoning biotech culture. Rather, their work is engaged in 
shaping discourse and public policy, and in stimulating wide-ranging debate’ (2007a, p. 12). 
254 The chimerical sculptures of Australian artist Patricia Piccinini are another great ambiguous 
example. 
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perspective coalescing into awareness during and after World War II, however, 
cybernetic systems are constituted by flows of information. (Hayles, 1999, p. 84) 
 
The disposition of Kac’s argument, developed under the same rationale exposed 
by Hayles, rests on the assumption that both the rabbit and the human, as species, evolved 
under mutual influence and, consequently, that it is right to question the definition of 
‘purity’ by affirming not only that humans have always interfered in the development of 
other species but also that, naturally, as ‘humans domesticate rabbits, so do rabbits 
domesticate their humans’ (Kac, 2000). From Kac’s point of view, neither human nor 
rabbit are finished or immutable identities, and genetic engineering, therefore, does not 
alter this unfinished condition and, instead, may even be used to improve it. This 
conception of humans as unfinished and open entities, as expected, is again mirrored by 
Bostrom, who contends that, after Darwin, ‘it became increasingly plausible to view the 
current version of humanity not as the endpoint of evolution but rather as a possibly quite 
early phase’ (2005, p. 3). Although Hayles is more interested in the criticism of 
categories such as ‘humans’, the dissolution of boundaries between humans, animals, 
plants and even machines can be seen as a central pillar of enhancement advocates. 
Tellingly, both Bostrom and Kac evoke the work of physician and materialist philosopher 
Julien Offray de La Mettrie as a historical focal point in this narrative of human plasticity 
(Bostrom, 2005; Kac, 2007a, pp. 4–5). It was from him, perhaps, that the idea that 
‘technology could be used to improve the human organism’ (Bostrom, 2005, p. 3) 
initially developed. La Mettrie, then, can be seen as their tragic heroic figure whose 
intellectual bravery was both profound and profane, and who, because of ‘suggesting 
continuity among plants, human and nonhuman animals, as well as machines […] was 
persecuted’ (Kac, 2007a, p. 5). What is at stake here, in this supposedly heroic struggle 
against ignorance, is the intention to control our destiny, our bodies and our conception of 
humanity. The human body in this conception is just another object, like the machine so 
usually remembered, and a faulty one for that matter. As Kac succinctly declares: ‘new 
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technologies culturally mutate our perception of the human body from a naturally self-
regulated system to an artificially controlled and electronically transformed object’ (Kac, 
1998). 
The different and sometimes oppositional representations and appropriations of 
scientific subjects, such as genetics, reflect a division in the artistic world. This is a 
division between those who see and comment on science positively, the AST world, and 
those who appreciate it suspiciously and negatively, the broader artistic world. The 
reader, however, should not see this division as solid, dualistic or black and white. The 
positions of different artists, in a field as heterogeneous as the artistic one, cannot be 
simplified. The field seems more inclined towards a discrete, spectrum-like disposition in 
relation to its adoption, representation and support of scientific practices. Technophilia 
and technophobia should be seen as labels for the most extremes positions presented in 
both AST and contemporary art. The few examples provided in this case study describe 
individual positions that, nevertheless, reflect broader artistic attempts to discuss the 
importance and value of science. In the case of AST, given its smaller size in relation to 
the broader artistic field as well as the centrality of certain institutions such as Leonardo, 
it is easier to comprehend its technophilic tendencies. Its recent history, closely related to 
the wide debates of scientific progress over the past sixty years, also helps us to cement 
its more regular character compared to wider artistic debates. 
Given this division, however, it may seem quite surprising that AST has survived 
to this day. If artists using emerging technologies have not been fully integrated within 
the artistic world, how could they continue to produce ‘art’? If Paul Brown’s ‘kiss of 
death’ still persists, why are more and more institutions created in order to accommodate 
these practices? The reason for this, I argue, is not that AST-related practices have 
become more accepted or integrated into the arts. AST has not softened its technocratic 
discourse. Despite some exceptional and unusual examples, AST is still a fringe and 
specialised artistic field. Institutions such as Leonardo still cater to AST in the same way 
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they did when they were created. AST has not changed its position, neither has the 
broader art world; as far as the art world is concerned, the technological and scientific 
criticism intensified in the late 1960s still persists. 
What seems to have changed, however, is the propensity of people to accept this 
technophilic discourse. Exemplified by the similarity of AST and transhumanist 
discourses, and AST’s apparent rise in popularity, a new larger cultural trend might be 
emerging. The transformation of how certain social groups comprehend scientific and 
technological development, from suspicion to optimism, perhaps is best exemplified by 
Turner’s study on the ‘rise of digital utopianism’ (2006). By tracing the adoption of 
cybernetics and the technological optimism of the 1950s and 1960s among some groups 
within the counter-culture movement, which theoretically should have combated the 
visions of technocracy denounced by the artistic world that was part of the same counter-
movement, Turner highlights the apparently paradoxical view that computers, once seen 
as the explicit representation of technocracy, became over the years a symbol of a 
‘decentralized, egalitarian, harmonious, and free’ society (2006, p. 1). Although speaking 
of computational devices and their social symbolism specifically, and not genetics or 
science at large, Tuner reminds us that the work of those actors in effect ‘naturalized and 
legitimated the technologies, theories, and work patterns of the scientific research world 
as cultural rather than simply professional styles’ (2006, p. 255). By framing their 
existence in technoscientific terms, individuals seem to become more inclined to accept 
enhancements as well as transhuman and AST discourses as normal human 
developments. The new possibilities opened up by conceivable future genetic therapies, 
under this new technoscientific ontology, where humans and societies are seen as 
malleable, upgradable and informational objects just like computers, for some, seem to 
become the norm. 
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Last words 
 
Over the course of this thesis I have attempted to show the emergence of AST as an 
autonomous artistic world. This detachment from the art world, I argue, is the result of a 
paradoxical situation: while AST describes itself as art, and consequentially wishes to 
partake in the artistic canon and be recognised as a legitimate artistic expression, the 
wider art world’s negation, scepticism and sometimes outright artistic incomprehension, 
incompatibility and rejection have provided AST with the means, the will and the 
certainty over its own project to enable it to not only persist but also expand over time. Its 
message, repeated over and over again, in different guises but yet retaining the simple yet 
powerful call – that technoscientific developments are changing the world and we ought 
to do something about it – has resulted not only in growth but also in autonomy. This 
autonomy, complete with a whole new set of discourses that frame technoscientific 
developments in a particular positive light, by emphasising their social transformative 
aspects and/or by highlighting the necessity to engage with them in order to ‘humanise’ 
technology, was then followed by the creation of institutions that have supported and 
disseminated AST’s technophilic ideals. Instead of being a cohesive group, in a 
traditional art historical sense, the group that has emerged is a heterogeneous amalgam of 
agents that do not necessarily agree on a single course of action – that is, they each 
propose a different interpretation of how to engage and live with, or what are the dangers 
and the potentials of, an increasingly and rapidly changing world affected by 
technoscience. Common to them all, however, is their engagement in this debate. 
Participating directly, via discourse, or indirectly, via the adoption of these technologies 
developed after the Second World War, the artistic production is as varied as the 
diagnosis and prognosis of the current situation: they have been rational formalists 
attempting to transform art into a scientific practice (as in the early computer art wave); 
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they proposed an engagement with industry and technology in order to either humanise 
both (as in E.A.T.) or explore potential artistic practices (as in Reichardt’s Cybernetic 
Serendipity); they proposed to coerce the very same tools developed by the military–
industrial complex to fight against capitalism and the art market (as in Tendencije); they 
wanted to reshape artistic practice into a scientific model, aiming for a demystified art 
and a more humane science (Malina’s Leonardo); they believed in the capacity of 
technoscience to transform our bodies and minds into something new and potentially 
improved (as in Kac’s and Stelarc’s work); and so on. Despite the differences between 
the members of AST, they have all agreed that society was changing via technological 
development and that something ought to be done about it, either by dreaming of bright 
new futures or by discussing and engaging with science and technology right now. They 
have generally been technophiles, believers in the transformative aspects of 
technoscience as much as in their capacity to partake in this transformation. At its most 
extreme and utopian position, AST proposes, in essence, a new ontology where the 
boundaries between humans and the natural/material world are dissolved: the end of 
humanism and the rise of transhumanism. 
Yet, perhaps as important as recognising this unity in diversity, my research also 
points to the influence of non-artistic exogenous factors in the development of AST. 
Using material usually relegated to footnotes, this thesis reiterates the importance of 
exogenous factors in the formation of new artistic practices against more formalist or 
essentialist art histories. Consequentially, we have seen that AST’s continuous 
relationship with the larger cultural, material and political fields has been manifested in 
the importance of the underlining optimism intrinsically linked to technological and 
economic development after the Second World War – optimism that positioned 
technocratic principles such as modernisation theory and computing machines as well as 
scientific development as harbingers of a new prosperous era, potentially creating a 
positive environment that allowed the very idea of art being made by computers possible; 
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in the development of a collection of rational formalist theories, which could be described 
as supporting a scientific faith anchored in the moral righteousness of scientific methods 
and in particular empiricism and positivism, perhaps best exemplified by the use of 
cybernetics by artists and theorists, which in turn informed some of the earlier discourses 
arguing initially for computers and later for a broader understanding between art, science 
and technology; in AST’s symbiotic relationship with the military–industrial complex, a 
product of the Cold War and its national policies, which in fact indirectly supplied AST 
with its tools and directly financed some of the biggest exhibitions during its early period, 
as well as in its relationship with academia, which, in time, became a hub for producers in 
a time when the necessary equipment and knowledge were not only rare but also 
incredibly expensive to anyone outside industry; and, finally, in the fateful rise of the 
counter-culture movement and its technophobic turn, whereby the relationship between 
AST members and the military–industrial complex was called into question, resulting in 
AST being pictured by outsiders and even some internal members as a collaborator of the 
status quo and, consequently, in diametrical opposition to the general inclination of the 
artistic and cultural field as humanistic and anti-technocratic. 
With all those factors in mind, and on a final note, we might then ask: What does 
the future hold for AST? As we realise the importance of all the aforementioned factors, 
where is AST placed at the moment? What are the current proposals for the future of the 
field? Here, and again, the answer seems to lie in the tools and the larger cultural field 
and not in artistic debates only. Rather like jazz, for example, which ‘spread faster after 
the introduction of industrialized production and distribution of phonograph records’ 
(Becker, 2008, p. 322), so would AST grow with the advent of, firstly, the personal 
computer and, then, the Internet. Since many of its artworks already relied on computers 
or, at least, were conceptualist in the sense that they were as much as textual as pictorial, 
as in the case of Kac’s GFP Bunny, the Internet provided a low-cost platform for their 
dissemination. Likewise, the tools of its trade, mainly in the form of computers, 
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partnerships with scientists and/or technoscientific techniques, also became cheaper. 
Gone were the days when computers cost hundreds of thousands of pounds. Direct 
communication and the availability of information, via email, websites, search engines, 
forums etc., invariably made it easier for a previously restricted practice to become 
widely available. It is notorious that even programming languages became simpler, less 
abstract, away from machine language and closer to a natural human syntax than before. 
Anyone who has ever used something like Processing or Pure Data will know what a 
difference these tools meant – for someone without formal computing education – in 
learning, programming and creating. Not only were those tools free but they were also 
informed by, discussed and taught by a very engaged community: forums, projects and 
examples were there, for free, for anyone minimally interested in learning. Universities’ 
monopoly over the knowledge to work with the converging tools of the post-war era, the 
computational apparatus, consequentially diminished. Concerning this very decrease in 
price and the wider availability of technology and its know-how, a similar point could be 
raised in relation to hardware: no longer did industries hold the influence they once had. 
That is not to say that industry and academia are no longer central to AST. The examples 
provided in the introduction to this thesis dismiss this theory of complete independence 
from industry or academia. 
However, while institutions such as Leonardo are still central forums of (mainly 
academic) discussion, the field has become more and more heterogeneous and 
multifaceted, with Leonardo, for example, holding considerably less power than it once 
did. Such is the proliferation of publications, cultural centres and festivals that it is 
impossible to compile this development without leaving the majority of its components to 
one side. A quick, unscientific search on Google for the exact term ‘new media art 
journal’ returns 9720 links; ‘new media festival’ returns 88200 links; ‘new media art 
society’ 12100; ‘new media art group’ 7060; ‘new media art exhibition’ 90000; and so 
on. Here is where AST really shows its vitality, not as a single stylistic artistic practice 
  320 
but as a movement in the classical sociological meaning of the word. Although most of 
the links returned pertain to the same webpages, the sheer amount of websites makes this 
compilation a project for a data-mining technical paper. Ultimately, one thing can be said: 
with the growing number of competitors, traditional spaces invariably have lost some of 
their lustre. Note that I say ‘some’ and not all. That is because Leonardo and other 
traditional institutions such as Ars Electronica, MIT Media Lab, SIGGRAPH, 
Transmediale and ZKM still function as nodes in a huge network that can be thought of 
as the active, living world of AST. 
In the midst of this newfound heterogeneity, something else also happened to 
AST: not only did it continue to develop its own ideas but it also started to interact with 
new disciplines that emerged as a consequence of computing technology’s explosion. 
Although not necessarily dominant in artistic discourses, nor central to AST today, these 
new disciplines, such as software studies, digital art history, digital humanities, data 
visualisation and information studies, are now also discussed within AST circles because 
of their shared interest in information technology. These most recent developments, 
although not discussed in this thesis, point to a vigorous field that, similarly to the 
technology itself, is developing quickly over time. AST, in this case, demonstrates an 
open mindedness that should be seen in conjunction with its ability to promote and 
celebrate the new. Here AST is, in fact, striving to adapt itself to newer discourses that, 
similarly to its own original position, are engaged with our newest machines. 
This act of appropriation, of translation, should not, despite its apparent 
omnidirectional movement, be thought of as an exclusive characteristic of contemporary 
AST. Since AST in fact predates most of these new emerging disciplines, we should not 
be surprised that some of its early ideas have themselves been rethought by these new 
disciplines. That people discuss, then, computational culture today, as in generative or 
computer art back then, should come as no surprise. In this context, neither should we be 
surprised that artists today talk about computational art instead of simply computer art. 
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As AST has moved forward, alongside its newfound partners and cousins, it has also 
adopted the terminology and the new emphases of its time. Whereas, for example, as we 
previously saw, Bense would emphasise the generative aspects of algorithms, as in early 
computer art, the focus now seems to be directed towards the capacity of computers to 
generate images via data inherently outside the machine. This data or information 
visualisation, to use the current terms, instead of emphasising the potential of random 
algorithmic processes, highlights the chaotic aspects of reality that, in turn, can be 
exploited by programmers and artists interested in the use of vast amounts of data 
recently produced by, for example, social media or search engines. 
If AST’s variety is a direct consequence of technological developments, both 
facilitating and proliferating its techniques while widening its scope, how can we make 
sense of it all? Returning to the question presented in the first chapter, regarding the 
impossibility of a stylistic explanation for the production of this huge output, what could 
minimally and coherently unite this new contemporary wave of production? Here, and 
again, the tools and the cultural context of AST are pivotal and show us the path towards 
a holistic understanding of the contemporary features of AST. With its historical genesis 
in mind, we should then focus on the development of a potential new kind of 
technophilia, away from the scientism of earlier periods and towards the utopian 
constructions of free, decentralised, non-hierarchical societies discussed by Turner (2006) 
and Barbrook (2007). Such a new kind of technophilia is also well exemplified by the 
development of the free software movement and by the entrepreneurial Californian ethic 
that informs many of the tools and discourses of AST’s post-Internet generation. It is also 
in evidence in the transhumanistic dreams of an enhanced human, seen in the mystical 
discourses of Ascott and in the technological determinism of Stelarc, which feed into a 
whole ecology of DIY body improvements pertaining to the trendy label of ‘body 
hacking’ and the increasing use of cognitive enhancers by members of academia and 
industry. 
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A future research project intended to explain the totality of AST and its troubling 
relationship with the art world today should not, then, preoccupy itself with defining AST 
within a philosophical theory that argues for certain particularities and qualities of its 
artistic production. This, again, would result only in a partial explanation, an artistic 
discourse that accounts for a section of AST and not its totality, and in arguments for 
certain kinds of art and against others not perceived as desirable. The reader should be 
aware that, although reflecting on the nature of AST is a valid preoccupation, in fact a 
critical one from the point of view of AST’s own criticism, this thesis has not talked 
about AST as a whole, about its underlying ideologies and its position within our 
contemporary culture. These partial explanations can only discuss small fragments of 
what has become a behemoth. This thesis obviously lacks such a discerning, critical 
intention. To define AST as an appropriate, worthy or good artistic practice has never 
been my intention. The benefit of this thesis lies in its explanatory and not its 
discriminatory potential. 
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Figure 4: Sequences of Azul e roxo em primeiro movimento (Abraham Palatnik, 1951), 
wood, metal, synthetic fabric, light bulbs and motor 
 
 
Figure 5: Sequences of Aparelho Cinecromático (Abraham Palatnik, 1954), wood, metal, 
synthetic fabric, light bulbs and motor 
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Figure 6: Objeto Cinético (Abraham Palatnik, 1966), wood, metal, magnets, industrial 
paint and motor 
 
 
Figure 7: Ballerino with CYSP 1 (Nicolas Schöffer, 1951), photoelectric cells, 
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Figure 9: Reprint of Scientific American cover depicting Texture and Visual Perception 
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Figure 10: Pages from Human or Machine: A Subjective Comparison of Piet Mondrian's 
‘Composition with Lines’ (1917) and a Computer-Generated Picture (Michael Noll, 




















approach was used to insure that the effect of the picture was reasonably 
similar to Mondrian’s “Composition With Lines.”
Fig. 3 “Computer Composition With Lines” (1964) by the author in associa 
tion with an IBM 7094 digital computer and a General, Dynamics SC-4020 micro 
film plotter. ( © A .  Michael Noll 1965).
Human or Machine
After the computer had produced its version of the Mondrian 
painting, two pictures similar in composition, but one painted by a 
human and the other generated by a machine, were available. Sub 
jective tests were then administered in which the Ss were shown 
reproductions of both pictures and indicated their preferences and also 
which picture they thought was produced by the machine. The remainder 
of this paper describes these subjective tests and their results.
METHOD
Procedure
The photographic print of the computer-produced microfilm and 
the photograph of Mondrian’s painting had clues to their identity 
since the quality of the two photographs was somewhat different.
2 NOLL
“Computer Composition With Lines”
Many pictures can be thought of as consisting of series of con 
nected and disconnected line segments. Since two points determine 
a line, such pictures can be described numerically by the cartesian 
coordinates of the end points of the lines. Thus, a picture can be 
uniquely transformed into numerical data which are then inversely trans 
formable back into the original picture.
Fig. 1 “Composition With Lines” (1917) by Piet Mondrian. (Reproduced with 
permission of Rijkmuseum Kroller-M idler, Otterlo, The Netherlands, ©  Rijkmuseum 
Kroller-Miiller.)
Digital computers perform arithmetic operations with numerical 
data under the control of a set of instructions called a program. If this 
numerical data were the coordinates of end points of lines, then the 
computer could be programmed to numerically specify a picture. This 
numerical data could then be used to position and move the beam 
of a cathode ray tube to trace out the desired picture. In this manner, 
and as depicted in Fig. 2, an IBM 7094 digital computer has been 
programmed to generate pictures using a General Dynamics SC-4020 
Microfilm Plotter. The picture drawn on the face of the cathode ray 
tube is photographed by a 35 mm camera which is also under the control 
of the microfilm plotter.


















































Figure 13: Cybernetic Serendipity Poster (Franciszka Themerson, 1968) 
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Figure 15: Grass Field (Alex Hay, 1968), performance realised at 9 Evenings: Theatre 
and Engineering 
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Figure 16: Open Score (Robert Rauschenberg, 1968), performance realised at 9 Evenings: 
Theatre and Engineering 
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Figure 27: Nr. 3, Progression II (Rudolf Kämmer, 1961), wood, metal balls and paint 
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Figure 28: Vertical-Horizontal Number Three (Michael Noll, 1965), computer-generated 




Figure 29: Gausian Quadratic (Michael Noll, 1965), computer-generated drawing, photo 
print from microfilm 
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Figure 31a: Landscape (Charles Csuri, 1968), computer-generated drawing, ink, paper 
 
 



























Figure 32: Achsenparalleler Polygonenzug Nr. 14 (Frieder Nake, 1965), computer-


























Figure 33: Achsenparalleler Polygonenzug Nr. 2 (Frieder Nake, 1965), computer-




Figure 34: Hommage a Paul Klee (Frieder Nake, 1965), computer-generated drawing, 
ink, paper 
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Figure 35: Cerno-bílá struktura (Zdenek Skyora, 1968), computer-generated design, oil 
on canvas 
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Figure 36: POEM 1143 and POEM 4432 FOR SPASMO (Alan Sutcliffe, 1969), 
computer-generated poem, print, ink, paper 
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Figure 37: DIN. GF100 (Vladimir Bonacic, 1969), computer-controlled light objects, 
metal construction, electronics, lamps, colored transparency film, plexiglass 
 
 
Figure 38: Untitled (Georg Nees, 1965–1968), computer-generated drawing, ink on paper 
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Figure 40: Design Study for Five Screens with Computer (Metzger and Rowe, 1969), 
computer-generated graphics, print 
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Figure 41: Model for Five Screens with Computer (Gustav Metzger, 1963–1969), steel 
 
 
Figure 42: Dreidimensionale Struktur XYZ (Jorrit Tornquist, 1967), plastic, wood, glass 
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Figure 43: Eye II ‘One picture is worth a thousand words’ (Manfred Schroeder, 1968), 
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Figure 45: PAGE 2 (Computer Arts Society Schroeder, 1969) 
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Figure 47: Cover of PAGE 5 (Computer Arts Society Schroeder, 1969) 
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Figure 48: Cover of PAGE 18 (Computer Arts Society Schroeder, 1971) 
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Figure 50: Details of Random War (Charles Csuri, 1967), recreated in 2006, Lightjet with 
lamination 
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Figure 53: Automata (Charles Csuri, 1965), paint and paper 
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Figure 54: A mulher que não é B.B. (Waldemar Cordeiro, 1971), computer-processed 
photograph and print 
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Figure 55: Example of Cubic Limit Series (Manfred Mohr, 1973–1978), computer-
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Figure 57: Zygotic Acceleration, Biogenetic, De-sublimated Libidinal Model (Jake and 
Dinos Chapman, 1995), fibreglass 
 
 
Figure 58: The Chapman Family Collection (Jake and Dinos Chapman, 2002), wood and 
paint 
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Figure 60: GFP Bunny (Eduardo Kac, 2000), genetically modified animal 
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Figure 61: Rabbit in Rio (Eduardo Kac, 2004), public intervention and print 
 
 
Figure 62: Free Alba! NY Times (Eduardo Kac, 2001–2002), colour photographs mounted 
on aluminium with plexiglass 
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Figure 64: Paris Intervention (Eduardo Kac, 2001), public intervention and print 
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Figure 65: Opération Opéra (Orlan, 1991), performance and plastic surgery 
 
 
Figure 66: Third Hand (Stelarc, 1980–1998), performance with prosthetics 
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Figure 67: Ear on Arm Hand (Stelarc, ongoing), body modification with prosthetic and 
artificially grown tissue 
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